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Abstract
This study is unique in providing an in-depth analysis o f  the process o f  learning when 
linked to an epistemological authority. Applying this to  the Christian tradition, and in 
particular its faith authorities as identified in its textual sources and ecclesiastical 
representatives, the thesis demonstrates how  these affect a) the processes o f  learning 
as identified by Jarvis in his developing m odel (1987, 1995, 2001); b) the process o f  
internalisation as understood through the construction o f  personal biographies and 
selves, and through the act o f  reflection; and c) the form/content relationship as 
approached through the concept o f  learning styles and with reference to Belenky et 
aPs Women’s Ways of Knowing (1986). The potential for the ideological and 
authoritative dimensions o f  Christian faith to affect learning adversely is something 
already identified by Hull (1991 [1985]). The study therefore builds on this to 
demonstrate not only how  Christians don't learn, but how  they do.
In  response to a research question which hypothesised that the faith o f  adult Christians 
influenced the way they learnt, the inductive analysis o f  twenty-one semi-structured 
interviews resulted in the compilation o f  four distinct ‘ways o f  believing’, each o f 
which reveals learning characteristics which the thesis argues are specific to  their faith 
context, confirming hence the hypothesis. A n original contribution to  knowledge is 
therefore made in two areas: the field o f  adult learning in furthering understandings o f  
experiential learning and associated processes, and that o f  Adult Christian Education 
in providing a unique analysis o f  Christian learning. In  the context o f  the latter, its 
results challenge other studies into the ‘form ’ o f  faith, notably Fow ler’s Stages of 
Faith (1981), as well as theories o f  theological reflection. In  that o f  the former, 
student-centred theories o f  learning able to  do justice to  the process o f  internalisation 
are called for. Subsequent areas o f  research are therefore identified.
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faith outcomes 
Prologue
Introduction
This is a study o f  Christian learning. It did not set out with that goal. Rather, it had 
anticipated conducting a study o f  adult learning patterns amongst Christians, 
separating people and their personal faith commitment from the ‘content’ o f  Christian 
faith in order to investigate the impact the latter might have on their learning. The 
inextricable role o f  people’s Christian commitment quickly became apparent, 
however, and the existence o f  a necessary relationship between individuals and the 
content o f  their learning was reinforced by the theories o f  learning upon which the 
investigation was based. So a tw o-stranded study emerged, considering Christian 
learning from and within a context o f  adult education. The question o f  Christian 
authority lies at its heart and its prime focus is how  this authority impacts the learning 
process. It assumes a threefold relationship betw een Christians and their faith 
authorities: a) a necessary relationship, since one way o f  conceiving Christian identity 
is through people’s engagement with and commitment to  an overall Christian belief 
system and its faith-content; b) an authoritative relationship, since the Christian faith 
itself is based on  a range o f  sources which carry both intrinsic and attributed 
authority; and c) an influential relationship, since these authorities have the potential 
to affect the learning patterns o f  those who adhere to them.
The original contribution to knowledge made by the project lies precisely in its 
demonstration o f  an interaction betw een Christian faith authorities and adult learning 
processes. This is recognisable in a  variety o f  ways, and the empirical data analysed 
and outlined in the second section o f  the thesis specifies the threefold relationship 
(above) through the identification; a) o f  four ‘ways o f  believing’ presented as a 
typology o f  learning; b) o f  four different configurations o f  the fundamental
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experiential components o f  Christian learning; c) o f  a range o f  different learning 
procedures which the thesis views as specific to  the context o f  Christian education; 
and d) o f  different forms o f  reflection which affect the grow th and development o f  the 
self. These are its ultimate conclusions in response to a research question which asked 
whether people’s faith influenced the way that they learnt, and the reverse.
The project took the form  o f  a journey, however, already implied by the slight change 
o f  course acknowledged above. The significant aspects o f  that journey are now 
outlined, constituting firstly the background to the research and the formulation o f  the 
research question; secondly the overall approach taken; thirdly, some o f  the 
considerations and caveats that arose en cours de route and which should be hom e in 
mind as the thesis progresses; fourthly, the scope and context o f  the study; and lastly, 
the concepts and areas o f  scholarship in adult learning which underpin its theoiy.
I. Background and research question
William Perry, in 1970, brought out a book entitled Forms of Ethical and Intellectual 
Development in the College Years. His basic quest had been simple. Observation o f  
his H arvard students suggested that they responded to what Perry understood as ‘the 
relativism which perm eates the intellectual and social atmosphere o f  a pluralistic 
university’ in different ways. He comments:
A  few seemed to  find the notion o f  multiple frames o f  reference wholly 
unintelligible. Others responded w ith violent shock to  their confrontation in 
dormitory bull sessions, or in their academic work, or both. Others 
experienced a joyful sense o f  liberation. There were also students, apparently 
increasing in number in the years following W orld W ar II, who seemed to 
come to college already habituated to a notion o f  m an’s knowledge as relative 
and who seemed to be in full exploration o f  the modes o f  thinking and o f 
valuing consequent on this outlook. (Perry, 1970:4)
Intrigued by this variety, Perry prepared a research project that aimed to  ‘illustrate the 
variety in students’ response to the impact o f  intellectual and moral relativism’ 
(1970:7). Only as time went on did he begin to  associate his findings with a 
developmental path; his original assum ption had linked these responses with
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personality factors, and as a result he had turned to Adorno et al. ’s (1950) The 
Authoritarian Personality to  help explain why some students displayed a ‘strong 
preference for dualistic, right-wrong thinking’ and others ‘an affinity for more 
qualified, relativistic, and contingent thinking’. One o f  the principal features o f  his 
enquiry was a conceptual link that connected dualistic thinking with authority. Those 
in authority in an educational setting, be that informally in the home or formally at 
H igh School, were perceived to know  right from  wrong and to be responsible for 
communicating that. Right and wrong were inextricably linked with good and bad 
(hence his emphasis on ethical development) and it was only when major authorities 
were seen to  be challenged or even be in error that a shift from this dualistic way o f  
thinking to  a relativistic epistemology occurred. Perry’s project shifted gear with his 
realisation that the transition was probably indicative o f  a stage o f  cognitive 
development, and after a  lengthy investigation he detailed nine stages, or ‘positions’ 
in his book. These are summarised in a general Chart o f  Development on the inside 
back cover, which shows a transition from ‘simple dualism’ to ‘complex dualism’, 
through to ‘relativism’ and finally to ‘commitment in relativism’. Each is 
characterised by people’s relationship to authority, which in the early stages he m ite s  
w ith a  capital ‘A ’, indicating thus a  tendency tow ards absoluteness. M id-way through 
the stages he identifies a transition from relating to  Authority to  perceiving a variety 
o f  co-existing authorities. Part o f  his focus was also how individuals related to other 
people and whether they perceived the world in ‘us and them ’ terms, or in a  more 
general and inclusive way.
I was introduced to Perry’s w ork through another seminal study which had based 
itself on  Perry. Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger and Tarule had, in their volume 
Women’s Ways of Knowing (1986), taken these fundamental premises and explored 
them  and related issues in a unique study amongst women, offsetting Perry’s male 
bias and extending the param eters well beyond formal schooling and a High School 
environment. This w ork had been influential in my M aster’s degree research, which 
had investigated the relationship betw een learning styles and gender amongst 
theological students. I had taken their penultimate stage o f  Procedural knowers, 
consisting o f  Connected and Separate knowers, as paralleling many characteristics o f  
other, m ore deliberate and overt studies into learning styles. The connection between
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learning styles and authority was thus made, and it was only a small step from there to 
form  the hypothesis and research question upon which this thesis is based.
A  number o f  implications and repercussions were identifiable within Perry’s research. 
One o f  the m ost notable was a chicken-and-egg situation that appeared to represent 
the relationship between learners and external authorities. According to Perry, the 
greater the degree o f  authority perceived (or exerted?), the lower the developmental 
stage. Conversely, the more authority was perceived in relativistic terms, the higher 
the developmental stage. This begged an immediate question o f  which came first:
W as authority perceived, or exerted? I f  the former, what accounted for this and could 
it truly be considered representative o f  an aspect o f  human development? I f  the latter, 
then it was conceivable that authorities, or Authority, were/was responsible for 
hindering people’s grow th and development. In  Belenky et a l ’s work, this was far 
m ore apparent and touched one o f  the m ost profound aspects o f  people’s beings: the 
self. As part o f  the exploratory w ork for the research I published an article which 
engaged with this dimension o f  learning, applying it particularly to theological 
distance education. The paper (Le Cornu, 2001) argued that both theology as a 
discipline and distance education as a medium o f  instruction carried an unusual 
authority which could, if  care was not taken, be self-defeating. The play on words was 
deliberate: rather than encourage personal grow th through learning, either o f  these 
two authorities— and worse, the two combined— had the potential to  hinder it.
So the transfer was made from  Perry’s live, personal authorities in the form  o f  
parents, teachers, professionals... all o f  w hom  conveyed notions o f  right and wrong, 
good and bad, tru th  and falsity to  those in their care, to other, inanimate authorities, 
and more specifically and relevantly, to Christianity, its leaders and its faith-content. 
Quite clearly, here was an identifiable group made up o f  both types o f  authority, 
animate (clergy, Pope, other church leaders) and inanimate (bible, Christian doctrine), 
which claimed for itself the ability and right to decide in these same matters. Given 
my ow n professional w ork context o f  theological education, the implications were 
huge and the questions tantalising. Could it be that our educational endeavours were 
in some way blighted before they even got going? Did the nature o f  Christian faith-
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content have this, or some other effect on those studying it? I f  so, how  did it manifest 
itself? I f  not, what was the faith-content/leam ing relationship?
Research hypothesis and question were thus formed. As hypothesis, the project 
conjectured that the authoritative nature o f  Christian faith-content did have an effect 
on those studying it. The research question was therefore posed as:
Does the faith of adult Christians influence the way they learn? If so, how?
Largely in recognition o f  the chicken-and-egg dimension o f  Perry’s work, a 
subsidiary question was also allowed, although this was to prove less fruitful and less 
easy to explore.
Does the way adult Christians learn influence their faith? If so, how?
At the time, the pertinent dimensions o f  the question were perceived to be the 
question o f  authority and the role it played in the learning/educational process, and the 
way in which people processed information as exemplified particularly in Belenky et 
aV s ‘perspectives’. I reasoned that people’s learning styles might well be affected or 
influenced simply by dint o f  the authoritative nature o f  the faith-content they were 
engaging with and/or by the people communicating it. Despite embarking on a 
lengthy subsequent journey o f  exploration, that hypothesis remained at the core o f  the 
research, and the results presented at the end o f  the thesis in part address it.
11. Approach to the research
One o f  the key concepts within the question, and a feature which had also functioned 
as the springboard for enquiry was the dichotomy between the inner and the outer. 
P erry’s authorities had all been external, and it was the transfer from an external 
Authority to an internal authority which attracted my attention. Belenky et al. had also 
emphasised this dialectic in people’s epistemological make-up, expressing it through 
the question of:
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W hat factors control goal-setting, pacing, decision making, and evaluation?
W ho and what is experienced as validating/nonvalidating? (1996 [1986]:238) 
The relationship between the inner and the outer became the main focus o f  the 
research. This in turn provided a second fil conducteur: the process o f  internalisation 
as understood as a  means o f  hum an grow th and development. The stage was thus set 
for a rough outline o f  exploration. Within the context o f  a study o f  adult learning, a 
theoretical framework o f  the processes o f  learning needed to be established. The 
salient characteristics o f  Christian authorities and faith-content needed to  be 
ascertained in order not only to  establish the validity o f  the hypothesis but also, more 
precisely, the nature o f  the authority and its potential for impact in interaction with 
learning theories. The process o f  internalisation needed to be contextualised within a 
similar educational fram ework and concepts embedded within in that were susceptible 
to influence identified. This provided the structure for the first five chapters o f  the 
thesis, which look in turn at:
1. The study o f  learning
2. The authoritative influence o f  faith on learning
3. Internalisation, and the construction o f  the person
4. Reflection, and theological reflection
5. People’s ways o f  believing: learning styles, form and content
The content o f  these chapters and the rationale lying behind them  is outlined in 
section IV o f  this Prologue. The ensuing empirical data collection was based primarily 
on Belenky et al.’s inner/outer dichotomy and its analysis refers to  the aspects o f  
learning previously identified as pertinent. Chapters Eight and Nine identify and 
comment on specific ways in which Christian faith-content influenced the learning o f  
the interviewees; Chapter Ten looks back over the project as a whole, evaluating its 
quality and assessing its significance within three specific scholarly contexts. 
Recommendations for further research are made at the same time.
As the project progressed, however, a number o f  questions and difficulties arose that 
demanded attention. These are specified in the next section.
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III. Considerations and caveats 
111.1 Authority and learning
Although the link between authority and learning was a relatively new concept to  me 
at the time o f  conducting my M aster’s degree research, and was the catalyst for the 
research question as a whole, it quickly became clear that it was a well-known 
phenomenon in educational scholarship. The turning point in people’s epistemological 
grow th identified by Perry and interpreted by him as a shift from viewing knowledge 
in absolute to relative term s was m irrored in James Fow ler’s (1981) Stages of Faith, 
for example. Here, the transition from  Stage 3 to Stage 4 was in many ways the most 
significant o f  the various developmental progressions, and was one marked 
particularly by the same shift in perception. In  more specifically pedagogical terms, 
the dichotomies between didactic and heuristic and between deductive and inductive 
teaching and learning expressed similar tensions and wrestled with the authoritative 
dimension o f  education. Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1996 [1970]) was 
an excellent portrayal o f  some o f  the issues involved. In each case, however, these 
continued to  revolve around people’s overall individual grow th and development and 
often focused on the teaching dimension without specifying precisely the implications 
for the learning process.
As the discussion on the notion o f  ‘influence’ in section III.3 indicates, the link 
betw een authority and influence was also more complex than had first been 
appreciated, and different ways o f  approaching the study o f  how  Christian faith 
‘influenced’ learning were eventually identified. Nonetheless, the authoritative 
dimension o f  Christian faith remained central to the enquiry, provoking questions 
about the definition o f ‘faith’.
111.2 Faith and faith-content
The background to  the research question had led to its articulation in term s o f  
people’s Christian faith per se. Som ewhat unnecessarily, as it turned out, a 
considerable amount o f  time and energy was spent immersed in literature concerned 
w ith the conceptual definition o f  faith, both  genetically and specifically Christian.
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This encompassed a range o f  approaches, including the highly abstract and 
philosophical and the more earthy understanding characteristic o f  those involved in 
Christian Education. Fowler became prominent once again, as did Wilfred Cantwell 
Smith (1979) whose study had also been significant in Fowler’s work. While the 
research eventually made a distinction betw een faith per se and faith-content and 
authorities, these two works in particular nevertheless proved their w orth in their 
largely epistemological emphasis (despite the fact that both sought to reduce this 
dimension and to develop a broader, m ore all-encompassing understanding). 
Epistemology was at the heart o f  the research question, however. Belenky et al 
described their overall study in general epistemological terms. M ore specifically, their 
inner/outer dichotomy asked highly epistemological questions, concerned with how 
people validate their knowledge and know  what they know. It was these connections 
which led to the final title o f  the thesis, ‘People’s ways o f  believing’, paralleling 
Belenky et a l ’s Women’s Ways of Knowing,
While an epistemological context eventually proved to be an appropriate framework 
within which to locate and interpret the significance o f  the final research results, it 
was also expedient to differentiate betw een faith as a  general concept and what the 
research came to term  Christian faith-content, although there is necessarily a  high 
degree o f  overlap. Faith-content, however, can be located external to  people, and 
while its internal dimension m ust also be recognised, for the purposes o f  an enquiry 
which looked extensively at the internalisation o f  an external authority, then it was the 
body o f  authoritative Christian teachings, as mediated also by the Christian Church 
and its representatives— in short, the Christian belief system—that provided the 
external dimension.
111.3 The notion of Influence’
One o f  the fundamental convictions lying behind the research question was that o f  the 
distinctiveness o f  the Christian belief system and faith-content, and its corresponding 
separation from  other ‘content’, however that might be described. (This forms part o f  
the discussion o f  Chapter Tw o.) Such a conviction, however, immediately affected the 
way in which the term  ‘influence’ functioned in the research question, since it became
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quickly apparent that if  this distinctiveness was a reality, then this in itself would 
intrinsically imply an autom atic influence. In  other words, linking a body o f  content 
with specific and particular characteristics that are peculiar to itself w ith people in the 
learning process was necessarily going to result in an ‘influence’ simply because the 
way learning would take place would be intricately linked to that content and to no 
other. This had a number o f  repercussions for the research. Firstly, it suggested that 
there was no need for a control group w hen conducting the empirical interviews. 
Interest was not in comparing one way o f  learning with another, but rather in the 
interaction betw een a definable body o f  content and learners. The very fact that 
Christian faith-content had an authoritative dimension set it apart, and that separation 
implied an influence on its ow n grounds. Fundamentally, therefore, the research 
question was expressed in cyclical term s since it already had the answer ‘yes’ 
embedded within it. As a result o f  this, secondly, the focus o f  the study broadened to 
become one o f  the way Christians learnt tout court. Because the influence was 
implicitly present, then all that was required o f  the investigation was that it would 
identify the learning characteristics o f  Christians as they engaged with Christian faith- 
content. At this point the research question was subtly modified and to  a  large degree 
simply asked ‘H ow  do adult Christians learn?’.
The concept o f  ‘influence’ was slippery throughout the course o f  the research. N ot 
only did this impact on m ethodological issues such as those identified, but it also 
begged questions such as those often associated with motivation. Is a  perceivable 
influence intrinsic or extrinsic, or simply attributed? D oes it m atter? Ostensibly it 
would appear to be important, since in a context which asks what impact an outside 
agent has on people’s behaviour, then the expectation is that the influence should be 
extrinsic. However, this is to  overlook the cyclical nature o f  people’s involvement 
w ith their environment and the fact that they are constantly ‘in communication’ or 
‘relationship’ with it. A wholly extrinsic influence is conceptually impossible and 
people have to play a role when relating to  external content. The w aters become 
muddy at this point, although fundamentally the argument returns to the point made 
previously: in general terms, the investigation became an exploration o f  the 
interaction betw een a body o f  content w ith specific characteristics, whether inherent, 
imputed, or both.
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These considerations impacted both the scope o f  the study and the approach taken. 
The latter was outlined previously. The section to follow engages w ith the former.
HI-4 Scope and context of study
III.4.1 Christian Education?
The alternative articulation o f  the research question immediately suggested that its 
natural scholarly context would be that o f  the study o f  Christian Education. This is a 
well-developed area o f  study in the United States. Its concerns and approaches are 
beginning to filter into the United Kingdom, but the discipline is yet to be established 
on a firm footing. In  both contexts, also, it has its roo ts in children’s education, 
although, largely because churches o f  all denominations in Great Britain have taken 
seriously the educational needs o f  their adult congregations— something often 
reflected in the appointment o f  adult education officers— the study o f  specifically 
adult Christian education is now  recognised in its own right, albeit largely outside a 
formal scholarly and academic context. One o f  the principal characteristics o f  both 
forms o f  Christian Education, however, is the focus on faith development. Adult 
education programmes are designed w ith that end in mind, and although within the 
discipline a distinction is made betw een formative and critical Christian Education 
(see Astley, 1994, 2000), the fundamental intention is that the educational pursuit 
should develop ‘Christian’ individuals. From  this concern, a  scholarly debate has 
arisen about the relationship betw een faith and learning, and a sophisticated body o f  
literature developed, together with specifically designated ‘Centres for Christian faith 
and learning’, that focus on the integration o f  the two.
It would have been possible, and a case could have been made for this particular 
project to place itself in this context. How ever, this would have been to  deviate from 
the actual interest embedded within the question, which asked not how  faith and 
learning might integrate tow ards a specified goal, but how they interacted and one 
affected the other. A  more appropriate context was that o f  adult education in general, 
‘secular’ term s, with faith-content introduced as a somewhat alien component. This
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approach would permit the identification o f  ways o f  learning that were actually 
characteristic o f  learners rather than intended or desirable characteristics. To my 
knowledge, this approach has never been taken before, and it is at this point that the 
research can claim originality. At the same time, it straddles the two specific 
disciplines o f  adult education and adult Christian education, and its results inform 
both constituencies.
111.4.2 Form vs content
It is possible nevertheless to  identify an area within the study o f  faith development 
which is o f  relevance to the project. Fow ler’s Stages of Faith has already been 
introduced as sharing a comm on epistemological dimension with Perry’s Forms of 
Ethical and Intellectual Development in the College Years. Perry opens his work 
stating that:
W e describe in this m onograph an evolution in students’ interpretation o f  their 
lives evident in their accounts o f  their experience during four years in a  liberal 
arts college. The evolution consists o f  a progression in certain forms in which 
the students construe their experience as they recount it in voluntary 
interviews at the end o f  each year. These “forms” characterize the structures 
which the students explicitly or implicitly impute to the world, especially 
those structures in which they construe the nature and origins o f  knowledge, o f  
value, and o f  responsibility. (1970:1)
The whole o f  his study focuses on these structures and forms, which he finally draws 
together in nine ‘positions’. He acknowledges the difficulty o f  the concept o f ‘form ’ 
together with that o f ‘structure’, but defends his approach on the grounds that this is 
the most appropriate way o f  analysing and understanding the progressive series o f  
ways in which people interact with their environment. Perry spoke in term s o f  people 
‘construing their experience’ which the hypothesis and research transferred 
conceptually to people ‘engaging w ith social know ledge’.
Fowler, o f  course, adopted the same approach in his study o f  faith. His ‘stages’ 
directly parallel Perry’s ‘form s’. In  a  faith context, however, the approach has drawn 
criticism, largely on account o f  the separation o f  form from content. Astley states:
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Fow ler’s theory is contentious in concentrating on the form, rather than the 
content of faith. This seems perverse to  many. M ost religious, and indeed, 
most non-religious, people are interested in what people believe and what they 
believe in. They are concerned, then, w ith the content o f  faith. Fowler, on the 
other hand, has as his focus o f  research the ways in which we have faith, the 
how o f  faith. He argues that this form  o f  faith can be viewed under a number 
o f  interrelated dimensions. These ... include such elements as the way we 
reason, the way we make m oral judgem ents, the way we rely on authorities for 
our faith, our view o f  symbols, and the way we hold our experience and 
beliefs together. (Astley, 2000:125; italics in original)
Fowler himself provides a discussion o f  the form /content relationship tow ards the end 
o f  his volume in which he defends his approach, claiming:
As a theologian I never lost sight o f  the crucial importance o f  the “contents” o f  
faith— the realities, values, pow ers and communities on and in which persons 
“rest their hearts.” (1981:273)
‘Content’ for him, however, was a vehicle which determined form. Content is not 
faith; rather, faith is a conglom eration o f  hum an characteristics shaped around 
content. Content is therefore important since it helps account for the shape— form— o f  
faith. It was this latter which Fowler focused on, compiling his six ‘stages’.
Fowler provides an (undefended) understanding o f ‘content’, stating:
To try to account for the interplay o f  structure and content in faith means to 
look m ore radically and inclusively at faith as a  particular person’s way o f  
constituting self, others and w orld in relation to the particular values, powers 
and stories o f  reality he or she takes as ultimate. (1981:271; italics in original) 
Values, powers, stories o f  reality ... a  case can (and implicitly is, in Chapter One) be 
made to  view these as dimensions o f  social knowledge constructed by people as a 
result o f  learning. These constitute aspects o f  the broader concept o f  a  general world­
view or belief system than the specific Christian faith-content that the thesis primarily 
focuses on. Nevertheless, the external/internal interaction is evident, and in many 
ways Fow ler’s thesis parallels the position o f  the thesis, since he emphasises the role 
that content has to  play in shaping fonn. He gives an example o f ‘conversion’, which 
he understands as a significant change in the contents o f  faith.
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Conversion is a significant recentering of one’s previous conscious or 
unconscious images of value and power, and the conscious adoption of a new 
set of master stories in the commitment to reshape one‘s life in a new 
community of interpretation and action. (1981:281-82; italics in original) 
Content therefore potentially ‘influences5 form.
The form/content relationship therefore became an additional dimension relating to 
the research question, and was particularly relevant to the thesis on account o f  
Fow ler’s study. Chapter Five situates the relationship within the context o f  a study o f  
learning styles and uses this to  dem onstrate the interaction between the two and the 
potential influence one has on the other.
111.4.3 Human growth and development
Despite rejecting Christian Education as a  specific context for the study, the focus on 
learning and the developing interest in internalisation indicated that the more general 
concept o f  human grow th and development was an appropriate contextual framework. 
This had a number o f  repercussions. Firstly, it suggested that theories o f  experiential 
learning, which claim to be amongst the few truly able to understand learning in 
holistic personal terms (Jarvis, Holford and Griffin, 1998), were adequate for the task 
o f  analysing a range o f  aspects relating to  the process o f  learning. Secondly, the tw o- 
dimensional research question was affirmed. People’s development is seen in terms o f  
grow th as they continually experience their environment. This is a  two-way process 
not only o f  internalisation but also o f  externalisation (Jarvis, 1992; see Chapter One). 
So people do not simply absorb and process, but they also relate to their external 
environment. There are simultaneous processes going on involving forms o f  
internalisation and forms o f  interaction w ith the external.
These considerations affected the structure and approach o f  the thesis, which, having 
explored the validity o f  the hypothesis that Christian faith-content has a particular 
authority, then looks at the way in which it has the potential to affect learning from 
three different perspectives: that o f  the theoretical understanding o f  the processes o f  
experiential learning; that o f  the process o f  internalisation; and that which the thesis
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term s ‘people’s relationship w ith know ledge’, which considers how  people relate to 
their external world using the concept o f  learning styles and the form/content 
interaction.
111.4.4 Social constructivism
The study was placed from  the outset within a social constructivist framework. This 
had underpinned Belenky et aVs work. It was also the referent used by many theorists 
o f  experiential learning. Broadly summarised, social constructivism (and its relation, 
social constructionism: see Burr, 1995 and Dougiamas, 1998) furthers the thinking o f  
Kant (1788) in acknowledging the role that people themselves play in constructing 
knowledge. Berger and Luckmann developed a sophisticated understanding o f  the 
social construction o f  knowledge, emphasising the role o f  language and the 
‘objectification’ o f  personal knowledge through linguistic externalisation. Language 
itself functions to provide societies with a  comm on bank o f  social knowledge. 
Dougiamas, with reference to V on Glaserfeld (1990), Vygotsky (1978) and others, 
identifies six ‘facets’ o f  Constructivism which he lists in order o f  developing 
complexity, especially as it relates to learners. The thesis does not engage with these, 
or indeed with Social Constructivism as a  ‘philosophy’ (Dougiamas, 1998). N or does 
it enter the associated debates o f  relativism versus absolutism, despite the fact that this 
w as an integral dimension o f  Perry’s study. Nonetheless, its basic tenets o f  people 
constructing their knowledge, and in particular constructing a bank o f  social 
knowledge which is linguistically articulated, provide an overall framework, and 
Chapter Two takes this as an underlying premise from which to analyse the salient 
characteristics o f  Christian faith-content.
111.4.5 Learning and non-learning
Although the research questions were expressed in positive terms, and their 
m odification focused veiy m uch on how  Christians do learn and not on how  they 
don’t, both the relationship with authority and one o f  the primary studies to which the 
project turned as an early indication o f  support for its hypothesis— John Hull’s What 
Prevents Christian Adults from Learning? (1991 [1985])— inclined the overall
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approach initially tow ards a consideration o f  ‘non-learning’ as opposed to  learning. 
The inverted commas are deliberate, since the thesis contests even the notion o f  true 
‘non-learning’, at least within a fram ework o f  experiential learning. W hen considering 
the impact o f  authority on learning, however, the implication is that this is likely to be 
negative or adverse, something very m uch at the heart o f  Hull’s own study. Yet 
influence doesn’t  necessarily need to be restrictive, nor authority an impediment. So a 
progression is evident through the first five chapters o f  the thesis, the opening 
chapters having a more overt focus on the negative side, moving to what the thesis 
suggests is an intermediate position in a study o f  reflection and theological reflection, 
to  a  positive influence in the identification o f  people’s ways o f  believing in Chapter 
Five. This again ensures that the question o f  how  Christian adults do learn is the final 
point o f  interest, while at the same time acknowledging the wide range o f  influences 
on learning that are present within a  Christian Education context.
IV. Scholarly concepts and structure of the thesis
The first task o f  the research was therefore to establish a theoretical fram ework for the 
study o f  learning. Theories o f  experiential learning provided a suitable base, for the 
reasons articulated previously. Jarvis’s 2001 model o f  the processes o f  learning is 
introduced as a developing attem pt to  systematise an understanding o f  the 
complexities involved. The model is considered in-depth, identifying various 
strengths, weaknesses and fundamental assumptions, and in so doing preparing the 
ground for the interpretation o f  the theoretical discussions and empirical data 
presented in later chapters. From  there, the thesis turns to determining the distinctive 
and authoritative nature o f  Christian faith-content more securely, turning to  a broader 
range o f  scholarship than simply Perry. Chapter Two argues for the distinctiveness o f  
Christian ‘social knowledge’ in the form  o f  an articulated belief system, discerning its 
peculiarly authoritative dimensions in its discreteness from other social knowledge, in 
both its propositional and its ideological nature, and in its authoritative claims for 
itself, primarily through the doctrine o f  revelation. These combine to  reinforce the 
underlying assumption behind the hypothesis: that the authoritative nature o f  
Christian faith has the potential to influence learning. The chapter includes a  survey o f  
Hull’s What Prevents Christian Adults from Learning? (1991 [1985]). Hull focuses
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predominantly on the ideological features o f  the Christian faith, and in certain ways 
the present study provides a  positive corollary to Hull’s negative: the reverse side o f  
the same coin.
Jarvis’s model and typology do not attem pt to address the process o f  internalisation, 
however, and Chapter Two identifies this as another area o f  learning susceptible to 
influence on account o f  the primarily external nature o f  Christian faith authorities. 
Learning and internalisation share com m on ground in a constructivist understanding 
o f  how  people grow and develop, and Chapter Three explores the relationship o f  the 
tw o within this context. Two fundamental dimensions are considered: that o f  
individual biographies (a concept developed by Jarvis, 1995, 2001, inter alia), and 
that o f  the self and its growth, in each case demonstrating ways in which Christian 
authorities may impact the process. Chapter Four continues the theme o f  
internalisation by focusing on the processes o f  reflection and theological reflection. 
Using the latter as a springboard to identify perceived ‘problems’ that Christians 
encounter when engaging w ith their faith-content, it then turns to non-theological 
reflection and proposes two faith-related factors which pertain strictly to  this 
dimension o f  learning.
The theoretical discussion which makes up the first half o f  the thesis finally turns to a 
concept which evolved through a study o f  people’s learning styles: that o f  people 
having a relationship with knowledge, and hence o f  a direct link betw een form  and 
content. This harks back to  Social Constructivism  in recognising the fact that 
individuals are necessarily involved with and include something o f  themselves to any 
and all types o f  knowledge. It is not possible to  think in terms o f  a to ta l separation 
between the two, therefore, as might be the case between people and absolute 
knowledge. Instead, they are in a relationship, and Chapter Five argues that one way 
o f  understanding this is through epistemology and the study o f  learning styles. The 
chapter proposes a modified understanding o f  the concept, nevertheless, and in so 
doing identifies a final way in which an external authority such as faith-content might 
affect learning.
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W ith the foundations laid, the rem ainder o f  the thesis outlines the empirical 
investigation, looking at its design and m ethodology and the means by which the data 
w ere analysed, before identifying three main ways in which faith-content can be seen 
to  have influenced the learning o f  the participants. The penultimate chapter draws the 
various threads together, highlights and discusses issues relating to the data 
interpretation, and considers the question o f  non-learning in the context o f  the 
research once again. Finally, the thesis concludes by standing back and evaluating the 
project as a  whole, identifying its strengths and weaknesses, its significance and 
original contribution to knowledge, and identifying areas for subsequent research.
V. Sum m ary
As is the nature o f  many research projects, this one took time to find its true path. 
Nevertheless, the research question was retained in its original thrust throughout, 
while a  number o f  ways o f  interpreting and exploring it were identified. These 
included an analysis o f  theories o f  experiential learning, an examination o f  how 
external social content was internalised, and a reconceptualisation o f  learning styles. 
The underlying hypothesis was that in a  Christian context, external faith-content and 
faith authorities would influence any or all o f  these aspects o f  learning. The opening 
chapters demonstrate this potential from  a theoretical perspective; the second half o f  
the thesis investigates this empirically.
Certain caveats need to be borne in mind. ‘Faith’ as originally articulated in the 
research question should be understood as ‘Christian faith authorities’ and/or 
‘Christian faith-content’, emphasising the external and authoritative dimension o f  this 
form  o f  social knowledge. The concept o f  influence was difficult as it proved to  be 
m ulti-stranded, incorporating a correlative dimension as well as having both  an 
intrinsic and an extrinsic side. As a result, the research could be situated in both an 
adult education and a Christian education context. While the conclusions inform both 
constituencies, they are perhaps m ost apposite for the latter since the approach 
eventually taken was one o f  a study o f  Christian learning from an adult education 
perspective. This is one way in which the research breaks new ground. Its  conclusions 
are presented in two stages. Firstly, the correlative influence resulted in the formation
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o f  a typology depicting four ‘ways o f  believing’ (following Belenky et aV s ‘ways o f  
know ing’); and secondly, these types brought to light other learning characteristics 
which the thesis argues are specific to  an intrinsic or extrinsic influence. Hence the 
overall title o f  the thesis: People’s ways of believing: learning processes and faith 
outcomes.
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Chapter One 
The study of learning
Introduction
The thesis opens by providing a study o f  theories o f  experiential learning. The 
Prologue established that this was an appropriate context for the focus o f  the research 
as a whole on account o f  its holistic nature and its ability to encompass most, if not all 
dimensions pertaining to individual hum an grow th and development, and by extension 
to  Christian growth and development. One o f  the implicit requirements o f  the research 
question was the securing o f  a  fram ework by which the processes o f  learning could be 
ascertained and explored, and this is the principal purpose o f  this chapter. It focuses 
around the w ork o f  Peter Jarvis (1995, 2001, inter alia) whose model and 
accompanying typology o f  learning are considered in depth. In response to  Jarvis’s 
implicit invitation to further his ‘w ork in progress’ a critique o f  his w ork is provided 
which pinpoints areas in need o f  further consideration as well as those which have 
stood the test o f  time. The chapter opens w ith an introduction and overview, 
presenting the m ost recent published and therefore publicly available version o f  his 
model. (As the write up o f  the thesis w as in its final weeks, Jarvis significantly 
modified this. However, as his revised version is not yet accessible through 
conventional published channels, the chapter focuses principally on the 2001 model.)
A variety o f  dimensions o f  experiential learning are then focused on, preparing the 
ground for the approach taken in subsequent chapters.
I. Theories of experiential learning
1.1 The concept of experience
Any theory o f  experiential learning needs to  establish a secure understanding o f  the 
concept o f ‘experience’. This, however, is one o f  the great challenges! Jarvis cites 
O akeshott’s (1933) comment that experience, ‘o f  all the words in the philosophic 
vocabulary, is the most difficult to m anage’ (1995:65). This does not deter him from
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exploring it, however! The essential ingredients are time, and people’s individual 
consciousness or awareness. So right from  the start o f  life, people can be seen to 
experience, albeit at a fairly basic level. Air on skin, tem perature, impressions o f  
movement and sp ace ... These are semi-continuous experiences with which all 
humans are familiar, and which are inescapable. As people grow older, they are also 
experiences that they pay little attention to  unless they register some form  o f  
abnormality such as extreme heat or cold. So experience and consciousness are 
inextricably linked, yet take different forms. W ith reference to Bergson’s notion o f  
duree (Lacey, 1989), Jarvis (1995) suggests that people operate with different levels 
o f  consciousness. M uch o f  the time, continuous, familiar or ‘expected’ experiences 
such as those cited above do not attract or demand focused attention, and 
consciousness is at a low level. W hen something happens that takes people by 
surprise and requires attention, then ‘time appears to stop, indeed time appeal's to be 
frozen. Herein lies experience with a  heightened consciousness’ (Jarvis, 1995:65).
That situation is never neutral or vacuous. People themselves contribute to it by 
bringing a variety o f  aspects o f  themselves to help interpret and manage the 
experience. Similarly, each situation has a context in which it occurs and which 
guides people’s response to it. Jarvis therefore offers the following definition o f  
experience:
Experience is a subjective awareness o f  a  present situation, the meaning o f
which is partially determined by past individual learning. (1995:67) 
Nevertheless, people differentiate betw een two principal forms o f  experience, the one 
being essentially sensory, the other m ediated through communication, be that written, 
spoken or gestured. The former, ‘prim ary’ experience is generally direct, the latter, 
‘secondary’ experience, indirect. How ever, secondary experience is always 
accompanied by primary. So children watching a video and ‘experiencing’ the world 
it portrays may also be aware o f  their sibling crying in another room, feel a  draught 
through the open window and enjoy the prickly sensation o f  the fizzy drink they are 
sipping. The two forms o f  experience lend weight to  the idea o f  different levels o f  
consciousness also. The video is absorbing the majority o f  their attention and their 
consciousness is heightened as a  result. Nevertheless, at a low level, they are also 
aware o f  the background situation around them.
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The study o f  experience requires a consideration o f  a whole raft o f  dimensions that 
includes the way in which people perceive, apprehend, interpret, sense, conclude and 
act. Philosophers talk o f  the ‘puzzle o f  experience’ (Valberg, 1992) and discuss, 
among other tilings, the object o f  experience, its content and reality. M uch o f  the topic 
is still open for discussion. However, for the purposes o f  the thesis, Jarvis’s definition 
provides a  working understanding o f  the concept and this underpins the various 
dimensions o f  theories o f  experiential learning to  which the following sections now 
turn.
1.2 Experiential learning
Jarvis, Holford and Griffin (1998:46), quoting Miller and Boud (1996:8-10), suggest 
that there are five underlying tenets o f  experiential learning.
® Experience is the foundation of, and stimulus for, learning.
« Learners actively construct their ow n experience.
® Learning is holistic.
® Learning is socially and culturally constructed.
® Learning is influenced by the socio-econom ic context within which it occurs.
It is the first o f  these which is the foundation stone; all the others flow as logical
corollaries as scholars attem pt to understand both the nature o f  experience and how  it 
interacts with people as learners. So Jarvis speaks o f  disjunctive as the sensation o f  
disorientation that people experience when ‘individuals’ biographies and their current 
experience are not in harm ony.’ This produces a situation ‘whereby they recommence 
their quest for meaning and understanding’ (Jarvis, 1995:13): they learn. He is 
consequently able to formulate a definition o f  experiential learning:
Learning is the process whereby hum an beings create and transform  
experiences into knowledge, skills, attitudes, beliefs, values, senses and 
emotions. (2001:10)
Experiential disjunctive is therefore intricately linked with meaning and 
understanding, which Jarvis suggests is intrinsically built into people’s biographies.
The holistic dimension o f  experiential learning is significant. The definition o f
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experiential learning (above) aims to encompass all existential dimensions o f  human 
existence. While it may be conceptually difficult to grasp how experience might be 
transform ed into such outcom es as emotions, it is nonetheless important that this 
occurs if  one o f  the basic premises o f  experiential learning theories is to hold fast: that 
experience, learning, and all dimensions o f  hum an growth and development are 
inextricably and necessarily linked. The links betw een theories o f  experiential 
learning and social constructivism  are also significant. People construct their own 
experience and therefore are originators and sources o f  knowledge. Objective 
knowledge which frequently appears ‘absolute’ is nonetheless a  phenomenon which is 
similarly socially constructed (see later).
Given the holistic nature o f  experiential learning, scholars focus on a range o f 
dimensions that contribute to the overall concept. For Jarvis, two are o f  particular 
significance: the cyclical nature o f  the process which he has developed (1987, 1995, 
2001) into a  model which attem pts to  depict the different components which are 
included, and the different types o f  learning that can occur, which he links to the 
process o f  reflection. The next two sections look at these in turn.
1.3 A cyclical process?
Having formulated a basis on which the concept o f  learning can be grounded, scholars 
have then gone on to explore the process o f  learning, which is generally understood as 
a  cyclical progression. Kolb (1984) cites three models o f  the experiential learning 
process, w ith reference to Lewin, Dewey and Piaget. Somewhat curiously, that which 
he indicates (1984:21) originates w ith Lewin seems generally to have been taken by 
subsequent scholars as K olb’s own. Kolb depicts it as a simple cycle, notably without 
specific starting point, incorporating four fundamental elements: concrete experience, 
observations and reflections, form ation o f  abstract concepts and generalizations, and 
testing implications o f  concepts in new  situations. All three models bear similarities, 
not only in their cyclical nature, but also in what is imderstood to  comprise the 
process o f  learning. Kolb indicates that ‘for Piaget, the dimensions o f  experience and 
concept, reflection, and action form  the basic continua for the development o f  adult 
thought’ (1984:23) and acknowledges that D ew ey’s model is ‘remarkably similar to
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the Lewinian model, although he makes m ore explicit the developmental nature o f 
learning implied in Le win’s conception o f  it as a feedback process by describing how 
learning transforms the impulses, feelings, and desires o f  concrete experience into 
higher-order purposeful action’ (1984:22). The Kolb/Lewinian model has formed the 
basis for new developments in studies o f  learning, focusing both on the process itself 
and on learning styles. So Honey and M umford developed four learning styles which 
they acknowledged originated from K olb’s work, while claiming that a fundamental 
difference is that, unlike Kolb, they refrained from  asking ‘direct questions about how 
people learn’, basing their proposals instead on ‘what managers and professional 
people do ’ (1992:4). Each o f  their four categories o f  Activists, Reflectors, Theorists 
and Pragmatists, ‘connects’ with a  stage on the continuous learning cycle. Similarly, 
Jarvis used the m odel as a discussion starter w ith over 400 people, as a result o f  which 
he developed a m uch m ore complex model o f  the overall process o f  learning from an 
experiential perspective. This has gone through a number o f  revisions, one o f  the most 
recent o f  which is presented in Figure 1.1.
To an extent the model attem pts the impossible, since the various components are 
necessarily generalised, and one could argue for ju st that reason that they become 
almost bland and meaningless. The mem orisation o f  factual information differs 
enormously from the mem orisation o f  a  physical skill, for example, and the nature o f  
the practice and evaluation involved in piano playing is quite different from  each 
employed in, say, the controlling o f  one’s emotions. The ‘how ’ is therefore a 
problematic concept for the model; the question already arises therefore whether some 
(or even all) o f  the term s require elucidation and explanation, and whether in the 
process, the model might be reconstructed. Jarvis shies away from  such a  task, almost 
certainly rightly, since his objective is precisely to  provide a m odel which 
encompasses all learning. Instead, he fills out the model by identifying three 
‘categories o f  response to experience’ which result in nine ‘types o f  learning/non­
learning’ that he presents as a  typology (2001), details o f  which are provided in the 
following section. This usefully acknowledges some o f  the difficulties involved when 
attempting to  provide a model o f  learning which encompasses the cognitive, affective 
and psychom otor domains.
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1.4 Reflection and learning
As mentioned above, the components o f  Jarvis’s model are extremely broad and the 
model itself demands filling out. An important contribution Jarvis goes on to  make to 
the study o f  learning is the provision o f  a  typology o f  learning which accompanies the 
model. Key to the entire process is the act o f  reflection, the degree to  which this 
occurs (or doesn’t), and the manner in which it takes place. He proposes three 
categories o f  response to  experience, all o f  which result in particular types o f  
learning/non-learning, as depicted in Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2: A typology of learning and non-learning (Jarvis, 2001:15)
Category of Response to Experience Type of Learning /  Non-learning
Non-learning
Presum ption 
N  on-consideration 
Rejection
Non-reflective learning
Preconscious learning 
Skills learning 
M emorization
Reflective learning
Contemplation 
Reflective skills learning 
Experimental learning
Each o f  the reflective forms o f  learning can have tw o possible outcomes,
conformity or change
Each o f  the types is then elucidated. Briefly summarised, these constitute:
Non-learning
Presumption
A typical response to  everyday experience when people enter familiar situations and 
encounter familial* experiences. ‘There is a  sense o f  harmony betw een the biography 
and the individual’s experience, so that there is no need to change anything— we 
know  precisely what to do ’ (2001:15).
Non-consideration
Tins takes place in two forms. Either individuals choose not to engage with a 
challenging situation at all, or they engage with it and choose to avoid or defer its 
consequences. The former involves some form  o f  mental deflection and/or perhaps 
physical removal; the latter is akin to putting something on the shelf.
Rejection
Rejection takes non-consideration a step further. People are unable to avoid an 
experience which would potentially result in learning, but they choose not to pursue
Chapter One 29
People’s Ways o f  Believing: learning processes and faith outcomes
that path. While non-consideration may often be an instinctive reaction, rejection is 
more deliberate and conscious. Jarvis suggests that ‘one o f  the most common reasons 
for this approach is because individuals hold fixed beliefs about ‘the tru th ’, they are 
sure they are right and so nobody can teach them  anything more. Rejection may 
actually serve to confirm them  in positions they already hold’ (2001:16).
Non-reflective learning
Preconscious learning
This is the type o f  learning that occurs without people being consciously aware o f  it or 
directing conscious attention to allowing it to happen. Often this learning remains in 
the subconscious, only emerging if  something specific brings it to the fore. It may also 
represent the type o f  learning that takes place w hen conscious attention is placed 
elsewhere. Jarvis is keen to distinguish, nevertheless, between preconscious and 
incidental learning on the grounds that ‘incidental learning might well be conscious 
but its occurrence is still inciden tal... while preconscious learning occurs at the edge 
o f  consciousness or at the periphery o f  vision’ (2001:17).
Skills learning
Jarvis suggests that skills learning ‘has to be restricted to the learning o f  simple, short 
procedures, such as those that somebody on an assembly line might be taught’ 
(2001:18) due to the fact that much other psychom otor learning demands reflection. 
The thesis is unable to  enter a  lengthy debate, and to a point accepts the contention 
that some skills learning might be non-reflective. A t the same time, the example given 
(an assembly line) indicates the complexity o f  the subject: the actual skills being 
taught and learnt may be mechanical and involve little or no thought but to  accustom  
oneself to the overall environment and its demands might require considerable 
reflection. It can also be queried whether anything performed for the first time can be 
truly non-reflective.
Memorization
This is a broad term  that includes ro te learning o f  information, the Teaming’ o f  a 
smell or taste, as well as the retention o f  ‘past successful acts, memories o f  which are 
stored away and form the basis o f  planning for future action’ (2001:18-19).
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Reflective learning
Contemplation
Contemplation involves pure thought. Jarvis distinguishes contemplative learning 
from  the process o f  thinking itself by suggesting that it is ‘focused’ thinking. He cites 
examples o f  the intellectual activity o f  a pure mathematician or the reasoning 
processes o f  the philosopher. Tt is the process o f  thinking about an experience and 
reaching a conclusion about it w ithout necessarily referring to the wider social reality’ 
(2001:19).
Reflective skills learning
This is the reflective version o f  non-reflective skills learning. Tt involves not only 
learning a skill but also learning the concepts that undergird the practice. This makes 
it possible to know why the skill should be performed in a certain way’ (2001:20). 
Experimental learning
Theory is tried out in practice, resulting in ‘a new form o f  knowledge that captures 
social reality’ (2001:20). Experimental learning represents most clearly the interactive 
cycle o f  internalisation and externalisation that takes place between individuals and 
their* social reality, and accounts for the fact that social knowledge is never static and 
unchanging.
Jarvis (1995) turns to M ezirow  (1977, 1981) in order to fill out his understanding o f  
the process o f  reflection, citing the latter’s seven proposed levels o f  reflection, but 
criticising him also on the grounds that M ezirow ’s approach to learning and reflection 
restricts learning to the cognitive domain. From  the comments made previously in this 
section, it is clear that this is a  disputed area o f  scholarship. On the one hand, it is 
difficult to envisage any learning taking place without some form o f  reflection 
(Jarvis’s distinction between different levels o f  consciousness and attention is useful 
at this point), but on the other, the suggestion clearly implies that if  the possibility o f  
reflection is removed, then so is the potential for learning. This raises significant 
questions with regard to  the mentally handicapped, or those in a  vegetative state, as it 
does about whether and how  animals leam. These considerations are outside the remit 
o f  present discussion. Similarly, lengthy arguments defending the position the thesis
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has adopted— that in fact all learning is accompanied by some degree/form  o f  
refection— are inappropriate. Suffice it to  indicate simply that the thesis links 
reflection with consciousness, and suggests that just as the concept o f  the 
subconscious is familiar and accepted, so there are potentially ways in which people 
‘sub-reflect’. The ice is thin at this point o f  the argument; m ore in-depth investigation 
is called for. The thesis nevertheless rejects the option o f  occasions w hen there is a 
complete separation between learning and reflection, hence associating learning to the 
cognitive domain working in partnership w ith both  affective and psychomotor 
domains when called for.
II. Analysis and d iscussion
11.1 A horizontal model
One o f  the significant features o f  Jarvis’s model which the thesis grapples w ith from 
tim e to  time throughout is its significant dependence on time. Jarvis states:
Life might be described as a passage through time, so time m ust be the starting 
point o f  any discussion o f  experience. Hum an existence is situated within time 
and emerges through it, and it has been argued elsewhere that learning is the 
process through which the human, as opposed to the biological, being grows 
and develops. (1995:65)
His m odel reflects a time-dependent approach, presenting learning in a  ‘horizontal’ 
manner w ith the various components interacting sequentially. This is specifically 
evident in the left to right movement o f  the model, which, while incorporating a 
‘dow nw ard’ dimension in its lower half (boxes 5 through 9), nevertheless sees 
individuals ‘entering’ a  learning situation (left), progressing through a number o f  
stages, and ‘exiting’ (right) either having learnt or not learnt. Jarvis him self recognises 
that the model is an ‘over-simplification o f  the complex processes through which we 
go every time that we learn’ (2001:13). One o f  the over-simplifications is emphasised 
through this horizontal depiction. Is learning truly as sequential as the m odel 
suggests? M ight not any number o f  the components he identifies be operational at any 
one time? Is it actually feasible to  isolate one, single, learning event? Are there 
genuinely only two possible outcom es, either o f  learning or o f  non-learning? One o f
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the difficulties encountered when engaging with the model is a slight inconsistency in 
terminology from one version to  another. So, for example, in the 2001 version the 
person emerges either ‘unchanged’ or ‘changed and more experienced’, whereas in 
1997 the former was described as emerging ‘reinforced but relatively unchanged’.
The difference might be slight, yet is almost certainly significant, especially in a 
discussion which relates experience to  time. Self-evidently, no two experiences can be 
genuinely identical: the m arch o f  time indicates that people and their biographies will 
have changed, and however great the similarities, the social situation in which they 
occur will also be different. To emerge literally ‘unchanged’ would seem  impossible, 
whereas ‘reinforced but relatively unchanged’ is a more representative portrayal o f  the 
result o f  some interaction w ith experience. There is, correctly, no implication in the 
m odel that people have to emerge. It is quite possible for them  to circulate around 
boxes 5 through 9 indefinitely. This, however, provokes the question o f  whether no 
learning is taking place at this time. Is it not possible to  conceive o f  each o f  these 
components as a learning outcom e in its ow n right, rather than as a  means to an end? 
Once again, the need for greater clarification o f  the terms, with reference to  the ‘how ’ 
as well as the ‘w hat’ would be beneficial.
A  second anomaly introduced by the horizontal, time-centred depiction o f  learning 
lies in Jarvis’s understanding that people’s biographies develop essentially through a 
process o f  internalisation and externalisation. He observes that ‘human beings are not 
passive recipients o f  their cultural heritage, they do not have it imprinted upon a 
tabula rasa type o f  mind, but they receive, process and externalize it’ (1995:7). Hence 
a cycle o f  internalisation and externalisation takes place which he depicts 
diagrammatically, reproduced in Figure 1.3. It is important to  note the fact that over 
time, both people and the objectified culture they construct through externalisation 
change. Neither is static, but rather dynamic, growing, developing and renewing itself 
moment by moment. This too is part o f  the process o f  learning.
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Figure 1.3: The processes of internalization and externalization (Jarvis, 
1992:25)
(T im e)
The notions o f  internalisation and externalisation suggest that there is also a ‘vertical’ 
dimension to  learning, one that focuses on the change that takes place in people from 
a slightly different perspective. Jarvis relates the former in particular to the process o f  
reflection: internalisation occurs through the making o f  meaning. Later chapters argue 
that this is a transform ation o f  a different order: rather than the transform ation o f 
experience into personal knowledge, it is the transformation o f  personal knowledge 
into knowing. This is a difficult aspect to capture in a  model such as Jarvis has 
developed, but it does suggest a) that were it possible, the model should be at least 
two-dimensional; and b) box 8, reflection/thought, might benefit from being expanded 
and or re-positioned.
The time-bound nature o f  Jarvis’s model and its consequent horizontal approach is a 
feature which the thesis returns to , proposing that, ultimately (and ironically), it 
contrasts against learner-centred models, despite the fact that no developed version o f 
the latter appeal's yet to exist. I t has an immediate impact on the study o f  the processes 
o f  internalisation, and ultimately the thesis has to set a  thorough discussion to one 
side, recommending this as an area meriting further development and research.
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11.2 The components of learning
Box 8, reflection/thought, is a second box in which Jarvis uses different terminology 
from  one version to another, however. This had previously been labelled ‘reasoning 
and reflecting’ (1997, box 7). These various anomalies reveal something o f  the 
difficulty Jarvis faced when trying to  identify the different components within the 
learning process. Other scholars have similarly engaged with the question, most 
notably M arton and Saljo. As indicated previously, Jarvis compiled his list o f  
components heuristically and to  an extent, phenomenologically, as a  result o f  people 
reflecting on their own practices: people were asked to engage w ith Kolb’s model and 
then identify the components which they considered were representative o f  their own 
learning. M arton and Saljo cite a  similar study which Saljo initially conducted alone 
before being joined by M arton, in which a group o f  adults were asked what learning 
‘meant to them ’. Saljo drew  up five ‘qualitatively different conceptions’ to which a 
sixth was subsequently added, comprising:
•  A  quantitative increase in knowledge
•  Memorising
• The acquisition, for subsequent utilisation, o f  facts, methods, etc.
• The abstraction o f  meaning
• The interpretative process aimed at understanding reality
« Developing as a person.
(M arton and Saljo, 1997:35-38)
The scholars’ intent was not to draw  up a comprehensive picture o f  the learning 
process, showing the intricate relationship betw een the various components as Jarvis 
has done, and their analysis is clearly lacking in comparison. The complexity o f  the 
task o f  identifying and defining aspects o f  the learning process also becomes clear in 
their work: we are obliged to query, for example, whether the first three ‘conceptions’ 
are not at least in part identical! The difficulty and complexity o f  the task Jarvis has 
embarked on is further highlighted, although the compliment paid him by M erriam 
and Caffarella should also be noted:
Jarvis’s model does deal w ith learning per se. The thoroughness o f  his 
discussion, which concentrates on explaining the responses one can have to an 
experience, is the strength o f  the model. These responses encompass multiple
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types o f  learning and their different outcom es— a refreshingly comprehensive 
view o f  learning. Furthermore, his m odel situates learning within the social 
context; learning is an interactive phenomenon, not an isolated internal 
process. (1991:257-58; cited in Jarvis, 2001:11)
For the purposes o f  the research, it is the interaction o f  people with their social 
situation which most relates to the question o f  how  Christian faith-content might 
influence the learning process. This is picked up once more in the next chapter. 
However, from  the perspective o f  Jarvis’s model, attention must be focused on the 
first three boxes, since these pertain directly to the discussion. Certain modifications 
can be proposed; this is the consideration o f  the next section.
11.3 Learning and its social referent
M erriam  and Caffarella’s compliment (above) stresses the importance o f  situating 
learning within a social context, emphasising the interactivity that has to take place 
betw een people and their environment. Jarvis has, in fact, portrayed the relationship 
betw een social situation and experience in various ways. In  his 1987 and 1995 
volumes, the two were portrayed as ‘joined at the hip’, depicted within the same 
overall box, separated almost tenuously by a dotted line. In  his 2001 work, however, 
the two have become distinct, separate in their ow n right. Some o f  the reasoning 
behind this change is articulated in a statement within liis 1998 publication (with 
Holford and Griffin):
Individuals enter situations and construct experiences. B ut the experience they 
construct is one that either they themselves or others (perhaps a teacher or 
facilitator) create on their behalf. The situation itself, therefore, is only the 
context within which the experience occurs, not the experience itself. (Jarvis, 
Holford and Griffin, 1998:50)
11.3.1 The social situation, and the experience of disjuncture
The relationship betw een people’s social situation and the experience that occurs 
within/as a result o f  it is complex. Indeed, Jarvis himself identifies it as problematic. It
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is reasonably easy to  concur w ith the distinction made in the quote above between the 
two. Nevertheless, we might argue that the use o f  the term  ‘experience’ is imprecise, 
particularly in view o f  the proposed differentiation between primary and secondary 
experience. As indicated above, secondary experiences are necessarily accompanied 
by primary experiences. Every experience occurs within a social context, but 
secondary experiences— as the definitions o f  the two types point out— are distinct 
from  that context, whereas primary experiences pertain to it. An immediate 
modification o f  Jarvis’s m odel might therefore be to  place a new box within the social 
situation, itself within a social context, as in Figure 1.4:
Figure 1.4: Experience, its social situation and context
S o c ia l  co n te x t
S o c ia l  s itu a t io n
E x p e r ie n c e
This would respect the huge range o f  primary continuous experiences everyone 
undergoes at every moment o f  every day. As these would generally not cause 
disjunctive and/or result in new  learning, a  progression to the box ‘person reinforced 
but relatively unchanged’ w ould be expected. I t would also respect the fact that even 
secondary experiences are not rem oved from  a social context— something that the 
model as stands seems to suggest. The points o f  emerging importance, then, become 
a) whether or not an experience causes disjunctive; and b) how  people respond to  both 
the experience of disjuncture and the experience per se. It is essential to  make such a 
differentiation, since the former relates to  many o f  the aspects o f  learning identified in 
the discussion previously (if disjunctive is experienced as traumatic and negative, for 
example, then the learning opportunity may be rejected), while the latter pertains 
m ore accurately to how  the experience, once ‘accepted’, is interpreted and knowledge
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is constructed. The box entitled ‘experience’ might therefore be usefully subdivided 
into two, in order to reflect these distinctions.
(Somewhat tangentially, it might be considered appropriate, for similar reasons, to 
place the person/biography box within the social situation, given the fact that people 
never live or operate outside this context. Their separation is justified in a model o f  
the learning processes, however, once again i f  the situation provokes learning. I f  not, 
then a case can he made for joining the person and biography to the social context in 
which they are operating.)
M uch depends, therefore, on the nature o f  an experience, the affective and/or 
cognitive responses it provokes, and— assuming it is responded to— the way in which 
it is constructed and consequently transformed. The thesis proposes that the real 
relevance behind the term  ‘situation’ is, in fact, whatever it is that causes or provokes 
a sense o f  disjuncture in people, and that this results in two specific forms o f  
(response to  an) experience: affective and cognitive. The former influences whether 
the experience is engaged with or not, the latter relates to the act o f  reflection and the 
degree to which this occurs. This understanding suggests that the social situation 
affects the interpretation o f  experience highly specifically and in a singularly narrow 
manner. One situation, indeed, one element o f  a ‘situation’ (and the inverted commas 
might suggest the need for a  m ore precise term ), provokes one experience (but 
possibly more). The next section suggests that while this is probably accurate in terms 
o f  how  the relationship betw een social situation and experience is understood, it is a 
restricted view regarding the overall learning process, and that situations occur within 
wider contexts.
11.3.2 The social context, and the interpretation of experience
The discussion thus far has not considered the significance o f  a situation being social. 
There are different ways o f  approaching the issue. Jarvis, w ith reference to his model, 
builds an impersonal, semi objective understanding. M arton and B ooth (1997), on the 
other hand, deliberately separate situation and ‘phenomenon’, acknowledging in a
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similar way to the discussion above that there are various elements embedded in the 
relationship between an experience and the ‘situation’ which provokes it.
This section takes both  approaches in turn.
(i) The impersonal perspective
An immediate query arising from  a conventional understanding o f  a ‘situation’ is 
whether any situation it necessarily has to be ‘social’. It is certainly true, for example, 
that people go through many life experiences, both large and small, alone, in what 
might be considered a  non-social situation. While other people are frequently the 
initiators o f  new experiences, they are only one o f  a number o f  other forces that 
intrude into individuals’ lives. The physical environment, nature, wind, sensations, 
new  sights, tastes, sounds... all contribute to  present people with a need to identify the 
challenge, analyse it, and respond accordingly. W hatever the case, many o f  these 
experiences take place in social isolation, away from other people, and we might 
consider these to be ‘non-social situations’.
Such an assertion is on uncertain groimd, however. People themselves are always 
present in a learning situation, and this itself m ust constitute a  social dimension. The 
contention is strengthened by the notion that people are socially-constructed beings.
As soon as they begin to interpret an experience, they necessarily impose a meaning 
on it that has its origins in their social biographies. Thus two people will not interpret, 
understand or respond to an experience in the same way, nor will one person look at 
an ostensibly identical experience the same way a second time. In  each case, their 
biographies, which have been socially conditioned and are continually changing, will 
determine the outcome. It w ould appear, therefore, that all learning takes place in a 
social situation, the major differences being whether the social referent for an 
experience is individuals themselves, or a  combination o f  this and a wider, more 
general social context.
These two understandings o f ‘social’— personal and contextual, or perhaps individual 
and corporate— plus the fact that an experience may or may not cause disjuncture,
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Figure 1.5.
Figure 1.5: Possible learning situations
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Experience causes 
disjunctive
Experience does not cause 
disjunctive
Personal biography in a 
non-social context
Box A Box C
Personal biography in a 
social context
B o x B B o x D
Boxes C and D refer to situations which do not result in new learning. In  B ox C, 
people are physically alone, but that isolation is a familiar experience and they are not 
presented with anything that forces them  to stop and think about their situation.
Sights, sounds, tastes, smells emotions and thoughts all cohere with individuals’ past 
experiences and the sense they had previously made o f  them. B ox D, similarly, relates 
to those social occasions w hen the interaction w ith other people does not challenge 
existing assumptions and ways o f  doing things, ranging from situations which demand 
a  highly impersonal professional protocol, to  those intimate m oments between 
husband and wife, parent and child. In  each case (and for the spread o f  other 
possibilities between the two ends o f  the personal/impersonal continuum) mechanisms 
and knowledge built up over time allow for a  smooth, disjunctive-free interaction.
Boxes A and B, however, indicate occasions which potentially result in learning.
While the possibility o f  non-learning continues to be part o f  the equation, this is 
necessarily laid to one side given the present interest in learning. In  both boxes, 
personal biography is an agent interacting w ith external stimuli. In  B ox A, however, 
given the lack o f  other hum an beings whose opinions, views and assumptions have to 
be taken into account, people are in a position to learn comparatively freely, or at least 
individually. There are fewer constraints pu t upon the learning outcom e simply
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because individuals themselves are the principal referent. In Box B, the situation 
becomes m uch more complex, since people must use not only themselves as a 
referent, but also relate this to others and to the surrounding environment. A wide 
range o f  diverse factors must be taken into account, and those factors may be 
continually shifting and changing.
This analysis begins to provide a fram ework for understanding the relationship 
between people’s social situation and their experiences. Individuals entering a 
learning situation with personal biographies become a ‘constant’ in that this factor is 
found in each scenario. It is important, therefore, to examine the nature and 
functioning o f  these biographies. This takes place in Chapter Three. Secondly, people 
interact with external stimuli which are categorised as either social or non-social. 
While it is clearly reasonable to  differentiate between the tw o, there may also be 
considerable degrees o f  overlap.
Three areas o f  investigation are therefore present: characteristics pertaining 
exclusively to the social context, those exclusively o f  the non-social context, and 
those belonging to both.
W hen turning to examine the relevance o f  a social context to the process o f  learning, 
new  dimensions emerge. An analytic fram ework such as that provided is useful in 
bringing thoughts to order and clarifying issues. Nevertheless, a further step needs to 
be taken to relate these conclusions to the theories o f  learning the thesis has been 
considering. W e are already moving to a point where it would seem appropriate to 
place ‘experience’ inside a box labelled ‘situation’ which itself is situated inside a box 
entitled ‘social context’. It is the interaction betw een the situation and context that 
must now  be explored.
Returning to Jarvis’s definition o f  experience, his inclusion o f  the meaning o f  an 
experience is striking. His definition is careful to  avoid the easy conclusion that a 
meaningless experience cannot be viewed as an experience at all, although one might 
suggest that the implication is there. Yet again we are struck with the complexity o f  
the concept. Within the context o f  theories o f  learning, however, the notion o f
Chapter One 41
People's Ways o f  Believing: learning processes andfaith outcomes
meaning is vital, since it is as people find and construct meaning that learning occurs. 
The discussion to date would suggest also that this is the way in which people 
internalise the external. Meaning-making is therefore a  form o f  transition or 
transaction between people and their external environment: their social context.
(ii) The personal perspective
Such an understanding o f  the relationship betw een social situation and social context 
is primarily impersonal and objective, however, approaching the discussion from the 
perspective o f  a m odel o f  the overall process rather than through an examination o f  
the person/learner. This latter is the approach favoured by M arton and B ooth  (1997) 
who are at pains to emphasise their general discomfort with the traditional separation 
betw een learner and reality, internal and external, knower and known. Rather than talk 
o f  learners ‘constructing’ knowledge, they suggest that individuals ‘constitute’ 
knowledge, indicating thus the merging o f  these various dichotomies within the 
person. A  preliminary discussion o f  their position has already been provided, and the 
value o f  their conclusions for the purposes at hand is slightly questionable, other than 
to signal that the approach taken by the research is not universally agreed upon. 
Nevertheless, it is w orth drawing attention to  certain aspects. Instead o f  differentiating 
betw een a social situation and social context, for example, M arton and B ooth 
differentiate between a ‘situation’ and a ‘phenom enon’, suggesting that:
A  situation is always experienced with a sociospatiotem poral location— a 
context, a time, and a place— whereas a  phenomenon is experienced as 
abstracted from or transcending such anchorage. ... We refer to the wholeness 
o f  what we experience to  be simultaneously present as a situation, whereas we 
call entities that transcend the situation, which link it w ith other situations and 
lend meaning to  it, phenomena. (1997:82-83).
They go on to reflect on the fact that situation and phenomena are ‘inextricably 
intertwined in experience’, while acknowledging that ‘as researchers we may opt to 
focus on one or on the other’ (1997:83). A t this point, however, their w ork takes on  a 
different twist, since rather than go on to  explore the difference betw een them, they 
suggest that a  researcher may opt to  look at how  learners a) experience the situation, 
or b) experience the phenomenon. They also draw  attention to  the fact that the
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l e a r n e r ’s  focus may differ, sometimes concentrating on the situation, at other times on 
the phenomenon— a conclusion they had come to through their research and which is 
more Hilly explored in previous chapters. M arton and B ooth’s fundamental opposition 
to a division between inner and outer is clear in the questions they ask (expressed in 
this paragraph as ‘a’ and ‘b ’). Situation and phenomenon can be distinguished, but 
their interpretation in a  study o f  learning uses people themselves as the referent, and 
hence a triangular structure is formed (Figure 1.6).
Figure 1.6: The relationship between learner, situation and phenomenon
Learner
The distinction made by the scholars betw een situation and phenomenon is thus 
useful, but not totally applicable to the research at hand in view o f  the arguments 
made previously that supported not only the ‘constituting’ position but favoured a 
‘constructed’ alternative or partner. Given M arton and B ooth’s basic premise, a direct 
parallel between ‘social context’— the interest o f  this section— and ‘phenomena’ 
cannot be drawn, although there are certainly similarities. One major contribution 
made by the term  ‘phenom enon’ is the implication that no social context ever displays 
the whole range o f  its components. A  ‘phenomenon’ therefore, is the particular 
combination o f  elements that surround a situation, but which will be peculiar to that 
situation. Even then, it is likely to  constitute unseen and unidentified aspects, and 
people may only perceive part o f  the whole picture and have to engage with an 
experience using a limited field o f  reference.
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III. Summary and conclusion
This chapter has laid the foundations for a study o f  the processes o f  learning by 
focusing on theories o f  experiential learning, in the main as developed by Jarvis 
(1987, 1995, 2001). The different versions o f  his model clearly indicate the fact that 
this is ‘w ork in progress’; indeed, the latest version, not yet available through 
published channels, makes further modifications which the thesis was unable to take 
into account. The holistic nature o f  experiential learning was noted, one o f  its 
strengths lying in the ability o f  these theories to incorporate and account for a wide 
range o f  areas o f  human grow th and development. Nonetheless, the association o f  
experience with time resulted in an emphasis on a horizontal, sequential approach to 
the study which the chapter suggested may not be typical o f  every type o f  learning. 
Another ‘transform ation’ that took  place was the vertical internalisation o f  
knowledge, and the chapter observed that the m odel would benefit from becoming 
two-dimensional in order to incorporate more effectively the process o f  internalisation 
through reflection. Reflection was seen to  account for different forms o f  learning and, 
ostensibly, non-learning, although this latter was challenged on the grounds that 
people and situations are never the same from  one situation to  another, and hence no 
two experiences can be identical. Some o f  the difficulties associated with Jarvis’s 
changes in terminology were noted, focusing principally on the shift from ‘person 
reinforced’ to  ‘person unchanged’ (relevant to  the discussion on non-learning) and the 
different term s employed to describe the box conveying reflection, thought and 
reasoning. Certain modifications to Jarvis’s m odel were also recommended, most 
notably that o f  the relationship betw een experience, social situation and social 
context.
The analysis o f  how Christian faith might affect the processes o f  learning takes place 
within this framework. Chapter Two moves to  consider the nature o f  Christian faith 
and identify potential ways in which this might occur.
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Chapter Two 
The authoritative influence of faith on learning 
Introduction
Having established certain foundations for the study o f  learning, this chapter now asks 
w hat in particular about the Christian faith might affect the way in which this takes 
place. Returning to the notion o f  authority, it focuses on a variety o f  areas which it 
proposes are characteristic o f  Christianity and its faith-content and identifies 
corresponding ways in which these are likely to interact with the process o f  learning 
and potentially influence it. John H ull’s volume W h a t P r e v e n ts  C h r is t ia n  A d u lts  f r o m  
L e a rn in g ?  (1991 [1985]) is significant since thus far it stands alone in the field o f  
Christian Education in demonstrating an impact on the partnership and interaction 
betw een ideological authority and learning. However, Hull’s w ork is limited since it 
does not engage with learning theories. W ith reference to  Jarvis’s model discussed in 
Chapter One, consideration is given to  how  Hull’s thesis may be interpreted, and new 
ways in which an influence may be exerted identified.
I. The authority of social knowledge
One way o f  understanding the collection o f  authoritative documents that together 
provide the foundations o f  the Christian belief-system is to view it as a form o f  social 
knowledge. Despite not cohering entirely w ith some o f  the system’s ow n basic 
premises, this ‘from below ’ approach, following Berger and Luckmann (1966) sees 
reality itself as a social construction, brought about as people engage with their 
external world and environment and articulate their conclusions. The linguistic 
expression is important, since this externalises knowledge that would otherwise have 
remained personal and subjective, and it fulfils a  number o f  functions, allowing 
people in general to  compare their conclusions and hence together as a social group to 
construct an interpretation o f  reality that is comm on to them  all. In  so doing, it also 
creates the impression o f  objectivity and thus o f  reliability, offsetting the insecurity o f
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individual subjective judgm ents by providing a commonly-accepted corpus o f  
‘knowledge’ that people take as ‘true’: social knowledge. The system functions 
cyclically, social knowledge providing the referent for individual understandings o f  
experience as it occurs, internalising it and transforming it into personal knowledge, 
and these understandings then being bought back into the public arena through human 
communication. Social knowledge is therefore a continuously yet imperceptibly 
shifting phenomenon (Jarvis, 1992; see Figure 1.3) as individuals necessarily put their 
ow n stamp on the personal knowledge they externalise. Kolb (1984) asserts the 
primacy o f  social knowledge over personal, and one o f  the weaknesses o f  the theory is 
exposed: if  social knowledge has to exist in  o r d e r  th a t  people might make sense o f  
their experience and only then make their ow n contribution to  it through 
externalisation, the question is begged as to how the system started. It is a question o f  
the same order as that o f  the beginning o f  the world, and (regretfully!) the discussions 
can go no further at this point. Despite the weakness, this constructivist outlook ably 
accounts for the interaction betw een people and their environment in an established 
order such as we know it.
The collection o f  authoritative writings which lie at the heart o f  the Christian religion 
can be seen in this light. The bible and the set o f  doctrinal statements which together 
articulate Christianity’s fundamental premises are/were also the articulation o f  a 
particular people’s understanding o f  their experience at a  particular point in time. 
Hence they reflect the world-view o f  that people and era, but must take their place 
alongside the significantly different conclusions o f  other people groups and other eras 
both globally and throughout time.
This being the case, the question is raised as to what makes Christian faith-content 
distinct enough for the thesis to investigate its impact on the learning process. I f  this 
body o f  social knowledge is simply one corpus amongst many o f  the same ilk, then 
what properties might it have to suggest it has the potential to influence? The 
following subsections propose tw o specific characteristics.
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i.l A discrete body of knowledge
Theories o f  the construction o f  knowledge hold that social knowledge is not, in fact, 
the m onochrome entity portrayed thus far, but that it is composed o f  a wide variety o f  
layers and subsections. Two understandings are noteworthy. Berger and Luckmann 
(1966) identify two ‘layers’, the first constituting the ordinary, eveiyday knowledge 
that extends throughout a society and which is comm on to all its members (see also 
Heller, 1984). This is the knowledge that in many ways is ‘nearest’ and most 
accessible to people, as well as the most familial*. It underpins all other forms and 
provides them  with a hermeneutical base. Alongside this everyday knowledge, 
however, are numerous ‘sub-universes’: smaller, often virtually self-contained bodies 
o f  m ore specialised knowledge that relate primarily to the different roles exercised by 
people within a society. Roles require linguistic articulation commensurate with the 
specific characteristics o f  each, something m ost obviously seen in jargon. Berger and 
Luckm ann suggest that:
Sub-universes o f  meaning may be socially structured by various criteria— sex, 
age, occupation, religious inclination, aesthetic taste, and so on. 
and that:
These result from accentuations o f  role specialization to the point where role- 
specific knowledge becomes altogether esoteric as against the common stock 
o f  knowledge. (1966:102)
They may become increasingly autonom ous and independent from the surrounding 
body o f  social knowledge, and this is often associated with a tendency to identify the 
people who are ‘in’ the group and those who are ‘outside’ it. So techniques develop 
that help maintain the status quo, providing the means for the separation to  be ever 
m ore distinct. Jargon, once again, fulfils this role by automatically rejecting those to 
whom  it makes no sense.
Christianity can be considered a sub-universe within this scheme. This is the case at a 
number o f  levels. Clearly the body, or bodies o f  people who associate themselves with 
the religion are defined as ‘Christians’ as distinct from those who don’t. At the same 
time, the boundaries are fuzzy, since Christian identity is an obscure concept that can 
refer simply to those bom  in a country where Christianity is the official state religion
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as m uch as it can to those profoundly committed to its precepts. Commitment can also 
vary, ranging from  those who attend church on a Sunday but have little else to do with 
the faith during the rest o f  the week, to those who aim to live a ‘Christian’ life on a 
day-to-day, hour-by-hour basis. For the former, their membership o f  the Christian 
sub-universe is likely to be somewhat peripheral and they take far m ore central 
positions in other sub-universes in other spheres o f  their lives, even those with 
somewhat contradictory norms to those o f  Christianity. M ore committed Christians 
may find that the majority o f  their lives is spent within the context o f  the Christian 
sub-universe, as they not only aim to live a  particular type o f  life on an individual 
basis but they also take employment in an overtly and deliberately Christian 
environment where w ork colleagues all share the same outlook. At this point, the sub­
universe almost takes the form o f  everyday social knowledge for the people who live 
within it, although sociologically they remain very m uch a minority group.
On a different level, the written and articulated Christian belief system also functions 
as a sub-universe. Here there is a  defined body o f  literature, the combined total o f 
which is understood as the foundations upon which Christianity is built. This corpus 
has as its core the bible and the set o f  doctrinal and creedal statements that express the 
basic tenets o f  the religion’s beliefs. Once again, the boundaries blur as throughout 
history schisms occurred resulting from  disagreements regarding the precise nature o f  
that core as well as how  it should be interpreted. At this point new sub-sub-universes 
are constructed, smaller groups again, all ostensibly under the Christian banner but 
defined according to theology, churchmanship, and other related dimensions.
The thesis proposes, nevertheless, that for its ow n purposes a  basic core o f  Christian 
teaching exists which is expressed in certain key texts and expounded in a  whole 
range o f  others, and that, despite significant variations in the way in which those texts 
are appropriated, those committed to the Christian faith are necessarily committed to 
that core in some way or another. M any would be familiar with the texts themselves, 
particularly the bible and central creedal confessional statements. Appointed 
authorities, in the form o f  clergy, Pope, trained leaders, church ‘professionals’ and 
theologians may also communicate and expound these central texts so that Christian 
adherents come to  know  their content even if  unfamiliar w ith the primary source.
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Once again, in a divided Church, fragm entation occurs at this level as individuals and 
groups pursue different foci and interpret the core according to  their own purposes. 
Yet an engagement with the core is fundamental and is common to all.
The Christian sub-universe is a highly discrete sub-universe at this level. The core 
texts are defined. The Christian Patriarchs toiled long and hard to establish the biblical 
canon, determining which texts were ‘in’ and which ‘o u t’; the views o f  individuals 
and groups were tested for heresy w ith the same aim in mind. Once established, the 
core has stood the test o f  time, remaining largely unchanged for almost two millennia. 
This is significant for the research, since the very fact that this Christian faith-content 
is set apart from  surrounding bodies o f  knowledge means that it has characteristics 
peculiar to itself and that people’s relationship with it is likely to have a particular 
form. The interest o f  the thesis is to identify that relationship. The hypothesis is based 
in part on the notion that faith-content has a  status which subsequent sections link to 
authority, but in the present discussion on sub-universes and social knowledge relates 
to  its discrete nature. N ot only is it distinguishable on accoimt o f  its content—  
significant in its own right for the arguments just presented— but it remains time- 
bound, set apart from the contem porary body o f  social knowledge. Here we may 
introduce the second understanding o f  the social construction o f  knowledge: M ax 
Scheler’s (1984 [1924]) view that some forms o f  knowledge alter faster than others, 
the fastest being technological knowledge. Jarvis, summarising Scheler’s thesis, 
states:
[Scheler] called [technological knowledge] ‘artificial’ because it is a form o f  
knowledge that does not persist over time, and he classified knowledge into 
seven types, based upon their degree o f  artificiality: myth and legend; 
knowledge implicit in the natural folk language; religious knowledge; basic 
types o f  mystical knowledge; philosophical-metaphysical knowledge; positive 
knowledge o f  mathematics, natural and cultural sciences; technological 
knowledge. (Jarvis, 1995:4)
It is not clear from Scheler’s argument whether religious knowledge, ‘moving’ 
comparatively slowly in contrast to other forms, also struggles to be contemporary 
and up-to-date, but the implication is there. Particularly given the fixed dimensions o f  
Christian faith-content, one is left w ith the impression o f  Christians having to reach
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out and back in order to  engage with the body o f  literature and teaching which they 
have appointed as authoritative. Hull (1991 [1985]) speaks o f  an ‘ideological time- 
lag’, to  which the chapter returns at a later point. Here, the Tag’ appeai-s to be more 
than purely ideological, incorporating issues pertaining to the very nature o f  
knowledge.
The chapter suggests that the discrete nature o f  Christian faith-content as a  sub­
universe o f  social knowledge means that it has a  particular form o f  authority that may 
well impinge upon the way in which Christians engage with it. That authority and 
hence potential is heightened, nevertheless, by further characteristics.
1.2 A prepositional body of knowledge
A second way in which Christian faith-content can be seen to  be authoritative is its 
highly propositional nature. Cantwell Smith observes:
In  the Christian case, the role o f  belief has been quite major, at times decisive. 
Doctrine has been a central expression o f  faith, has seemed often a criterion o f  
it; the community has divided over differences in belief, and has set forth 
belief as a formal qualification o f  membership. N o other religious community 
on earth has done these things to the same degree; and some have not done 
them  at all. ... The historical fact is that faith is expressed in a  great variety o f  
ways, and that in the Christian case one o f  the primary and basic expressions 
has been conceptually, in propositional doctrine; but in other traditions it has 
been expressed primarily and basically in other forms. (1979:13-14)
While Christians have begun to  wrestle w ith the fact that it may be inappropriate to 
interpret apparently propositional statem ents a s  propositions (see Lindbeek, 1984 and 
Hull, 1991 [1985], for example), Hull’s volume demonstrates how the Christian 
propositional belief system frequently functions as a  deterrent to learning. He makes 
an important link with ideology, to which the discussion returns. In  the first instance, 
however, it is clear that in their purest form, propositions are perceived by nature to 
carry a high degree o f  authority. Indeed, w e might argue that as soon as they are seen 
as s y m b o lic  representations o f  a bigger, or as yet unidentifiable tru th  (interpretations 
suggested by Lindbeek and Hull), strictly speaking, they are no longer propositions.
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The Concise Oxford Dictionary (9th edition) offers the following amongst its list o f  
definitions for the term:
Logic: a statement consisting o f  subject and predicate that is subject to p roof 
or disproof.
Propositions by their very native, therefore, cany  notions o f  tru th  and falsehood. N ot 
only so, but these qualities m ust be evidenced in some way.
It is the link with tru th  which makes propositions authoritative. As has been seen 
previously, ‘tru th ’ conveys value, and the thesis concurs with Perry’s (1970) linkage 
o f  content with moral and ethical values. There is a direct line that connects notions o f  
right and wrong with those o f  good and bad. Nevertheless, ‘tru th ’ as a  concept is also 
associated with other authoritative factors. An important player is the role o f  
objectivity. Humans have always distrusted what they perceived to  be the totally 
subjective. W ith its link to the personal, subjectivity is too vulnerable to the vagaries 
o f  the less controllable aspects o f  human-ness, namely emotion and temperament. By 
implication, the subjective is also too ‘near’ individuals. This nearness renders the 
tasks o f  accurate analysis and-genuine identification almost impossible to achieve 
with any degree o f  certainty. A lthough at times it is necessary to bring something 
close in order to examine a particular detail, in general term s it has to  be held at a 
sufficient distance for it to be seen in its entirety. Only then can it be m anoeuvred and 
turned so that each salient dimension can be scrutinised and identified, and its 
relationship to the whole understood. The distance at which something has to be held 
depends on the size and dimensions o f  the object in question; clearly also at some 
point if  the object is at too great a distance it goes out o f  focus once again. However, 
the necessity for objectivity to  require a  distancing from individuals is clear,
A  further dimension o f  the same question introduces the relationship betw een the 
subjective and individual versus the objective and publicly-recognised/recognisable. 
Objects gain credence and are considered ‘real’ and tangible if  other people appear to 
perceive a phenomenon in the same way as oneself. This is the fine line between 
subjectivity and objectivity. Individuals are all ultimately bound within their own 
subjectivity, and can never be totally sure that their experience, especially their 
sensory experience, is the same as that o f  others. Nevertheless, one way o f  addressing
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the issue is by developing ways o f  objectifying experience. A prime way in which this 
occurs is through language, and the ability to ‘put something into w ords’ (the ‘into’ 
taking a greater significance than is often recognised) enables all members o f  a 
society, culture, or linguistic network, to construct a common, objective reality. This 
was the thrust o f  Berger and Luckm ann’s afore-mentioned (1966) thesis.
Propositional statements such as are characteristic o f  the Christian belief system 
therefore carry a high degree o f  authority both  on account o f  their perceived 
objectivity and o f  their link with ‘tru th ’. These characteristics are intrinsically part o f  
the Christian doctrinal belief system. M any also carry an additional dimension, 
however: one claimed by the propositions themselves.
i.3 A ‘revealed1 body of knowledge
The Christian doctrine o f  Revelation is undoubtedly the major extrinsic, or attributed 
form  o f  authority linked to Christian faith-content. It is unnecessary to explore the 
intricacies o f  the doctrine itself. Briefly summarised, various sources o f  Christian faith 
are considered not only to  reveal aspects o f  God himself but also to be divinely 
revealed. God himself is the author. Hence it is possible for humans to know  the 
transcendent, and to  some extent apprehend him (noting at this point Christianity’s 
traditional male-centredness) through these media. The person o f  Jesus is o f  central 
importance, with the bible lying closely alongside, especially since this is an almost 
unique source o f  information about Jesus. Other sources o f  revelation are found in the 
created order itself, although this m ust be understood through the lens o f  Christian 
teachings, and in many o f  the Church’s doctrines and creeds, especially when 
considered to have been com posed under divine guidance. Revelation cannot be 
dissociated from other doctrines such as inspiration and infallibility, therefore. While 
the Church recognises four principal authorities on which its fundamental tenets 
stand— bible, reason, tradition, and experience (and hence appearing to  incorporate all 
the major ways in which humans in general construct knowledge and form  world­
views)— the idea that these tenets are in some way divinely initiated and upheld 
endows them  with a significance and importance that is also highly authoritative.
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Since Christianity is such a highly propositional faith, the doctrine o f  Revelation 
necessarily links with questions o f  tru th  and falsehood, and we return to the 
discussion o f  section 1.2. God himself is an/the Absolute o f  all Absolutes. He is the 
truth, and therefore his self-revelation also makes the tru th  known. A  certain amount 
o f  w ork has nevertheless gone into exploring how  people relate to this authoritative 
yet propositional source. George Lindbeck’s (1984) consideration o f  the nature o f  
doctrine in a postliberal age contributed m uch to the discussion. Lindbeek identified 
three ways in which Christian propositions functioned.
The currently m ost familial* theological theories o f  religion and doctrine can, 
for our purposes, be divided into three types. One o f  these emphasises the 
cognitive aspects o f  religion and stresses the way in which church doctrines 
function as informative propositions or tru th  claims about objective realities. 
Religions are thus thought o f  as similar to  philosophy or science as these were 
classically conceived. This was the approach o f  traditional orthodoxies (as 
well as o f  many heterodoxies), but it also has certain affinities to  the outlook 
on  religion adopted by m uch m odern Anglo-American analytic philosophy 
with its preoccupation with the cognitive or informational meaningfiilness o f  
religious utterances. A  second approach focuses on what I shall call in this 
book the 'experiential-expressive' dimension o f  relig ion , and it interprets 
doctrines as noninformative and nondiscursive symbols o f  inner feelings, 
attitudes, or existential orientations. This approach highlights the resemblances 
o f  religions to aesthetic enterprises and is particularly congenial to  the liberal 
theologies influenced by the Continental developments that began with 
Schleiermacher. A  third approach, favoured especially by ecumenically 
inclined Rom an Catholics, attem pts to  combine these two emphases. B oth the 
cognitively propositional and the expressively symbolic dimensions and 
functions o f  religion and doctrine are viewed, at least in the case o f  
Christianity, as religiously significant and valid. Karl Rahner and Bernard 
Lonergan have developed what are probably the currently m ost influential 
versions o f  this two-dimensional outlook. ... For a  propositionalist, if  a 
doctrine is once true, it is always true, and if  it is once false, it is always false.
.. For experiential-expressive symbolists, in contrast, religiously significant
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meanings can vary while doctrines remain the same, and conversely, doctrines 
can alter without change o f  meaning. (1984:16)
Lindbeck’s w ork is considered seminal, particularly on account o f  his understanding 
o f  religions as ‘languages’ for which doctrines provide the ‘gram m ar’. Since each 
grammar belongs to its own language, the implication is that a particular set o f  
doctrines is valid only for its ow n religious community. The doctrine o f  one group is 
not meant to provide meaning to other religious communities and cannot be expected 
to make statements at all about God in any absolute sense. Nonetheless, the Christian 
doctrinal ‘gram m ar’ continues to  make tru th  and revelatory claims o f  and for itself. 
This, once again, sets it apart, especially for those who adhere to it, and gives it a 
particular authority which the chapter will go on to demonstrate can affect the 
learning process.
1.4 An ideological body of knowledge
I f  the classification o f  Christian faith-content as a  sub-universe within the overall 
range o f  a culture’s social knowledge can be accepted, then one o f  its defining 
characteristics that sets it apart from  other sub-universes is that o f  an ideology. Paulo 
Freire’s w ork was introduced in the Prologue as contributing to discussions pertaining 
to education and authority. One o f  his objections to what he called a ‘banking’ system 
o f  education was on account o f  its prom ulgation o f  a set o f  social norms and values 
that served the interests o f  one sector o f  society and oppressed another. This objection 
could well be expressed in term s o f  ideological oppression. Kress and H odge (1979) 
point out how  language is necessarily and implicitly ideological. Defining ‘ideology’ 
as ‘a systematic body o f  ideas, organized from a particular* point o f  view ’ and 
commenting that ‘ideology is thus a  subsuming category which includes sciences and 
metaphysics, as well as political ideologies o f  various kinds, without implying 
anything about their status and reliability as guides to  reality’, they go on to  state:
Language is an instrument o f  control as well as o f  communication. Linguistic 
forms allow significance to be conveyed and to be distorted. In  this way 
hearers can be both m anipulated and informed, preferably manipulated while 
they suppose they are being informed. Language is ideological in another, 
m ore political, sense o f  that word: it involves systematic distortion in the
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service o f  class interest. Yet the tw o kinds o f  ideology are not entirely distinct, 
in theory or in practice. Science is a systematisation from  a point o f  view: so is 
a  political ideology. Political ideology is liable to project fantasy versions o f  
reality, but science deals in hypothetical constructs whose status is not always 
so very different. (1979:6)
Freire saw a vital dimension o f  the emancipation o f  the oppressed as their claiming 
reality through articulating it on their own term s and according to  their own 
interpretations and perceptions. The challenges he threw  were not lost on  the Christian 
Church, which understood its ow n educational mission in precisely the term s he 
rejected: the continuation o f  a  systematised and authenticated way o f  looking at the 
w orld that all too often served the interests o f  its powerful members.
The Christian belief system largely falls into the sociological category o f  an ideology. 
Eagleton, in his classic and thorough study o f  ideologies, identifies six ways in which 
the notion may be defined, suggesting that these represent a  ‘progressive sharpening 
o f  focus’. These are:
a) ‘The general material process o f  production o f  ideas, beliefs and values in 
social life.’ Any pejorative or value-laden implications are removed, and 
although Eagleton is at pains to  differentiate between ideology and culture, the 
two are closely linked in referring to  the way people ‘live’ their social 
practices. ‘This m ost general o f  all meanings o f  ideology stresses the social 
determination o f  thought, thus providing a valuable antidote to  idealism.’
b) A  concept very similar to ‘world-view’. The ideas and beliefs representing the 
‘conditions and life experiences o f  a specific, socially significant group or 
class.’ W orld-view and ideology might be distinguished, nevertheless, by the 
fact that the former generally refers to ‘fundamental m atters such as the 
meaning o f  death or humanity’s place in the universe, whereas ideology might 
extend to such issues as which colour to  paint the mail-boxes.’
c) The way in which the interests o f  various social groups are prom oted and 
legitimated, especially in the face o f  opposition. In  this sense, tension is an 
inherent ingredient as ‘self-promoting social powers conflict and collide over 
questions central to the reproduction o f  social pow er as a whole.’
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d) ‘Ideas and beliefs which help to legitimate the interests o f  a ruling group or 
class specifically by distortion and dissimulation.’
e) False and deceptive beliefs are not associated to a dominant class, but are seen 
to be integral to ‘the material structure o f  society as a whole. The term  
ideology remains pejorative, but a class-genetic account o f  it is avoided.’ 
(Eagleton, 1991:28-31)
Clearly, the ‘sharpening o f  focus’ is at least in part accompanied by increasing 
degrees o f power, authority, control and a sense o f  pejorative-ness. Certain common 
factors also run throughout. Ideologies are concerned with ideas and beliefs, their 
truthfulness and falsity, and the way in which these are communicated. They are also 
linked to  groups, whether majority or minority. John Hull (1991 [1985]) picks up a 
number o f  these features, drawing a link between ideology and authority, and 
suggesting that the Christian ideology provides an authoritative interpretation for 
experience, connecting this interpretation, over time, with truth. He quickly refers to 
Christianity as being a ‘belief system ’ and points out that this has been important, 
particularly to Protestants whose (alleged) ‘fear o f  uniformity’ and need to  be right 
(common to all people) has created an ‘ideological enclosure’. This is characterised 
by a clear disbelief system that accompanies its affirmative corollary.
Ideological authority therefore incorporates some o f  the dimensions identified in the 
previous section. While an ideological concern for truth is m ore pragmatic and 
socially functional in nature than it is philosophical, the need to  be ‘right’ continues to 
feature, this time in a  social rather than individual context. This opens the door for a 
range o f  repercussions. Pressure to  conform, not simply in behaviour but also in 
beliefs and attitudes, is commonplace, recalling Fow ler’s description o f  those at his 
Stage 3.
Stage 3 ... structures the ultimate environment in interpersonal terms. ... I t is a 
“conformist” stage in the sense that it is acutely tuned to the expectations and 
judgments o f  significant others and as yet does not have a sure enough grasp 
on its own identity and autonom ous judgm ent to  construct and maintain an 
independent perspective. ... A t Stage 3 a person has an “ideology,” a  more or 
less consistent clustering o f  values and beliefs, but he or she has not
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objectified it for examination and in a sense is unaware o f  having it.
(1981:172-73)
The previous section commented on how  authority can be attributed and perceived as 
well as intrinsically present. This is relevant to  the present discussion, as it is to any 
which looks at the relationship between people and their external environment and 
social context. Ideological authority pertains as m uch to the hermeneutical side o f  
constructing knowledge as it does the epistemological. So individuals belonging to an 
ideological community turn  to the hermeneutical framework o f  that community in 
order to  interpret their experience and give it meaning. The nature o f  its authority and 
influence therefore has a  different flavour: options are restricted, and those available 
are endorsed as the only truly bona fide possibilities. Correspondingly, the emotional 
pressure that characterises much non-ideological epistemological reasoning is 
lessened. People make autonom ous choices, freed from the affective considerations 
implied in Perry’s study, simply because all the options come with a stamp o f  
approval.
Hull (1991 [1985]) provides a  thorough exploration o f  the implications o f  the 
Christian ideological fram ework for the consequent learning o f  its adherents. This, 
together with other ways in which the various authorities outlined in this section play 
their part in Christian learning, is taken up later in this chapter. However, the 
discussion o f  this section has demonstrated not only how ideologies p e r  s e  exert an 
authority, but how  ideological characteristics, when attached to propositions, heighten 
the authoritativeness o f  those propositions. Their ‘tru th ’ becomes even weightier, 
bolstered by the values and associations o f  the ideological framework and community. 
This applies on a macro level to the overall prepositional belief system, and on a 
micro level to individual and personal propositions and belief statements. One o f  the 
results o f  this is that both the system and its propositions become even more self- 
contained and discrete, separate from  the body o f  knowledge which surrounds them. 
This discreteness then becomes one last way in which authority is exerted and which 
is o f  relevance to the thesis, since it means that people are able to identify what is 
‘Christian’ and what isn’t and make corresponding commitments and decisions. A 
fram ework o f  inclusivity and exclusivity is constructed, the one trustw orthy and 
worthy o f  people’s devotion; the other to be rejected as a  negative corollary.
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II. The impact of authoritative social knowledge on learning
One o f  the significant aspects o f  social knowledge for the purposes o f  the thesis is that 
it is external to people. By juxtaposing it against personal knowledge as Kolb (1984, 
above) does, an inner/outer relationship is put in place. This relationship is held in a 
balanced tension, rather like a  seesaw, and the balance in any learning situation can be 
weighted towards either end, or more evenly distributed between the two poles. M ore 
generally, returning to Fowler and Perry and the discussion o f  the Prologue, the 
balance represents where the greatest authority is placed and exercised, and the major 
transition point identified by both m en conveys the sense o f  the seesaw tipping 
slightly from being weighted tow ard the external to being weighted tow ard the 
internal. The next chapter argues that this balance is best investigated through the 
concept o f  internalisation, and the impact that a heavy external authority might have 
on the process. Since Jarvis’s model presented in Chapter One took  a horizontal 
approach, its time-centred emphasis was itself ‘weighted’ tow ard a focus on 
quantitatively defined learning outcom es and the different components which 
contributed to their construction. The discussion suggested that his m odel was less 
able to incorporate the vertical process o f  internalisation and hence it is difficult at 
this point to suggest specific theoretical ways in which that process may be affected 
by an external authority. This is the purpose o f  Chapters Three, Four and Five.
One aspect o f  the learning process as outlined by Jarvis can be shown to be 
susceptible to influence, however.
11.1 A fourfold configuration
While Jarvis suggests that people and their biographies, the social situation, and 
experience itself are the key players in initiating learning, the two former elements 
may appropriately be reconceptualised to take into account the ‘how ’ rather than the 
‘w hat’ o f  learning. People bring their biographies and their selves, that individuation 
o f  consciousness, and when making sense o f  an unfamiliar situation it is essentially 
the latter which initiates learning as people begin to reflect on what is going on. The 
social situation is essentially that body o f  external social knowledge which represents
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constructed reality. A  common configuration o f  learning is therefore triadic, w ith a 
cyclical interaction between these three components, as depicted in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Interacting components o f experiential learning
The discussion o f  Chapter One suggested that since people also bring their conscious 
selves to every learning situation, this necessarily involves some form o f  reflection 
and hence indicates a  need to re-think the placing and role o f  Jarvis’s box 8, 
‘reflection/thought’: something apparent in his ow n most recent revision (2004). It is 
also possible that the ensuing patterns o f  reasoning are affected according to the 
configuration o f  the components, something looked at in the next section.
W hen considering the effect o f  Christian faith-content, however, as a  distinct, discrete 
and alternative form o f  social knowledge, it w ould appear that the umbrella ‘social 
know ledge’ subdivides into two. Two alternative referents for the interpretations o f  an 
experience are available, especially if  and when this occurs outside a specifically 
Christian social context. By subdividing social knowledge in this way, a fourfold 
rather than threefold configuration is constructed, with a corresponding greater range 
o f  possible forms o f  interaction. The precise details are difficult to anticipate. (This 
was an area which the empirical data was able to clarify.) Yet the potential is there.
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11.2 Patterns of reasoning
A second way in which faith content may influence the specific interaction between 
people and social knowledge is identifiable in people’s patterns o f  reasoning, 
especially if  it is possible to speak o f  ‘everyday’ forms o f  reasoning in the same way 
as Heller (1984) speaks o f  everyday knowledge. There seems to be some indication 
that this might be the case in certain instances. Donald Schon, for example, explores 
the concept and function o f  the m odel o f  Technical Rationality. Citing Glazer, he 
comments that:
The major professions are “disciplined by an unambiguous end— health, 
success in litigation, profit— which settles m en’s minds,” and they operate in 
stable institutional contexts. Hence they are grounded in systematic, 
fundamental knowledge, o f  which scientific knowledge is the prototype, or 
else they have a “high component o f  strictly technological knowledge based 
on science in the education which they provide.” In  contrast, the minor 
professions suffer from  shifting, ambiguous ends and from unstable 
institutional contexts o f  practice, and are th e re fo r e  unable to  develop a base o f  
systematic, scientific professional knowledge. ... The systematic knowledge 
base o f  a profession is thought to have four essential properties. It is 
specialized, firmly bounded, scientific, and standardized. (Schon, 1991 
[1983] :23; italics in original)
Schon’s particular interest is in practical and professional knowledge which he then 
takes forward into a thorough examination o f  reflection-in-action. This is picked up 
again in Chapter Four. For the discussion at hand, the points o f  interest in his 
comments above lie in his emphasis on the systematic and standardised dimension o f  
knowledge. Schon goes on to  observe:
The concept o f  “application” leads to  a  view o f  professional knowledge as a 
hierarchy in which “general principles” occupy the highest level and “concrete 
problem  solving” the lowest. (1991:24)
From  all o f  the above, it is possible to  deduce that there are normal and accepted ways 
in which people engage w ith an established body o f  (social) knowledge, and these 
ways are characterised by general principles, codes o f  practice, and forms o f  logic. In 
the professional context that Schon is engaging with, w ith his particular interest in the
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reflective p r a c t i t io n e r , he focuses on ‘professional’ types o f  knowledge: what Berger 
and Luckmann (1966) might have designated ‘sub-universes’, particularly in view o f  
their association o f  sub-universes with role. In  a wider, more general context, it is 
probable that different philosophical eras tend to govern the forms o f  logic and reason 
that characterise people’s engagement w ith the social world. So modernism, post­
modernism, and other social philosophies, each provide a basis for understanding the 
world, and this basis has its ow n structural foimdations and premises. Technical 
Rationality therefore fits as an epistemological sub-universe within the wider 
‘everyday knowledge’ universe which provides it w ith some, but not all, o f  its 
epistemological tenets.
It is suggested that Christian faith-content has the potential to function as an 
epistemological sub-universe, but with a less stable basis than Glazer’s Technical 
Rationality. While it is possible (although questionable) that an established way o f  
engaging w ith it might exist, and that this might be characterised by a set o f  general 
principles that govern its logic and interpretation, evidence would suggest this is m ore 
akin to the ‘shifting, ambiguous, unstable’ patterns o f  reasoning typical o f  Glazer’s 
‘minor professions’. Individuals, denominations, churches, each have a form o f  
reasoning which fits with their ow n emphases and preferences, be these theologically 
rooted or other. Unlike Berger and Luckm ann’s sub-universe, however, which is very 
m uch connected to role and therefore often operates ‘singularly’, people performing 
one principal role at a  time, in the case o f  people engaging with Christian faith 
content, they have not only the choice about whether to interpret their experience 
using this faith-content or not, about the form o f  reasoning to use if  they do, and about 
how  this might interact— or not— with the reasoning o f  the surrounding social 
epistemology. This is the basic outworking o f  the fourfold configuration outlined in 
section II. 1 and hence a second theoretical way in which people’s faith-content might 
influence their learning is identified.
Thus far, the discussion has centred primarily on social knowledge and its specific 
attributes, identifying authoritative characteristics pertaining to Christian faith- 
content. John Hull’s study o f  what prevents Christian adults from learning turns to the 
Christian ideology in more general terms, considering it largely from the perspective
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o f  Eagleton’s categories (a) and (b) (above, section 1.4). He suggests a number o f  
reasons why and ways in which the process o f  Christian learning is often inhibited 
and adversely affected on account o f  Christianity’s ideological characteristics. His 
thesis is o f  immediate relevance to the interests o f  this research, and the next section 
explores his position in depth.
111. What Prevents Christian Adults from Learning?
John Hull’s volume W h a t P r e v e n ts  C h r is t ia n  A d u lts  f r o m  L e a rn in g ?  (1991 [1985]) 
has become an important text in the body o f  literature within the discipline o f  
Christian Education. At first sight, his concerns appeal* somewhat tangential to the 
interest o f  the thesis, w ith its concern not on how  people d o n ’t  learn, but on how they 
d o .  Nevertheless, the one is the negative corollary o f  the other, both functioning as 
tw o sides o f  the same coin, and Hull’s study offers insights which are important and 
relevant. Theorists o f  learning also highlight the fact that non-learning must be 
included alongside the process o f  learning (see Jarvis, 1995, 2001). This section firstly 
outlines the essential features o f  Hull’s thesis, and then moves to  analyse these from 
the perspective o f  the processes o f  learning p e r  s e .
Hull identifies three main (overlapping) ways in which the Christian ideology affects 
the behaviour and attitudes o f  its adherents. Fundamental to his thesis is the notion o f  
‘ideological closure’ and a consequent ‘ideological tim e-lag’. He suggests that the 
form er is a  characteristic o f  many ideological systems such as Christianity on account 
o f  the presence o f  a hermeneutical circle, which means that ‘ideologies (systems o f  
interpretation and o f  meaning) always interpret themselves by reference to 
them selves’ (1991 [1985]:80). Thus they often fail to allow either a  critical self- 
awareness and a realistic engagement w ith other surrounding ideologies, belief 
systems and world-views. Other characteristics were identified in section 1.4 (above). 
Ideologies therefore necessarily narrow  the hermeneutical field available to people, as 
well as constructing a boundary around it.
Ideological closure may result in an ideological time-lag:
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We must never forget that for many Christians their experience o f  growing up 
in faith is profoundly influenced by what we have called the ideological time- 
lag. This means that the Christian faith into which they were nurtured was 
always lagging behind realistic adjustment to the world as it has come to be 
today. M any Christian children are brought up within a sort o f  ideological 
enclave. The absence o f  an element o f  criticism from m ost programmes o f  
Christian education in the early years means that the child or young person 
comes face to face with reality with a sudden jolt at a later point. (1991
[1985]:113)
Linked to  this is what Hull calls ‘sedim entation’. Layer upon layer o f  similar 
interpretation forms within the consciousness o f  a  group, creating a form o f  ‘inertia’ 
as well as a resistance tow ards the new, unfamiliar and novel. The sedimented layers 
also provide an authoritative way o f  interpreting new experiences. Discussing the 
relationship between experience and authority, Hull comments:
Although the life o f  ideological groups is experiential in the general sense that 
it is built up by an interpretation o f  experience and is sedimented by 
experience upon experience continuously interpreted and re-interpreted in this 
manner, nevertheless the life o f  these groups is authoritative rather than 
experiential. The authority will justify the ideology, and the ideology must 
now  also include elements which will justify the place given within it to the 
authority. W ithout such authority social groups would disintegrate, they would 
no longer be historically significant. (1991 [1985]:69)
Secondly, Hull identifies a concentration upon the past. While he recognises that 
ideologies may have a future orientation also (a M arxist utopia, for example, or 
Christian eschatology), he considers that a  key characteristic is the tendency for social 
groups to understand themselves in relation to the event (and figure) which founded 
them. ‘The role o f  the ideology is to diffuse the convictions o f  the founding fathers 
and to  perpetuate the influence o f  their actions’ (1991 [1985]:64). He then speaks o f  a 
‘dom estication by memory’. ‘An ideology is a  way o f  selecting from  the past certain 
elements which are to be valued because o f  the impetus and coherence they give to 
current action.’ So ‘the free-ranging and uninformed catalogue o f  past events is 
shaped in the memory by the ideology into a coherent pattern o f  interpreted meaning’.
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A  third potential characteristic o f  the Christian ideology is its tendency to exert a 
totalitarian grip over its adherents, which is threatened by other (generally religious) 
ideologies, each making similar totalitarian claims. Hull contends that the result will 
be a ‘controversy about ‘relativity” , linking this to  assumptions o f  absoluteness. He 
rejects the latter on the grounds that ‘to  be absolute is to be unrelated. The things in 
this world must be related, and that goes for the religions o f  humanity just as for the 
planets in the solar system’. (1991 [1985]:26) Nevertheless, Christians often retreat 
behind walls o f  supposed absoluteness. Hull links the ‘outer’ plurality with an ‘inner’ 
pluralisation o f  consciousness: ‘W e are not so m uch unified persons facing many 
realities as disunified persons containing many realities’ (1991 [1985]:27).
From  these premises and others draw n from the psychology o f  belief, Hull is able to 
draw  conclusions (followed by remedial suggestions) about how and why adult 
Christians are prevented from learning. Central to his thesis is the notion o f  cognitive 
dissonance and the discomfort Christians experience resulting from  the combination 
o f  the ideological fram ework and their psychological belief system. Difficulties from 
the form er arise in three main ways: within the belief system itself when it becomes 
apparent that it is not self-consistent; betw een one belief system and another when 
suddenly they both seem equally plausible or people meet equally convinced 
adherents o f  another religion; and if  (when) people’s own deeply-held beliefs are 
regarded as being childish or unimportant by those around or by society in general. 
Difficulties from the latter result from people’s psychological ‘need to be right’ and o f  
the ‘pain o f  learning’ which Hull suggests is characteristic not only o f  Christians but 
o f  hum an beings in general. The experience o f  disjuncture may be painful— indeed, 
Hull’s position would suggest disjuncture automatically involves ‘pain’, something 
this thesis would contest— and hence learning p e r  s e  may also be painful. The pain, 
according to  Hull, is far m ore extensive, however, than simply that o f  disjuncture, and 
he relates it to more far-reaching aspects o f  the learning process than the initial 
experience. R e fle c tio n  is an ‘experience’ which may be painful, for example, and 
Christians may well resort to thought-stopping techniques.
Certain Christians abandon or suppress all reflection (whether critical or 
otherwise) about their beliefs, surrendering themselves to a sense o f  relief by
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not engaging these particular intellectual gears. (Astley, 1994:101, 
summarising Hull)
It is impossible to determine whether such techniques are solely characteristic o f  
Christians, o f  religious people, or o f  everyone in general, and thus no significant light 
is shed upon the research question w ith which the thesis in concerned. (At a later 
point, Hull makes it clear that for him, ideologies are a  universal hum an construction 
and no one operates outside their influence. We can surmise, therefore, that thought- 
stopping is likely to be characteristic o f  all people. It may nevertheless be m o re  
characteristic o f  Christians and/or religious adherents than o f  others.)
Together with thought-stopping techniques, Hull names two further major ways in 
which Christian ‘discom fort’ may be alleviated. The first is separation from the 
external causes. This may be either physical, social, or inward. So people may remove 
themselves geographically from  a source o f  dissonance, or alternatively build 
protective walls round their ‘city’; they may restrict their social relationships to those 
o f  their group; or they may ‘simply not notice the opinions and beliefs o f  others;
[they] will simply not hear the discordant voices’ (1991 [1985]:117). Secondly, Hull 
speaks o f ‘ideological hardening’. ‘The believer is drilled or schooled in the tenets o f  
his faith’ (1991 [1985]: 125). This, at w orst, gradually eliminates individuals’ ability 
to  think for themselves. A t best, questions will be ‘revisionary or applicatory, but not 
exploratory, comparative or critical’. ‘The adult believer remains passive, finding out, 
but not contributing creatively to what there is to find ou t’ (1985:126). So an ‘us and 
them ’ division is created, which Hull describes as an ‘ideological compensation’. The 
group becomes the authoritative source o f  truth, saved and defending itself 
(successfully) from the wiles o f  the enemy.
Hull considers that these three techniques are extreme, and not representative o f  the 
majority o f  church affiliation in contem porary Britain. (Astley’s' view that ‘it is not 
the task o f  e v e r y  C h r is t ia n  to reinterpret the faith for each generation, or even for 
themselves. To begin with, many people are simply incapable o f  th a t . . .’ [1994:103; 
italics in original] should nevertheless be borne in mind.) He then composes a list o f  
less draconian measures that he suggests a r e  characteristic o f  British Christians.
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These range from vagueness (avoidance o f  specific belief, tendency tow ards lack o f  
clarity), to piety ( ‘God knows, we don’t  need to ’), authoritarianism (‘the 
minister/bible knows, and we shouldn’t/m ustn’t question), objectification (refusing to 
engage with the bible or theology at a personal or internalised level, keeping them  at 
arm ’s length), to an overall spiritual passivity that means Christians renege on their 
personal responsibilities, allowing themselves to  be Ted in prayer’, ‘blessed’ and 
generally have their spiritual batteries recharged simply by attending a worship 
service.
B oth Hull himself, and Astley who engages in depth with Hull’s w ork in a  number o f  
studies (1994, 2000, in te r  a l ia ) emphasise the importance o f  critical reflection in the 
process o f  Christian learning. At this point, the line between studying formative 
Christian education as distinct from the way that Christians learn becomes blurred. 
Astley distinguishes betw een formative (Christian) education and critical (Christian) 
education by suggesting that the former ‘concentrates on [the] role o f  passing on the 
chinch’s values, beliefs and ways— in a w ord, its ‘culture’.
This process is often described as some form  o f  cultural formation: 
‘enculturation’ (learning a culture by being brought up in it), ‘acculturation’ 
(the additional learning o f  a new, ‘second’ culture), ‘assimilation’ (the 
learning o f  a new culture w ith a loss o f  one’s original culture) or 
‘biculturalisation’ (the blending o f  two cultures).
The latter ‘encourages a reflective analysis and evaluation o f  the church’s claims, in 
the light o f  the learner’s ow n experience and understanding’.
Critical Christian education is primarily evaluative o f  the church’s self- 
understanding, and therefore in principle less conservatively ‘traditional’ than 
formation, when form ation is seen simply as passing on a received tradition. 
This ‘Christian criticism’ embraces w hat has been described as the 
‘deconstruction’ o f  the tradition. (Astley, 2000:38)
The majority o f  Hull’s categories outlined above represent thought-stopping 
techniques, which themselves are indicative o f  no, or minimal, reflection. In  many 
senses, this is a third (and least desirable) alternative to the formative/critical 
education partnership, since in each o f  these at least some reflection takes place. Hull 
connects people’s resort to thought-stopping techniques with a  variety o f  fears,
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appropriating them  hence to  an affective response or reaction. This rings true, and the 
demonstration throughout his volume o f  how  cognitive and affective walk hand in 
hand is important to the overall discussion o f  the thesis. Apparently ignorant o f  
Perry’s (1970) study, Hull nevertheless takes the latter’s identification o f  escape and 
retreat from learning one step further. For Perry, these were apparently direct 
responses to  a  challenge o f  relativism. They were nonetheless equally affective, often 
themselves based on fear, anxiety and insecurity. There were few implications in 
P e n y ’s scheme that escape and retreat also involved a ceasing o f  reflection. Indeed, 
Perry suggested a number o f  ways in which people in these ‘bubbles’ actively 
continued to  reflect as they had previously done, using this as a defensive mechanism 
against the perceived outside pressures to change. Hull, however, suggests a capacity 
that people have to put reflection and thought on hold. The source o f  fear is different 
from  that o f  Perry’s interviewees. Hull’s reasoning suggests that an ideological 
influence causes people to  retreat to the safety o f  their ideological enclosure on 
account o f  differences o f  content: m atters o f  right and wrong.
Hull makes no attempt to  relate his theories, and in particular his conclusions, to 
educational scholarship. However, certain dimensions can usefully be compared, 
contrasted and critiqued with Jarvis’s m odel and typology in order to  consider their 
‘place’. Two immediate observations come to the fore. Firstly, a general unease with 
the notion o f  non-learning p e r  s e  has been expressed. B oth in the Prologue and in 
Chapter One, indications were given that this should be viewed as a misnomer or even 
a misconpeption. While Jarvis, like Hull, associates non-learning with lack o f  
reflection, the two challenges to this position emerge from the unrepeatability o f  an 
experience, since biography and situation will necessarily be different, and the notion 
that people can genuinely cease to  reflect to  the point that no learning occurs. For 
M arton and B ooth (1997), for example, hum an consciousness implies thought and 
reflection, and while the previous chapter argued for understandings o f  each term  to 
be m ore clearly defined, it is possible that they largely signify an increasing degree o f  
focus and structure. Unconscious learning would appear not to  be an option. So for 
both Jarvis and Hull, the question becomes a) the length o f  time that something is 
focused on, and the corresponding level o f  consciousness (Jarvis), and b) the focus 
and structure o f  thought (Hull). R ather than thought-stopping, therefore, Hull’s
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understanding o f  non-learning is m ore appropriately viewed as a diminution o f 
perceptive, focused and structured thought. A  descent into muddled disorganisation, 
probably involving a positioning o f  the issue at a  lower level o f  consciousness, with 
little or no attempt to impose structure.
This proposal, however, ignores one o f  the strengths o f  Hull’s thesis: the role o f 
em otion in learning. Is it not possible that people impose an emotional barrier that 
prevents them  from engaging with an experience, and hence to say that they don’t 
learn? This would cohere with Jarvis’s older— or not so old— learner who rejects the 
opportunity to  adjust to the m odem  world. The question presupposes, however, that 
em otion can prevent thought! Certainly it can prevent f o c u s e d  thought. Jarvis’s 
emphasis on different levels o f  consciousness suggests that thought— maybe 
uncontrolled and subconscious— can continue even if  it has been emotionally blocked 
at the m ore focused level. The experience o f  many is that after a period o f  time, the 
original issues resurface, often taking new  perspectives and suggesting in so doing 
that all thought has not stopped.
Chapter Nine introduces the idea o f  primary and secondary learning which begins to  
grapple w ith some o f  these issues. W hat is significant from the discussion o f  this 
section, however, is Hull’s dem onstration that the authoritative dimensions embedded 
within the Christian ideology often affect, influence, divert, or even impede individual 
learning processes. This is both at an intellectual and at an emotional level, and may 
pertain as much to the quality o f  learning as it does the quantity. ‘Prevention’ o f  
learning, however, is almost certainly not the case.
V. Summary and conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated a variety o f  ways in which it considers people’s 
learning might be influenced as a  result o f  the authoritative dimensions o f  the 
Christian ideology and its faith-content. Focusing on both aspects, the authority o f  the 
latter was shown primarily to  relate to the process o f  internalisation, and hence 
deferred for discussion. Nonetheless, the discrete characteristic o f  the Christian sub­
universe and its associated bank o f  social knowledge suggested that the common
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triadic configuration o f  players within the learning process— individuals, the social 
situation with its referent o f  social knowledge, and experience— could potentially 
function as a foursome, two alternative areas o f  social knowledge becoming available 
by which to interpret the experience. Equally, the patterns o f  reasoning employed may 
be affected by this configuration, since people have the option o f  deviating from that 
commonly associated with the construction o f  everyday knowledge. The authority o f  
the former, Christian ideology, was considered w ith reference to Hull’s W h at P r e v e n ts  
C h r is t ia n  A d u lts  f r o m  L e a rn in g ?  (1991 [1985]). Here, the links betw een thought, 
reflection, emotion and learning suggested that, while ‘prevention’ was an 
inappropriate way o f  interpreting the impact o f  the ideological authority on learning, it 
had an effect on the quality o f  thought and reflection, as well as heightening people’s 
emotional responses.
The discussion has served two puiposes, therefore. Firstly, it has established both the 
fact that people’s external faith-content has a variety o f  authoritative dimensions; and 
secondly, it has demonstrated ways in which this and the accompanying ideological 
fram ework might influence the processes o f  learning, hence confirming via theoretical 
means the research hypothesis. Since the analysis o f  learning was based primarily on 
Jarvis’s model and typology, little attention was paid to the process o f  internalisation, 
although the chapter indicated that certainly the authoritative characteristics o f 
external faith-content suggested that this was another area o f  learning susceptible to 
influence.
This is the focus o f  the next tw o chapters.
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Chapter Three 
Internalisation, and the construction of the person 
Introduction
Having ascertained in Chapter Two the appropriateness o f  viewing Christian faith- 
content as a) a form o f  external social knowledge, which b) carries particularly 
authoritative characteristics, this chapter turns to  the concept o f  internalisation, 
reasoning that both features are likely to affect the way in which this occurs and hence 
exert an influence. This is particularly the case i f  social knowledge is located 
externally to  people, since the inner/outer balance identified by Belenky e t  a l  (1996
[1986]; see Prologue, section II) will be weighted tow ard the external. Within the 
overall context o f  the social construction o f  individuals, this chapter focuses on the 
processes o f  internalisation and extem alisation in learning, exploring firstly the very 
concept o f  an inner and an outer in this context. Two specific results o f  internalisation 
are then considered, people’s biographies, and their selves, and a variety o f  ways in 
which Christian faith-content may affect the process that contributes to their 
construction is demonstrated. Lastly, the chapter turns to  the development o f  the self, 
turning to the m etaphor o f  voice to  dem onstrate both how  the self grows and develops 
.and how  this too is vulnerable to  the influence o f  external authority. Through each o f  
these studies, the validity o f  the research hypothesis is confirmed in theory, and areas 
to be explored in the empirical investigation identified.
L The social construction of individuals and the processes of 
internalisation and extemalisation
Fundamental to  the discussion o f  the chapter is the assumption that people construct 
themselves as a  result o f  transforming experience into a variety o f  learning outcomes. 
This relates not only to Jarvis’s definition o f  learning introduced in Chapter One, but 
also to  the notions o f  social and personal knowledge. Fundamental to  those are the 
understanding that the latter is external to  the ‘inner’ person. Such an understanding is
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not universally accepted, however, and the purpose o f this first section is to  consider 
the different perspectives, in order to arrive at a conclusion on which the subsequent 
discussions can be based.
Despite the fact that Chapter One mildly criticised Jarvis’s model for not doing 
sufficient justice to the process o f  internalisation, the cycle o f  internalisation and 
externalisation nonetheless plays an important role in his thinking and theorising 
about learning in general. There is a  clear divide betw een people and their external 
world, and it is the transaction betw een the two that firstly causes experience, 
secondly permits its interpretation by providing it w ith a social referent, and thirdly 
occasions learning and grow th in people as they transform  and appropriate it within 
their lives. The cycle o f  internalisation and externalisation was introduced previously, 
w ith Jarvis’s diagram o f  the process depicted in Figure 1.3. People’s external 
‘objectified culture’ is largely represented by the language that they use to  construct 
it, since a significant degree o f  externalisation takes place linguistically, be that 
expressed orally or via gesture. Chapter Five returns to this model when discussing 
the relationship it argues people have w ith knowledge. For the purposes at hand, 
however, a  clear distinction betw een the external and internal is understood. People 
are distinct from their environment. Learning takes place as they experience, 
transform  and appropriate it within themselves. They articulate the result o f  their 
learning in their consequent interaction w ith the external environment, something 
which takes place primarily, although not exclusively, linguistically.
This understanding o f  people in relation with their environment provides the basis for 
Jarvis’s constructivist m odel o f  the processes o f  learning outlined previously. While 
the discussion o f  the chapter finally accepts this overall configuration, it is 
nevertheless important to  note that it is not a  universally-accepted understanding o f  
the world and people’s relationship with it. A  particularly relevant challenge since it 
emanates from the study o f  learning is M arton and B ooth’s volume L e a r n in g  a n d  
A w a r e n e s s  (1997) in which the scholars challenge the view that people ‘construct’ 
their knowledge, preferring instead the term  ‘constitute’. They make their unease 
about the principles o f  social constructivism  clear from the outset o f  then  work, 
stating in the first chapter:
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Individual constructivism  is a form  o f  cognitivism in the sense that it regards 
the outer (acts, behaviour) as being in need o f  exploration and the inner 
(mental acts) as explanatory, whereas, as we have pointed out, the reverse is 
true for s o c ia l  c o n s tr u c tiv ism . The tw o schools are thus m irror images o f  each 
other, their focuses being on different sides o f  the borderline betw een “the 
inner” and “the outer.” They share the shortcoming o f  lacking explanatory 
pow er with respect to  what they claim to account for because they share the 
separation between “the inner” and “the outer.” In order to combine the 
insights originating from  these two camps that relate to our question “H ow  do 
we gain knowledge about the world?” one has to transcend the person-world 
dualism imposed by their respective focus on what is within the person and 
what surrounds her. One should not, and we do not, consider person and world 
as being separate. One should not resort to hypothetical mental structures 
divorced from the world, and we have no intention o f  doing so. N or should 
one resort to the social, cultural world as seen by the researcher only. People 
live in a world which they— and not only the researchers— experience. They 
are affected by what affects th em , and not by what affects the researchers.
W hat this boils down to— as far as learning o f  the kind to be dealt with in this 
book is concerned— is taking the experiences o f  people seriously and 
exploring the physical, the social, and the cultural world they experience. The 
world we deal with is the world as experienced by people, by learners—  
neither individual constructions nor independent reahties; the people, the 
learners, we deal with are people experiencing aspects o f  that world—-neither 
bearers o f  mental structures nor behaviourist actors.
Thus in this book the dividing line betw een “the outer” and “the inner” 
disappears. There are not two things, and one is not held to  explain the other. 
There is not a real w orld “out there” and a subjective world “in here.” The 
world is not constructed by the learner, nor is it imposed upon her; it is 
c o n s t i tu te d  as an internal relation betw een them. There is only one world, but 
it is a  world that we experience, a  world in which we live, a  world that is ours. 
(M arton and Booth, 1997:12-13; italics in original)
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M arton and B ooth  attem pt to reconceptualise the relationship traditionally expressed 
as existing between learner and environment by focusing on the content o f  people’s 
experience, as distinct from the event, as emphasised by Jarvis. It should be noted that 
their argument is rooted in a general discussion o f  how  people know and what the 
nature o f  knowledge is. It is their understanding o f  this which leads them  to challenge 
the inner/outer dichotomy. In many ways, therefore, their position contrasts against 
the approach o f  others in that it is fundamentally learner-centric. Rather than look at 
the w orld and understand people as participants in a world that is ‘bigger’ than them, 
they place the emphasis on learners and draw  conclusions about how  they and the 
world relate, contending that in so doing they solve M eno’s paradox: the conundrum 
o f  how  people gain knowledge when (a) either it cannot be found because they are 
unequipped to find it (otherwise it would already have been found), or (b) the seeker 
already has it, in which case it does not need to be sought (M arton and Booth, 
1997:137). For the authors, the solution to this paradox ‘lies in not making the 
distinction between inner and outer . . not  seeing the knower and the known, the 
subject and the object, as separate’ (1997:138). I f  this approach is taken, then 
‘knowledge is [seen to  be] bom  by a change in something in the world as experienced 
by a  person. The new way o f  experiencing something is constituted in the person- 
world relationships and involves both .’
In  this way M eno’s paradox disappears. We simply do not ask the question: 
“H ow  do we gain knowledge f r o m  the world?” N or do we ask the question: 
“H ow  do we gain knowledge from  the depth o f  our immortal soul?” Person 
and world, inner and outer are not separated. We do not have to  account for 
how  knowledge travels from  one to  the other. Instead o f  trying to account for 
the person-world relationship is established, we posit this relationship and 
study how  it changes as time passes’ (1997:139)
The authors’ position is interesting, but, the thesis suggests (and will go on to 
dem onstrate), less revolutionary than they imply. Certainly regarding scholarship o f 
learning, if  one digs deep, little appears to have changed in reality. M arton and B ooth 
continue to talk in term s which accept a  distinction between ‘individuals’ and ‘w orld’. 
I f  the two were genuinely merged, then this distinction would be impossible to 
maintain. Similarly, their reference to  people ‘gaining knowledge’ ‘about something 
specific’ suggests at least a distinction betw een people and knowledge, and since
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learning involves ‘gaining’, then it is a quantifiable increase that occurs as a result o f  
engagement w ith the external. It would seem that at heart, these scholars may have 
revealed more about the inappropriateness o f  the philosophy behind M eno’s paradox 
than they have about the true nature o f  the person-world relationship. The thesis 
returns to this at a  later point.
Despite these objections, one valuable contribution M arton and B ooth do make to the 
study o f  learning regards the role o f  awareness. This, for them, is the locus where 
individual and world connect; this is where learning takes place. The thesis recognises 
the influence o f  their thinking in its own form ulation o f  how learning and experience 
relate, and while an entirely learner-centric understanding appears at this stage o f  the 
discussion difficult to substantiate, the problems associated with Jarvis’s time-centric 
approach should not be forgotten. Neither one nor the other is yet able to present an 
entirely coherent portrayal o f  the process. Nevertheless, any study o f  learning must 
ultimately concentrate on the individual, and in this context it is apposite to refer to 
Belenky e t  a l ’ s (1996 [1986]) category o f  Constructed knowers who displayed many 
o f  the attributes that M arton and B ooth  prom ote.
Constructivists seek to stretch the outer boundaries o f  their consciousness— by 
making the unconscious conscious, by consulting and listening to  the self, by 
voicing the unsaid, by listening to others and staying alert to all the currents 
and undercurrents o f  life about them, by imagining themselves inside the new 
poem  or person or idea that they want to come to know  and understand. 
Constructivists become passionate knowers, knowers who enter into a union 
with that which is to  be known. ... W hat we are calling passionate knowing is 
the elaborated form connected knowing takes after women leam  to use the self 
as an instrument o f  understanding. (1996 [1986]: 141)
H ere we have an example o f  a type o f  ‘m erger’ between individual and world, a union 
in which the two not only interact, but begin to  fuse in the area o f  conscious 
awareness. Yet for Belenky e t  a l , this also involves the affective domain, not simply 
the cognitive. Important dimensions relating to  the overall interests o f  the thesis are 
being raised at this point, and the discussion returns to them  throughout. A  significant 
pointer for the issue at hand, however, is the authors’ use o f  the w ord ‘enter’ when 
describing the suggested union betw een people and knowledge. This suggests an
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initial separation which people themselves talce the initiative to dissolve. Prior to this, 
however, two distinct entities exist.
Clearly this is an area in need o f  continued discussion and investigation. The major 
players appear to be organised in different layers, perhaps most effectively depicted 
diagrammatically as in Figure 3.2. ‘Hum an conscionsness and awareness’— which 
should not exclude emotion— is placed at the centre o f  a structure which might almost 
take the form o f  an egg-timer, emphasising the fact that this is the pivotal point 
between the elements on either side.
Figure 3.2: People, experience and reality
‘Absolute’ reality 
Experience 
Constructed reality 
Human consciousness and awareness 
Experience 
Constructed beings
The m odel does not, in fact, negate the idea o f  a process o f  internalisation and 
externalisation taking place through learning, nor does it reject the concept o f  the 
existence o f  an external and internal. M uch depends on where one sees the pivot 
betw een the two. For M arton and B ooth  this is in the cognitive domain o f  conscious 
awareness. Nothing in Jarvis’s w ork disallows or rejects this; his emphasis, however, 
is on the sociological construction o f  people’s biographies, focusing hence on the 
constructed outcome rather than on cognitive activity. The two are complementary, 
and both must contribute to an overall understanding o f  the growth and development 
o f  individuals.
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This section therefore considers that the idea o f  a dual process o f  internalisation and 
extem alisation linking aspects o f  people’s beings to  an external environment can be 
upheld. While both ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ are somewhat nebulous concepts, from the 
perspective o f  experiential learning, experience itself marks the separation between 
the two. Human conscious awareness is almost certainly a pivotal area o f  overlap 
representing the zone where the two begin to merge. In  one way this contrasts against 
biography which may be viewed as an outcom e o f  internalisation rather than a stage 
o f  its process. In  another, however, as will be seen, human conscious awareness also 
has a constructed dimension and as such fits within the overall concept o f  biography. 
Nonetheless, if  a specific relationship betw een inner and outer can be maintained as 
the discussion suggests, then the potential for a  weighty external authority to  exert a 
particular influence on both the process o f  internalisation and on its outcom es is clear. 
For the purposes o f  the research, this took  the form  o f  Christian faith. The next section 
focuses on people’s biographies and dem onstrates ways in which this influence might 
be exerted.
18. The construction of a biography
The concept o f ‘biography’ is one introduced by Jarvis (1995) as he seeks to 
understand the result o f  the experience o f  disjuncture in terms o f  learning and its 
relationship to people themselves. Thus if  learning is a question o f  transforming 
experience into knowledge and other ‘outcom es’, people are seen as gradually 
building a cumulative and increasingly complex store o f  these outcomes, which 
together form their biography. Jarvis associates biography with mind, stating that:
People’s minds— their biographies— are the sum total o f  their learning within 
social situations. (1992:41)
M ind is therefore the constructed result o f  learning, the ‘place’ where its cognitive 
outcom es, at least, are stored, and which governs subsequent transformation o f  
experience. Jarvis emphasises the fact that people bring their biographies to  each and 
every new  learning experience, and they resort to  these when faced with the 
unpleasantness o f  disjuncture, interpreting and making sense o f  the unfamiliar with 
reference to what has gone before. Hence two referent banks are brought to each 
experience: people’s individual biographies, and the social situation in which the
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experience occurred. Given the cumulative nature o f  a biography, people therefore 
become increasingly ‘individual’ throughout their lives, as each experience brings a 
unique combination o f  referents which results in a conclusion and outcom e unique to 
the person concerned. One o f  the important functions o f  social knowledge, however, 
is to  provide a public and commonly-accepted bank o f  interpreted information. This 
ensures that a  reasonable cohesiveness is maintained at a social level even when 
individuals themselves might differ significantly.
For the purposes o f  the research, however, it is not the concept itself which is the 
focus o f  attention, but the processes which contribute to its construction. If, as section 
I argued, it is legitimate to view this construction as a  result o f  internalisation, then it 
is necessary to consider how  this occurs and what the outcomes might be. Two 
aspects are explored: the existential, followed by the psychological dimensions o f  
personhood.
11.1 People, knowledge and knowing
One o f  the problems o f  viewing people’s biographies as the sum o f  their knowledge^ 
as Jarvis’s quote cited above suggests, is the impression conveyed o f  finite, 
quantitatively-defined beings. This relates to his emphasis o f  understanding 
experience through the lens o f  time, and although his definition o f  learning quoted in 
Chapter One suggests that ‘know ledge’ should be seen as an umbrella term  
incorporating all the various outcom es o f  the transform ation o f  experience, 
‘information’ replacing its conventional use, this section argues that people’s 
biographies consist o f  m ore than quantifiable knowledge. There is, nonetheless, a 
sense in which biographies do require the internalisation o f  knowledge, not simply in 
term s o f  information (which relates primarily to  the act o f  memorisation in Jarvis’s 
model) but through the act o f  constructing personal knowledge. As people internalise, 
so they evaluate and begin to ow n new  knowledge, making commitments to it that 
then enable them  to move on. While the discussion above suggested that the process 
o f  internalisation began in people’s conscious awareness, and hence is primarily 
intellectual and potentially relates to information, its transformation moves beyond a
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purely cognitive and intellectual commitment to an emotional one. Hull makes the 
same, important point.
We are emotionally committed to our everyday sense o f  reality, and to the 
thousands o f  cognitions which we take to  be true and genuine knowledge 
without which we could not operate in this everyday world ... We all have the 
experience o f  being wrong sometimes, and usually we can find a reason for it.
... But to have the experience o f  unalleviated and inexcusable error, and to 
have it again and again and again would lead to cognitive and emotional 
breakdown. (Hull, 1991 [1985]:94)
It is as people come to the point o f  making this emotional commitment that the 
transform ation o f  experience into personal knowledge can be said to  have been 
completed and they themselves have engaged in further self-construction. The role o f 
commitment, however, confirms the fact that one dimension o f  people’s biographies 
consists o f  quantifiable knowledge. Returning to Jarvis’s model, it also means that 
this knowledge, as a specific ‘outcom e’, is identifiable and often articulated. There is 
an obvious- link with external content and social knowledge here. As this is 
internalised, people evaluate it, considering ways in which it might fit w ith their 
existing knowledge bank and biography. As these are found, so new  commitments are 
made. These may, or need not, replace previous commitments, depending on the 
circumstances and context.
This, then, is the process that occurs as Christians engage with external faith-content. 
Initially, this is perceived as a  bank o f  external information. As people experience its 
content, so they begin the process o f  internalisation and evaluation, working toward 
making some form o f  intellectual and emotional commitment to it. One o f  the ways in 
which the chapter proposes faith-content influences the learning process, however, 
occurs at precisely this point. Given its perceived authoritative nature, it is 
conceivable firstly that the process o f  evaluation is fast-tracked and secondly that 
more rapid and potentially more highly emotional commitments are made to it. As 
with many o f  the discussions o f  these theoretical chapters, this must lie at the level o f  
the hypothetical, to  be explored in greater depth through the empirical data. A t the 
same time, it should be recalled that commitment is in fact a normal part o f  learning. 
N ot only is it the means by which people establish and ‘fix’ their personal
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knowledge— the final step o f  transforming experience— but it is also part o f  their 
epistemological growth. Perry’s forms were characterised by a gradual progression 
tow ard making a ‘commitment in relativism’, for example. As people began to sense 
that a black and white world o f  absolutes no longer fitted their experience or the 
evidence around them, so they firstly entered a state o f  confusion in which they were 
bom barded with alternatives. As they wrestled with this, Perry suggested that Position 
6 (‘commitment foreseen’) was the stage when individuals may perceive commitment 
as a logical necessity for action in a relative world, or ‘feel’ it as something needed. 
From  there, they go on to make a ‘first commitment or affirmation’ which also 
involves the acceptance o f  the origins o f  these commitments within their own 
experiences and choices, and some intimations o f  the implications. Positions 8 and 9 
develop this still further, to the point that Perry suggests the latter is characterised by 
commitments being ‘expended or remade in new terms as grow th’ (1970: chart o f  
development, inside back cover). W ith reference to, Position 7, ’initial commitment’, 
he comments:
N ote on religion: In  Commitment involving a religious faith in an absolute, the 
same distinctions re Commitment apply (c f  theological distinction between 
belief and faith). The structural solutions for relating an absolute and 
relativism are varied and not outlined here. In  all o f  them  the crucial criterion 
for the integrity o f  the Relative orientation is the attitude tow ard people with 
other absolutes.
(1970: chart o f  development, inside back cover)
Perry does, in fact, identify different forms o f  commitment which he links to religion 
and hence adds weight to the developing argument o f  the chapter. Linking these forms 
to the difference between faith and belief, and identifying Position 5 as particularly 
relevant to  the discussion, he comments:
The role o f  religious Absolutes in the subsequent Positions o f  Commitment is 
a  special subject. There are data in our records illustrating several dispositions 
(e.g., “leap o f  faith,” “liberal religion,” etc.). In this report, however, it is 
enough to make two observations:
1. Theologically speaking, Position 5 represents the point o f  critical 
division betw een “belief’ and the possibility o f  “faith.” Belief requires
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no investment by the person. To become faith it must first be doubted. 
Only in the face o f  doubt is the person called upon for that act o f  
Commitment that is his contribution, his faith. In Position 5 one can no 
longer “believe” in the simple unquestioned sense.
2. I f  one later commits oneself to a faith in an Absolute, th e re  is  a  
c r ite r io n  w h ic h  r e v e a ls  th a t  th is  C o m m itm e n t h a s  b e e n  m a d e  in  th e  
c o n te x t o f  a  r e la t iv is t ic  w o r ld . This criterion is one’s attitude toward 
other people with a belief or faith in a different Absolute. They cannot 
appear as alien, as other than human; one must, however paradoxically, 
respect them. In  one sense they “m ust” be wrong, but in another sense, 
no more so than oneself. The moral obligation to convert them  or to 
annihilate them  has vanished. (1970:146)
The discussion o f  the thesis, both previous and in subsequent chapters, would refute 
Perry’s assertion that ‘belief requires no investment by the person’. Rather, it requires 
investment o f  a different order and nature. Fow ler’s work would also suggest that 
Perry somewhat overstates his case, since his ow n fundamental purpose was to 
identify the specific forms o f  people’s faith right from their earliest years. Perhaps the 
biggest difficulty w ith Perry’s scheme when considering Christian learning, however, 
is the assumption that all dimensions o f  people’s epistemological grow th occur 
simultaneously and that it is impossible for people to be at a  mixture o f  stages at the 
same time. So those who continue to  profess belief in and commitment to an absolute 
w ould automatically be classified in one o f  the lower positions even if  in other areas 
o f  their life they display a m ature awareness o f  (and commitment to) living in a highly 
relative world. This would suggest that Christians might engage differently with their 
faith authorities than with other forms o f  social knowledge, and hence another type o f  
separation and discreteness from  those explored in Chapter One is identifiable, adding 
weight at the same time to the methodological principles lying behind the project.
The role o f  commitment in constructing personal biographies is clearly o f  significance 
and the discussion thus far suggests that Christian faith-content may well influence 
people in the manner in which these commitments are made and in their nature. A 
second way in which that content can affect people’s biographies, however, relates to
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the content o f  external social knowledge. In  a Christian context, as people internalise 
faith-content, so they construct themselves and their personal knowledge in such a 
way that their biographies are increasingly ‘Christianised’. This fact is tacitly 
recognised by different branches o f  the Church which encourage the practice o f  daily 
‘Quiet Times’ o f  bible reading and prayer, or the recital o f  the daily Office. In  these 
instances, simple exposure to  Christian faith-content has an effect akin to 
quantitatively increasing the Christian dimension o f  people’s biographies in the same 
way as the experiencing o f  any other form  o f  social knowledge would do. Some 
Christian educators argue that the content o f  the content is also significant. Springsted 
states his case clearly.
What does it mean to say that theology is or ought to be spiritual? Such a 
claim is not analogous to saying that physics is scientific. For whereas physics 
is scientific because it is in accord w ith scientific method, that is, it reflects 
critically on empirical data, theology is not spiritual because o f  a spiritual 
method. Although there are spiritual methods, they do not involve the same 
sort o f  theoretical bases that scientific ones do. Rather, theology is spiritual 
because it involves an improvement, or is tied to an improvement, o f  the spirit. 
That theology has something to  do w ith spirituality, therefore, means that we 
not only think o f  God, but by thinking o f  God truly at all we are at the same 
time involved with him in such a way that our spirits are improved by that 
involvement, by that thinking. This is what it means to  say theology is 
spiritual, for there is an important connection between the thought and the 
improvement o f  the thinker. This makes theology, thinking on God, unique not 
only because God is unique, but also because the thought is related to a change 
within the thinker that comes from  an active relationship with God. I do not 
believe that sciences make anything like this claim that one becomes like what 
one studies. (1998:49-50)
Springsted’s position would suggest that not only are people’s b io g r a p h ie s  shaped by 
the content o f  their learning, but in the context o f  Christian faith, there is an ethical 
and spiritual influence also. People are ‘improved’, or in traditional theological 
language, ‘sanctified’. This is not the time or place to engage in the discussion any 
further, other than to observe that his position is not without its difficulties and clearly 
comes with a faith bias!
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Thus far the discussion has suggested that the construction o f  individual biographies 
and the process o f  internalisation can be affected by the nature o f  Christian faith- 
content both through the role o f  commitment and the experience o f  engaging with its 
content. One further way is discemable, however: in the transform ation o f  knowledge 
into knowing.
The section opened by suggesting that to  view people’s biographies simply as the sum 
o f  their knowledge was somewhat limited, and overemphasised the quantitative 
dimension. Elsewhere in the same volume Jarvis (1992) does more justice to the 
dynamic and qualitative, focusing on the existential side o f  biographies and linking 
this to the making o f  meaning and the role o f  understanding. So he states:
Being is about understanding, which in turn  is about knowing rather than 
having knowledge. (1992:169)
The difference but partnership betw een knowledge and knowing is a  familiar one.
Ryle (1949) refers to  the commonly-accepted distinction between knowledge o f  
acquaintance, and knowledge about, the one being a fluid, indefinable and dynamic 
form  o f  knowledge, the other conveying a sense that it can be ‘grasped’ (Kolb, 1984). 
‘Know ing’, by nature, is qualitative, evading definition and quantitative articulations. 
Y et as the next chapter demonstrates, the final transform ation o f  experience into 
personal knowledge involves knowledge becoming so integrated into people’s 
biographies that it is no longer separate and identifiable. For Jarvis, this comes about 
through understanding and making meaning.
In  a Christian context, then, the final step o f  constructing an existential biography 
through the process o f  internalisation is that o f  transforming knowledge into knowing. 
It is precisely at that point which the section suggests new difficulties arise. The 
Christian church has long recognised the fact that much o f  its faith-content no longer 
has any meaning in contem porary society. So a Church o f  England publication 
(T o m o r r o w  is  a n o th e r  c o u n try :  e d u c a t io n  in  a  p o s t- m o d e r n  w o r ld , 1996), for 
example, offers an exercise to be conducted in church groups in which over thirty 
term s integral and specific to the Christian tradition are listed. These include ‘trinity’, 
‘grace’, ‘kingdom’, ‘god’, ‘sin’, ‘salvation’, ‘justification’, ‘blessed’ and ‘loved’. 
Participants are invited to draw  a symbol alongside each term  indicating by a sun their
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general comfort with it and its meaning, by a flower an awareness that it is a fairly 
fragile concept and w ord which they use with caution, and by a skull and crossbones 
that it is ‘dead and has little meaning’ (1996:24). Irrespective o f  how  individuals 
respond, the very presence o f  this exercise is an acknowledgement o f  the church’s 
awareness that its content is potentially meaningless even to its own adherents, much 
less to  those with no church contact.
In  a consideration o f  how  faith-content might affect people’s biographies, the 
potential for it never to be transform ed into knowing is clear*. At first sight, this would 
appear not to relate to the authoritative dimension o f  faith-content. However, it is 
quite conceivable that given its authoritative nature, Christians internalise faith- 
content as knowledge but are unable to  take the next step o f  transforming it into 
knowing so that it becomes part o f  their beings. This, o f  course, would be an act o f  
self-transformation, having the effect o f  changing people’s existential make-up.
Three specific ways in which Christian faith-content might influence the process o f  
internalisation as it relates to the construction o f  individual existential biographies 
have therefore been identified. The nature o f  people’s commitment to personal 
knowledge as they construct it may take different forms. The content o f  faith-content 
necessarily plays a role by dint o f  people experiencing it. The transform ation o f  this 
content into knowing, however, might either never take place, or be impeded.
As indicated previously, while the concept o f  biography necessarily incorporates the 
whole o f  individuals’ existential grow th and development, it is helpful to  focus 
specifically on the cognitive and psychological if  only because o f  the argument o f  the 
previous section which suggested that the central zone for the initiation o f  learning 
within people was human awareness and consciousness. This is the interest o f  the next 
section.
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11.2 Biographies and personal constructs
11.2.1 The concept of personal constructs
One o f  Hull’s (1991 [1985]) emphases in his consideration o f  why aspects o f  the faith 
o f  Christian adults might prevent them  from  learning is the experience o f  cognitive 
dissonance. He links this w ith what he considers people’s need to be right and the 
pain o f  being wrong, using these to form  the theories first introduced in Chapter Two. 
In  support o f  his argument, he turns to the w ork o f  George Kelly (1955) and Kelly’s 
theories o f  personal constructs which provide him with a useful understanding o f  
people’s psychological structures, particularly w ith respect to the role o f  perception. 
This necessarily relates to the process o f  learning, and Kelly’s w ork becomes o f  
relevance at this point both on account o f  the outw ard focus o f  the act o f  perception—  
it is concerned with how  people ‘perceive’ their external environment— and o f  his 
conclusions about the structures o f  hum an conscious activity. An inner/outer 
interaction is thus clearly present and the purpose o f  this section is to consider what 
impact Christian faith-content might have on that interaction, its process and results.
Kelly articulated in his two volumes entitled P s y c h o lo g y  o f  P e r s o n a l C o n s tru c ts  
(1955) an understanding o f  people developing a  range o f  psychological constructs 
throughout their lives. Like Jarvis, he emphasises the role o f  time. An important 
characteristic o f ‘biography’ is that it consists not only o f  a past and present, but also 
o f  a  potential future. This was an equally important dimension o f  Kelly’s constructs.
H e began his important w ork with tw o fundamental premises:
We started out with two notions: (1) that, viewed in the perspective o f  the 
centuries, m an might be seen as an incipient scientist, and (2) that each 
individual man formulates in his ow n way constructs through which he views 
the world o f  events. As a scientist, m an seeks to  predict, and thus control, the 
course o f  events. It follows, then, that the constructs which he formulates are 
intended to aid him in his predictive efforts. (Kelly, 1955:12)
Prediction— a looking beyond and reaching outwards— not only coheres w ith the 
definition o f  people and learning proposed above, but, according to Kelly, accounts 
for another characteristic o f  people’s biographies: the ordering and organisation o f  
their (particularly cognitive) knowledge in recognisable ways. He term s these
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‘constructs’, and suggests that a personal construct is ‘an anticipation, based upon our 
experience and continually modified in the light o f  more experience, which is 
intended to offer predictions about the way tilings will be’ (Hull, 1991 [1985]: 102). It 
follows that constructs are highly individual, representing people’s individual 
perspectives and outlook on life, according to their previous experiences and 
conclusions (learned outcomes, knowledge). Constructs are continually being 
modified and adapted, then, as people also look back and evaluate.
Just as constructs are used to forecast events, so they must also be used to 
assess the accuracy o f  the forecast, after the events have occurred. (Kelly, 
1955:13)
I f  the forecast was inaccurate, then the tools which were used to formulate the 
prediction— the constructs— are considered to have been deficient in some way, and 
people must then alter and amend them  accordingly.
Personal constructs, then, are ways ‘in which some things are construed as being alike 
and yet different from  others’ (Kelly, 1955:105). Kelly’s theory is largely based on 
the notion o f  bipolarity. People initially test out the world and their understanding o f  it 
by asking whether something is like or unlike another thing, whether one meaning can 
also be applied to a different situation. While at first this might appear a blunt 
instrument, in fact it permits him to understand constructs as a vast range o f  
overlapping systems o f  meaning, none o f  which are fixed and immutable. This 
dichotomous view provides people w ith ‘channels in which one's mental processes 
run. [Constructs] are two-way streets along which one may travel to  reach 
conclusions’ (Kelly, 1955:126). Constructs therefore have limits, borders, frontiers, 
built individually by each person, and they both intersect and are superimposed one 
over another. They consist principally o f  meaning systems and o f  fields o f  knowledge, 
within which other forms o f  knowledge are contained (values, emotions, etc.). Kelly 
goes on to  distinguish between a percept and a concept, suggesting that in the process 
o f  forming constructs, people perceive and conceive, image and construe.
A  percept is a cognition based upon immediate sense experience, and it is 
maintained only under the influence o f  the object o f  experience. An image is 
the memory o f  a  perception, cast usually in visual form, and only available in 
the absence o f  the object. A  concept is an intellectual, mental o r logical
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structure given to  a percept and its image, and is durable in the sense that it 
persists in the mind whether the reality with which it deals is actually present 
or not. Because they are durable intellectual structures o f  a logical kind 
expressed in language, concepts have an objective quality. Concepts are open 
to public discussion and to philosophical analysis. It is possible to clarify a 
concept, to define a concept and to reach agreement about a concept. Concepts 
do have a subjective side, in that it is perfectly correct to speak not only o f  the 
concept o f  God but also o f  my concept o f  God, but in rejecting the use o f  
concepts, personal construct theory wishes to correct the emphasis upon the 
public, objective or uniform aspects o f  conceptual thinking. (Hull, 1991 
[1985]:103-104).
Personal constructs thus become articulated and concretised in images and concepts.
For the purposes o f  the discussion, a  picture is therefore being built o f  people’s 
biographies consisting o f  o r g a n is e d  cognitive knowledge, but that organisation is 
individual and continually shifting. The organisation, and the principles behind it, 
however, are the means by which people anticipate the nature o f  their experiences. In 
a non-social context, particularly with regard to the environment on a day to day 
basis, people’s constructs are reasonably quickly built and remain fairly stable. Even 
when taken to a  different place with unfamiliar sights and sounds, there is enough 
common ground with other environmental experiences for them  not to  be overly 
shaken. In a social context, given the fact that individuals’ personal constructs may 
differ radically one from another, people are far more challenged in the effort to find 
common meaning: to reach a point where each individual construct and the features 
pertaining to  a particular situation have sufficient matching points for meaningful 
communication to take place. Kelly talks about personal constructs being both 
permeable and impermeable. ‘Impermeable constructs will resist new  experience, or 
the new experience will be forced into the mould o f  the old constructs, however poor 
the fit may be’ (Hull, 1991 [1985]: 107). The link with certain o f  Jarvis’s forms o f  
‘non-learning’ is clear, and questions raised previously about the role o f  emotion, 
personality and time re-emerge. Functioning in a  hierarchical system, Kelly suggests 
that the higher a construct stands, the less permeable and the more resistant to change 
it is. Superordinate structures are those which are attributed greater importance,
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greater stability or validity, and hence greater universality. They are the ‘ruling 
constructs’ in the system, the controlling point in the system as a  whole. Hull points 
out that:
Since religious constructs are normally superordinate, that is, they are ruling 
constructs o f  great generality and pow er around which commitment is 
focussed, they will be highly resistant to change. It has been observed that 
religious people are difficult to indoctrinate, and personal construct theory 
would suggest that for this very reason they are also difficult to  educate ... 
(Hull, 1991 [1985]: 109-110).
The discussion returns to this at a  later point.
As was indicated previously, Kelly form ulated his theory o f  personal constructs on the 
premise that people try to order their experience o f  the world by interpreting it, and 
construing it in a certain way b e c a u s e  o f  a n  in n a te  c u r io s ity  w h ic h  m e a n s  th e y  lo o k  a t  
life  w ith  a n  in q u ir in g  m in d . Kelly’s prototypical human is a scientist, and his 
constructs are built on people’s attem pts to  anticipate and predict. Happily, through 
his notions o f  a hierarchical structure o f  diminishing layers o f  permeability, he was 
able to  accommodate forms o f  non-learning, albeit inadvertently. While his basic 
tenets cohere with the understanding o f  people and learning proposed earlier, other 
questions are nevertheless raised, particularly with regard to the degree to which 
people behave proactively or reactively. In  a learning context, as shown above, we 
might consider that such a curiosity and forw ard looking is only characteristic o f  
people (a) o f  a certain temperament; and (b) who are emotionally ‘fit’. Certainly the 
separation o f  emotion from  (at least the operation and functioning of) construct should 
be viewed as a  weakness.
Kelly’s w ork has largely stood the test o f  time, although others have proposed 
alternative understandings o f  the structure o f  human psychological behaviour. 
M ezirow, desirous o f  avoiding the ‘suggestion o f  separation o f  the cognitive from  the 
conative and affective dimensions o f  apperception and the psychological from  the 
cultural in the learning process’ (1991:42)— in other words, looking to  provide a 
holistic theory o f  human learning and behaviour that incorporates all the various 
dimensions o f  being— devised a scheme o f ‘meaning perspectives’. H e proposed three
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types: epistemic meaning perspectives, which relate to the way people know  and in 
which they use knowledge; sociolinguistic perspectives, concerned w ith society, 
culture, language and philosophy; and psychological perspectives, which focus on the 
self, control, various psychological features such as inhibitions and defence 
mechanisms, and personality attributes. These perspectives group into meaning 
schemes, which he defines as ‘the particular knowledge, beliefs, value judgments, and 
feelings that become articulated in an interpretation’. They are the ‘concrete 
manifestations o f  our habitual orientation and expectations (meaning perspectives) 
and translate these general expectations into specific ones that guide our actions’ 
(1991:44). Commenting on Kelly’s work, M ezirow notes Kelly’s bipolar- approach 
and hence suggests that ‘constructs do not “represent” or symbolize events but rather 
represent distinctions betw een events’ (1991:52). M ezirow tries to focus on what is  
rather than what isn  ’t , and his thesis is based (unsurprisingly!) on how  people make 
meaning in their lives. ‘Meaning is an interpretation, and to  make meaning is to 
construe or interpret experience— in other words, to give it coherence’ (1991:4). So 
both Kelly and M ezirow (and M ezirow cites a  number o f  other researchers, all o f  
w hom  he contends are articulating similar notions albeit in different forms) are 
concerned with how people organise their conception o f  the world and their own 
realities, and how this relates to their experience. To a point, the two scholars must be 
viewed separately. Kelly, w ith his emphasis on anticipation, should be viewed as 
offering a way o f  understanding people’s perception and initial grasping o f  an 
experience. In a learning situation, therefore, Kelly’s personal constructs imply a 
cyclic pattern, originating from  people themselves, enveloping an experience, and 
incorporating it back into their existing structures. Mezirow, on the other hand, also 
originates from the person but in imposing meaning on a phenomenon, in some way 
leaves it there. The difference may be slight. However, it permits a  distinction 
betw een perception and apprehension in the learning process. M ezirow ’s position is 
dependent on people grasping an experience, identifying with it, constructing it. It is 
ultimately the experience which takes centre stage. Kelly, on the other hand, puts the 
emphasis on individuals, imposing a gap between them  and experience. The 
difference is subtle and potentially significant for theories o f  experiential learning, 
especially relating to the discussions on  time- or learner-centred approaches. In terms 
o f  people’s biographies, however, both scholars propose similar analyses: that
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individuals interact with experience in such a way that an inner fram ework is 
constructed. For Kelly, unsurprisingly in view o f  his psychological background and 
position, personal constructs are essentially cognitive, whereas M ezirow specifies that 
meaning schemes are ‘made up o f  specific knowledge, beliefs, value judgments, and 
feelings that constitute interpretations o f  experience [and] become m ore differentiated 
and integrated or transform ed by reflection on the content or process o f  problem 
solving in progressively wider contexts’ (M ezirow, 1991:5-6). Reflection is 
imperative for M ezirow; without this, meaning schemes could not exist.
The theme o f  reflection is returned to  in the next chapter as another strand o f  the 
inter/outer interaction. O f the two scholars discussed above, Kelly’s personal 
construct theory m ost obviously positions itself as relevant to the same consideration 
since there is an obvious interaction betw een the outer, in people’s environment, and 
the inner, in their conscious awareness, w ith perception fimctioning as the pivot 
betw een the two. Nonetheless, there is clear potential for the outer to  influence the 
inner, since the latter is understood in term s o f  defined structures. The next section 
considers what that influence might be, especially if  (when) it has particularly 
authoritative dimensions such as Christian faith-content.
11.2.2 The influence of Christian faith
I t is Kelly’s emphasis on a dichotomous approach to perceiving the world which 
provides an immediate way forward in the discussion. Hull (1991 [1985]) suggests 
that this links with attitude, so that people’s approval or disapproval, their emotional 
predisposition tow ard or against something, starts to consolidate a particular 
psychological construct. That may well be the case, but it would seem more likely that 
this builds upon existing constructs rather than accounts for their formation: Kelly 
was at pains to emphasise that his dichotomy was primarily one o f  perceiving likeness 
and opposite-ness, similarity and difference, which, at least in early stages, suggests 
an absence o f  affectivity. Perhaps a more appropriate link o f  the dichotomous 
approach to life is found in Perry (1970), whose early forms o f  epistemological 
behaviour, it will be recalled, were highly dichotomous, people viewing life veiy 
m uch in either/or, black and white, right and wrong terms.
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As the thesis progresses, areas o f  overlap betw een different branches o f  scholarly 
investigation become increasing apparent, and at this point, questions must be asked 
about how epistemology relates to perception. Chapter Five poses a similar question 
with regard to learning styles. Perry did not classify his study as one into people’s 
psychological constructs, yet there are immediate similarities betw een his findings 
and Kelly’s theories, and Perry’s w ork might even be viewed as an empirical study 
into forms o f  perception and into the development o f  personal constructs. As people 
grew, so their constructs became far more complex and intricate, eventually 
preventing them  from perceiving the world in absolute terms. The contribution o f  
Perry’s w ork to the present discussion, therefore, is in his demonstration o f  a link 
betw een the external and internal which revolves around authority. The cyclical 
nature o f  the interaction between inner and outer means that perception is a two-way 
process, and while in the early stages people probably initiate the bipolar approach, 
this is seen to be confirmed by the object o f  attention itself. There is no sense o f  
disjuncture between the manner o f  perceiving and the content o f  learning. By logical 
extension, however, if  the content o f  learning is inextricably associated with the 
(dichotomous) notions o f  tru th  and falsehood, for example, or carries a  particular 
authority that confirms people’s perception o f  it, then a cycle o f  dichotomous 
perception is both put into place and constantly reinforced. In Perry’s terms, people do 
not progress beyond ‘simple dualism’. So an external authority such as those which 
contribute tow ard the Christian faith may well serve to keep people in lower 
epistemological positions. The hypothesis is supported by personal observation and 
conversations with clergy which suggests that many probably lie in Fow ler’s Stage 3. 
The Prologue already drew  attention to the parallel between Perry’s shift from 
absolutism to relativism and Fow ler’s shift from  Stage 3 to Stage 4.
Hull too identifies the possibility o f  people’s personal constructs being ‘rigidified’ as 
a  result o f  the Christian ideology.
Since religious constructs are normally superordinate, that is, they are ruling 
constructs o f  great generality and pow er around which commitment is 
focussed, they will be highly resistant to change. It has been observed that 
religious people are difficult to  indoctrinate, and personal construct theory 
would suggest that for this very reason they are difficult to  educate.
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He continues:
This is perfectly understandable and highly justified up to  a point, since we 
naturally have greater confidence in the constructs which life has tested, but if  
it reaches the point where new experience is being distorted or disregarded for 
the sake o f  loyalty to  the old constructs, a dangerously false position has been 
reached. (1991 [1985]: 109-10)
The discussion o f  this section and previous chapters would suggest that the cause o f  
the rigidity and ensuing lack o f  openness tow ards learning lies as m uch in the nature 
o f  the ideology as it does in people’s ‘loyalty’.
III. The growth of the self
The last area the chapter considers as a dimension o f  personhood which is constructed 
and learnt through the process o f  internalisation is the self. As will be seen, it is a 
difficult concept to pin down, which has corresponding difficulties when trying to 
ascertain how its grow th through internalisation might be affected. The section 
therefore turns to Belenky e t  a l. ’s w ork and the metaphor o f  voice which they employ 
as indicative o f  many dimensions o f  the self. Before so doing, however, a  brief 
overview o f  the concept in general is necessary.
111.1 The concept of self
One o f  the immediate observations to make in any discussion about the self is that it 
incorporates a  wide variety o f  components. It is also a notion which has been 
variously interpreted in different disciplines and in different cultural contexts. So 
whereas in the west, for example, selfhood implies individualism and unique identity, 
this is not necessarily a perception shared in other parts o f  the world (Allen, 1997). 
Theology has had an ambiguous relationship with the self, both treating it with a 
degree o f  suspicion and often preferring to shift the emphasis to the concept o f  soul 
(see, for example, Crabbe, 1999). Jarvis (1992), following M ead, links the self with 
mind. Self is also related to  other existential dimensions such as identity, (self-) w orth 
and esteem, (self-) image, (self-) perception, (self-) assertion and more. Given this 
panoram a o f  spectra, any discussion must necessarily be restricted.
Chapter Three
People’s Ways o f  Believing: learning processes and faith outcomes
An immediate parallel betw een the notions o f  biography and self is that scholars 
consider them  both to be learned entities.
Jarvis (1987, 1992), following George Herbert M ead, has argued that the mind 
and the self are learned phenomena, since the brain stores memories o f 
experiences, probably from  the time that the baby is still in the womb and 
certainly from  the time o f  birth. Hence, the brain is the storehouse o f  
memories from which emerge the mind and the self. (Jarvis, 1995:44)
J a m s  continues:
The person has two major components: the self and the physical body in which 
the former is contained. (1995:44)
He considers self to be ‘an individuation o f  consciousness’. Strawson, on the other 
hand, lists seven components that he considers have traditionally contributed to an 
understanding o f  self:
Self is:
a) A  th in g
b) M e n ta l
c) S in g le , both at a specific time and through time
d) O n to lo g ic a l ly  d is t in c t  from  its thoughts, experiences etc.
e) An a g e n t
f) Something that has c h a r a c te r  o r  p e r s o n a l i ty  (Strawson, 1999:132; italics 
in original)
The purpose o f  his essay is to explore certain o f  these perceptions, and in particular 
the mental dimension w ith regard to people’s sense o f  self. M uch o f  his discussion 
revolves around the role o f  consciousness and its relationship with time, in the same 
way that Jarvis considers this partnership in the process o f  learning. O f particular 
interest, however, is the implication that se lf and sense o f  self are inextricably bound. 
Straw son seems to  suggest that w ithout a sense o f  self, then the very existence o f  self 
must be questioned, although he does wish to divorce this from  personality and long­
term  continuity.
Certain essentials therefore seem  to  be established. Self is a learnt aspect o f  being, 
hence showing its capacity for its grow th to  be influenced. It differentiates from 
biography yet relates to personal constructs in that it pertains specifically to
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individuals’ consciousness. It is rooted in the brain and linked to the mind, whereas 
biography applies to people’s entire existential existence. Unlike biography, however, 
or perhaps enhancing the notion o f  biography, it has the capacity to reach beyond 
itself. It would appear to exist independently o f  people’s character or personality, yet 
function in partnership with this. Despite Straw son’s view that ‘one may have ... a 
sense o f  the mental self without experiencing [it] as something that has long term  
continuity’ (1999:149) it remains something that has to be se n se d . In  other words, 
although it is possible to analyse the concept and simply acknowledge the role o f  the 
conscious, in reality it would seem that the two cannot be divorced. The self is  
conscious, and this is experienced and lived through a s e n se  o f  (it)self.
The questions are raised, o f  course, about how  that individuation o f  self-conscious 
sensing not only learns, but how  consequent grow th can be focused on. For that, the 
discussion turns to the m etaphor o f  voice.
III.2 An influencable self?
I f  the self is a learned dimension o f  people’s beings, then logically it would seem 
susceptible to influence from  authority in the same way that the thesis has argued is 
the case for other aspects. In the context o f  learning and internalisation such as that o f  
this chapter, then it is necessary to determine a relationship that the self has between 
its inner and outer worlds.
Perhaps the most significant o f  Straw son’s six components o f  the self for the purposes 
o f  the discussion is the idea o f  the self as an agent. By definition, agents are proactive 
and assertive. Three o f  the seven definitions o f ‘agent’ listed by Dictionary.com 
(http ://dictionary.reference. com /: 2004) reflect this capacity.
1. One that acts or has the pow er or authority to act.
2. A means by which something is done or caused; instrument.
3. A  force or substance that causes a  change: a  c h e m ic a l a g e n t;  a n  in fe c tio u s  
a g en t.
So an agent itself has the pow er to influence (change) something it acts on. This then 
is something integral to the concept o f  self. Nonetheless, an agent has to be
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sufficiently formed and ‘powerful’ to effect these changes. W ithout this, it cannot do 
its w ork and therefore its very identity is challenged. When considering the self in a 
context o f  learning, that formation and pow er are seen to occur through the process o f  
reflection. Jarvis (1992), again reflecting his existentialist approach, connects growth 
o f  the self with authenticity, which itself is a  m atter o f  allowing people to come to be 
themselves through individual reflection. He comments:
W here the person is the center o f  attention, the aim o f  education is focused on 
the development o f  the learners as persons, and being and authenticity 
' coincide. But where the “product” is m ore important, the direction o f  the 
grow th is tightly controlled and the personhood o f  the learners is neglected. 
This leads to inauthenticity. (1992:112)
Returning to Ms typology o f  learning and non-learning, it is clear that the most 
effective and profound learning comes about through different forms o f  reflection, 
and these enable people to  develop to  the point o f  being able to  make autonomous 
choices and decisions, as well as assume personal responsibility. At tMs point, they 
also become effective agents. TMs enables them  to gain a sense o f  their identity, 
comparing and contrasting themselves against others, and in the process, gaining an 
idea o f  their ‘w orth’ and/or constructing a ‘self-esteem ’.
The theme o f  reflection is returned to in the next chapter. One o f  the significant ways 
in wMch the self acts as an agent, however, is through speech. People articulate their 
ideas and views, commimicate them  to others, and indeed, in so doing ‘ac t’ on their 
social environment so that it becomes the continually sMfting phenomenon outlined in 
Figure 1.3. The m etaphor o f ‘voice’ became important to Belenky e t  al. in their own 
study o f  the development o f  self. They write:
W hat we had not anticipated was that “voice” was more than an academic 
shorthand for a person’s point o f  view. Well after we were into our interviews 
with women, we became aware that it is a  m etaphor that can apply to many 
aspects o f  wom en’s experience and development. In  describing their lives, 
wom en commonly talked about voice and silence: “speaking up,” “speaking 
out,” “being silenced,” “not being heard,” “really listening,” “really talking,” 
“words as weapons,” “feeling deaf and dumb,” “having no w ords,” “saying 
what you mean,” “listening to be heard,” and so on in an endless variety o f
Chapter Three 94
People's Ways o f Believing: learning processes and faith outcomes
connotations all having to do with sense o f  mind, self-worth, and feelings o f  
isolation from or connection to others. W e found that wom en repeatedly used 
the metaphor o f  voice to depict their intellectual and ethical development; and 
that the development o f  a sense o f  voice, mind, and self were intricately 
intertwined. (Belenky e t  a l ., 1996 [1986]: 18)
The authors contrasted the m etaphor o f  voice against visual m etaphors that equated 
knowledge with illumination, knowing with seeing, and truth w ith light, suggesting 
that these historic, traditional m etaphors reflected a predominantly male approach to 
epistemological questions.
Voice proved to be a useful m etaphor that the research picked up and referred to in 
the data analysis. A t this point o f  the research, however, it provides an essential 
conceptual link with the present consideration o f  how  internalisation contributes to 
hum an grow th and development. The role o f  language as a means o f  externalisation 
has already been introduced as the major way in which people construct social 
knowledge. Here, however, it takes on a personal significance since it is the means by 
which people assert themselves and hence develop a self. Belenky e t  a U  s wom en who 
experienced words as weapons, who were silenced and unable to speak out, also 
internalised far more than they externalised. In  the process, their very selves were 
quashed, they were unable to form  a  true sense o f  identity and suffered from  a  low 
sense o f  worth. Those able to externalise orally and verbally also engaged in a form o f 
self-assertion through which these existential dimensions grew and developed. A 
significant implication resulting from  Belenky e t  a l. ’s w ork is that the quality o f  
internalisation actually depends on the degree to which people are able to externalise 
and to which this externalisation is effective: the degree to which they are listened to. 
N ot only so, but this is related to their ability to articulate in a reasoned and logical 
way. Their ‘silent’ wom en were not always silent! On occasion they would rant and 
rave, shout and gesticulate, but not in a  way which commanded the respect o f  their 
listeners. So the growth o f  the self through the self-assertion in speech is more 
complex than simply ‘speaking’. This dimension o f  the inter-relationship between 
internalisation and externalisation merits further exploration, since there is also 
evidence that profound internalisation can take place even if  externalisation is 
restricted, and that the self can continue to grow. Extrem e examples such as Helen
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Keller, the American wom an whose illness in infancy left her blind and deaf, yet who 
eventually came to  have a highly public profile, come to mind.
The metaphor o f  voice nonetheless provides a useful way o f  understanding how  the 
grow th o f  self can potentially be affected by an external authority such as the 
Christian faith. M ore than any o f  the other concepts thus far considered, the dual 
processes o f  internalisation and externalisation are evidenced, suggesting a delicate 
balance between the external and the internal. The latter is easily cowed by the 
former! Just as Perry demonstrated, an overly-heavy external authority may well serve 
to  keep people in a  ‘place’.
One o f  the significant factors relating Christian faith to the grow th o f  the self through 
the development o f  voice is Christianity’s ow n doctrinal framework o f  prepositional 
beliefs, which, self-evidently, is linguistically articulated. So those engaging with it 
are necessarily, in the first place, engaging w ith an authoritative external ‘voice’.
W hat might the effects o f  that ‘voice’ be? M ost obviously, and in need o f  little further 
exploration on account o f  its already established position in the w ork o f  Perry,
Fowler, and indeed in general scholarship, is the weakening o f  people’s willingness or 
ability to accept personal responsibility and the cultivation o f  a spirit o f  dependency.
In  Fow ler’s terms, this means that they may often not develop beyond Stage 3. T his 
links w ith the discussion o f  the form ation o f  personal constructs above, and although 
a ease might be made for the two dimensions to walk hand in hand, they are 
nonetheless independent o f  each other, albeit w ith a similar outcome. In  a Christian 
Education context, Astley (2000) sees one o f  the primary ways o f  counteracting this 
as the development o f  people’s ability to  think critically about faith-content, 
something supported by Brookfield (2001) writing from a secular, adult education 
perspective.
M ore subtly, however, is the question o f  the voice which people adopt as they assert 
themselves. W hose voice are they speaking in? Is it an authentic one? H ow  is 
authenticity defined? The discussion above would suggest that this again links with 
reflection and people’s ownership o f  the content they are articulating. Belenky e t  a l. ’s 
w ork suggests a more complex picture. They describe their Procedural knowers as
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‘chameleons’, able to change colour according to the context in which they find 
themselves, but also struggling w ith a sensation o f  selfishness as they begin to 
develop their own position:
“Selfishness” is required because the sense o f  identity is weak. Procedural 
knowers, many o f  them  quite successful, feel much like other wom en we have 
met in this book who have also subordinated themselves to  the demands o f  
authorities. Procedural knowers feel like chameleons; they cannot help but 
take on the color o f  any structure they inhabit. In  order to assume their own 
true colors, they must detach themselves from  the relationships and institutions 
to  which they have been subordinated. (Belenky e t  a l , 1996 [1986]: 129)
So speaking in another voice, functioning as a  ‘chameleon’, clearly relates to a weak 
sense o f  identity. It is probably incorrect to assume that the two are inextricably 
linked. M any people can assume other voices, often temporarily and associated with a 
particular role (one might think o f  politicians) and retain a  high sense o f  identity 
and/or a strong sense o f  self. The issue therefore is, once again, the degree to which 
that voice is owned and how  it is used. However, it is also clear that within a 
developmental scheme, the tw o can be very closely connected. In  a  Christian context, 
observation suggests that the Christian ‘voice’ can sometimes be appropriated without 
a  genuine backing o f  conviction formed from  personal experience, and one might 
surmise that a  weak self is ‘hiding’ behind this far more authentic voice.
The grow th and development o f  the self therefore relates to learning through the 
processes o f  internalisation and extemalisation, which this section has analysed 
through the metaphor o f  voice. A n external authority such as the ‘voice’ o f  the 
Christian faith, has been shown to have the potential to affect the way in which the 
grow th o f  the self occurs both by cultivating a spirit o f  dependency rather than foster 
one o f  autonomy and self-responsibility, and by ‘supplanting’ people’s ow n voices. In  
both instances, the self is at least maintained in a lower developmental position, if  not 
specifically weakened.
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IV. Summary and conclusion
In  this chapter, three dimensions o f  learning as it relates to the processes o f 
internalisation and externalisation have been explored, and in each instance, different 
ways in which Christian faith might play an influential role detected. The approach o f  
studying learning via the concepts o f  internalisation and externalisation was 
challenged, yet considered justifiable, the discussion contributing to  the identification 
o f  two specific dimensions in which learning could be seen directly to  result in the 
construction o f  the person: their biographies, and, as a dimension o f  these, their 
conscious awareness. Influence was perceivable not only in contributing to 
individuals’ store o f  personal knowledge, hence in some way ‘Christianising’ those 
who are exposed to it almost as a quantitative outcome, but also in the way in which 
people made commitments and therefore constructed their personal knowledge. 
Personal knowledge is necessarily accompanied by knowing, however, which is 
linked w ith the making o f  meaning. The challenges experienced by Christians to make 
meaning from  and with Christian faith-content were highlighted, w ith the recognition 
that this impacted on the grow th o f  their existential selves. The possibility that the 
very content o f  Christian faith-content might also affect this dimension o f  being was 
introduced, but considered to be on a very fragile foundation.
In the domain o f  hum an conscious awareness, the chapter focused on Kelly’s personal 
constructs and suggested that if  these are best understood as essentially dichotomous 
in nature, then the absolute tendencies o f  Christian faith-content that lend themselves 
to  a similar approach, may well m ean that Christians consolidate a bipolar' view o f  the 
world and maintain it, potentially therefore not developing the complex structures o f  
P e n y ’s relativity 01* o f  Kelly’s own system. Similarly, following Hull, the constructs 
they do develop are used and reinforced to the point o f  inflexibility, hence restricting 
learning.
The last section considered the grow th and development o f  the self by turning to  the 
m etaphor o f  voice, which itself represented the processes o f  internalisation and 
externalisation. Here, the issues became those o f  self-assertion and autonom y versus 
acquiescence and dependence. The section argued that the capacity o f  the
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characteristics o f  Christian faith-authorities to foster dependence could also inhibit the 
development o f  the self, and that that potential inauthentic use o f  the Christian ‘voice’ 
might contribute to  certain individuals using it as a refuge.
The discussion o f  the chapter has highlighted the fact that, although the thesis overall 
rejects the notion o f  non-learning, learning can certainly be impeded or adversely 
affected. This is certainly due to the focus on authority, which necessarily carries 
negative and often oppressive overtones. One o f  the recommendations made in the 
final chapter is that more attention is paid to  more positive ways o f  responding to the 
same authorities. The empirical data dem onstrated certain ways in which this 
happened. However, at this stage o f  the research, reflecting also the interests o f  the 
original hypothesis, the adverse influence is m ore prominent.
One o f  the themes to emerge as significant throughout the chapter has been that o f  
reflection. This is the focus o f  the next chapter.
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Chapter Four 
Reflection and Theological Reflection 
Introduction
Reflection is a theme which emerged as significant in a number o f  ways in the 
previous chapter. In  educational scholarship, it is understood to  be a  significant means 
by which people internalise the external, thus providing a further string to be 
investigated on the internalisation bow. It is accompanied in a Christian Education 
context by the study o f ‘theological reflection’, which is a developing attempt to 
address some o f  the ‘problem s’ that Christian learners are perceived to  face when 
engaging with faith-content. Its very existence suggests that different forms o f 
interaction between the two are likely to  take place, some more effective than others. 
This may also affect the process and quality o f  internalisation. This chapter therefore 
opens by examining theories o f  theological reflection with a  view to identifying and 
analysing the difficulties in learning it is concerned to address. It will then evaluate 
these in comparison with a study o f  the process o f  reflection taken from  a non- 
theological perspective, and suggest further areas in which Christian faith-content 
would appear to affect learning.
i. Theological reflection
1.1 Introduction
The pursuit o f  ‘theological reflection’ is generally assumed under the rubric o f  
‘practical theology’. This places an emphasis on the lived, applied and contextual 
dimensions o f  Christian faith rather than on the philosophical, doctrinal and content- 
focused. The two necessarily walk together, although different ways in which this 
happens can be perceived. Lartey, for example, identifies what he term s three 
different ‘stream s’, or ways in which practical theology ‘has been characterized, 
engaged in, or understood’ and hence reflection undertaken. The b ra n c h  approach 
emphasises the content o f  a discipline and focuses on how  this is to  be applied. He
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turns to Schleiermacher’s m etaphor o f  a tree whose roots are philosophical theology, 
with a trunk o f  historical theological and branches o f  practical theology, and states: 
Practical theology has to do w ith ‘church governm ent’, or else the ‘church’s 
action’ and is derived by applying doctrinal (philosophical and/or biblical) and 
historical formulations to the task  o f  church management. (2000:130)
The p r o c e s s  approach prizes method, and looks at how  practical theologians are to 
‘deliver their goods’. ‘M ethod’ is concerned with how  ‘existential questions’ are 
‘correlated with Christian symbols which provide the answers to the existential 
questions’ (2000:130). He cites the w ork o f  Thomas Groome and his ‘shared Christian 
praxis’ (1987) and Laurie Green’s ‘pastoral cycle’ (1990) as examples o f  ways in 
which practical theologians understand that questions and symbols can be brought 
together. Lastly, he describes the ‘w a y  o f  b e in g  a n d  d o in g ’ approach as a ‘form o f  
theological engagem ent’.
Here practical theology is understood not primarily as a branch o f  theological 
knowledge, nor simply as a m ethod o f  generating theologically informed 
action, but rather as offering us a  w a y  o f  ‘d o in g  th e o lo g y ’ a n d  b e in g  
th e o lo g ia n s . This approach attem pts to examine the content o f  faith and 
practice. It asks questions about what the contents o f  our faith are, realizing 
that tradition, context and experience (the ‘three elements in the practical 
theology equation’) shape us in such a way that there are very many different 
forms o f  equally valid Christian faith. (2000:129-131; italics in original).
Lartey critiques each, considering that: a) the branch approach risks turning practical 
theology into a ‘second class citizen’ by always making it a ‘derived discipline 
dependent on knowledge and theory from  the other ‘more solid’ fields o f  study; b) the 
process cycle runs the risk o f  superficiality, over-valuing method at the expense o f  
content; and c) the way o f  being and doing approach has the potential o f  becoming 
anti-intellectual and o f  over-estimating the importance o f  context. He offers his own 
alternative which purports to address these weaknesses and incorporates his own buzz 
w ord o f  ‘analysis’. Rather than ‘reflect’, which he understands as the principal focus 
particularly o f  process theology, his ow n ‘pastoral cycle’ includes three forms o f 
analysis: situational analysis, theological analysis, and situational analysis o f  theology 
(2000:132). He is at pains, nevertheless, to emphasise that ‘the whole process may be 
seen as theological and not simply the points within it labelled as such’ (2000:132).
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L artey’s analysis is useful since it quickly highlights areas o f  disjuncture between the 
essential elements o f  Christian living, which he identifies as tradition, context and 
experience (above). In  the branch approach, context and experience flow from 
tradition, and hence a pivotal point o f  disjuncture is formed. In  the process and way o f  
being and doing approaches, the content o f  experience and context are offset against 
that o f  tradition in different ways and for different reasons. Since tradition (faith- 
content), context and experience also lie at the heart o f  experiential learning, these 
areas o f  disjuncture also relate to  individual learning patterns and the interests o f  the 
research. The ‘problem s’ appear' to  take two forms: firstly some sort o f  a gap between 
Christian tradition and hum an experiential and contextual life, and secondly, the 
way(s) in which that gap is bridged. Theological reflection is but one w ay in which 
this happens, and it pertains most precisely to Lartey’s process theology, questioning 
how  ‘existential questions’ can be correlated w ith Christian symbols. His 
understanding that these symbols are often viewed as providing ‘answ ers’ to those 
existential questions (above) is revealing, and is something the discussion returns to in 
the next chapter.
Despite Pattison’s acknowledgement that:
Students undertaking placements on pastoral studies courses are bidden with 
m pnotonous regularity to indulge in theological reflection. This activity has a 
mystic flavour to it, for the teachers who demand theological reflection for the 
m ost part find it very difficult to say what it is they are looking for. (2000:136) 
there is an increasing body o f  literature which is devoted to the art o f  theological 
reflection, and the next section turns to tw o specific models.
1.2 The art of theological reflection
The title o f  this section has been taken from  one o f  the books and theories that will be 
considered, and itself confirms the developing understanding o f  theological reflection 
addressing a ‘problem ’. An ‘art’ implies a  skill: the acquiring o f  an ability to do 
something that people were previously unable o r unequipped to  do. The bridging o f  a 
gap ...
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1.2.1 Let’s Do Theology (Green, 1990)
For Green (1990), that gap lies principally betw een two distinct elements o f  
theological work: active, and reflective. In  pursuit o f  two major concerns, the 
transform ation o f  theology itself, and the practice o f  being ‘theologians’ which he 
sees as the responsibility o f  every Christian, he understands both to  come about 
through the interaction betw een action and reflection. Just as Jarvis sees social 
knowledge going through a continual process o f  change as people externalise, so 
Green sees theology as being transform ed as people internalise it and then ‘act’ it. He 
formulates what he entitles a ‘doing theology spiral’, which, reminiscent o f  Kolb, has 
four elements: experience, exploration, reflection, and response, leading to a new 
situation/experience. Emphasising the importance o f  ‘praxis’— a dynamic process o f 
interaction between experience and reflection— he suggests that in many cases people 
split the cycle in tw o, unable to bridge the gap between the ‘active elements o f  
theological w ork’, experience and response, and the ‘predominantly reflective’ 
elements o f  exploration and reflection. He provides a diagram in support o f  his 
argument, reproduced in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: A model o f the interaction between action and reflection(Green, 
1990:39)
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Joining the two halves becomes his major preoccupation. He includes a chapter 
specifically on ‘reflection’ in which he states:
In order to do theological reflection then, we have to develop methods o f  
bringing into juxtaposition our present life experience and the treasures o f  our 
Christian heritage, to check one against the other, to let each talk to the other, 
to leam  from the mix and to  gain even m ore insight to  add to the store o f 
Christian heritage. (1990:79)
Within this chapter he proposes a ‘secondary cycle o f  theological reflection’ which he 
bases on intuition, an ‘imaginative leap which sets up an interplay betw een the 
explored issue and the Christian faith tradition so that each is affected by the other’ 
(1990:93). So a more sophisticated model o f  theological reflection is proposed, 
reproduced in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: The process o f doing theology (Green, 1990:95)
The inclusion o f  imagination re-introduces Kelly’s personal constructs in his view that 
anticipating the object o f  learning through imaging, or imagining it, was an essential 
step in the process. Fowler (1981) too emphasises its role in the development o f  faith, 
although Green’s use o f  it differs from  Fow ler’s in that the latter’s appears to be freely 
exercised and not directed tow ard any particular target, whereas the form er’s clearly
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focuses on Christian faith-content of some sort. Green appears to understand the 
process theologically.
The Holy Spirit is operative in the process of reflection upon the issue that we 
have explored, and intuitively suggests that a particular element in the 
tradition—an element from the bible, sacraments, church history and so on—is 
somehow resonating with the experience in question and has something to 
teach us for today. So there emerges an intuition o f what the tradition may 
hold. (1990:92-93; italics in original)
The second cycle therefore originates in the ‘reflection’ box of the first cycle, which 
moves to an intuition, exploration and new witness. At the same time, he perceives the 
key to theological reflection being that o f hermeneutics. Finding satisfactory 
techniques for bridging the ‘hermeneutical gap’ is the principal task of the theological 
reflector.
Our reflective task is to find some way of bridging this cultural gap and seeing 
connections between the Christian heritage on one side and our present 
experience on the other—to hear resonances, to ring bells, to sense 
similarities, to sense opposition, to build up a whole range of sensitivities to 
the tradition so that we can draw upon it to check our present actions and 
understandings and see if our own story is part of the Jesus story, or not. 
(1990:80)
He proposes a range of techniques by which this can be done. One of the most 
important is the use of six theological ‘tent pegs’ which function as pivots between 
the Christian faith tradition and contemporary life. Identifying what he considers six 
fundamentally important theological themes (God’s reign or kingdom, the incarnation, 
church, holy Trinity, crucifixion, and Eucharistic presence) he then draws an ‘insight’ 
from each: salvation includes liberation, all theology has context, theology includes 
action, concern about power, God’s concern for the oppressed, and witnessing 
spirituality. In constructing a ‘new model for doing theology, these markers remind us 
. . . to  give special regard to issues o f liberation, context, action, power, oppression and 
spirituality’ (Green, 1990:14-15). At a later point he demonstrates how his cyclical 
model might function in a specific situation. When considering the topic of adult 
education, for example, the theme of incarnation is interpreted as ‘living alongside’ or 
being ‘hands on’. An example other than Jesus might be St Francis, or just people in
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their own contexts. The educational implications of the incarnation are that education 
is ‘not just theory’, and that it involves participation; and the practical responses are 
that education starts from experience and requires commitment (Green, 1990:88).
Green’s ‘problem’ to be solved is therefore seen to lie in the fact that the 
hermeneutical gap between people and their cultural biographies, and the Christian 
tradition. This gap was identified as contributing to the authoritative character of 
Christian faith-content in Chapters Two and Three, and it is possibly for this very 
reason that it is so significant and ostensibly so difficult to bridge. Green’s method of 
bridging it is essentially hermeneutical, finding meaning in theological propositions 
(which often involves viewing them as symbols) and using this as a pivot to link with 
contemporary situations. Killen and de Beer offer an alternative model, however, 
which is the focus of the next section.
1.2.2 The Art o f Theological Reflection  (Killen and de Beer, 2001)
Killen and de Beer’s framework for theological reflection is less well-developed than 
Green’s, and consists of four components: 1. Focusing on some aspect of experience;
2. Describing that experience to identify the heart of the matter; 3. Exploring the 
Heart of the Matter in conversation with the wisdom of the Christian heritage; and 4. 
Identifying from this conversation new truths and meanings for living. (2001:68-69). 
More relevant for the present discussion is their exploration of a number of 
‘standpoints’ that they indicate ‘markedly influence the quality and trustworthiness of 
the insights that result when we bring our lives to our Christian heritage’ (2001:46- 
47). Those standpoints are: a) certitude; b) self-assurance; and c) exploration. The 
authors demonstrate how these different standpoints influence the way in which 
reflection is conducted. So:
In the standpoint of certitude we think that we already know, or easily can 
come to know, what our lived experience means, because we think we 
understand our Christian religious heritage. In this standpoint, reflection 
involves catching what happens to us—events, thoughts, feelings, questions—
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and placing them quickly into the boxes of our pre-established religious 
interpretive framework.
In the standpoint o f self-assurance we think that we already know, or easily 
can come to know, what our Christian religious heritage means because we 
think we understand our lived experience. In this standpoint, reflection 
involves catching pieces of our Christian religious heritage— Scripture 
passages, theological themes, received traditions—and placing them quickly 
into the boxes of our pre-established interpretive framework.
If we want to encounter the wisdom of our Christian heritage in a way that 
empowers and offers transformative insights, we must bring that heritage into 
our reflection from the standpoint of exploration. In this standpoint we know 
that coming to understand both our religious heritage and our own experience 
is a lifelong process o f the journey o f faith. In this standpoint we willingly re­
experience all the dimensions o f the situations on which we reflect. We enter 
reflection open to the possibility that our interpretive frameworks are in need 
of revision and will be changed by our reflection and experiences.
(Killen and de Beer, 2001:47, 48, 50)
The authors indicate how people’s reasoning alters according to the standpoint they 
adopt. That of certitude leads to a type of victimisation mentality: their religious 
framework is certain and unchallengeable, so life’s difficult situations must be borne 
stalwartly. That o f self-assurance results in a general discomfort with the religious 
framework that in time people potentially discard: an undesirable outcome for those 
actively pursuing faith development. That of exploration is the only one in which the 
two components come together in a vibrant, creative synergy, and is therefore the 
standpoint the authors favour. The examples given in support of their first two 
standpoints are curiously negative, nor are any of their conclusions based on empirical 
research. They offer no analysis as to why people might adopt a particular standpoint, 
and the general impression given relates to personality, background, religious 
context... . It is appropriate, therefore, to view them as hypothetical and potentially 
unrepresentative. However, the thesis affirms the underlying suggestion that people’s
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standpoints may then influence then* pattern of reasoning. From these standpoints the 
authors then go on to emphasise what they term a ‘movement towards insight’, the 
culmination of which is the desired transformation, or the coming together of the two 
originally separate elements o f faith-content and personal experience. They then offer 
a chart which outlines the ‘complementarity between the movement toward insight 
and the framework for theological reflection’, reproduced in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: The movement toward insight and framework for theological 
reflection (Killen and de Beer, 2001:74; emphasis in original)
Movement Framework
1. When we enter our experience, 
we encounter our feelings.
1. Focusing on some aspect of 
experience.
2. When we pay attention to those 
feelings, images arise.
2. Describing that experience to 
identify the heart of the matter.
3. Considering and questioning those 
images may spark insight.
3. Exploring the heart of the matter 
in conversation with the wisdom  
of the wisdom of the Christian 
heritage.
4. Insight leads, if we are willing 
and ready, to action.
4. Identifying from this conversation 
new truths and meanings for
living.
As will be seen, there are significant similarities between the interaction of these two 
columns and the process of reflection outlined by Boud et a l (1985).
This brief survey of two models of theological reflection are significant for the 
purposes of the research essentially because despite their differences, they 
demonstrate that the separation between people and Christian faith authorities on 
which the hypothesis was based is acknowledged and grappled with by the discipline 
o f Christian education. Green identifies a ‘gap’ between experience and ‘the treasures 
o f our Christian heritage’ (above), Killen and de Beer state their pursuit in terms of a
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search for ‘authentic lives’ which they see as most profoundly achievable through the 
Christian faith.
Authentic lives reflecting integral patterns grounded in religious wisdom and 
values result from seeking God’s presence, not apart from the world, but in the 
midst of it. Seeking God’s presence involves theological reflection, the artful 
discipline of putting our experience into conversation with the heritage of the 
Christian tradition. In this conversation we can be surprised and transformed 
by new angles of vision on our experience and acquire a deepened 
understanding and appreciation of our tradition. In this conversation we can 
find ourselves called to act in new, courageous, and compassionate ways. We 
are called to transformation. (2001:2-3)
The pursuit differentiates seeking God’s presence apart from the world, from seeking 
it in the midst of the world, mirroring therefore Green’s gap and the research’s own 
fundamental premise articulated in Chapter Two. Both term this as a ‘problem’ which 
needs to be overcome, although the nature of the problem differs. For Green it is an 
inability on the part of learners to bring experience and reflection together in a 
Christian faith context and his emphasis tends toward the hermeneutical; for Killen 
and de Beer, a dimension o f people themselves and the way they learn present an 
obstacle. Each covets a ‘dialogue’ between two identified players, and the proposed 
way in which this happens—theological reflection—can be analysed according to 
theories of adult learning. This analysis suggests that both succeed in identifying 
certain potential stumbling blocks that impede dialogue, and that the processes of 
theological reflection proposed to overcome the obstacles might well be effective. 
Killen and de Beer, especially, with their emphasis on authenticity and transformation 
imply that theological reflection is also a matter of internalisation and the 
development of a particular, albeit undefined, form of the self (see later).
These, then, are the ‘problems’ which are perceived to be tackled and indeed 
overcome through the process of reflection. On the one hand, the difficulty lies in the 
nature o f Christian faith-content, very much as was argued in Chapter Two, but 
placing the emphasis on the cultural differences embedded in the Christian tradition, 
and without the emphasis on authority. On the other, the difficulty lies in people 
themselves and dimensions of their own learning. Neither focus overtly supports the
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research hypothesis, therefore, although the implications are perhaps present, 
especially when compared with the work o f Hull, presented in Chapter Two, and the 
exercise in determining whether a particular theological term had meaning or not in 
today’s society used as part of the argument of Chapter Three.
The chapter argues, however, that there are two specific ways in which the reflective 
processes themselves can be affected by Christian faith-content. The next section, 
which opens with a general overview of the concept and its outworking before 
focusing on these aspects in particular.
II. T h e  p r o c e s s e s  o f  r e f le c t io n
11.1 In tro d u c tio n
Despite the apparent importance o f reflection as part of the process of learning, there 
are nevertheless disappointingly few studies into the process per se. Moon (2000) 
identifies four which she considers ‘important’ although only one she labels 
(reasonably) ‘comprehensive’: that of Boud, Keogh and Walker (1985), She 
recognises that all four emanate from different contexts and backgrounds, resulting 
hence in a variety of emphases. So Boud et al. ‘stress the importance o f affective 
influence from humanistic psychology, while Boyd and Fales stress the importance of 
clarifying the problem—a need that derives particularly from the counselling context 
o f their other work’ (Moon, 2000:26). She observes that at the time most of the papers 
were written, Donald Schon’s work on reflection in professional practice had not been 
fully absorbed or its impact truly felt, and certainly this volume has gained a prime 
place in studies into the overall process. Moon’s observations seem to be somewhat 
selective: she overlooks the studies on ‘thinking’ made by Dewey early in the 20th 
century, and by Heidegger following him. Nor does she engage with the work of Jack 
Mezirow, although Mezirow is important in Jarvis’s work, particularly in his 
emphasis that Teaming occurs as a result o f reflecting upon experience, so that much 
of his work is relevant to understanding the learning process in socialization and in 
non-formal learning situations’ (Jarvis, 1995:96).
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No doubt one of the reasons for the significant disparity of approaches to the study 
originates in the wide range of dimensions that seem to be integral to the concept. The 
thesis has emphasised its relationship with the process of internalisation and with the 
making of meaning. However, as previous discussion demonstrated, it can equally 
well be linked with the way in which people reason and think, and with the growth of 
the self. At times, the term is used synonymously with evaluation, and it was this 
general frizziness which provoked earlier questions about the box entitled ‘reflection5 
in Jarvis’s model.
The link between reflection and internalisation is a significant one, however, 
incorporating also the notion of levels o f internalisation. The work of various scholars 
combines to present a picture of a gradual process in which an initial engagement with 
external social knowledge is gradually transformed to become part o f people’s beings. 
Marton and Saljo, whose work has already proved important elsewhere in the thesis in 
other ways (together, on occasion, with contributions from Booth), investigated the 
way in which learners processed information, identifying two principal categories 
which they labelled Deep and Surface (1976). Deep learners focused primarily on 
what was being communicated—the ‘signified’— as distinct from Surface learners 
who concentrated on absorbing factual information: the ‘sign’. The former were more 
interested in reflecting, evaluating and somehow ‘experiencing’ the subject matter, as 
contrasted against the latter whose intent was to memorise and reproduce. While the 
scholars’ choice o f terms might be considered in many ways unfortunate since the 
contrast suggests that ‘deep’ learning is in some way superior to ‘surface’, the 
relevance to the argument at hand is that content can be absorbed at different levels, 
ranging from the apparently surface and superficial, to a more profound degree of 
internalisation. This relates to the processes that people employ, and in particular to 
the extent to which they seek meaning. Boud et al. (1985), whose work is engaged 
with in depth later in the chapter, talk o f learners needing to ‘appropriate’ knowledge. 
Appropriation represents the final ‘owning’ o f new knowledge, its absorption into the 
warp and woof of being to the point that it then forms part of people’s overall 
biographies and/or selves. Interestingly, the authors indicate that it may be both a 
component of reflection and an outcome (presumably of learning).
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... for some learning tasks it may be quite sufficient for us to have integrated 
the new knowledge which has arisen from the experience into our own 
conceptual framework, but in many ways a further step is required. The new 
information which has been integrated needs to be appropriated in a very 
personal way if it is to become our own. Some learning can become so related 
to the self that it enters our sense of identity and can have a considerable 
importance and become a significant force in our lives. Significant feelings 
can come to be attached to this type o f learning and any learning experience 
which touches this area can give rise to strong emotions that may need to be 
taken into account in future reflection. (Boud et al., 1985:33)
Lastly, the work o f Michael Polanyi is relevant with his understanding of tacit 
knowledge, or more precisely, tacit knowing. This is a form of knowing that cannot be 
articulated, and that people experience as ‘just knowing’. It is not necessary to go into 
the intricate details of Polanyi’s discussion, since he was concerned not only to 
establish the existence and importance of tacit knowing, but also to demonstrate its 
structure and modus operandi. A link with internalisation nevertheless appears clear. 
We identified the two terms of tacit knowing, the proximal and the distal, and 
recognised the way we attend from  the first to the second, thus achieving an 
integration of particulars to a coherent entity to which we are attending. Since 
we were not attending to the particulars in themselves, we could not identify 
them: but i f  we now regard the integi'ation ofparticulars as an interiorisation, 
it takes on a more positive character. It now becomes a means of making 
certain things function as the proximal terms of tacit knowing, so that instead 
of observing them in themselves, we may be aware of them in their bearing on 
the comprehensive entity which they constitute. It brings home to us that it is 
not by looking at things, but by dwelling in them, that we understand their 
joint meaning. (1983:18; italics added.)
Frequently tacit knowing is associated with ‘knowing how’ rather than ‘knowing that’ 
(Jarvis, 1995). However, the thesis suggests that tacit knowing is more than simply a 
form of practical knowledge: it is the fruit o f such thorough internalisation that it 
cannot be separated from its surrounds. Nyiri (1988) acknowledges the possibility of 
different layers of knowledge within people, and of the need to extract certain forms 
‘jewel by jewel’.
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Human experts thereby gradually absorb 'a repertory of working rules of 
thumb, or "heuristics", that, combined with book knowledge, make them 
expert practitioners'. This practical, heuristic knowledge, as attempts to 
simulate it on the machine have shown, is 'hardest to get at because experts— 
or anyone else—rarely have the self-awareness to recognize what it is. So it 
must be mined out of their heads painstakingly, one jewel at a time'. (1988:20) 
The instances of people (frequently women?) having great difficulty in remembering 
the exact details of a conversation or event, and providing what (to men?) appears to 
be an inaccurate and often semi-articulate version is almost certainly not due to faulty 
or poor memory. Instead, these individuals may have so internalised the information, 
and so focused on understanding it, that what was originally discrete knowledge 
quickly became part o f their bank of tacit knowing. From that point, it is exceedingly 
difficult to excavate it.
So reflection has an distinctly existential element, contributing to the construction o f 
individuals through enabling them to transform knowledge into knowing, and the 
discussion returns to some of the themes explored in Chapter Three. In the context of 
a study which sets out to explore the effect that external social knowledge might have 
on the process o f reflection, however, it is helplul to work from a structured 
understanding of the concept. As Moon identifies, the most developed model 
available is that provided by Boud et al. (1985). The first of the following sections 
therefore look at this in depth. Section II.2 picks up one component o f this model 
(validation) and explores it from a range of alternative perspectives, proposing that 
this is one important dimension of the process which relates to the influence of faith 
on learning.
11.2 T o w a rd s  a  m o d e l
Boud et al. identify three components o f reflection: experience, reflective processes, 
and outcomes. They depict these in a diagram reproduced in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Model of the process of reflection (Boud et al., 1985:36)
The third element of their reflective processes— ‘re-evaluating experience’—they 
break down into four important aspects. Association is ‘the connecting of the ideas 
and feelings which are part of the original experience and those which have occurred 
during reflection with existing knowledge and attitudes’ ... ‘New associations are 
facilitated by positive attitudes and a responsive state’ (1985:31). Integration develops 
association by ordering and ‘discriminating’ between the conglomeration of ideas and 
feelings. It has two aspects: firstly ‘seeking the nature of relationships that have been 
observed through association’ and secondly ‘drawing conclusions and arriving at 
insights into the material we are processing. Synthesis is the characteristic of this 
integration phase in which we seek insight, which is the basis for further reflective 
activity’ (1985:32). Validation involves ‘testing for consistency between our new 
appreciations and our existing knowledge and beliefs, for consistency between these 
and parallel data from others and trying out our new perceptions in new situations’ 
(1985:32-33). An important player in the process is that of rehearsal. This is a 
technique people may employ prior to making a concrete commitment. Finally, 
appropriation is the means by which the new knowledge which has arisen from the 
experience is integrated into people’s very beings. The authors comment that:
... for some learning tasks it may be quite sufficient for us to have integrated 
the new knowledge which has arisen from the experience into our own 
conceptual framework, but in many ways a further step is required. The new
Experience(s) Reflective processes Outcomes
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information which has been integrated needs to be appropriated in a very 
personal way if it is to become our own. Some learning can become so related 
to the self that it enters our sense of identity and can have a considerable 
importance and become a significant force in our lives. Significant feelings 
can come to be attached to this type of learning and any learning experience 
which touches this area can give rise to strong emotions that may need to be 
taken into account in future reflection. (Boud et a l, 1985:33)
It is already possible to sense a gradual process o f internalisation. Appropriation 
represents the final ‘owning’ of new knowledge, its absorption into the very essence 
of being to the point that it then forms part of people’s overall biographies and/or 
selves. Interestingly, the authors indicate that it may be both a component of reflection 
and an outcome (presumably o f learning).
11.3 V a lid a tio n
One of the significant dimensions of reflection appeal's to be the act of validation. For 
Boud et al.y validation, as part of the process o f reflection, means ‘subjecting what we 
have started to integrate to what we might call ‘reality tests” .
We are testing for internal consistency between our new appreciations and our 
existing knowledge and beliefs, for consistency between these and parallel 
data from others and trying out our new perceptions in new situations. If  any 
contradictions present themselves we have to reappraise the situation and 
decide on what basis we should proceed. (Boud et a l, 1985:33)
The authors stop short o f exploring how these reality tests are conducted, however, 
other than suggesting that people might employ techniques o f ‘rehearsal’, either 
internally or through literal enactment. Mezirow too states that ‘the central function of 
reflection [is] that of validating what is known’ (1990:18). Following Habermas, he 
suggests:
Validating a belief in the realm o f communicative learning involves making a 
judgment regarding the situation and its circumstances in which what is 
asserted is justified. To understand the meaning of a sentence or any expressed 
idea, one must understand under what conditions it is true (in accord with what
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is) or valid (justifiable) (Habermas, 1984, p. 276). We can turn to an authority, 
tradition, or force to establish the validity of an assertion, or we can turn to a 
decision by rational discourse, that is, a consensus regarding its justification.
In communicative learning there are no empirical tests of truth; we rely on 
consensual validation of what is asserted. (1990:9-10)
Mezirow, in a similar way to Jarvis, emphasises the link between reflection and the 
making of meaning. While Boud et al. take a slightly different approach, the 
possibilities complement each other well. Testing for consistency involves looking to 
see whether something is ‘true’ under a variety of conditions, some of which forced 
its re-evaluation. It also involves the seeking of a consensus that coheres with the 
conclusions of other people.
Given the epistemological focus of the thesis and its interest in whether people 
validate their knowledge through use of an inner or outer authority, the way in which 
people validate an assertion was of particular relevance to the research. Mezirow 
speaks of turning to an authority, tradition or force. From a more philosophical 
perspective, particularly focusing on the cognitive, these are epistemological 
discussions which ask how people know what they know, and how they are sure that 
what they know is ‘true’. Philosophy works with a concept under the rubric of an 
‘epistemic primitive’. Erickson describes these through the notion of 
‘presuppositions’, indicating that these are ‘assumptions that are brought to the 
process of thought or reasoning’ (Erickson, 1986; cited by Zeolla, 1999.) Zeolla, 
engaging with Erickson’s thinking, comments that:
Different people ascribe to different epistemologies. Although many people 
may accept more than one epistemology as being reliable, one view is 
generally considered more fundamental than the other(s). 
(1999:www.dtl.org/apologetics/article/dead-men.htm)
He goes on to identify seven ‘primitives’ to which people might adhere. Writing from 
an overtly Christian stance, indeed, taking the position of a Christian apologist, certain 
of these epistemologies might be considered ‘unconventional’. The thesis included 
them, however, in part because of their general contribution to the argument, in part 
on account of the fact that the research was specifically interested in Christian 
epistemological behaviour.
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ZeoUa’s seven epistemologies, or primitives, are as follows.
1. Empiricism. "A philosophical theory which holds that all knowledge comes 
through sensory perception." By seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, or tasting 
truth is determined. Empiricism is the basis for scientific inquiries.
2. Rationalism, "The theory that knowledge is gained through reasoning rather 
than through sense experience." Reasoning means to, "think logically." So 
adherents of this epistemology believe truth can be attained through following 
the rules of logic.
3. Skepticism. "The doctrine that absolute knowledge is impossible and that 
inquiry must be a process o f doubting in order to acquire approximate or 
relative certainty." An agnostic would ascribe to this position.
4. Emotionalism. An emotionalist is, "One whose conduct, thought, or rhetoric is 
governed by emotion rather than reason, often as a matter o f policy." An 
emotionalist will appeal to a subjective, inner feeling for proof of his beliefs.
5. Post-modernism. This is "a view of the world characterized by a deep distrust 
o f reason, not to mention a disdain for the knowledge Christians believe the 
bible provides." Further, "The postmodern view of truth is that religious truth 
is never learned from an authoritative or objective source outside o f ourselves. 
It is created by the worshipper once he or she takes leave of all rational 
categories and enters the mystical experience
6. Organizational authority. Here the person believes what his authoritative 
organization tells him to believe.
7. Revelation. "The belief that God has communicated factual information about 
himself." The Christian and the adherent o f any religion which claims it has an 
"inspired" book or prophet would ascribe to this epistemology.
(Zeolla, 1999: www.dtl.org/apologetics/article/dead-men.htm. quoting 
Erickson, 1986)
His position is not well argued, and raises a number of questions, especially at the 
points where he makes unqualified assertions. Nonetheless, the significance o f their 
role seems valid. Laura and Leahy (1994) comment:
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The most deeply entrenched beliefs in any conceptual system (apart from our 
logical primitives which themselves provide the conceptual categories which 
determine the scope and limits of the patterns of coherent reasoning) are what 
we call 'epistemic primitives'. Epistemic primitives form a distinct class of 
beliefs which, together, constitute our epistemic framework for interpreting 
our entire experience o f the world. On this view our chains of reasoning about 
that experience begin not with some immaculately perceived 'brute facts', but 
with these epistemically primitive beliefs which express our fundamental 
suppositions about the nature of our world. These beliefs are primitive in the 
sense that they have a threefold function in the belief systems which they 
underpin: a) a presuppositional or foundational function; b) a constitutive 
function; c) an organisational function. (1994:411)
There is a certain amount of overlap between Zeolla’s categories; his 
acknowledgement that none is discrete and that people may employ some or all, either 
individually or combined, is therefore important. He gives no indication as to whether 
these primitives function at a subconscious, perhaps emotional level, or as conscious 
and deliberate intellectual acts of commitment. Other scholarship suggests either 
might be the case. The significant dimension of Perry’s (1970) move towards 
commitment in relativism, at which point students would appeal’ to make an 
intellectual choice that is largely reasoned and informed, will be recalled. Belenky et 
al. (1996 [1986]), on the other hand, contrast this against the gut, instinctive and often 
affective way in which a number of their interviewees (Subjective knowers) made 
epistemological decisions.
Despite the somewhat lightweight nature of Zeolla’s contentions, his analysis is 
nonetheless useful in providing greater insight into the types of ‘authorities, traditions 
and forces’ identified by Mezirow that people might resort to in the process of 
reflection. There are also points of contact with other considerations o f the thesis, 
particularly the external/internal dichotomy. Some of Zeolla’s primitives are clearly 
internal, for example, others external. This is an important point in the thesis as a 
whole. Not only is the hypothesis on which the research question was grounded 
proved to bear weight, but the notion of inner and outer authority became a legitimate 
means o f conducting the empirical research. It is logical also to hypothesise, or even
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assume, that wherever people place their authority will affect, guide and influence the 
consequent patterns of reasoning. The discussion returns to considerations explored in 
previous chapters.
For the purposes of the discussion, Zeolla usefully introduces certain specifically 
Christian considerations which pertain to the process of reflection. The thesis has 
consistently argued for the distinctiveness of Christian faith-content, and at this point 
in its developing argument the question of epistemic primitives becomes o f particular 
relevance. As previously, much must be left at the hypothetical level potentially for 
the empirical data to illuminate. Yet the fact that Zeolla was able to identify at least 
two primitives which can be applied to a specifically Christian context (numbers 6 
and 7) suggests that a commitment to these is likely to affect all consequent learning. 
Given the context o f validation within reflection, then this assertion may be rephrased: 
people’s commitment to a ‘Christian’ primitive may well influence the process of 
reflection as detailed in Boud et al. *s model. Precisely how this might happen is open 
to conjecture, but the point of significance at this juncture of the thesis is to establish 
its potential.
11.4 A ffirm ative , re c e p tiv e , o r  c r itic a l re fle c tio n
A second dimension of the reflective process that suggests it might be susceptible to 
influence by Christian faith-content lies in the actual nature o f the reflection that takes 
place, which itself links to the growth of the self. As has been seen, Jarvis, turning to 
existentialism, sees reflection as integral not only to the growth and development of 
the person, but to people becoming authentic (1992). Emphasising the interactivity of 
the reflective process, which he sees as only truly developing authenticity when 
‘individuals freely act in such a way that they try to foster the growth and 
development of each other’s being’ (1992:113), he also identifies a negative corollary: 
Inauthenticity occurs when individuals are unable to interact in order to help 
other people achieve their own personhood or when people’s actions are 
controhed by others and their performance is repetitive and ritualistic. In this 
case, people reproduce the social situation and act within the organization’s 
boundaries in a conformist manner. It occurs in education and industry, as well
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as in any other bureaucracy. A typical example is where the teacher, however 
well intentioned, tells the learners that they must learn their mathematical 
tables, that a procedure or skill must be performed in a certain manner, and so 
on, and where the learners are expected to learn in an unreflective manner and 
reproduce what they have memorized and practiced. They may reproduce the 
social situation and reproduce themselves, but their human essence is stymied. 
They are, but the process of becoming is inhibited. (1992:116-17)
Within that human essence, however, is the self, the growth and development of 
which the previous chapter linked with self-assertion, autonomy and responsibility. 
While that chapter considered this through the metaphor of voice, another way in 
which the self develop these capacities is through the act of critical reflection. To 
critique means to stand in opposition, to hold a view and to accept responsibility for it. 
This may involve a high degree of autonomy, especially if the voice is lone.
The role of and need for critical reflection in Christian Education has long been 
recognised, although as with theological reflection, its link with the development of 
the self may be less well understood. Astley’s (2000) juxtaposition of Christian 
critical education against Christian formative education, seeing one as receptive, the 
other evaluative, has already been highlighted but bears being reintroduced.
Formative Christian education is primarily receptive of the received self- 
understanding of the church. Phrases such as ‘spiritual formation’, ‘moral or 
character formation’, ‘theological formation’ and ‘ministerial formation’ also 
utilise this metaphor of moulding or fashioning something into a certain shape 
or after a certain pattern. ... As long as such formation does not disable a 
person’s development towards personal autonomy and critical reflection, it 
seems to me a proper—indeed essential—dimension of any education that 
wishes to call itself Christian.
Critical Christian education is primarily evaluative of the church’s self- 
understanding, and therefore in principle less conservatively ‘traditional’ than 
formation, when formation is seen simply as passing on a received tradition.
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This ‘Christian criticism’ embraces what has been described as the 
‘deconstmction of the tradition’.
(Astley, 2000:38; italics in original)
He under stands these issues to ‘cut across [the] variety of ways o f defining the content 
o f Christianity’ (2000:37), and suggests that different programmes place greater 
emphasis on one or the other, although the two should not be considered 
incompatible. For the purposes of the chapter and thesis, it would seem that the 
former tends to put greater weight on the external and view this as something 
authoritative which has to be internalised, whereas the latter sees individuals as 
having an inner authority which is fundamentally ‘superior’ to the external content 
that is being engaged with. Astley’s comment above also recognises that a receptive 
form of reflection may well risk fostering dependence and possibly a weak sense of 
self, as highlighted in the previous chapter.
Receptive and critical forms of reflection are not the only possibilities within a 
Christian context, however. From the Roman Catholic stable, and in particular the 
monastic tradition, one further form is discernible, which the thesis terms 
‘affirmative’, although both process and term have been drawn inductively from 
source material rather than hold a recognised educational position. Jean Leclercq, 
however, in what has become a classic study o f monastic learning, outlines what he 
entitles ‘a theology of “admiration”’:
Baldwin of Ford often describes his attitude in the presence o f the Eucharist by 
these two words: stupor et admiratio. He is surprised, rapt, as in an ecstasy, in 
a state which partakes both of the immobility caused by astonishment and the 
spontaneous elan provoked by enthusiasm; he never grows accustomed to the 
sublime realities on which his glance lingers; his wonder never diminishes; he 
marvels at the mystery Revelation proposes for contemplation, and he also 
marvels at the faith. His admiration rewards and, at the same time, stimulates 
his faith, and these two dispositions o f the soul augment each other mutually. 
They awaken the intelligence and all the other faculties of man: reflection and 
understanding are benefited by admiration and, in turn, foster charity and all
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the other virtues, and mystical experience and asceticism flow from them. 
(Leclercq, 1982:226; italics in original)
Elsewhere (Le Cornu, 2001) this is shown to relate to Kolb’s analysis of the processes 
o f experiential learning which include ‘appreciation’. The argument includes the 
following quote.
Much can be said about the process and method of criticism, indeed, most 
scholarly method is based on it. The process of appreciation is less recognized 
and understood. Thus it is worth describing in some detail the character of 
appreciation... Appreciation is largely the process of attending to and being 
interested in aspects of one’s experience. We notice only those aspects of 
reality that interest us and thereby ‘capture our attention.’ Interest is the basic 
fact of mental life and the most elementary act of valuing1.
Is it possible to claim an ‘influence’ o f Christian faith-content that is evidenced in 
these different forms of reflection? It would seem highly probable. The least 
questionable is the receptive form, since, as Astley points out, it is difficult to 
conceive of Christian identity unless some form o f receptive reflection is present. The 
argument of previous chapters also suggests that Christian authorities may well 
augment and justify this approach to learning. However, a more subtle influence is 
equally present in the affirmative stance. Here, faith authorities require people to 
rejoice and celebrate in their truths. In so doing, their truths are experienced. Thus a 
cycle is put into place, yet one could not exist without the other. Truths are celebrated 
not only because it is right and proper that they should be celebrated, but because they 
themselves suggest this should be done. To do so is to experience them, and as a 
result o f experiencing them, more rejoicing can take place. In many ways this is the 
most significant of all the influences! Is it possible to claim, however, that critical 
reflection is devoid of any influence? Probably not, since essential to theories of 
theological reflection is the notion of critical dialogue. Pattison, Green and Killen and 
de Beer all emphasise this dimension. So that critical theological reflection is not 
simply a matter of scrutinising for the purposes of finding flaws which in turn 
discourages any commitments from being made. It is not one-way traffic. Rather,
1 Kolb, D.A., E xperiential L earn ing  - experience as the source o f  learning a n d  developm ent, Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice Hall, 1984, 103/4.
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A good starting point for [theological reflection] is the model of a critical 
conversation which takes place between the Christian tradition, the student’s 
own faith presuppositions and a particular contemporary situation. (Pattison, 
2000:136)
111. S u m m a r y  a n d  c o n c l u s i o n
This study of both theological reflection and reflection per se has suggested that while 
the former clearly grapples with certain features of Christian faith-content, as well as 
acknowledging other influential aspects that are likely to impact the reflective 
process, there are a number o f factors embedded within the act of reflection itself 
which, as yet, it appears not to recognise. Since the purpose of the chapter was not to 
critique the process of theological reflection with a view to identifying strengths and 
weaknesses, these observations can only be offered as a comment on the theory 
together with recommendations for further work to be done in the field. Rather, the 
discussion served to confirm a variety of aspects of the research hypothesis and 
support arguments and points made in previous chapters. Particularly pertinent, 
however, was the role of validation and the type of reflection engaged in, both of 
which were demonstrably affected by people’s faith-content and authorities.
To a degree, the discipline of theological reflection views the relationship between 
Christians and their faith-content as ‘unnecessary’, despite the fact that the thesis 
argued previously for an indisputable necessary relationship on the grounds of 
Christian identity. Theological reflection largely focuses on gaps that need to be 
bridged, however, and proposes methods by which this can be done. Starting from 
premises similar to those of Hull—and to an extent those of the research—it offers as 
many insights into how and why Christian learning may be impeded as it does into 
how it might be encouraged and developed. That encouragement and development 
does not necessarily focus on the process of internalisation, although the implications 
and outworkings are generally covertly present.
Both this and the previous chapter focused almost exclusively on the one-directional 
process of internalisation, however, sometimes accompanied by extemalisation, but
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The next chapter turns to consider this under the concept of the relationship between 
form and content.
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C h a p t e r  F i v e  
P e o p l e ’s  w a y s  o f  b e l i e v i n g :  l e a r n i n g  s t y l e s ,  f o r m  a n d  
c o n t e n t
I n t r o d u c t io n
The form/content relationship has already been introduced as significant to the interest 
of the research on account of Fowler’s understanding that the two could be separated 
in order to analyse the forms of a human universal: faith. Conceptually, it is a 
relationship which can be placed within a discussion o f the relationship between inner 
and outer, ‘form’ representing inner, personal structures, ‘content’ the object of their 
learning, often represented by external social knowledge.
This chapter examines the relationship between the two by turning to the concept of 
learning styles, which, it argues, ably incorporates both dimensions since it is 
concerned with the characteristic, inherent ways in which individuals relate to 
external knowledge. Bearing some similarities to Kelly’s personal constructs, theories 
of learning styles may perhaps be interpreted as the way the former operate in real 
life: fleshed-out examples of the acts of perception and knowing. The chapter opens 
by examining theories of learning styles per se, initially considering how they have 
traditionally been understood before focusing on two dimensions it considers 
significant both to an understanding of the concept in its own right, and to the 
interests of the research: their procedural and relational nature. It then draws 
significant parallels between these and the form/content partnership, applying the 
considerations specifically to Christian faith-content and demonstrating the inter­
relationship between the two. Rather than look at the impact of this authoritative 
knowledge on learning styles themselves, however, as was the focus o f Chapter Three 
with personal constructs, the interest of this chapter is in the nature of the interaction 
between inner and outer. This in turn provides an appropriate framework for analysing 
what the thesis has called the ‘necessary’ relationship between Christians and then 
faith-content, providing examples o f how they do learn, as opposed to don’t.
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I. T h e o r i e s  o f  l e a r n in g  s t y l e s
‘Learning styles’ is the title given by educational scholarship to the study of the way 
in which people individually go about processing information. Roughly summarised, 
learning style theories focus on the ‘way’ people learn as opposed to exploring the 
process of learning that was described in Chapter One: the ‘how’ rather than the 
‘what’ of learning. It is a complex concept not least because a number of aspects 
remain only partially understood. Various questions quickly arise. Can any 
identifiable traits be considered innate? What is their relationship to personality? To 
which domain do they pertain? Is the concept itself secure enough as a result of these 
questions to command academic respect? Some of these questions were explored in 
the research preceding and leading to this project (1998). The conclusions are 
incorporated into the discussion o f this chapter.
Theories of learning styles generally pertain to and are ‘claimed’ by the discipline of 
educational psychology. This has had a number of consequences, although given the 
thesis’s understanding of people’s conscious awareness functioning as the location 
where an engagement with the environment fundamentally takes place, a 
psychological focus is appropriate. Nonetheless, learning style theories have tended to 
be restricted essentially to the cognitive domain, focusing on patterns o f thought, 
mental activity and intellectual approaches and abilities. Secondly, perhaps reflecting 
the era in which they had their heyday (1970s), studies into these various phenomena 
have beep guided, if not determined, by established (scientific) methodology relating 
to psychology. So Entwistle, for example—an established educational psychologist in 
Edinburgh—criticises Perry’s work into the epistemological development of High 
School students on account of his emphasis on interviews.
Perry’s scheme relies heavily on intuitive impressions from interview 
transcripts. It is difficult to demonstrate the validity of the findings, except by 
appeal to the reader’s own experiences of higher education. (Entwistle, 
1981:75)
The thesis engages with the methodological issues Entwistle raises at a later point. 
Nevertheless, the majority of now generally-accepted conclusions about learning 
styles are based on investigations whose emphasis was, as far as possible, not only to
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examine how people performed, but to do so in such a way that the results were both 
measurable and scientifically verifiable. One of the difficulties that this approach had 
to grapple with, and which continues to dog conclusions, is the extent to which 
identifiable learning styles were linked to people’s underlying personality. This 
provokes a fundamental question of whether Teaming style’ is a representative title 
that accurately describes the phenomenon under investigation. The conundrum is 
heightened by the similarities that are evident between certain traits categorised under 
‘learning style’ with, for example, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator which purports to 
classify people into personality groups. Sternberg (1997), in a defiant attempt to move 
discussions on, includes an entire chapter in his book that simply explores the concept 
o f ‘styles’, which he breaks down to include cognition-centred styles, personality- 
centred styles, activity-centred styles, and teaching styles. His category specifically of 
Teaming styles’ is found under ‘activity-centred styles’ on the grounds that:
Activity-centred theories of styles are more action-oriented than are cognitive- 
or personality-centred theories. They tend more to be centred around kinds of 
activities people engage in at various points in their lives, such as schooling 
and work. (1997:145)
Quoting Webster’s New World Dictionary, he states that a ‘style’ is “a distinctive or 
characteristic manner ... or method of acting or performing”, specifying from there 
that the term ‘cognitive style’ ‘refers to an individual’s way of processing 
information’ (1997:134). Sternberg claims that his own work, entitled Thinking Styles 
(1997), is more representative o f people’s behaviour than any o f the alternatives he 
cites principally because he takes exception to their (perceived) tendency to pigeon 
hole individuals into one particular style (‘we do not have a style, but rather a profile 
of styles’ [1997:19]). Thinking styles are forms o f ‘mental self-government’ and he 
deliberately chooses the analogy of the organisation of society in the description of his 
proposed styles. Governments are ‘external reflections of what goes on in people’s 
minds. They represent alternative ways o f organizing our thinking. Thus, the forms of 
government we see are mirrors of our minds’ (1997:19). Sternberg’s thesis and 
conclusions are interesting yet unconvincing. Entwistle’s methodological query must 
apply equally to him; he supports his theories with reference to a series of inventories 
he designed, but which appear to test the characteristics o f each individual style,
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having already established in advance what he considered these to be. His three 
categories bear strong resemblances to the variety of other studies he draws from, and 
the impression given is tantamount to that of old material repackaged. Nevertheless, 
his discussion is useful in bringing order to the overall subject, and he makes 
important points in emphasising the fact that people have a profile of styles rather 
than one specific approach, and in attempting to bring the various different domains 
(cognition, personality etc.) under one all-encompassing umbrella.
A further complication is evident in that from even a cursory investigation into 
‘traditional’ studies into learning styles one o f the striking factors to emerge is the fact 
that the term ‘style’ must take its place alongside a number of other alternatives. 
Scholars speak equally freely principally o f learning strategies and approaches to 
learning, but also of processes, skills, tactics, orientation, and more (see, for example, 
Laurillard, 1979), with no clear common consensus about what distinguishes each, or 
one from another. Some of the difficulty appears to have resulted simply from a huge 
number of separate investigations that took place world-wide within a very short 
space o f time, not allowing hence a pooling of expertise in order for an accepted 
terminology to be established. Another feature seems to have been the vast range of 
approaches that in origin appeared to have little in common, yet with time many could 
be seen to contribute to a central thesis. Schmeck, for example, comments that:
I feel that all cognitive styles can be encompassed by one broad inclusive 
dimension of individual difference, labeled “global versus analytic” by Kirby, 
“holist versus serialist” by Pask, and “right-brained versus left-brained” by 
Torrance and Rockensteim “Field-dependent versus field-independent” is a 
related dimension studied at length by Witkin and his colleagues. ... The term 
“global versus articulated (or differentiated)” has also been applied to this 
dimension of perceptual or attentional style. “Impulsive versus reflective” 
(Kogan, 1976), and “category breadth” (Wallach & Kogan, 1965) are likewise 
relevant. I am arguing that all of these, at some level of abstraction, are 
reflections of a single dimension that I label “global versus analytic,” similar 
to Kirby’s terminology. (1988:327)
These studies took place in very different disciplines under very different conditions 
and in many ways with quite different goals. Only with hindsight did scholars begin to
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realise the similarities between them. Lastly, it would appeal* that scholars did indeed 
consider they were investigating subtly different phenomena. The key issues are 
expounded in depth elsewhere (Le Comu, 1998). However, one basic consideration is 
the distinction between the way students structure unstructured subject matter in terms 
of procedures or descriptions (style) and what students do in order to learn something 
(strategy) (Laurillard, 1979). Schmeck (1988) makes a different distinction, focusing 
on the deliberate, conscious ‘strategy’ that students adopt in the learning process, as 
opposed to the unconscious (innate?) ‘styles’ that typify their approach, and, to some 
extent, guide and determine it. Lastly, Entwistle and Ramsden:
... reserve the word style to refer to the stable, trait-like consistency in one’s 
approach to attending, perceiving, and thinking traditionally labelled cognitive 
style. They prefer the word orientation when referring to consistency in one’s 
approach to learning in school and university setting, because they feel that the 
student’s orientation to studying in schools and universities results from a 
combination of motives and styles during his or her perception of the 
classroom situation’. (Le Cornu, 1998:16, quoting Schmeck, 1988:7-8)
The 1998 study proposed three salient features which emerged from the overall 
discussion. Cognitive learning styles were understood to:
• Be mpntal processes
• Be reasonably stable traits that are repeated in various situations
• Pertain to the way a student structures unstructured subject matter in terms of 
procedures or descriptions. (Le Cornu, 1998:16)
It also accepted a definition of ‘learning style’:
People’s characteristic ways of information processing, feeling and behaving 
in and toward learning situations ... those preferences, dispositions and 
tendencies that influence one’s learning. (Smith, 1983:60; inLe Comu, 
1998:16)
As the discussion progresses, this definition is taken up and examined, as are the three 
proposed characteristic features of a learning style. Nevertheless, this summary 
adequately expresses the way in which the concept has traditionally been understood 
and used, despite variations in terminology and approach to the subject. It also
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provides an immediate link with the question of how people reason and reflect—the 
form of thought—through the emphasis on mental processes.
From the variety of ways in which the concept has been approached, analysed and 
understood, two in particular proved of significance to the interest of the thesis and 
research: a bipolar relationship, and a procedural nature. The next sections look at 
each in turn.
II. A  b ip o la r  r e l a t i o n s h ip
Both words of the title of this section are important. In the first place, a case is made 
for learning styles to be understood as lying along a bipolar continuum. It is almost 
certainly rare for people to operate exclusively at one or other of the extremes, and the 
reality o f a continuum allows for the possibility of a combination of characteristic 
traits to function alongside each other, perhaps in this way also respecting Sternberg’s 
insistence on people having a profile of styles rather than one sole style. The 
continuum argued for, however, functions primarily within people, representing the 
inner epistemological make-up of individuals. Alongside this, and partnering it, is a 
relationship that people construct with the content o f their learning which the section 
suggests is best understood in personal vs impersonal terms. A matrix is thus formed, 
one axis representing the continuum, the other representing people’s relationship with 
content. This prepares the ground for the final section which discusses the 
form/content relationship with respect to Christian faith-content.
11.1 A b ip o la r  c o n tin u u m
Many learning style theories propose two fundamentally different and alternative 
ways in which people engage with the content o f their learning, although there are 
certain notable exceptions. Honey and Mumford’s 1992 categorisation of four styles, 
originating with Kolb’s work, and mentioned in Chapter One is one example.
Sternberg also refers to a theoiy of learning styles designed by Dunn and Dunn and 
which is ‘widely used in education’, which has 18 different styles divided into four 
main categories: environmental, emotional, sociological and physical. He nevertheless
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states that it is ‘hard to say .. .exactly why they are called styles. They refer more to 
elements that affect a person’s ability to leam than to ways of learning themselves’ 
(Sternberg, 1997:146). The bipolar model seems to have gained the greatest credence 
amongst the leading scholars in the field, however.
‘Cognitive style literature has produced dichotomies or bi-polar constructs 
representing preferences towards one or other way of thinking’ (Entwistle, 
1981:217).
While Entwistle then goes on to propose a third position that represents a merge of the 
two, no serious challenge from scholarship that approaches the subject from a 
cognitive perspective has yet been presented to this dichotomous arrangement. In a 
previous study (Le Comu, 1998) a case was made that agreed with Schmeck’s 
conclusions (above), and a number of parallels were drawn out between the work of 
Pask (1976), Witkin et a l (1977), and Belenky et a l (1986). This was presented in 
diagrammatic form and is reproduced in Figure 5.1.
Certain slight disparities are apparent. There is little evidence of Witkin et a l ’s 
passive, spectator approach in Pask’s learners, for example, although this could be 
explained by the fact that Pask did not offer his subjects the opportunity to wait and 
see: they were obliged to make immediate choices and construct quick hypotheses. 
Nevertheless, the two are not incompatible. Pask’s ‘teach-back’ technique required 
participants to articulate verbally their process of reasoning, and this permitted him to 
identify a pattern of thought that indeed might well have been conveyed as a ‘wait and 
see’ approach without this articulation. Pask’s and Witkin et a l ’s work should 
therefore be seen as complementary. Similarly, Belenky et a l ’s study might be 
considered somewhat alien to a study o f learning styles. In the first place, this was not 
the stable from which their work emanated. Secondly, it does not immediately cohere 
with one of the basic principles of learning style theory: that people’s styles are .stable 
over time. No scholarship is set in stone, however, and the data and results from the 
afore-mentioned small-scale research project (Le Comu, 1998) suggested that men, in 
particular, shifted their approach as they grew older, thus challenging this 
fundamental premise.
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Figure 5.1: A comparison of learning style characteristics
W itkin et al. Pask Belenky et al.
Field-dependent Holist Connected
Don’t analyse Complex hypotheses Acceptance
Don’t structure Use o f analogy, illustration, 
anecdote
Little evaluation
Work with the field ‘as
is’
Remember and recapitulate a whole Purpose o f connection
Spectator approach Many goals Empathy
Passive role Assimilate information from 
diverse topics
Relationship
Relevant, constant 
features emerge
Ask questions about broad relations Self allowed to participate
Form hypotheses about 
generalisations
Trustworthy knowledge 
comes from personal 
experience
Look ahead Believe rather than doubt
Understand the topic as a whole
Wide focus o f attention
Build the overall picture from the 
start
. .
Field-independent Serialist Separate
Analyse Step by step Impersonal authority
Structure Make use o f the bare essentials Voice o f reason
Governed by principles 
abstracted from 
experience
Look for logic Public language
Seek to identity constant 
features
Straightforward Critical reasoning
Form and modify 
hypotheses
Relate items by simple data links, 
moving to the next topic only when 
the first is mastered
Adversarial
Form and use specific hypotheses Suppression o f self
Ask questions about narrow 
relations
Use o f techniques
Focus either on abstracts, or on 
real-world topics at one time
Tendency to doubt
Exclude feelings and 
personal beliefs
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One additional dimension to Belenky et al. ’s bipolar structure is the parallel they draw 
with Latin languages’ differentiation between knowledge of acquaintance and 
knowledge that (compare also Ryle, 1949). Connected knowers know almost by 
primary, sensory experience. They become familiarised with their knowledge because 
they experience it. This is the French connaitre and the Spanish conocer. On the other 
hand, Separate knowers extract information from that experience. They are able to 
articulate something about it in a way that Connected knowers may not be. This is the 
French savoir and the Spanish saber. One o f the highly significant contributions— 
perhaps the most significant—that Belenky et al. ’s work made to scholarship was 
their demonstration that to know by acquaintance involved different procedures, but 
was nevertheless an approach to learning that occurred in similar circumstances and at 
a similar developmental stage as those who naturally learnt ‘separately5. Traditionally, 
knowledge of acquaintance has been viewed as an epistemological ‘first stage’, 
necessary but inadequate since it struggled to separate, and hence to analyse and 
manipulate. Belenky et al. not only identified the ways, or procedures that 
characterised that way of knowing, but put it on an equal par with Separate knowing: 
‘Connected knowing is just as procedural as separate knowing, although its 
procedures have not yet been as elaborately codified’ (1996 [1986]:121). Reference to 
Figure 5.1 reveals two major differentiating factors: firstly the degree to which the 
self is allowed to participate and to which knowledge is therefore viewed in personal 
terms; secondly, a general attitude o f either acceptance or critique, belief or doubt.
The authors acknowledge that the two ways of knowing might be gender-related, with 
more women than men knowing in a Connected way, although they state that they 
know of no ‘hard evidence (to use a very separate word)’ to support such a claim (see 
later).
A bipolar approach to understanding the concept o f learning styles therefore seems 
solid. It does, o f course, find parallels with Kelly and his own understanding o f how 
people go about the act of perception. For Kelly, people adopted a bipolar approach 
which asked whether something was like or unlike something else. While at one level 
this might appear to be an example of entirely objective ‘separate’ reasoning, at 
another it can be understood as embryonic forms o f connected and separate knowing, 
those looking for likeness operating as Connected knowers, those wishing to perceive
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difference as Separate knowers. Further parallels are identifiable in the fact that 
learning styles take the form of mental structures that then influence the way people 
relate to experience. Both of these features, according to Kelly, pertain to the 
formation of personal constructs through the act of perception. As with Kelly, the 
characteristic traits of learning styles are fundamentally internal to people and 
incorporate both the cognitive and the affective. However, particularly if 
incorporating the work of Belenky et al. one of the key features in learning style 
theory must be the degree to which the self is allowed to participate in the process of 
knowing and constructing knowledge, itself an indication of the degree to which 
people include or suppress the affective. Another key feature is whether people follow 
a lineai*, step by step logic that focuses on detail, or prefer to work with bigger overall 
concepts in order to grasp the whole picture. Lastly, some individuals are proactive in 
seeking to make sense of the object of attention, forming and modifying hypotheses as 
they go along, while others prefer a more passive approach, waiting for the important 
features to emerge. All of these characteristics, relate to the inner dimension of 
learners and in the last section the chapter argues that these contribute to people’s 
epistemological ‘form’. Thus far, however, little attention has been paid to how they 
relate to the external environment, to external content. The next section considers this 
under the rubric of people’s relationship with knowledge.
11.2 P e o p le ’s  r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  k n o w le d g e
The idea that people are necessarily in a relationship with their external world is 
fundamental to theories of experiential learning which take a constructivist approach. 
It can hardly be otherwise. The realisation that people contribute a dimension of 
themselves to all knowledge was highlighted by Kant in the 18th century, and Jarvis’s 
representation of the processes of internalisation and extemalisation portrayed in 
Figure 1.3 interprets this in a learning context. Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) 
emphasis on the role of language contributes to the same idea. Language implies the 
need for interpretation, and much of the study o f hermeneutics focuses on where 
meaning resides, and whether this is primarily with the communicator, the audience, 
or both. In some sense, all social knowledge is like a ball on a piece of elastic which
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people project away from themselves and which is held in tension in its social and 
cultural environment, but which is never completely divorced or separated from them.
As part of their process of analysis of women’s ways of knowing, Belenky et al. 
compiled a list of what they termed ‘educational dialectics’. These had been extracted 
inductively from the raw data resulting from their interviews and consequently 
contributed to and guided their analysis of it. One of the significant features of these 
dialectics was the focus of a number of them on the nature of the relationship between 
people and their external world. So one dialectic overtly asked, for example, what the 
relationship was between self and the content of one’s learning; another what the 
relationship was between learning and ‘life’. The full set of dialectics is reproduced in 
Figure 5.2.
Those most relevant to the discussion are:
• Discovery/didacticism
• Rational/intuitive
• Discrete/related
• Personal/impersonal
• Inner/outer
• Listening/speaking
Each speaks o f a different aspect o f learning, many relating to previous discussion. 
Listening and Speaking return to the question of voice and the growth o f the self.
Inner and outer focus on validation of knowledge and potentially on epistemic 
primitives. Discovery and didacticism convey notions of authority, together with the 
development of autonomy in learning and self responsibility. More importantly, each 
speaks of a different relationship between the external and the internal.
A closer look reveals that most o f these five dialectics can be subsumed under the 
personal/impersonal dimension. Inner implies the personal, outer the impersonal; 
discovery the personal, didacticism the impersonal; related the personal, discrete the 
impersonal. Only listening and speaking imply a (theoretically balanced) transaction 
between the inner and the outer, and are equally personal. Within a constructivist
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Figure 5.2: Educational dialectics (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, Tarule, 
Women’s Ways of Knowing (1996 [1986]:237-38)).
Process Oriented Goal Oriented
Means 1 Ends
What are the aims of education?
Discovery Didacticism
Constructed knowledge Received knowledge
How is knowledge viewed? How is the act of becoming a “knower” explained?
Rational Intuitive
Logical, analytical, objective Gut feeling, subjective ESP
What method(s) are used for analysis? What method(s) are valued?
Discrete Related
Compartmentalization Synthesis
What is the relationship between learning and “life”?
Being with others . Being Alone or on Own
Collaborative, cooperative Solitary, competitive
What arrangements for learning are preferred? Have been experienced?
Breadth Concentration
Generalist, dilettantism Specialist, narrowness, 
blinders
What is the range of interests in learning?
Support Challenge
What are the optimal conditions for learning?
Who and what are experienced as supportive/nonsupportive? Challenging/nonchallenging?
Personal Impersonal
What is the relationship between self and the content of one’s learning?
How are these relationships structured in terms of the curriculum, relationship with peers,
relationship with faculty and staff?
Self-concern Responsibility and Caring 
for Others
Is concern for self vs. concern for others an issue in educational decision making?
Inner Outer
What factors control goal setting, pacing, decision making, and evaluation? 
Who and what is experienced as validating/nonvalidating?
Listening Speaking
What are the experiences of voice?
paradigm, therefore, the thesis proposes that the personal/impersonal dichotomy most 
appropriately describes the relationship between people and the content of their 
learning, embracing a wide variety of traits. Indeed, even the idea of people naturally 
having a ‘relationship’ with social knowledge is incorporated into the concept. So a 
picture is formed of a two-dimensional activity that incorporates both learning styles 
and perception, representing the relationship between people’s characteristic ways of
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initiating and handling the processing of external knowledge. This can be portrayed in 
the form of a matrix. Each of its axes have a personal characteristic, and their poles 
are represented in relational terms. The bipolar continuum of individual learning 
styles lies along the bottom, indicating many of the procedures that people employ as 
they begin to engage with their external world, but this engagement is itself expressed 
as a relationship with knowledge. Figure 5.3 portrays the matrix diagrammatically.
Figure 5.3 A matrix of people’s relationship with knowledge
Impersonal knowledge
Separate knowing 
Field independent 
Serialist approach
Personal knowledge
Connected knowing 
Field dependent 
Holistic approach
Since each matrix is a continuum, then a variety of different positions along each is 
probable, indicated in Figure 5.3 by the greyed lines.
The final section argues that this provides a usefiil model for understanding the 
form/content relationship, and engages with the impact that content, in the shape of 
Christian faith-content, might have on form, understood in terms of learning styles. 
Before moving to this, however, greater consideration must be given to the procedural 
dimension of learning styles.
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(II. A  p r o c e d u r a l  c o n c e p t
The procedural nature of Belenky et al. ’s Separate and Connected knowers has 
already been briefly introduced. The identification of procedures within the way of 
knowing they called ‘connected’ was one o f the most revolutionary aspects of their 
study, not least because it demonstrated a potential validity to this form of knowing 
that had never previously been recognised. Procedures imply logic, reason, structure, 
systematisation... all attributes that humans prize on account of their contribution to 
ensuring a validity and degree of objectivity in knowing. Never before had a way of 
knowing which allowed the personal to play a significant role been acknowledged as 
equally as legitimate as those forms which excluded the personal. Placing both 
Separate and Connected knowers under the same banner of Procedural knowers, the 
authors state:
All the women who appear in this chapter were absorbed in the business of 
acquiring and applying procedures for obtaining and communicating 
knowledge. Some ... were passionately involved in this process, while others 
... treated it primarily as a game; but the emphasis on procedures, skills, and 
techniques was common to all’ (1996 [1986]:95).
In a discussion on ‘aspects of procedural knowledge’ they suggest four specific 
characteristics o f these procedures, as follows.
(i) Speaking in measured tones
‘Women at this position think before they speak; and because their ideas must 
measure up to certain objective standards, they speak in measured tones. Often, they 
do not speak at all. But this is not a passive silence; on the other side of this silence, 
reason is stirring.’ (1996 [1986]:94).
The procedure involved here is therefore to take time to take stock o f a situation and 
the knowledge that is focused on. It requires people to ‘engage in conscious, 
deliberate, systematic analysis’, because things are ‘not always what they seem to be’. 
To find the truth takes considerable effort and requires significant investment, 
listening, looking, thinking... Because of people’s awareness that truth can be elusive, 
they err on the side of caution, holding back rather than speaking out, and using 
‘measured tones’ when articulating their views and thoughts.
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(ii) Knowing how
This is the preference for form over content referred to previously. Content is 
nevertheless affected. Tn learning to “do philosophy,” Faith learns how to formulate 
questions; but the questions had to be of a particular kind, and the questions she might 
have formulated on her own might have been quite different from those she was being 
taught to ask.’ In developing methods (forms) of reasoning that stood their ground and 
proved reliable, the interviewees in this category also acquired an increasing sense of 
control, demonstrating hence the link between this and their tendency to speak in 
measured tones.
(iii) Perspective taking
‘The notion of “ways of looking” is central to the procedural knowledge position’. It 
involves people in acknowledging that different people look at the world in different 
ways, and in their being willing to explore these different perspectives. ‘They are 
interested not just in what people think but in how people go about forming their 
opinions and feelings and ideas.’ So in preparation for an exam, students would focus 
not so much on what questions might come up on the paper, but on what sort of 
questions would be posed, according to the mind and character o f the teacher: the sort 
o f things he/she would be interested in and concerned about.
(iv) Objectivity
‘Women who use procedural knowledge pay attention to objects in the external 
world’. The authors contrast this against Subjective knowers who ‘professed to be 
open to anything’ and who were, ‘in fact, stubbornly immune to other people’s ideas’. 
Frequently, however, ‘it takes time to learn to attend to the object, to wait for 
meanings to emerge from a poem, rather than imposing the contents o f your own head 
or your own gut’. There are real similarities here with Witkin et al’s Field-dependent 
knowers whose approach was to allow the relevant, constant features of their focus of 
attention to ‘emerge’ (see Figure 5.1). The nature o f the objectivity involves people 
‘emptying themselves’ simply so that they can attend to the other with the purpose of 
discovering its true identity. The authors do not comment on the role of the self in this 
procedure. However, their text suggests that it is not eliminated or repressed. Instead, 
it simply takes a back seat because it is sufficiently well-formed to do that. Before one 
can be self-giving and self-‘retiring’, the self has to have taken control of itself: once 
again, implied through the characteristic o f speaking in measured tones.
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From these four aspects, the authors go on to identify procedures specific to 
Connected and Separate ways of knowing. These are outlined in Figure 5.4. Many 
have been elaborated on in greater depth previously. Notes have therefore simply been 
added to accompany those introduced for the first time.
Figure 5.4: Separate and Connected procedures
Separate knowing Connected knowing
Doubting Sharing small truths 
Gossiping. ‘As the gossiper observes her 
friend’s responses she learns about her 
friend’s ways of making meaning’, (pi 16)
Listening to reason Refusing to judge
Self-extrication Collaborating in connected-knowing 
groups
Collaborative explorations require 
individuals to ‘stretch [their] own vision 
in order to share another’s vision’, (pi 19)
Using personal knowledge
For Belenky et al., then, the term ‘procedure’ is used very broadly and might be 
understood as people’s ‘characteristics’ as they go about the learning process. 
Immediately apparent is the familiarity of Separate knowing processes in the 
contemporary educational context and the unfamiliarity of those of Connected 
knowing. One might even be tempted to question whether the latter can be considered 
procedures at all, as well as their legitimacy for the purposes of formulating a 
systematic understanding of how people construct knowledge. However, the authors 
draw attention to a further dimension, highlighting the fact that the two alternatives 
may well be based on different ethical and moral systems, the one prioritising justice, 
the other care.
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Returning to the discussion of learning styles and the proposal that Connected and 
Separate knowing should be viewed as contributing to and augmenting scholarly 
understandings of learning styles, a natural assumption is therefore that learning styles 
should be seen as a group of interacting procedures. There is little in any of the 
characteristics provided in Figure 5.1 to suggest this is inappropriate. Before the 
suggestion can be accepted as generally sound, however, a number of potential 
difficulties must be considered. Firstly, as section I highlighted, learning styles are 
commonly thought to be traits that are implicit to people throughout then lives, and 
reasonably stable over time. While challenges to that position have already been 
raised, questions must nonetheless be raised within the context o f Belenky et aU  s 
own work. Their Procedural knowers were presented as fourth of five perspectives, 
and although their insistence that the perspectives are not hierarchical has been noted, 
the implication is that none of the other perspectives, with the possible exception of 
Constructed knowers, employed these procedures or functioned in a connected or 
separate way. The difficulty is heightened by the authors’ suggestion that only those 
who have received a formal education, possibly at university level, develop these 
procedures. Two main responses can be made. The ethical and moral preference to 
either justice or care may well be innately present in people, inclining them to either a 
separate or connected approach, but the associated procedures take time and training 
to develop. Silent, Received and Subjective knowers may also use procedures linked 
to separation or connection as part o f their way of knowing, but these were less 
apparent than other dimensions o f their epistemology and the authors focused on 
these.
There seems little reason, therefore, to reject the idea that bipolar learning styles have 
a procedural dimension to them, although further research needs to take place to 
establish this more securely. Those procedures extend beyond the work of Belenky et 
al. and incorporate the conclusions of Witkin et al., Pask, and potentially others such 
as those identified by Schmeck (see section I). In many ways, returning to the 
definitions presented previously, learning styles might best be understood precisely as 
the range of mental procedures (as distinct from processes) people habitually use in a 
diversity of situations. The next section firstly argues that these also represent an 
aspect of people’s ‘form’ which in turn interacts with ‘content’, and then considers
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how this works out when that content is specifically Christian. In so doing, it 
reintroduces a number of dimensions focused on in previous chapters, hence 
beginning the process of drawing a number of different threads together.
IV. T h e  f o r m /c o n t e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a n d  C h r i s t i a n  f a i t h - c o n te n t
The relevance of the form/content relationship to the interests of the research was first 
highlighted in the Prologue. Section II.2 above offered a basic analysis of its structure, 
understanding this as the interaction which takes place between people’s ‘natural’ and 
inner way of approaching the construction o f personal knowledge which is then 
directed outward during the process of engaging with their environment and 
experience. Judging from Belenky et al. ’s work, it seems probable that those with a 
‘separate’ inclination based on the ethic of justice may also perceive and relate to 
content in a separate, impersonal way, whereas those inclined towards connectedness 
and care may perceive and relate to it in a relational, personal way. The pivot between 
the two axes lies in the procedures people employ to bring the two together. Referring 
to previous discussion, these procedures are part of the means of internalisation, 
relating both to the patterns of reasoning employed and to the process of reflection. 
Each axis, has a number of strands, the horizontal continuum including the different 
traits identifiable within people’s learning styles, the vertical incorporating a range 
largely grouped under the impersonal/personal dichotomy.
Although the questions identified previously about the connection between learning 
styles and procedures still play a role, certainly in Belenky et a l ’s work, the 
procedures of Procedural knowers constituted their form, or their way of knowing. It 
was through focusing on these procedures that the authors were able to identify the 
salient characteristics of form. At least for this group of individuals, form and its 
procedural structures were more or less synonymous. Perry expresses something of 
the same understanding of form. His definition, first quoted in the Prologue, bears 
repeating.
We describe in this monograph an evolution in students’ interpretation of their 
lives evident in their accounts of their experience during four years in a liberal 
arts college. The evolution consists of a progression in certain forms in which
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the students construe their experience as they recount it in voluntary 
interviews at the end of each year. These “forms” characterize the structures 
which the students explicitly or implicitly impute to the world, especially 
those structures in which they construe the nature and origins of knowledge, of 
value, and of responsibility. (1970:1)
Perry talks of students ‘construing their experience’ rather than interacting with 
content. However, Jarvis’s analysis of the relationship between experience, its social 
situation and social context considered and re-worked in Chapter Two suggests that 
experience and content, although conceptually separable, are generally intricately 
linked and largely inseparable in practice. For the purposes of the research, therefore, 
the form/content relationship was understood in terms of the procedural interaction 
between the two axes o f the matrix depicted in Figure 5.3.
When considering the impact that Christian faith-content might have on the 
form/content relationship, different possibilities come to the fore. Of the various 
interwoven threads on the vertical axis, the inner/outer dichotomy rises to 
prominence. The discussion on reflection and epistemic primitives provided in 
Chapter Four indicated that Christians might well attribute greater weight to external 
authorities such as the bible, Christian doctrine and Church leaders than they do to 
their own understandings and inner convictions. As a result, the procedures they 
employ and the structures which they impute to these authorities may have specific 
characteristics potentially unique either to Christian learning or to learning in general 
when attention is focused primarily on an external authority. It is difficult to predict 
exactly what these procedures might look like; at this point in the thesis, their 
identification through an examination of empirical data can be envisaged but the 
detail cannot be forecast other than anticipating particular configurations between the 
personal and impersonal using separate or connected techniques. With the weighting 
biased to the impersonal and external, it is also conceivable that the balance between 
listening and speaking may be influenced. Chapter Three linked this with the concept 
o f voice and the growth of the self. In the context o f a discussion on procedures this 
dichotomy may be evidenced in how people make use of Christian faith-content, 
whether they ‘submit’ to its ‘authority’ or not and what form either option might take. 
In an article entitled ‘The Educational Mission of the Church to Adults—a Quest for
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Truth?’ Jarvis (1999) argues that the Church needs to move away from providing 
answers, and instead to find ways o f enabling people to construct their own religious 
identities. Here the didactic/discovery dichotomy comes into play, once again 
potentially influencing the growth of the self, but procedurally a heavy didactic 
authority may result in people relating to content in a surface manner, relating to it 
impersonally and adopting ‘surface procedures’. Lastly, the discrete/related 
dichotomy suggests that different procedures may be adopted depending on the degree 
to which Christian faith-content is integrated into people’s overall lives; indeed, there 
is a hint that people may be able to use one set of procedures for their ‘Christian’ 
knowing, and a different set for other types o f knowing.
Belenky et al. ’s work demonstrated that all these vertical aspects combined together 
with the horizontal to form people’s overall ‘way of knowing’. Given the specifically 
Christian application to many of their vertical categories, and given the fact that 
Christian people are required, in some way, to engage with this authoritative content, 
an alternative to ‘ways of knowing’ is proposed: people’s ways o f believing. These 
ways represent the procedures and forms that Christians adopt when engaging with 
authoritative faith-content, and are living examples of the influence that people’s faith 
has on the way they learn.
V. S u m m a r y  a n d  c o n c l u s i o n
This final influence of faith-content on learning has focused on the form/content 
relationship as expressed through the interaction of people’s bipolar learning styles 
and external content. That interaction was understood as represented by a set of 
procedures that people employ as they engage with the content of their learning, and 
the chapter argued that the procedures were likely to take particular forms according 
to both the nature of the content and the learning style people employed as they 
related to it. The argument demonstrates how the necessary influence of faith-content 
on learning may be analysed—how Christians actually learn—since the implication is 
that content with particular and authoritative characteristics such as that of the 
Christian faith will require a context-specific set o f procedures, which in turn can be 
interpreted as ‘people’s ways of believing’.
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S u m m a r y  o f  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  a r g u m e n t
These first five chapters of the thesis have argued firstly that Christian faith, as 
represented by its living representatives, its corpus of teaching and traditions, and 
individuals’ personal commitment, has the potential to affect the way in which those 
same individuals learn. That potential lies in its authoritative nature, which is identifiable
a) in claims to divine authority made by the faith of itself; b) in the propositional 
articulation of its doctrinal framework; and c) in its separation from other forms of social 
knowledge. While this authority may be either intrinsic or attributed, the thesis argued 
that this was unlikely to alter the hypothesis that the learning patterns and processes of 
Christian adherents would be identifiable and potentially specific to a Christian context.
Within an overall context of theories o f experiential learning, different aspects of the 
process of learning were then considered, and a case made that the authoritative nature of 
Christian faith-content could affect:
• The configuration of the components of learning
® People’s patterns of reasoning
® Their use of time
• The development of individuals’ biographies
• The growth of the self
• The process of internalisation
• The process of reflection
® People’s learning styles, as represented through a range of procedures and ‘ways 
of believing’
There is both overlap and distinctiveness in these aspects. People’s patterns of reasoning, 
for example, relates to the process of reflection and to learning styles, while the growth of 
the self, particularly when considered through the metaphor of voice, stands alone. The 
final chapter, however, suggested that the majority of these dimensions could be 
incorporated into an understanding of the relationship between form and content, form 
being represented as a horizontal axis o f people’s inner epistemology, interacting with the 
vertical axis of their relationship with external content. The resulting procedures were
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indicative of the nature of this interaction, which, when largely focused on Christian 
faith-content, could be understood as people’s ways of believing, a more general way in 
which the influence of faith on learning was evidenced.
At various points it was acknowledged both that the argument necessarily remained at the 
theoretical (and therefore hypothetical) level, and that specific details of the outworking 
of the theories could only be determined through empirical research. This was conducted 
amongst twenty-one interviewees, and the chapters to follow outline the procedure.
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C h a p t e r  S i x  
R e s e a r c h  d e s i g n  a n d  m e t h o d o l o g y  
I n t r o d u c t io n
Chronologically, the empirical research took place alongside the thinking and reading 
in preparation for the theoretical analysis presented in Chapters One to Five. In part, 
this was because certain decisions were relatively straightforward and required little 
complex thinking-through; in part it was a result o f good familiarity with Belenky et 
al. ’s and Perry’s work and the fact that the former’s inner/outer dichotomy was 
quickly perceived as an appropriate methodological tool. This chapter outlines the 
design and methodology, providing a rationale for the various decisions made.
I. M e th o d o lo g ic a l  r a t i o n a l e  a n d  a p p r o a c h
1.1 A q u a lita tiv e  in v e s t ig a tio n
The decision to conduct a qualitative piece o f research had been made at a 
comparatively early stage. It was not made in thin air. None of the three major 
concepts involved (faith, experience, learning) lent themselves to a quantitative 
analysis. Certainly ‘faith’, as an umbrella term, was a somewhat fluid and indefinable 
notion, especially in a personal and individual context. One person’s ‘faith’ was likely 
to be significantly different from another’s, in terms of understanding, structure and 
expression—indeed, the original research questions somewhat depended on this being 
the case! Similarly, the way in which people responded to Christian faith authorities 
would be qualitatively different rather than quantitatively, and the goal o f the 
investigation was to draw these differences out. The emphasis would therefore be on 
individual description rather than on establishing frequency or aiming for 
representativeness. In order to do this, the study needed to be conducted amongst 
people of ‘lived faith’, in such a way that the ‘lived’ was focused on as much as the 
‘faith’. While Christian theology abounds with treatises and sermons on the nature of 
faith and how it should be lived, such theories may well not correlate with reality.
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Despite intellectually ‘knowing’ what their faith ‘should’ consist of (and very possibly 
aspiring to put this into practice), Christians may actually live something different. It 
was this natural, experiential element that the research intended to relate to 
experiential learning, and which in consequence led to a qualitative approach, since 
Patton’s criterion of using qualitative methods in order to ‘understand naturally 
occurring phenomena in their naturally occurring states’ was met (Patton, 1990:41). 
Posing a series of reasonably open questions for exploration would both respect these 
principles and also allow data to emerge inductively.
1.2 A p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l  e n q u iry
One of the difficulties that had to be faced once the decision to conduct a qualitative 
piece of research had been made was how to select the interviewees. Not only did 
comparatively routine questions focusing on the mechanics of selection (asking for 
volunteers, every Xth name from a list, etc.) require consideration, but more profound 
questions revolving around the issue o f Christian identity came to the fore. What 
might define a Christian? For a number o f decades in Britain it has been 
commonplace to have people with no religious belief or commitment to call 
themselves ‘Christian’ simply, it would appear, on account of the fact that this was the 
official religion of their place o f birth. Furthermore, while conceptually it makes little 
sense for people to speak of being a Christian sometimes and not other times, or to be 
part Christian and part something else, either case would nevertheless seem to be a 
frequent reality. People may attend church every Sunday but consign their religiosity 
to this sole occasion during the week. It is thus possible to ‘box’ faith. Christianity 
itself recognises in its doctrine of sanctification the fact that people are ‘Christian’ to 
varying degrees, and teaches that the development o f faith and the growth toward 
godliness is a lifelong pursuit. These methodological questions could only be solved 
at base level by accepting a phenomenological principle, interviewing individuals who 
both confessed Christian faith and interpreted their lives and experience through this 
lens. Given the accompanying interest of the research in learning, it was possible to 
put one or two extra security measures into place. All those interviewed were actively 
and formally studying theology in one context or another, and were doing so as a faith 
‘act’. Although some had embarked on their studies without any clear idea of what
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they would do afterwards, the majority anticipated working in a Christian leadership 
capacity. Six interviewees were training for Anglican ordination, for example; one 
other for ordination as a Catholic Priest. Others were already ordained or anticipating 
ordination into other denominations either in Britain or abroad. Some were 
considering positions as Christian youth workers in churches. The two obvious 
exceptions were two French Roman Catholic nuns. These were my own private 
contacts as I regularly visit the Convent in which they live. Members of the 
Benedictine order, they lead highly contemplative lives in a strictly regulated 
environment. The rules o f the cloister are such that no members of the community 
should stray beyond its the limits, and the interviews were conducted in a small 
‘parloir’ (‘parlour’) with bars down the middle separating the community from the 
outside world. The inclusion of these interviewees (and the Roman Catholic 
seminarian, who was also French and connected to the community) added a very 
different dimension to the data and final results. Yet they fulfilled the criterion of 
actively studying theology, since this was a regular part of their community life. All 
the interviewees also shared in common the fact that they were studying as a result o f 
making a life-changing faith-related decision. Many, if not all of the eleven full-time 
students had made significant sacrifices to attend college. The part-time students all 
expressed similar challenges and pressures resulting from the course of action they 
were pursuing. The nuns were the most obviously committed for life and had 
ostensibly made the biggest sacrifice. (One emerged as the eldest of all the 
interviewees. At the age o f 88, she had been ‘inside’ for 60+ years.) The fact that all 
were formally studying theology (a faith-related discipline), that all had made a life- 
changing decision to do so, that this had implied significant sacrifice and challenge, 
and that ah had committed themselves to or envisaged a faith-related profession 
resulting from their studies, helped address these methodological questions. Their 
‘faith’ encompassed the whole of their beings, and therefore the research could be 
reasonably confident of a relationship between their faith and their learning, whatever 
that might be.
Philosophically, therefore, the research was based on phenomenological principles. 
Phenomenology:
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• ‘is a theoretical point of view that advocates the study of direct experience 
taken at face value; and one which see behaviour as determined by the 
phenomena of experience rather than by external, objective and physically 
described reality’ (Cohen and Manion, 1994:29).
® ‘focuses on the question: “What is the structure and essence of experience of 
this phenomenon for these people?”’ (Patton, 1990:69)
• focuses on ‘how we put together the phenomenon we experience in such a way 
as to make sense of the world, and, in so doing, develop a worldview. There is 
no separate (or objective) reality for people. There is only what they know 
their experience is and means. The subjective experience incorporates the 
objective thing and a person’s reality (Patton, 1990: 69).
While something of a tension should be recognised in the fact that the faith of many 
Christians is based precisely on the premise that there is a separate, objective reality in 
the person of God, the last of the three points is particularly relevant. For people of 
‘lived faith’, and even more so for students who enrol on full-time courses which 
expressly aim to focus as much on the vocational aspect of Christian life as the 
theoretical, a natural rationale for sample (and possibly population) selection 
emerged, since it was possible to discount learners on non-vocational courses such as 
might be foimd in university departments and look more towards the independent, 
often (but not exclusively) denominational colleges whose express intent is to begin 
from a position of faith and allow that faith both to develop and change as well as 
interact with—and often seek to influence—the world around.
The purposive nature of phenomenological sampling was therefore considered 
appropriate, since ‘phenomenological studies are designed to describe the essence of a 
given phenomenon and informants are chosen because they have lived the experience 
being investigated’ (Baker, 1992:1358). The primacy of the subjective experience is 
emphasised, and participants would frequently be involved in the final validation of 
the results.
Phenomenology thus respected the basic criteria implicit in the research question by:
® enabling the experiential side of faith to be emphasised and focused upon;
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• providing a means by which this could be explored qualitatively rather than 
quantitatively;
® allowing individual similarities and differences to be identified and 
categorised inductively rather than deductively.
The research therefore committed itself to a qualitative approach, based on 
phenomenological principles. Measures were also taken to address the question of 
how lived faith should be identified and the extent to which it played a role in 
people’s lives. These principles then provided the foundations for the data collection.
1.3 T h e  in te rv ie w  s a m p le
Few of the standard methods o f selecting interviewees in an orderly fashion were 
available. Given the reasonably intimate nature o f the investigation (Christian faith is 
often seen as a private and personal matter) it would have been inappropriate and 
probably counter-productive to select individuals at random from any lists that might 
have been available (such as church electoral rolls or lists of registered students).
Such an approach would also have depended on those selected both being willing to 
participate, and on their responding honestly and openly. These are issues that every 
piece o f empirical research faces, but they were heightened in this particular case. 
Asking for volunteers was considered the most productive way forward. Three 
sources of volunteers were identified: the independent and vocational theological 
college where I was at that time employed, an Anglican ordination course with around 
seventy adults studying part-time and whose summer week-long residential school 
was held at my workplace, and the afore-mentioned Benedictine Convent in France. 
With the exception of the French contingent (permission had to be sought in advance 
from the Mother Superior o f the Convent who then elected two ‘volunteers’, and the 
Seminarian agreed to be interviewed on the spur o f the moment simply by dint of 
visiting the Convent at an opportune time) requests for volunteers were made 
publicly, with a brief outline of the purpose o f the research. Eleven were recruited 
from the fiill-time programme, seven from the part-time; these combined with the 
three French interviewees made a total of twenty-one. While the size of the sample 
might appeal* small, it cohered with the recommended number of interviewees in
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research of this nature, as well as with the space and time constraints imposed. 
Somewhat fortuitously, an extremely good balance between the various extraneous 
variables was present: nine male and twelve female volunteers, aged between twenty- 
one and eighty-eight, representing all levels of theological study from first year 
undergraduate to PhD (or equivalents), a good variety of churchmanships and 
backgrounds, and of previous education. No control group of people o f ‘no’ faith was 
used. As indicated previously, there were a number of ways of interpreting the 
research question. While to speak of faith ‘influencing’ learning might require proof 
that faith was an agent as opposed to anything else—and certainly this dimension 
needed to be considered—the possibility of interpreting the question by asking what 
the correlation between faith and learning was has also been demonstrated. In other 
words, how did people ‘of faith’ learn? The question of whether this was significantly 
different from how other people learnt became tangential. It was this latter angle that 
the research chose to pursue, hence obviating the need for a control group.
1.4 T h e  in te rv ie w s : ty p e , d e s ig n ,  q u e s t io n s ,  im p ie m e n ta tio n , 
t r a n s c r ip t io n
Given the goals of the research, semi-structured, open-ended interviews were deemed 
the most appropriate. Belenky et al. ’s inner/outer dichotomy provided a conceptual f i l  
conducteur which neatly encompassed the essential aspects of the hypothesis and 
research question, and interview questions were designed which focused on drawing 
out where people’s ultimate epistemic authority lay, whether this was ‘inner’ or 
‘outer’, and how it operated in their lives and learning. A range o f ‘outer’ faith 
authorities was identifiable in the bible, the Pope, other ecclesiastical authority figures 
such as priests, vicars, bishops, ministers etc., theological scholars (both authors and 
lecturers), God himself (however perceived), and the all-important faith-content... 
Certain questions also left room for other external and thus far unidentified authorities 
to come to the fore. ‘Inner’ authority was anticipated in statements of self-assertion 
over and above external authorities, examples of independent thought and autonomy, 
strength of self, and, potentially, in reasoned instances of change of behaviour. One or 
two questions were included of a more general nature to encourage participants to 
think more specifically about the relationship between their faith and the way they
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learnt. The questions were formulated and then piloted on six individuals. The pilot 
stage revealed a number of weaknesses, and the refined questions were then piloted 
on a further two people. The final set of questions was established, and each was 
written out on a card. Since most were profound in nature, it was hoped that giving 
the interviewees each question written out in this way would help keep them on 
track—all except the nuns were used to writing essays and having to keep to the essay 
question! The questions needed slight modification from one group of students to 
another, according to the social context. ‘Why did you decide to come to study at this 
college?’, for example, became ‘Why did you decide to seek ordination and from 
there to go into ordination training?’ and ‘Why did you decide to become a nun?’. 
Apart from the three French interviews, each was conducted in my office. Thought 
had to be given about the dynamics involved with this. Would it have been better to 
find somewhere neutral? Since t had a position of authority in the college, would this 
in some way affect the responses? Other potentially influential factors might have 
emerged regarding faith and theological positions: would interviewees be cautious not 
to step outside what they perceived as prescribed theological boundaries? Did any of 
the questions specifically require a position to be taken that might prove awkward or 
embarrassing and hence cause the respondent to answer ‘falsely’? These were all 
considerations. However, there were also counter arguments. Despite being in a 
position of authority in terms of being a member of college staff, this was not directly 
exerted in any capacity, and students and f would never normally come into contact 
with each other. Especially for students from the college itself, its theological 
‘position’ was well known and accepted. Corresponding assumptions would be made 
about its staff, and hence incur trust rather than suspicion. The office itself was a 
neutral environment, with an easy chair, plants and an unimposing desk and computer. 
Little about it was likely to intimidate.
The interviews were taped. Respondents were asked to give their agreement to this, 
and assured of total confidentiality. Names and other information likely to reveal 
specific identities would be changed in the write up, and tapes destroyed 
subsequently. They were also encouraged to draw then* own lines in the interviews 
and only to say what they felt comfortable sharing. They were not informed of the 
purpose of the research or the overall thrust behind the questions, although they were
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told that the general theme was to investigate the relationship between their faith and 
the way they learnt. The interviews lasted approximately an hour and fifteen minutes, 
and respondents were also warned of this beforehand so that if time became an issue 
the whole interview could be rescheduled. Finally, they were given an indication of 
how the interview would be conducted: they would be given sixteen questions, each 
written on a card. They could say as much or as little as they wanted, there were no 
rights or wrongs, nor was anything in particular being ‘sought’. The interviewer 
would remain silent as much as possible, speaking only to seek clarification, to clarify 
if this proved necessary, or on the odd occasion to prompt. They should not find a 
general silence intimidating, however, since the point was to get them to speak, not to 
have a two-way dialogue.
The data were therefore collected through sixteen questions, provided in Appendix A. 
With few exceptions, the questions were asked in the same order, the exceptions being 
on the occasions when respondents moved voluntarily and inadvertently to speak 
about something that another question asked.
The interviews were conducted over a period of two months, in the summer of 1999. 
Each was transcribed in its entirety by myself. Since each was in the order of 10,000 
words, this was a lengthy procedure, but deemed worthwhile on account of one major 
advantage: transcription by the same person who conducts the interviews permits the 
latter to re-live the interview experience, particularly if done within a reasonably short 
period of time. In this instance, most were transcribed within a week o f the interview, 
facilitating not only a re-living of the occasion but also (in some cases) permitting one 
or two areas of unintelligibility to be worked out. In general, the interviews were 
clearly intelligible; certain techniques to ensure this was the case had been put into 
place, with a carefully-placed microphone and both interviewer and interviewee 
sitting in good range. On one occasion, I informed the respondent during the interview 
that I was deliberately going to move further away from him since he was speaking 
very quietly. I hoped that by sitting further away he would naturally raise his voice. It 
worked! Most of the interviews contained one or two sentences or words that had to 
be replaced by ‘tape unintelligible’, but these were comparatively few, and very rarely 
at times that proved to be of real significance for their content.
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The transcriptions included both dialogue partners, and indicated the occasions when 
one had interrupted the other. Verbal conversation pauses, hesitations, voice inflexion, 
such as Timm’ and ‘err’ were included, but the transcripts were not provided with 
coding to indicate specific inflexions, body language etc.. Particularly long pauses, 
intonation indicating significant surprise, concern or other emotions were indicated as 
appropriate. The tapes were kept until the end o f the research, thus offering the 
possibility of returning to them for verification, after which they were discarded. The 
French transcriptions were somewhat more demanding to transcribe both because of 
the need for accents in written French, and because there were a number of areas of 
uncertainty (vocabulary, spelling, grammar). A first draft o f these three interviews, 
plus tapes, was sent to two independent French friends, with no connection with the 
interviewees, who corrected the draft, and their amendments were then incorporated 
into the final transcript. As all the interviews were worked on dining the whole of the 
analysis, other errors were noted and corrected, and where necessary, the tapes 
returned to. As a result of the process, the interviews became highly familiar, and on 
each reading the interviewees appeared almost to be speaking in real life, their voices 
clearly ‘heard’ behind the written words. This was an advantage in the analysis, as it 
ensured the research continued to represent each individual as closely as possible; any 
potential separation between researcher and interviewee was lessened in this way.
The transcripts were printed out leaving a wide margin on the right hand side of the 
page, with continuous line numbering every five lines. Each interviewee was allocated 
a research name (pseudonym) and any other indications that might reveal their true 
identity also changed as much as possible (spouses’ names, towns o f residence, for 
example). Although they had been instructed not to reveal any information that they 
would feel uncomfortable about being used and potentially made public through the 
research, I was aware that this was a somewhat dubious instruction, since a) they 
might easily say something on the spur of the moment and only later consider it 
inappropriate, and b) they might have shifted their position in the intervening time 
between interview and publication of research, resulting in embarrassment that they 
would not originally have felt. There was little that could be done about this, however, 
other than work with sensitivity and awareness of the issues, and take any subsequent
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measures as considered appropriate. Other means of protecting identity were also 
incorporated, not only regarding the interviewees, but also other people they may 
have mentioned. Lecturers and friends were typical examples, and where possible 
these too were changed. It was often not possible to eradicate all indications of 
people’s identity. Those recounting the content of their PhD research, for example, 
would be readily identifiable to anyone familiar with the research. Similarly, those 
with a distinguishing background or experience would be recognisable to their 
lecturers, friends and family, as would those with an ‘agenda’ that was actively 
pursued. Given the relevance o f the research to the world o f theological education 
from whom the interviewees were drawn, there was a (continuing) risk that 
confidentiality would be broken in this way. Ultimately, the research had to rely on 
the fact that interviewees had spoken freely and willingly, and indeed, had 
volunteered to participate, being aware o f the risks. The example transcripts provided 
in Appendix B, however, have nevertheless been amended to take these 
considerations into account.
1.5 P re lim in a ry  a n a ly s is :  th ic k  d e s c r ip t io n s
Patton (1990) argues that ‘the first task in qualitative analysis is description’. 
Distinguishing between description and interpretation, the former of which ‘analyses 
and answers basic questions’, the latter ‘involves explaining the findings, answering 
“why” questions, attaching significance to particular results, and putting patterns into 
an analytic framework’ (1990:375), he suggests that fundamental to any analysis of 
qualitative data is the presentation of ‘solid descriptive data ... in such a way that 
others reading the results can understand and draw their own interpretations’ 
(1990:374-75). These ‘thick descriptions’ function as a type o f summary and 
overview, identifying and describing the main issues, thus providing a context within 
which the final results can be interpreted and generally ratified by those not involved 
in the research.
Faced with a mass of data constituting over two hundred thousand words, to formulate 
a thick description of each offered the possibility of bringing order and focus. The 
task was begun by drawing up a detailed concept map of certain interviews, in which
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the primary, secondary and subsidiary themes were identified and plotted in such a 
way as to show their essential inter-relationships. The maps were complex, and 
clearly a little contrived, particularly regarding the inter-relationships. They were also 
very time-consuming, and after compiling half a dozen, it proved easier to make a list 
o f the major themes that were emerging in each interview. From here, it was a 
reasonably small step to write a summary, including what were perceived of as 
pertinent quotes, constituting between five and seven thousand words per interview: 
the thick description. The descriptions of the three French interviews were written in 
English. This homogenised the data linguistically. Although there are always question 
marks about translation both of words and of ideas and concepts, the shift from one 
language to the other was done with reasonable confidence, given my own 
competence in both languages, and thorough familiarity with French culture and 
‘spirit’ not only in general terms but also with the monastic culture from which the 
interviewees were drawn.
One of the difficulties the research was then presented with, however, was a lack of 
common emphases and major themes running through various interviews that could 
be grouped and categorised. This was possibly due to the interview questions being 
less focused than they might have been: something which is discussed in detail in 
Chapter Ten. In many ways they were significantly different, with, for example, 
certain people emphasising doctrine, church and beliefs; others people and ministry.
In some the role of the self was prominent, and in others not at all. Clearly (and 
naturally) people’s personal circumstances influenced the way they were learning, the 
concerns that they had, the way they led their lives and understood their faith to relate 
and function in their lives. Quite frequently individuals referred to changes that had 
occurred in these same areas, previously having behaved in one way, and as a result of 
their theological education, now thinking and behaving in quite another. These 
changes were multi-faceted, ranging from the view and function of the self, to a 
loosening interpretation o f previously hard-held faith authorities such as the bible, to 
an increasing tension between faith and life experience, to a more general bringing 
together o f ‘faith-logic’ and traditional rationality. For a short period, the research 
considered focusing on some of the differences that had emerged, and/or on the
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changes which had taken place, but too much of the argument was based on silence. 
An alternative way of analysing the data would have to be found.
The thick descriptions proved their use in providing an initial first handle on what 
issues and themes were present, and would potentially serve a useful purpose in 
relating the final conclusions back to their original context as a cross-check. At this 
point, therefore, they were put to one side and renewed focus was placed on the 
original research question and the rationale that had lain behind the interview 
questions.
II. S u m m a r y  a n d  c o n c l u s i o n
The data collected in any piece of research are obviously crucial to the overall quality 
o f the finished project. One of the more unusual aspects of this particular research was 
the fact that the interviews were designed and conducted at an early stage. In a 
phenomenological project, this can be an advantage, since of prime importance is the 
need not to lead the participant(s) in any way, and questions should be of the kind as 
to encourage participants to talk freely, with no motivation to provide what it might be 
thought the interviewer is looking for. This demands skills of the interviewer, 
particularly if he/she is well informed about the subject in hand and already has some 
possible notion of the type of information that might be forthcoming. Baker makes the 
point that ‘the phenomenological method is based on the notion that essences can be 
discovered by reduction which involves bracketing and imaginatively varying the 
description. To bracket, the researcher must identity and suspend what he or she 
already knows about the experience being studied and must approach it without 
preconceptions’ (1992:1337, citing Oiler, 1982). This proved a challenge in the 
present context. The research question had been formulated on previous knowledge; 
my own work context meant that I was surrounded with many of the issues the project 
was looking at, and it would be increasingly difficult to block out thought and 
reflection about how faith and learning inter-related. While there were no fool-proof 
ways of handling these issues, other than raising awareness and consciously bearing 
them in mind, to conduct the interviews at an early stage might help avoid the 
intrusion of a number of presuppositions since a lot of the significant reading would
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not have taken place. There was always a risk that this was putting the cart before the 
horse, and that the subsequent reading would influence the interpretation of the data. 
However, the decision was finally taken to pursue this route. The research therefore 
took on an iterative dimension, with an in-built flexibility that would allow the overall 
structure to emerge inductively. This accounts for the presentation o f the thesis as it 
stands. The stages corresponded to those outlined by Moustakas as inherent to 
phenomenological research:
Step 1: The Problem and Question Formulation—the phenomenon. The 
researcher delineates a focus of investigation... formulates a question in such a 
way that it is understandable to others.
Step 2: The Data Generating Situation—The Protocol Life Text... researchers 
start with descriptive narrative provided by subjects who are viewed as co­
researchers... We query the person and engage in dialogue, or we combine the 
two.
Step 3: The Data Analysis—Explication and Interpretation. Once collected, 
the data are read and scrutinised so as to reveal their structure, meaning 
configuration, coherence, and the circumstances of their occurrence and 
clustering... emphasis is on the study of configuration o f meaning... involving 
both the structure of meaning and how it is created. (Moustakas, 1994:15, 
citing von Eckartsberg, 1986:27).
The inductive dimension continued to be significant throughout, and Appendix C, 
entitled ‘People’s Ways of Believing’, provides a descriptive outline of the 
behavioural patterns identified which are organised into a typology in a similar way to 
Belenky et al’s positions. From there, it became possible to refocus on the research 
question and draw specific conclusions.
Content analysis is a complex activity which can be approached in a number of ways. 
In this instance, rather than turn to computer-aided calculations o f word frequency or 
thematic prevalences, I adopted a modified form of the Grounded Theory method, 
which again supported the use o f a comparatively small sample (Baker, 1992). A 
number of ways of structuring and organising the data were tried, most giving the 
impression of something being forced or contrived long before any useful conclusions 
could be drawn. At these points, there was also a sense of regret that more people had
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not been interviewed, as larger numbers might have seen more conclusive results 
emerging. Even at the end of the project, with results that proved satisfying and 
sound, there was a continued vulnerability due to the small sample. A productive 
analytic method was nevertheless found and is outlined in the next chapter.
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In tro d u c tio n
Chronologically, a significant period elapsed between the compilation o f the thick 
descriptions outlined in Chapter Six and the formal process of analysis presented in 
this chapter. When the interviews were eventually returned to, guidance regarding the 
analysis of qualitative material was once again sought from a range of sources (e.g. 
Patton [1990], Oppenheim [1992], Cohen and Manion [1994]), and Silverman [1997]. 
Various approaches were trialled; some were completely abandoned, others proved 
more fruitful. One in particular appeared to provide a coherent way forward, and it 
wasn’t until an independent judge was asked to work through a sample of interviews 
and code them according to a set o f criteria that its weaknesses were revealed as 
untenable. The foundations o f the approach nevertheless provided the necessary 
framework from which the final structure and interpretation was drawn.
This chapter focuses on these two major stages in the analytic process, while 
incorporating the important methodological considerations that were grappled with en 
cours de route. The first stage was that of developing a matrix as an interpretive 
framework; the second the emergence of a typology that highlighted the relationship 
between individuals’ faith-content and their experience. Each is explored in turn.
I. T h e  f o r m a t io n  o f  a  m a t r ix
Using the guiding questions formulated by Belenky et a l to elucidate their inner/outer 
dialectic, it was possible to begin identifying instances of people turning to an inner or 
an outer authority in the set o f interviews. The evident success in eliciting responses 
that revealed this inter-relationship was gratifying. The interviews abounded with 
examples, many o f which are quoted as part of the findings in the next chapter, as 
well as in the transcripts provided in Appendix B. Acknowledging a degree of 
repetition, they can be summarised as:
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Outer authority
• Statements showing interviewees consciously and deliberately acquiescing to 
‘higher authorities’ such as the Pope, bishops, and the bible, on the grounds of 
their divine authority and/or their superior intelligence.
• Statements of conviction about something ‘because the bible tells me so’.
« Evidence of acceptance rather than challenge; passivity rather than pro­
activity.
• Talk o f ‘disobedience’ and ‘humbling oneself with regard to God and the 
bible.
® A fearfulness about being angry with God.
• A determination to evaluate everything according to scriptural principles. The 
establishment of principles which functioned as an objective framework.
• A reluctance to express or even form a personal opinion, and the desire to be 
told, or discover ‘the truth’.
® Evidence o f people taking a course of action because God had told them to do
so, in a range of ways. Similarly, some had refused to go in a particular 
direction because God had not confirmed it.
This latter obviously involved a subjective interpretation. It was generally 
linked to a perceived objective reality, such as God’s word as found in the 
bible, or a particular experience or set of experiences. The subjectivity could 
never be eradicated, but the weight that was put on God having authenticated 
or been at the origin o f these occasions meant that the ultimate authority 
appeared to be external.
Inner authority
• Self-assertion in a variety of forms: the construction and expression of a 
personal opinion; the assertion of this over against other people’s; the making 
of autonomous choices and decisions without reference to any authority;
As evidenced by, for example:
• A willingness to over-ride, discard, dismiss biblical ‘teaching’.
• The construction and exercising of an individual theology.
• Evidence of struggle and wrestling between a faith authority and people’s 
natural understanding/inclination.
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• Doubt.
® Personal commitment and loyalty.
® Gut feeling, instinct.
® Self-confidence.
® Question posing; challenging authorities such as lecturers and preachers.
® Working things out for themselves. Working things through.
There was also evidence of people turning tail and escaping, neither able to acquiesce 
to an external authority nor assert themselves ‘against’ it. Escape routes meant 
shelving issues, putting things into an ‘I don’t know’ box, depending on others to 
work something out rather than do it themselves... To a point, escaping could have 
been an act of self-assertion. However, frequently this was a preferable alternative to 
challenging a faith authority overtly, and hence might be considered as retreat. 
(Genuine instances of uncertainty should nonetheless not be ruled out.)
As this route was pursued, however, a new dialectic emerged inductively: people 
could also be classified as validating their faith  in one of two principal ways. Certain 
respondents declared they were Christians because of an experiential relationship with 
God, while others held their faith because it made intellectual sense o f the world.
‘God is real to me, you know. There’s nothing kind of irrational about that. I 
mean, there’s nothing irrational about, I ’m not making it up, you know? Umm, 
or believing in something that’s abstract or, or an idea, or something else 
somebody’s told me.’ (Chris)
‘I am a Christian because I feel I have met God and experienced God. And felt 
his presence and his love. And that there is a relationship between us. And so, 
in a sense, for me it is not a lot different from being a friend or a partner or a 
parent or a child or whatever. It is a real relationship, one to one, with 
somebody else.’ (Frances)
‘My understanding of my faith is based on my intellectual understanding of a 
creator God that creates humanity for relationship with him. And if you like,
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my intellectual understanding of the story of the bible and salvation history.
But then I ’d also want to include an experiential dimension... ’ (Denise)
‘When I observe people that do have different beliefs and see that their beliefs 
make even less sense or are even less practical in their own lives, I don’t need 
to go down that avenue. And to date I haven’t found anything else as attractive 
as the Christian faith and having my doctrine right gives me confidence that 
there never will be anything like it. So in a sense this is a consolidation that I 
should cany on.’ (Jon)
While a number wanted to affirm the partnership between doctrinal beliefs and 
experience (as both Denise and Jon’s quotes demonstrate), it seemed that most 
interviewees leaned more towards one or the other in the understanding and 
outworking of their faith.
The research was thus provided with two sets of dialectics, one of which had 
underpinned all the questions and which was fundamentally about learning—the 
internalisation of the external—the other of which had arisen inductively from the 
interview material itself, and which expressed something of the way people’s faith 
operated. The relationship between faith and learning was essentially what the 
research was all about, and the next step became the drawing up of a matrix in which 
these two continua intersected each other (Figure 7.1).
Figure 7.1: A  matrix o f  intersecting fa ith  authorities
Inner
Experiential Cognitive
Outer
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The formation of the matrix was a significant step forward, since it opened the door to 
a systematic way o f ordering and grouping interviewees according to the quadrant 
into which they fell. The research then embarked upon the process of colour coding 
each interview, putting a coloured mark in the margin on each occasion when 
individuals demonstrated acquiescence to an outer authority, self-assertion in 
opposition to an outer authority, placing confidence in experience as a reason for 
faith, or alternatively, in the cognitive, intellectual domain. A fifth colour indicated 
instances of retreat. The interviews were coloured coded once, and the matrix began 
to take shape. The smaller score was subtracted from the larger for each continuum, 
giving a final ‘positioning’ which indicated either an inner or outer weighting, and 
either a cognitive or experiential way of validating their faith. Each was individually 
plotted on the matrix. The preliminary results suggested that the approach had been 
reasonably successful. All three Roman Catholics fell in the outer/experiential 
quadrant; all those in the inner/experiential quadrant were women; and those in the 
inner/cognitive quadrant were, with one or two exceptions, men studying full-time at 
the same theological college. One sole individual was placed in the outer/cognitive 
quadrant. He was there legitimately, although his interview suggested that in reality 
he could have been placed either as a cognitive or an experiential believer. His faith 
was primarily based on intellectual and rational conclusions. However, once these had 
been established, he lived a highly experiential life of faith. The fact that the three 
main quadrants so clearly showed a degree of cohesion with the real-life 
circumstances o f the interviewees was reason to consider the results at least 
provisionally indicative of their validity.
There was nevertheless still the need for a greater degree of security. The colour 
coding had been done by one individual who had relied on subjective judgement in 
each instance. The unreliability of this had been clear from the outset, given the high 
degree of re-consideration, replacing, and rubbing out that had taken place. A sample 
o f interviews was re-worked in order to see whether they emerged with the same 
results. While the scores differed, the interviewees maintained their place in the 
original quadrants. Another difficulty had been that sentences frequently indicated 
both instances of two poles simultaneously. Was it necessary to choose one or the 
other? Should these occasions be given the colour code of each type? More
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importantly, did this suggest that the developing analytic framework was not yet clear 
enough? As the interviews were re-worked, ways of ensuring consistency were 
worked out, as was a set of criteria that helped determine the coding procedure. 
Belenky et a l ’s guiding questions continued to hold water. A second set that helped 
ascertain the foundations for faith were also worked out and adhered to:
Cognitive Experiential
How is faith legitimated?
What factors govern the understanding and outworking of faith?
These provisional results then led to a subsequent analysis in which characteristic 
traits representative of each quadrant were identified. Certain themes began to 
emerge. Experiential believers made use o f experience in a variety o f ways, for 
example, while cognitive believers often expressed a tension between their intellectual 
beliefs and their everyday lives. The role and functioning of the self was very 
apparent, with a few interviewees rarely asserting themselves and obviously living 
lives of uncertainty and (mild) self deprecation. In the main, however, most were self- 
confident and at ease with themselves and their faith. There were also early 
indications of precise answers to the research question. Faith appeared to influence 
learning by forcing the development o f learning strategies: techniques employed 
particularly by cognitive believers that linked their faith and their experience together. 
It also heightened aspects of the learning process as outlined by Jarvis (1995, 2001).
This embryonic way forward continued to be vulnerable to attack in such a way that 
its conclusions were undermined, however. The findings were still based on the 
subjective judgement of one person. There were still too many inconsistencies in the 
emerging patterns for them to be considered generally coherent. It was possible to 
respond to this last with reference to the small sample. Nevertheless, despite the fact 
that an overall approach seemed to have been determined, it continued to feel as if it 
was on shaky ground.
The interviews were therefore set aside once again for a number of months. During 
this period an independent ‘judge’ was asked to colour code seven interviews, two
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from the three principal quadrants, and the one individual who occupied a quadrant 
alone. Seven represented a third of the total twenty-one. As he approached making his 
final conclusions, so the original interviews were returned to one last time, with new, 
unmarked copies, and the coding process was repeated. As each interview was 
finished, the results were compared with the previous conclusions, and a final 
decision was made. There was a clear consolidation of thought that took place during 
this stage about what constituted each dialectic and how decisions were being made, 
although the results for many interviewees had altered in this third analysis from the 
first.
When these conclusions were compared with those of the independent judge, 
however, there were significant differences. The judge had been provided with a 
Guide to Coding Practice (Appendix E), in which the two sets of dialectics plus their 
guiding questions had been laid out, as well as instructions about how to code repeat 
instances within the same sentences, references to the interviewees’ past habit rather 
than present, and sentences which indicated more than one type of behaviour. The 
intention was to ensure consistency of approach between the original researcher and 
the independent judge. He had also been primed verbally about the general nature of 
the research, but this had not been discussed in detail on the grounds that his 
conclusions might be adversely influenced. It would also have been inappropriate to 
use the interviews, or even ‘mock’ interviews, to work through together to help him 
get a feel for the coding practice. The judge had a PhD in theology and had done a 
certain amount of reading in the field of Christian education and in the area with 
which the research was concerned. It was a calculated gamble to ask him to code semi 
‘cold’. This background could well have accounted for the differences between his 
results and those of the researcher. Briefly summarised, the essential differences were 
as follows:
• The judge had been much more economical in identifying examples of each 
colour code, frequently returning scores that were a quarter of those of the 
researcher. While this would not necessarily have meant a change in quadrant 
in which each interviewee was placed, his scores were at times so sparse that 
the calculations became difficult.
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• On a number o f occasions the judge had coded sentences with the opposite 
dialectic from the researcher. Hence one set of results might indicate an ‘inner’ 
sentence, and the other an ‘outer’.
• The judge had clearly not found the exercise easy, and had resorted to 
intertwining squiggly lines of different colours down complete paragraphs 
which he considered represented behaviour o f one type or another.
The most probable explanation for the major differences was that of inadequate 
briefing. Nevertheless, his findings brought home the fact that the overall approach 
was still too vulnerable and unstable to base solid research results on. Despite having 
constructed the matrix semi-inductively, its use seemed inappropriate, since it tended 
to force people into one quadrant or another and hence function deductively which 
prevented the interviews from speaking for themselves. While the reasoning behind 
the matrix was not abandoned, and indeed, was the key to the approach finally 
adopted, this way of analysing the content of the interviews needed to be 
reconsidered.
II. A  typology of learners
Despite the fact that the matrix with its four quadrants was eventually discarded, it 
nevertheless paved the way for the way of interpreting the results finally adopted, 
since it identified some of the major differences between the various learners. These 
revolved around:
a) The relationship between faith authorities and experience. Some interviewees 
kept the two quite separate, others integrated them so that they became 
inseparable in their lives.
b) How people went about appropriating their external faith authorities. 
Depending on the relationship exercised in (a), different people employed 
different techniques that brought their faith authorities and their experience 
together.
c) The nature of people’s faith (cognitive, intellectual and impersonal, or 
experiential and personal). This was directly related to the 
cognitive/experiential continuum that formed part of the matrix.
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d) The use people made of experience. This was essentially a validating role, but 
exercised in a variety of ways.
e) The role of the self. Some interviewees were naturally self-assertive, spoke out 
with confidence, aired and justified their personal views that were frequently 
in direct contrast to those of others. Other respondents expressed great 
hesitation and reservation about their ‘right5 and the ‘rightness’ of allowing 
their selves to function in this way. A small proportion were obviously in a 
transition stage, moving from the latter to the former.
One of the tentative steps taken in constructing the matrix had been an attempt to give 
each quadrant a label which described the general learning characteristics of its 
members. Inner cognitivists had been given the provisional label o f ‘strategic 
learners’ since virtually all its members had employed learning strategies o f one sort 
or another that integrated their faith into their lives. Outer experientialists had been 
labelled ‘assimilative’ due to their desire to assimilate their faith into their lives. Inner 
experientialists displayed less cohesiveness between themselves. Nevertheless, there 
was a proportion that clearly relied on interpreting all aspects of their experience in a 
faith-related way, which was not characteristic of the other quadrants. These were the 
‘interpretivists’. It was these characteristics which provided the next step forward: the 
construction of a typology. Each of these groups expressed and epitomised a 
particular way of relating their faith to their experience. Some did so by maintaining a 
distinct separation. Their faith was largely cognitive, operating in a separate domain 
from their lives and experience. Interaction took place two-directionally, yet 
separately: faith considered experience, yet without necessarily affecting or being 
affected by it, and the reverse. Others began with a faith perspective, immediately 
related it to their experience and reconstructed their faith position accordingly, 
owning it thus in a very personal way. The Roman Catholics obeyed a faith authority 
that was perhaps the most rigid in its construction, although akin to the cognitive 
believers in emphasising and focusing on a doctrinal belief system. Their interaction 
with their experience was quite distinct, however, which was evidenced by an entirely 
different perception and appropriation of its nature and role in their lives. Finally, a 
small group related their faith and experience by interpreting the latter according to 
the (perceived) precepts o f the latter. These were the interpretational learners.
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It proved possible to depict these four ways of relating faith to experience visually, 
and Figures 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 outline each position, accompanied by quotes from 
interviewees.
Figure 7.2: Cognitive learners
‘My experience over the last few years of my life is that I feel, I have felt very 
distressed over being single. And out of that experience, I have been on quite a 
long journey really to think about the control of God over my life. So is my 
singleness something that God decided beforehand that I would be, or is it 
something to do with me, or what is it? And initially I would say I used to 
blame God totally for it. But because of the things I’ve learned, so in a way 
it’s my, my experience has been I felt very distressed by my circumstances, 
which has then made me reconsider, well, what do I think about God? And the 
way that he exercises his control in my life.’ (Denise)
Denise’s faith and experience related, but as impermeable constructs. There was clear 
two-way interaction, yet the two remained separate. She looked for her faith to affect 
her experience in a particular way, but faced reality in the fact that it didn’t. She then 
moved to look at how her experience might make her reconsider her faith, and the 
passage following this quote indicated that she was just beginning to adjust her view 
of God as a result of this experience (see later). For many years, however, she had 
been at an impasse, not able to reconcile the situation and living a profound doubting 
of even God’s existence as a result.
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Figure 7.3: Experiential learners
4 When I had my children, it was a very positive relationship. I learnt a lot 
about God from giving birth, and, umm, and the whole... when I was pregnant, 
because I had no control over what was happening to me. And for me that was 
very like how God is.’ (Beth)
Beth developed her understanding of God through her experience. Her interview 
showed her continually relating her experience to her faith framework and re-working 
the latter accordingly. The re-working did not result in a profound theological shift 
that moved her away from mainstream Christian doctrine—in fret, by her own 
admission she held fast to a reasonably orthodox position—but she did understand it 
in a different way. Rather than functioning as an outer framework, her orthodox 
position provided an inner core which she then developed by reflecting on her 
experience.
Figure 7.4: Assimilative learners
‘Allowing God to take the word within me, and there’s been various occasions 
when, when that hasn’t happened that day has become that much flatter often
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as a result of it. Whereas when the word is, I allow the word to speak to me or 
to have an effect upon me or God speaking through me, even if it’s just a sense 
of wonderment from taking the wonder o f David for creation and going 
outside and actually seeing it for myself and being able to relive that word in 
that sense, then it’s having its effect. And so life can be a lot more refreshing, 
having encountered, if you like, God in that sense.’ (Craig)
Assimilative learners adopted a personally-directional approach. As Craig’s quote 
demonstrates, faith authorities were external and had to be internalised by creating or 
re-creating a faith experience. Experience was highly personalised, and surrounding 
reality was simply the means by which faith experiences occur. The two were linked 
through and in individuals themselves, in a similar way to interpretive learners, the 
prime difference being that assimilative learners brought faith into themselves, 
whereas interpretive learners projected faith from themselves onto their experience.
Figure 7.5: Interpretive learners
‘Yes, I mean my whole life, really, is sort of, I suppose, I suppose underneath 
everything there’s this question, Where is God in this? Umm... Yes, I think I 
see most things from the perspective of Where is God in this? Varying from 
personal situation, family, wider situation, and, uh, politically, you know, 
umm, everything can be kind of boiled down to man’s nature and, and... I can 
give you an example which is probably a bit flippant, but we, umm, we had a 
holiday last week with a friend who’s, umm, just about to get divorced, and 
her two boys. And it was us and the two younger boys. And it was pretty hard 
work, and we realised actually that three of the children had statements, and 
one was at stage three, so it wasn’t surprising that these four boys were pretty
Chapter Seven 172
PeQple's Ways of Believing: learning processes and faith outcomes
hard work, and umm, we’d arranged on the journey back home to meet at a 
certain time for lunch, and my husband said, I want to go a different way. And 
we’d arranged if we didn’t meet that was fine, you know, but there was the 
opportunity. And we felt slightly guilty about this, but, yes, we, we took the 
detour, and the car broke down! And (laughs) I didn’t think, Oh, there! That’s, 
you know, God’s punishing you because you didn’t... But actually, where we 
broke down, and we foimd this garage, opposite a little restaurant where we 
had lunch, put the car in the garage. The place, that was a village where there 
was the most wonderful Abbey, and one hotel opposite it, and through 
negotiating with our insurance company we had a night in this hotel, that they 
paid for, and, umm, we had a meal together as a family in this very smart 
hotel, and, uhh, actually found we could all sit round the table and this was 
just wonderful. It was like a gift! And, umm, the, the cost of the room was 587 
francs, and umm, we had a lot of hassle over the insurance and what boat we 
were getting back, and eventually we, we, we were given a, a boat on an 
evening crossing with a berth. We’d never had a berth before! We go to our 
room and the room, berth number is 587! And I thought, Oh gosh! You know, 
I just felt that was God saying, Look, I ’m just giving you this little bit extra for 
you as a family, because it was quite a hard holiday and we hadn’t really felt 
we’d had one. And although we’d had this horrible bill for the car, yet it was 
cheaper than it would have been in England, and we just had that little bit 
extra for us! That’s probably a very naive way, but I just (?) God within that! 
Yeah.’ (Miranda)
Miranda’s question ‘Where is God in this?’ led her towards a position of interpreting 
even the smallest of experiences in a faith-related way. Faith and experience were . 
intricately related, but rather than understand experience in ‘normal’ rational terms 
(this instance could otherwise have been considered an insignificant coincidence, for 
example), interpretive believers put a faith interpretation on it. As opposed to 
experiential learners, whose experience informed their faith, for interpretive learners, 
their faith informed their experience.
There were a number of notable factors that came to the fore through this initial 
exploration. The notion of directionality has already been mentioned. Assimilative
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and interpretive learners tended to operate a one-directional (although opposing) 
emphasis, the former bringing faith and faith authorities into themselves, the latter 
externalising their faith and projecting it onto their experience. Cognitive and 
experiential .learners, in contrast, both operated a much more balanced process of 
internalisation and externalisation, albeit in different ways. (At the same time, as has 
been stressed previously in the thesis, the processes of internalisation and 
externalisation are cyclical. The emphasis of the points being made here is the 
direction, focus and ‘weight’ o f the faith and experience poles as lived out by 
individuals.)
Linked with the question of directionality was the degree to which faith authorities 
were ‘bigger’ than experience, equal to it, or indeed ‘smaller’. Cognitive and 
assimilative learners both gave faith an authority that meant it encompassed the rest of 
their lives. Their goal was to fit then experience into their faith framework. In 
contrast, experiential and interpretive learners gave experience a far higher degree of 
authority and constructed their faith from an experiential position. The former adopted 
a ‘top down’ approach, the latter a ‘bottom up’. A notable progression between the 
groups was the degree of personal-ness exercised in their faith position, which related 
also to the role of individuals as people, and the junction and development of the self. 
The faith of cognitive learners was intellectual and impersonal, akin to Belenky et 
al.’s ‘separate knowers’, as opposed to the highly personalised faith of experiential 
learners. Both groups exhibited a general faith world-view, but the former was largely 
impersonal and the latter highly personal. Between the two positions, assimilative and 
interpretive learners exercised a faith revolving around themselves as individuals, 
rather than extending beyond themselves as a world-view.
The research had arrived at an important turning point through this exercise of 
comparing and contrasting. Rather than analyse the data through a matrix into which 
people were ‘placed’ according to a ‘score’, four types of learner had emerged, all of 
which inter-related, and with clear signs o f movement from one type of learner to 
another amongst the interviewees. In addition, these types were based on the 
relationship between people’s faith and their experience. While the types in 
themselves did not answer the research question directly in identifying ways in which
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faith might influence learning, they did reflect the way in which people learnt and 
hence pointed towards answers. As was shown previously, theories of experiential 
learning involve the internalisation of the external and suggest that learning itself 
takes place at the intersection between people and their inner biographies, and 
experience as an external reality. Faith-content functioned as a form of external 
knowledge for members of all the groups, and the emerging types revealed the ways 
in which people went about the process of learning by depicting how people related 
them together. As an identifiable and discrete variable, juxtaposed against all other 
forms of external knowledge, the process o f learning could be re-examined. Not only 
so, but the discreteness of this variable would mean that once the learning types had 
been determined in greater detail, then it would also be possible to study whether faith 
had been influential in any way.
A typology of learners was therefore drawn up, depicting the inter-relationships 
between the four groups, as shown in Figure 7.6. Belenky et al. ’s educational 
dialectics provided one further clarification in their discrete/related category, 
expressed through the notions of compartmentalization and synthesis, coupled with 
the guiding question: What is the relationship between learning and life? This was 
clearly what the types were exploring and depicting, and the titles ‘discrete’ and 
‘related’ were consequently adopted in place o f ‘cognitive’ and ‘experiential’.
Figure 7.6: A typology of learners (1)
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With the typology, and with reference to the discussion above, certain fundamental 
relationships could already be identified, as shown in Figure 7.7.
Figure 7.7: A  typology o f  learners (2)
Discrete learners
Impersonal faith
Construction o f intellectual faith world-view 
that often conflicts with experience 
Stt'ong sense o f  self 
Faith framework more authoritative than 
experience
Assimilative learners
Individual and personal faith 
Strength o f se lf needing to be 
weakened 
A ll-encompassing 
authoritative faith framework 
constructs experience
Interpretive learners
Individual and personal faith 
Weak sense o f  self moving to 
stronger (and hence often to 
different type) 
Interpretation o f experience 
constructs all-encompassing 
authoritative faith framework
Related learners
Personal faith 
Construction o f  intellectual faith world­
view which integrates and often 
originates from experience 
Strong sense o f  self 
Experience more authoritative than faith  
framework
The typology went on to become the framework and foundation upon which the 
conclusions of the thesis and research are based. Certain preliminary observations can 
be made, however.
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11.1 Impersonal to personal
There was a gradual progression ‘downwards’ amongst the learners, in terms of how 
personal or impersonal a faith people exhibited and lived. Discrete learners were 
characterised by a largely impersonal faith that was understood and expressed in 
intellectual terms. Moving down the types, people’s way of relating their faith and
experience became increasingly personal, firstly focusing essentially on the 
individual in both assimilative and interpretive learners, and then broadening out to 
become more of a personalised world-view. Unsurprisingly, the categories o f personal 
and impersonal had been identified by Belenky et al., whose guiding questions behind 
the dialectic asked:
‘What is the relationship between self and the content of one’s learning?’
‘How are these relationships structured in terms of the curriculum, relationship with 
peers, relationship with faculty and staff?’
Although they do not explicitly say so, it seems likely that this dialectic lay at the root 
o f their category o f ‘procedural knowers’, with its joint ‘procedures’ of separate and 
connected knowing. As indicated previously, separate knowers favoured an objective 
approach to constructing knowledge, distancing themselves from the object of their 
attention, working towards a general mastery of its content and assuming that this 
would be in some way public and available to all. In contrast, connected knowers 
deliberately sought a relationship with their knowledge, investing themselves in its 
construction, frequently knowing empathetically and allowing information to emerge 
inductively rather than be identified deductively. Separate knowers was the only 
category in their findings where women demonstrated an impersonal way of knowing; 
self-investment and inclusion was typical of all other groups. Nevertheless, a 
progression from the individual to the more generally personal was evident amongst 
their interviewees. Subjective knowers asserted themselves as ‘inner experts’, trusting 
their own individual intuitive instinct over and above the rational and public. 
Constructive knowers, on the other hand—the last and most developed of Belenky et 
al. ’s categories—placed that personal expertise in a wider public context, integrating 
personal with general in such a way that it was personally known yet sufficiently 
related to reality as to provide a different way of looking at the world.
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The typology almost takes the form of an hourglass, the top and bottom positions 
reflecting two distinct ways o f looking at the world, but similar in that each represents 
general world-views. Amongst discrete learners, the self is largely removed and 
people’s external faith authorities provide a public ‘truth’ that explains the world and 
gives it an overall sense. Related learners resemble Belenky et al. ’s Constructive 
knowers in incorporating their own experience into a general contextual world-view 
that moves and shifts with them as they grow and develop. Here lies a further 
significant difference between the two positions: faith in the former is largely a static 
framework, while the latter is dynamic.
In between these poles, assimilative and interpretive learners function with a far more 
individualised focus. The move towards related knowledge is clearly there, but 
remains at the particular level rather than the general, although both groups assert the 
transferability of their position to others.
‘I don’t believe in God just because somebody’s told me he’s there cos they’ve 
had an experience of him. You know. I ’ve had an experience of him and if it 
comes to the point with someone where they’re saying, Well, that’s rubbish, 
how can you possibly believe that? That is the point at which I have to say to 
people, Well, look, you know, I ’ve met with God and I know he’s real. If you 
met with Mm, you’d know he’s real. And we’re not going to agree on this 
now, because, you know, until your experience is the same, well, not is the 
same as mine, but until you have an experience that is similar to mine, there 
isp’t an awful lot of point in us going oil talking about this.’ (Chris)
Subsequent sections of this discussion will indicate certain similarities between these 
two groups and Belenky et a lf  s subjective knowers. This is particularly the case for 
interpretive learners; assimilative learners stray beyond the boundaries in ways that 
suggest potential for further research, while at the same time affirming the hypothesis 
that faith-content is indeed a potentially influential agent in the learning process.
11.2 Strong and weak selves
The hourglass structure is paralleled in certain ways by the role of the self. Both 
discrete and related learners displayed strongly developed selves. Everyone in these 
groups exhibited a robust capacity to reason using the paths o f traditional logic,
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confidence in their ability and ‘right’ to express their views, and they lived their lives 
as an expression o f faith that was correspondingly personally ‘owned’, albeit in 
different ways. The self played a very different role for assimilative and interpretive
learners. Amongst the latter were found the greatest number of interviewees who 
deferred to external authority as described by Belenky et a l and which was implicit in 
Perry’s (1970) work. This deference was one of instinctive, unconsidered—and as 
such, involuntary—submission that appeared to hamper people’s personal growth. 
Self in these instances was weak and vulnerable, a fragile entity that was easily 
damaged. Assimilative learners displayed a different role of the self in their lives and 
learning, that paralleled that of interpretive learners in that it was unassertive and 
submissive to external faith authorities. However, the two groups differed in one 
essential way: assimilative learners showed a developed reflective capacity and strong 
sense o f self that they were trying to ‘transform’ into a new, spiritually-defined entity, 
whereas interpretive learners had yet to move to a position of strength of self. The 
hourglass is therefore somewhat lopsided, yet the metaphor holds water.
11.3 Movement
As the interview material was worked and re-worked, so the strength of the typology 
became apparent, particularly because of its ability to handle movement. This was 
evidenced through people moving from keeping faith and experience separate, to 
beginning to find ways of relating them together, or from a weak sense o f self to a 
gradually strengthening one. Denise, whose quote under Figure 7.1 exemplified a 
discrete (cognitive) learner, went on to say:
In a very profound way, I would say that I’ve come to understand that maybe 
God doesn’t promise us things in life that people think he does. And I think 
that God promises us faithfiilness, but he doesn’t promise us a good job or a 
big house or good health or a husband or children or any of those things. And 
sometimes I think as Christians we can be led to believe that those things, that 
God will. And therefore when they don’t happen or when you suddenly 
become very ill, or life doesn’t meet your expectations, it makes you seriously 
question the nature o f God. So for me, it’s probably been something that’s
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driven me to question the very existence of God. So it’s not a specific 
experience, but an ongoing experience.
Her experience had led her to a point where she had had to reformulate her 
understanding of God, which she had stalled to do in a way that cohered with her life. 
She had begun a transition. Miranda revelled in the fact that her course directors were 
encouraging her to think for herself and providing her with the equipment to do so, 
and was clearly beginning to develop as a person with an autonomous, more ‘rooted’ 
faith. Her embryonic transition from interpretive to related involved this ‘self­
strengthening’ and deliberate attempts to connect her faith with her life through 
‘theological reflection’. Penny too acknowledged a shift in the way she approached 
and understood her faith, moving from a highly subjective faith-interpretation of her 
experience to one she considered much more secure.
I think the bible is the one thing that I can hold onto as the word of God and 
therefore it plays a more vital role that I ’m... It’s an objective thing as 
opposed... That my faith is now based on Scripture as opposed to before when 
it was based on my, how I reacted to certain tilings and what God’s telling me. 
Umm, but, so now I just cling onto that because I can look at it and think, Well 
this is God’s word to humanity.
Occasionally the interview experience itself suggested people might have been seeing 
something differently for the first time: it itself was a learning experience. ‘I ’ve never 
thought about it like this before, but... ’.
11.4 Placing of interviewees
Interviewees were placed within a group with reference both to the original matrix, 
and to the five evaluative criteria outlined at the beginning of this section. The former 
provided a semi-objective method of placement as a reasonable starting point; the 
latter permitted its modification and honing. A number of people were ‘re-placed’ 
during this second analytic stage. As would be expected, in some ways none of the 
interviewees fitted their type exactly. People are not necessarily consistent to 
themselves, and occasionally contradicted themselves during the course o f their 
interviews. (The independent judge scribbled in the margin of one of the scripts he 
studied that the person concerned had, on page 16, flatly contradicted everything he
Chapter Seven 180
People's Ways of Believing: learning processes andfaith outcomes
had previously said!) In addition, ideal types are by very nature inexact, and it would 
be inappropriate to expect human beings to conform precisely to an artificial 
construction. The difficulties were compounded by the fact that the research was 
working with a comparatively small sample (although compare Belenky et a l : a team 
of four studying 135 women over a period of four years). Inevitably, certain 
individuals were placed somewhat tenuously, and one was kept out of the framework 
for a significant period o f time as he appeared to have too little in common with any 
of the other groups. He was eventually incorporated, but tentatively...
The compilation of the typology was important not only in bringing order to the raw 
data, but also because it was in and o f itself a basic response to the research question. 
The typology was dependent on people having found ways of relating to external faith 
authorities, and reflected these ways. I f  those authorities were to be removed, so the 
typology would cease to exist. For that reason alone, it was possible to affirm a 
connection between faith and learning: people’s faith authorities were integral to the 
way in which they learnt, and this resulted in various characteristic traits that 
depended on those authorities. The question could still be begged as to whether 
similar characteristics would be displayed in a non-faith context, yet as far as the 
research was concerned, this proved inconsequential. The inextricability o f frith 
authorities from the patterns of learning displayed by the interviewees, coupled with 
their clear distinctiveness in contrast to other categories o f external ‘knowledge’, 
indicated that for this particular group, there was a relationship between the way they 
learnt, and their faith. In the first instance, given the foundational stones undergirding 
the typology, this related primarily to the way in which people internalised and 
externalised information.
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III. Sum m ary and conclusion
This chapter has outlined the journey that took place in order to establish an adequate 
methodological procedure for analysing the qualitative data. Two main issues arose:
• Finding a framework that would underpin the research in such a way that 
resulting conclusions would permit a concrete way of addressing the research 
question.
• The appropriateness of a deductive analysis which, despite having been 
formulated semi-inductively, nevertheless pigeon-holed people into rigid 
positions;
The typology as eventually drawn up had a number of strengths, not least the fact that 
it centred around the relationship between faith, as imderstood as an authoritative 
body often represented by external social knowledge, and people’s experience. The 
interaction between these two entities depicts aspects of the process of learning, and 
hence a firm foundation as regarded the research question was established. In 
addition, to a certain extent the typology allowed for people to be viewed as growing, 
developing—learning—individuals.
The analysis was therefore inductive, allowing analytic categories to emerge o f then- 
own accord from the data. These were then progressively filled out, helped also by 
reference to the concepts and aspects of learning identified as relevant in the early 
chapters. The basic framework of the typology became a broader description of 
people’s ways of believing in general, providing the first of a range of responses to 
the research question. This is the focus o f the next chapter.
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C h a p te r  E ig h t  
T he  in flu e n ce  o f  fa ith  o n  le a rn in g  
Introduction
One of the discussion points throughout the thesis has been the specific nature of any 
identifiable ‘influence’ of Christian faith on learning. It became progressively 
apparent that the study was as much one of Christian learning in general, hence 
indicative of a simple corollary between Christian people and the object of their faith- 
related learning. This was very much the case with the compilation of the matrix and 
ensuing typology outlined in the previous chapter. In the first instance, this is 
presented as a result of the research in its own right. Once each description (‘form’) 
had been compiled, the respective learning procedures pertaining to each were also 
identifiable and open to analysis and categorisation.
This chapter therefore demonstrates a range of ways in which both hypothesis and 
research question were affirmed and addressed. It provides a series o f ‘conclusions’, 
many of which emanate from this corollary relationship. Nonetheless, as Chapter Two 
argued, Christian faith-content has a particularly authoritative dimension, both 
intrinsic and attributed, and this also contributes to the conclusions presented in the 
chapter. As a qualitative enquiry which aimed to explore various dimensions of what 
is basically the same phenomenon—the act o f learning—there are points of overlap 
and interaction between many of the categories. All contribute, however, to 
demonstrate the many and varied ways in which faith influenced the learning of those 
interviewed.
I. People’s  ways of believing; people’s  ways of learning
The typology itself is therefore the first and most overt answer to the research 
question. Here the form/content interaction between faith-content and people’s 
individual learning preferences was evidenced and four distinct ‘ways of believing’,
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paralleling Belenky et aU s ‘ways of knowing’ identified. The full text of these 
descriptive analyses is provided in Appendix D, space prohibiting their inclusion in 
the main body of the thesis. A summary table is provided in Figure 8.1, with a 
corresponding articulation of the first response to the research question: people’s 
faith influenced the way they learnt by integrating form and content into specific 
faith-related ways of believing and learning.
Figure 8.1: People’s ways o f  believing; people’s ways o f  learning
Ways of believing Ways of learning
Discrete • Separation between faith ® Employment of learning
authorities and experience strategies that bridge or
® Intellectual approach to faith overlay gap between faith
® Search for objectivity authorities and experience
® Dualistic self, often • Varying degrees of
experiencing tension intellectual and emotional
® Construction of a world-view commitment to a belief
that makes sense and that system
provides structure « Occasional deliberate self-
® Indications, in varying restraint vis-a-vis faith
degrees, of characteristics authorities
representative of other types ® Conscious retreat when faced
on the typology with clashes
® Use of conventional logic
Related ® Emphasis on the personal: * Techniques to bring faith to
focus on a personal faith life, that include use of
authority, understanding of imagination, verbal
faith in personal terms, articulation, and cultivating
construction of personal faith means of internalising
knowledge information
® Self plays a larger role than © Emphasis more on acquiring
the faith authorities, allowing faith-related skills and less on
an equal inequality, content
evidenced through factors
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such as anger with God and 
doubt
• Faith a process not an end 
® Conventional use of logic, 
yet allowing for mystery and 
a place for the 
incomprehensible
Assimilative ® Construction of a faith- 
experience cycle that focuses 
on quality and end goals of 
life
® Prime role of faith is to 
transform self 
® Emphasis on submission and 
obedience 
® Developed and deliberate use 
of instinct 
« Use of a pre-determined 
faith-logic
9 Use of techniques that restrict 
and prevent development of 
autonomous self 
® Use of other people as role 
models of ‘faith reflection’
® Conscious and deliberate 
affirmation and celebration of 
faith content 
® Functioning as receptors, 
looking to understand, not 
master
Interpretive ® Construction of a faith-reality 
bubble 
® Employment of ‘faith 
reasoning’: faith- 
authenticated patterns of 
thought that allow for the 
miraculous, do not require 
rigorous logic, make use of 
subjective judgment, and 
uphold the bubble in which 
they exist 
® Deference to uncontrollable 
authorities such as other 
people and God 
® Often a weak role and sense 
of self
9 Conscious and deliberate 
desire to be ‘open’, avoiding 
and rejecting opportunities to 
critique
® Conscious development of 
experience as a learning tool: 
events ‘strike’, guide, 
influence...
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A  general overview reveals certain essential characteristics. The question of how 
people related to Christian faith authorities was significant, and (predictably, given the 
provenance of the research) seen clearly to fall into either a personal or impersonal 
bracket. A third alternative appeared to be present, however, in that Assimilative and 
Interpretive believers both adopted a ‘submissive’ posture and relationship to faith 
authorities. The personal/impersonal dimension seemed to fade into comparative 
insignificance in favour of allowing ‘truth’, however perceived and attributed, to have 
its ‘way’. There were indications of alternative realities, different worlds, in which 
people lived, depending on which of the components in the learning equation they 
turned to as primary port of call. This in turn affected, and to some extent determined, 
the form of logic and reasoning they employed. For a number, their approach was 
theologically justified and reasoned, adding weight to the thesis’s basic premise that 
faith and faith authorities influenced learning. Ways of believing and ways of learning 
were necessarily interconnected and it was often impossible to determine which had 
priority in the cycle. The two-sided dimension of the original research question was 
affirmed.
Many of these features are picked up and explored in subsequent sections, placing 
them with greater precision within the analytic framework o f the different theories of 
learning presented in the early chapters.
II. People’s  construction of knowledge
Chapter Two (section IV. 1) suggested that one o f the possible ways in which faith- 
content might affect learning was in the subdivision of social knowledge into two 
categories, faith-content and non-faith content, hence creating a fourfold configuration 
o f learning components. This was confirmed by the empirical data. While 
fundamentally the Christian interviewees were all engaged in the process of 
constructing knowledge in the same way that anybody else is when interacting with 
their external environment and its body of social knowledge, the interviews 
nevertheless revealed that for all concerned the body of Christian faith-content was 
lifted into high relief from the surrounding background and deliberately referred to in 
preference to other alternatives. This was evidenced through statements of
Chapter Eight 186
People’s Ways of Believing: learning processes andfaith outcomes
commitment to the bible and its teaching (‘the bible says, so ...’), acknowledgements 
of a tension between two different ways of interpreting a situation created by 
individuals’ commitment to the Christian belief system, and overt rejection of ‘non- 
Christian’ understandings of the world and experience. Many interviewees associated 
their Christian identity with an intellectual and emotional commitment to the Christian 
tradition, and in so doing necessitated its isolation from other forms o f social 
knowledge. This was often directly linked to questions of Christian identity. Only by 
specific reference to Christianity expressed through its principal articulations of faith 
could people claim to be ‘Christian’. In varying degrees, the demarcation lines were 
important, some individuals making clear black and white distinctions between what 
could be considered Christian and what couldn’t, others allowing the lines to be much 
fuzzier. Other differences were identifiable in the extent of people’s ‘range’ some 
deliberately aiming to incorporate and honour the whole system as they perceived it, 
others identifying and focusing on a much narrower core. Nevertheless, all operated a 
procedure in which Christian authorities and the belief system they represented were 
seen as distinct from other contenders.
A quadratic combination o f learning components was therefore very much in 
evidence. More significantly, however, four different configurations o f those 
components emerged as representative of the four types, as follows.
11.1 Discrete ways of constructing knowledge
Discrete believers, looking to faith content to provide them with an overall world­
view, also generally accorded that content an equal place to the social knowledge that 
enabled them to interpret and analyse it. Both were of equal importance and they used 
one to examine and explore the other. In so doing, faith content was subjected to the 
same rational procedures as social knowledge, and was expected to conform to these. 
A basic triad was set up between reason, faith content and social knowledge in which 
all three interacted in equal measure. Frequently excluded from the equation, 
however, was experience. Jon, for example, agonised over the fact that his experience 
did not cohere with his rational understanding of the world, and his interview includes 
the following quote:
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Part of my thesis is the Doctrine o f God. How do we understand God? 
And I ’m leaning towards the orthodox tradition that understands God in 
terms of persons. The basis of God is the person of the Father who out of 
love created the Spirit and the Son, so it’s all relational. God is primarily 
relation and people. It’s not a matter of substance. Substance is 
impersonal and in a sense completely unimportant for your faith. So if 
love is fundamental to God, and relation is fundamental to God, how 
come that in my life, it doesn’t work out? Uhh, I understand that you can’t 
feel the love for God because it’s a different kind of love that we can’t 
really (tape unintelligible), but somehow that should feed back that there 
should be kind o f an interaction that you sense that God loves you in your 
daily life. Maybe not everyday, but once in a while. Uhh, unless you’ve 
got completely wrong expectations, which I might have. But it’s the 
knowledge that that particular doctrine, I think of it as orthodox, is 
correct. But in practical life I so often mn into a wall which I can’t get 
through. That causes, that... insurmountable tension.
Jon had eventually had to seek medical attention to help deal with the effects of this 
tension. All members of this group affirmed the desirability of including experience, 
yet for many this was quite a problem and it continued to play the role o f ‘poor 
relation’ in their construction of personal knowledge—with the result that they often 
felt they lived two lives. Martin spoke of feeling ‘schizophrenic’ and o f not expecting 
his Christian faith and his learning to cohere: by their very nature, they wouldn’t! 
Denise, quoted in Chapter Six section I, indicated that her Christian faith was 
primarily intellectual and it was on this that it was based. Experience came second, 
although when there were mismatches, she worked hard to reconcile the two, often— 
unlike Jon—shifting her theology and modifying her belief system accordingly.
Of the four components integral to the act o f ‘faith-learning’, therefore, Discrete 
believers tended to marginalise experience, and the basic configuration of their way of 
constructing knowledge is depicted in Figure 8.2.
Chapter Eight 188
Figure 8.2: Discrete configuration o f  learning components
People’s Ways of Believing: learning processes andfaith outcomes
11.2 Related ways of constructing knowledge
Related believers, on the other hand, operated with a different construction. They too 
reasoned according to the precepts o f social knowledge. However, this cohered firstly 
with their experience, and only secondly with their faith content. Felicity, training for 
ordination, understood her studies to be a means to an end:
... and the end is ministry, and the ministry is people. I prefer people to paper! 
Theology, faith-content, provided her with a framework and a discipline for thinking 
things through. However, her faith was an experiential faith, and she interpreted her 
faith authorities in such a way that it related to experience.
When Moses saw the burning bush and the burning bush spoke to him of God, 
it doesn’t really matter whether the bush was actually on fire, or it looked as if 
it was on fire. That’s irrelevant. It spoke to him of God. And if we see things 
or hear things or know things that speak to us of God and we know 
incontrovertibly that that is God speaking to us, you can’t dislodge that.
Beth protested vehemently against teaching she had received which jarred with her 
life.
In the evangelical church, the spirit often has to be ‘over’ the body. Victory 
over the body. And I, it was against my experience. ... When I did the
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Christology essay, umm, I kept coming up against this and I thought, Death is 
a little problem here!
Simon too emphasises his experience, although tries more overtly to bring experience 
and the Christian belief system together in an equally-balanced coherent whole.
I defend being a Christian from the fact of, from those two facts. So I ’d say 
it’s true historically and it works for me, and it works for my, umm, my 
character in that the more I ’ve understood it the more I have been at east in 
life. And I know that to be true. ... Even if I’m not at the stage where I can say 
I accept every event in the Gospels to be, to have happened exactly as it says, 
which is how I would have taken it in the past, I ’d still know I ’ve got that 
through the whole picture. I ’ve got a certain foundation that these things really 
did happen, the event of Jesus really did take place, and what I ’ve experienced 
in my life in terms of God’s forgiveness and acceptance matches up with that. 
The two go together.
Simon’s position perhaps exemplifies most clearly the balanced configuration 
between the four different components in the learning process. None is left out in the 
cold, a marginalised and side-lined dimension o f life. Instead, all four combine to 
allow people to live coherent, unified lives. Felicity states:
I don’t feel that my faith is something apart from my life, or apart from my 
studies. What my studies then I think so with my faith, there doesn’t seem to 
be that division.
Figure 8.3 shows the configuration o f learning of Related believers.
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Figure 8.3: Related configuration o f  learning components
An important M c between Discrete and Related believers was the employment of a 
form of reasoning that cohered with the methods and principles characteristic of 
society around them. Both groups used conventional reason in equal measure. 
However, Related believers allowed their personal experience to play a far more 
prominent role in their construction of knowledge.
11.3 Assimilative ways of constructing knowledge
Assimilative believers, like Related, found ways of incorporating all four components 
so that each interacted with the others. The major difference was the reversal of the 
positioning of faith content and social knowledge. For Assimilative believers life was 
a life o f faith, and faith content guided and informed the way in which they reasoned. 
Nevertheless, that reasoning also needed to conform to the patterns of social 
knowledge since they lived in the real world and a rational interpretation o f their 
experience was important. The Assimilative configuration is portrayed in Figure 8.4.
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Figure 8.4: Assimilative configuration o f  learning components
Roger, for example, is clear that living life according to faith precepts not only results 
in a happier, fuller life, but that it is the call o f every Christian.
Je suis la voie, la verite et la vie, quoi. C’est le Christ. II est la voie, la verite, 
done c’est de l’ordre de l’intelligence, et c’est cette voie, ce chemin, cette 
intelligence, elle mene a la vie. A plus de vie.1 
He continued this faith-logic by asserting that even those who consider themselves to 
be happy and fulfilled outside the bounds of the Christian belief system cannot 
actually be so. An immense swathe o f Craig’s interview revealed a self-understanding 
that was highly faith-determined. He was a sinner, in need of forgiveness and 
redemption. It was this view o f himself which provided a framework for the rest of his 
life. Assimilative believers did not place social knowledge outside their triad of 
themselves, their faith and their experience. Indeed, they regularly touched base with 
this since their major focus was to ensure that the two dimensions of life cohered. Of 
the two, however, faith was clearly superior.
1 1 a m  the  w ay , the  t ru th  a n d  th e  life , y o u  see. I t ’s  C h r is t .  H e  is  the  w ay , the  tru th , s o  it re la te s  to  o u r  
in te llig e n c e , a n d  it ’s  t h is  w a y , t h is  pa th , t h is  in te llig e n c e ,  w h ic h  le a d s  to  life. T o  a  fu lle r  life.
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11.4 interpretive ways of constructing knowledge
Interpretive believers, alone amongst the groups, permitted social knowledge and its 
rational patterns of thought to be sidelined. While Discrete believers marginalised 
their experience, Interpretive believers marginalised social knowledge, sometimes 
giving the impression of living in another world.
You see, nothing would surprise me about God. You know. God, I don’t think 
there’s anything surprising in a way about raising somebody from the dead or 
somebody being able to have a baby when they haven’t actually had sex with 
somebody else. Umm, because if God wants to do that that way, I have no 
problem with thinking that he can do it. Umm, I get, you know, I ’m amazed 
sometimes, and I do feel it’s an arrogance in some people, particularly perhaps 
some theologians, I don’t know, who will explain everything, you know, Well, 
this doesn’t really mean this. Actually, when Jesus comes again there aren’t 
really going to be trumpets in the sky because a trumpet wouldn’t be able to 
float in the sky because it would be too heavy! Now, I ’ve actually heard 
somebody say that. I ’ve actually heard somebody say that in a lecture, and I 
thought, Well, how small-minded can we get here. Umm, that, you know, if 
God wants trumpets to float off the ground, there is really no problem for him 
to be able to do that. You know. Wonderful. Umm, yeah, so, so, no, I don’t 
have a problem with that. (Chris)
This was a paradoxical group, since in many ways they had most obviously faced 
life’s hardest questions head on. Margaret’s agonies over the plight of the homeless, 
Chris’s involvement with those living in immense social hardship and deprivation, 
Ruth’s struggle to find a meaning in one friend’s death and another’s stroke during 
pregnancy, Miranda living with two handicapped children... These women were 
immersed in social and existential issues that one might have expected would have 
hardened up a form of social reasoning. Instead, they turned to faith to provide 
answers, reasons, meaning.
Well, with the friend who died... Well, because she’d been very ill before she 
died, so though it was a shock when she died, and we were all very upset, I 
think it got us talking... we realised that for her, she was better off, in a way, 
she’d had in many ways rotten things happen to her here so it was a relief in a
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way. And also just the way that she had lived her life. You didn’t feel that it 
was a waste that she’d died quite young. So that was, that caused us to talk 
about that, and how we lived our life and how she’d lived her life. We talked 
about heaven... With the friend who had the stroke, probably not so positive. 
I t’s harder to be more positive, because almost you can’t see the point of it. It 
just seems pain for pain’s sake. We can’t say that she’s better off now, or, and 
so that’s been more of a bewildering... I think making us all realise that to live 
life day to day and to be responsible and to make the most of each day, but 
also just causing us to accept that some things are unexplainable, and also just 
to think that you’re not going to sail through life just because you’re a 
Christian and everything’s going to be fine, you know, but to actually think 
about the fact that bad things do happen and also, I think one of the big things 
that certainly hit me and one or two others is, how on earth would you cope 
with these tilings if you didn’t have a faith. I t’s hard enough when you do, but 
without God, how would you cope? I don’t know. (Ruth)
This was not always satisfactory, and Margaret in particular indicated the inadequacy 
of her position yet seemed unable to move beyond it. Penny, an interviewee who had 
clearly made the transition from an Interpretive position to a Discrete, identified that 
one reason for the inadequacy was in the fact that most faith reasoning was subjective. 
My mum’s a veiy spend five or six hours in prayer a day, you know, puts 
everyone else to shame. But, and I think as a result o f that she has a much 
deeper relationship with God than a lot o f people, but a few of the things she 
comes out with aren’t heretical, but I just think, Did God really speak to you or 
was that, or Is that the right thinking, or is that you just reading into it? 
Subjectivity was very prevalent amongst Interpretive believers:
I don’t feel what I believe is irrational because I  know it’s true... (Chris)
The marginalisation o f social knowledge amongst Interpretive believers was primarily 
as a result o f their living highly individual lives. Despite the fact that each was 
sociable and valued contact with friends and family, most had developed a belief 
system which was individual and personal to themselves and had no need to cohere 
with the network of surrounding social knowledge. They found reassurance in the fact
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that other individuals functioned and reasoned in a similar individual way, and this 
fact was more significant than the conclusions drawn.
Interpretive ways of constructing knowledge followed a configuration as depicted in 
Figure 8.5.
Figure 8.5: Interpretive configuration o f  learning components
People’s Ways of Believing: learning processes andfaith outcomes
The second conclusion of the research is therefore that Christian faith influenced 
people’s learning by requiring them to incorporate an additional dimension into 
their construction of knowledge. This resulted in either the marginalisation of 
one component, or in the development of techniques to incorporate all four. A 
fourfold configuration permitted four different ways of constructing knowledge.
While the identification of these four ways of constructing knowledge is significant, 
and indicates an important and relevant dimension of the way Christians learn, the 
real significance of the finding appeared to be in the way in which these 
configurations then affected the process of reasoning and reflection. The process of 
analysis had quickly identified the fact that people turned to one of two epistemic
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primitives, experience or reason, to provide a basis for faith and a means of relating 
this to life. It seemed likely that this on its own would guide subsequent deliberations 
and conclusions. The four different configurations, however, suggested that reasoning 
was not simply a matter of where people started and grounded their thought processes, 
but also that this required an ‘end’: a source which enabled them to connect 
themselves to the world and reality. Interpretive believers had frequently given the 
impression of living in a type of ‘reality bubble’, a world with its own form of 
reasoning, its own logic, its own bank of social knowledge, separate from its 
surrounds. The analysis above shows both how and why this was the case, since not 
only was reason directed specifically at faith-content and authorities, but it also 
involved the marginalisation of social knowledge. The contrast with Assimilative 
believers was striking. Both groups tended toward an experiential faith; both focused 
on faith-content for the interpretation o f their experience. Yet Assimilative believers 
incorporated social knowledge, constantly touching base with its precepts and 
insisting that faith-content and social knowledge found ways of cohering.
The marginalisation of experience displayed by Discrete believers contrasted in a 
similar way against its inclusion by Related believers, although the effects were 
somewhat different. Both groups lived in the same world, using the logical systems of 
social reasoning to ground their thought processes. The disjuncture experienced by 
certain Discrete believers was primarily a result o f their inability to relate their 
experience to their intellectual conclusions, although in some cases (Martin, for 
example) there was a real difficulty reconciling faith-content and social knowledge.
11.5 People’s patterns of reasoning
Only limited information regarding the forms of reasoning employed by the various 
types could not be ascertained from the data, something which correctly reflected the 
character and emphasis of the interview questions. Further research is recommended 
to explore this dimension of the relationship between Christian faith-content and 
learning in greater depth. However, certain characteristics were identifiable. The 
clearest example was in Interpretive believers’ willingness to accept and rejoice in the 
miraculous, as demonstrated in Chris’s quote in section II.4 above. Experience o f this
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order was something to be expected and was a right and proper characteristic of 
Christian reality. While Interpretive believers embraced the new world most fervently, 
God’s intervention in the world was something that individuals from each of the 
groups affirmed. This was generally accompanied by a pattern of reasoning which 
enabled people to live with situations in which God’s hoped-for intervention did not 
come about. Ruth’s struggle to come to terms with the serious health problems of two 
of her close friends also cited in section II.4 above is revealing in her repeated 
attempts to find a positive faith-related puipose in what would otherwise be 
inexplicable and seemingly meaningless events.
This pattern of reasoning fits into a bigger picture in which experience is always 
interpreted in ways which affirm God’s goodness. Nevertheless, a number of 
interviewees highlighted times when they dared get angry at God. These were almost 
without exception significant turning points.
How would you say your faith had changed [...]?
Umm, it, it’s moved away from being a faith that was, I suppose, a cultural 
thing. You know, going to church, saying the right words, but actually a faith 
that looks at suffering, looks at what people are really like, not what, not the 
fa9ade. And, umm, actually, yeah, I can think of one example, I really got 
angry with God, and remember, that was such a break through, I just swore at 
him! How can you let this happen to me! I just let him have it all, and, ohh, 
then realised that that was what he was wanting me to do all along. Be honest 
with him. And, uhh, yeah, I think that was a break through. (Miranda) 
Affirming God’s goodness resulted in a form o f reasoning which, once again, tended 
to make individuals passive recipients, even victims, of experience, both good and 
bad. The disjuncture was made sense of in a faith-related way, cohering with a 
fundamental (perceived) understanding of a God who loved people and who would 
only act for their good. The ensuing reasoning followed that path, yet threatened to 
turn people into acquiescent vegetables. Break throughs involved bursting through the 
boundaries and beginning to reason in a different way. They were also important steps 
in the development of people’s individual selves, since they were often the first 
significant time that people had been self-assertive in the face of a respected authority.
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These examples are indicative of an influence which faith-content had on the process 
of learning in a number o f ways. Firstly, reasoning was underpinned by a fundamental 
faith tenet which many did not dare to transgress. This guided and directed 
consequent reasoning, channelling it down a comparatively narrow pathway. This in 
turn developed further forms of reasoning, one following from another as the former 
proved difficult to maintain. Secondly, as reflection, reasoning implies a degree of 
individual control. Once again, it would appear that the cultivation of a ‘faith 
reasoning’ was commensurate with people’s desire to allow God to have his way in 
their lives and not to take control, inappropriately, themselves.
III. The processes of learning
This analysis relates primarily to Jarvis’s model of the processes of learning. It 
focuses primarily on people’s use o f experience and provides a third indication of how 
faith influenced learning: a) by ‘unbalancing’ the ‘normal’ relationship between 
experience and social knowledge; and b) by facilitating an alternative 
interpretation of experience and hence the construction of alternative realities. 
The data highlighted two principal ways in which the learning patterns and processes 
of the interviewees appeared to have been influenced by the faith-content they were 
engaging with, both of which related to its ideological characteristics.
111.1 The use of experience
People’s use of experience was something already highlighted in the compilation of 
the four different configurations outlined above. One of the direct results of this was 
the opening of opportunities for experience to be used in a faith-related way. Two 
examples were evidenced. On the one hand, individuals gave experience and its 
interpretation a heightened significance; on the other, in direct contrast, they gave 
faith-content an exaggerated importance to the point of marginalising experience.
The section looks at each in turn.
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a) Experience: a faith tool
For Interpretive believers in particular, partnered on occasion by Assimilative 
believers and, in much smaller measure, across the board, experience was a way in 
which God was seen to communicate to people. Margaret, for example, indicates how 
she saw God speaking to her through specific situations. For that reason, the smallest 
of events might have significance and should not be overlooked. A number of 
Interpretive believers therefore used sensitive antennae to probe the world ‘outside’ 
themselves, if not actively looking for signs and messages, then consciously wanting 
to be ‘open’ to being ‘spoken to ’. A frequent and conspicuous theme was that of 
people being ‘struck’ by things. Often, in a devotional context, this occurred through 
the bible. Verses, phrases, words ‘leapt out’, rang bells, spoke to a situation, and were 
relevant to a particular circumstance. Similarly events were explored in view of a 
potential significance, which may hit somebody between the eyes. Links were made 
between different events, and a series of occurrences which all appeared to carry a 
similar message, pointed to a particular course of action often resulted in an individual 
being ‘convinced’ and taking measures accordingly. Other people played an important 
role, particularly (perhaps exclusively) as members of the community of faith where 
they are seen as representatives of God himself, porters of his will, communicators of 
his message.
Interpretive believers thus became either masters or slaves of experience. Since it was 
an important way in which God communicated to them, they adopted a generally 
submissive attitude, willing to be guided and moved. At the same time, since they 
themselves were responsible for the interpretation of those experiences, they also had 
to take possession of them, attributing significance and fitting them into the overall 
constructed framework that constituted their life o f faith. They did this primarily by 
asking what God’s purpose was behind the experience, hence giving it meaning. At 
the opposite end of the spectrum, people—far fewer, amongst those interviewed for 
this research—-could also be slaves, potentially victims of their experience, even when 
it related to faith. Margaret, who returned to study almost as an act o f self-assertion, 
described in strongly-worded terms how she had acquiesced with the will of others for 
her life until she almost felt a non-person. Her experience of other people’s interaction
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with her—in a church context which meant she felt it inappropriate to challenge—was 
so directive that she led a highly reactive existence. Even the self-assertive act of 
enrolling at theological college was tinged with a continued seeking of approval: 
those in ‘authority’ whose wills had so dominated hers could not criticise her desire to 
deepen her faith through study in this way. Margaret was beginning to get her life on 
an even keel. Part of the process involved identifying when her reactions were 
inappropriate; a standing back, a momentary halting of time that allowed her to take 
control of the experience and interpret and use it to ends she deemed preferable. A 
shift from victim to master had taken place.
The use of experience in this way seemed to have the effect of slowing time. People 
lived with a raised consciousness in everyday life, permanently alert to hearing God’s 
voice. The ‘taken-for-grantedness’ described by Jarvis (1997) as indicative of a 
harmony between people’s past learning experiences and their present situation, 
characterised by a low level of consciousness and only a vague awareness of the 
passing o f time, was significantly disrupted by Interpretive believers. These 
individuals changed the learning process from the totally reactive described by Jarvis 
to a more even partnership between reactive and proactive. On the whole they did not 
initiate situations of disjuncture; that would have been in some way to manipulate the 
hand o f God. On the other hand, they deliberately sought out significance, consciously 
freezing time in order to examine experience. This was one extreme in the learning 
process of Interpretive believers. It was typically (and paradoxically) partnered by a 
desire to be ‘open’ to God which was often characterised by a refusal to think and 
evaluate. To quote Ruth:
Listening to preachers and lecturers, listening to preachers... umm... I don’t 
set out to listen to, to critique them. I think because, I think if I ’m listening to a 
preacher I’m going there to learn something 01* to try and be filled or blessed 
or whatever language you want to use. And so I try to be more open-minded 
and try even if I, maybe even if I don’t like their style or their particular 
theology, I still try and learn something or benefit in some way. Because I 
think, I’m very conscious that if I ’m too critical, if I go with a critical attitude, 
I ’m closing myself off to learning things, or to being taught and spoken to.
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The discussion returns to this dimension of learning at a later point. However, the 
thesis suggests that Interpretive ways of learning actually reversed many of the 
precepts outlined by Jarvis. In an informal life context, rather than experience 
function as an initiator and the degree of learning be commensurate with the sense of 
disjuncture experienced, it became a tool in the hands of people actively wanting to 
learn. In a formal situation of learning, however, rather than critique and evaluate, 
these capacities which normally indicate people’s control of their learning, were 
turned off. Both had the same motivation at root, however: hearing God’s voice. For 
that reason it can be seen that faith and faith-content significantly influenced people’s 
ways of learning.
b) Faith-content and the interpretation of experience
The second use of experience relates to its interpretation. As theories o f experiential 
learning all emphasise, social knowledge provides the major referent for the 
interpretation of experience, giving it meaning and enabling people to harmonise it 
with then* existing biographies. Once again, however, the four configurations outlined 
above indicate that individuals used it unconventionally in a faith context. The two 
significant groups here were Discrete believers, who marginalised experience, and 
Interpretive, who marginalised social knowledge. The former can be accounted for 
both on the grounds of their natural penchant towards a cognitive approach to life as 
contrasted against experiential. Their commitment to Christian faith-content was 
primarily intellectual, and hence their most basic concern was to have a reasoned 
understanding of the world. Experience was frequently a casualty of that concern. 
Rather than focus on harmonising social knowledge and experience, Discrete 
believers tended to prioritise the harmonisation of social knowledge and faith-content, 
discovering to their consternation that their ‘real’ lives did not necessarily cohere with 
the resulting available interpretation. To quite a significant extent, they experienced 
conflict between two warring interpretations o f the same experience, resulting in 
many cases in the development of ‘bridging’ strategies as learning techniques (see 
later). Interpretive believers, on the other hand, could abandon the basic premises of 
social knowledge in favour of those of faith. Interpretation o f experience was thus 
liberated, and it could be understood in any number of ways that were either peculiar
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to the individual or characteristic o f the group or Christian context to which they 
belonged.
Both Discrete and Interpretive believers lived in a form of ‘reality bubble’, the latter 
more pronounced than the former. Their disaggregation of experience from social 
knowledge created an alternative universe, with its own rules, reasoning, logic, 
systems and experiences. The faith-reality bubble o f Discrete believers was one that 
haemorrhaged, constantly confronted (‘popped’) by the experiential world which they 
could not deny. The challenge was to find ways of bringing the two together. On 
occasion, unlike their Related counterparts, Discrete believers were unequal to the 
task, although the bridging techniques went some way to addressing the difficulty.
The influence that faith-content had on learning in these instances was rooted in 
interviewees’ prioritisation of this authority over and above other alternatives. It 
resulted in the construction of alternative realities, and from there in either a range of 
tensions or in the habitation o f a faith reality which permitted an interpretation of 
experience only shared by those living in the same reality.
IV. The process of internalisation
The process of internalisation was discussed in Chapters Three and Four, which 
demonstrated its multi-faceted nature. Questions of profundity, the growth of the self, 
and procedures and learning styles were all shown to be integral to the concept. The 
sections which follow draw conclusions regarding the influence of faith on each of 
these dimensions. Broadly summarised, however, they conclude that faith content 
influenced learning by a) impeding, b) ‘diverting’, c) changing the nature of 
internalisation.
IV.1 Levels of internalisation
Different levels of internalisation (surface, deep, integrated, tacit) were discernible 
within the four groups, although a degree o f uncertainty and ambiguity in the 
conclusions must be acknowledged. It was tempting to suggest that levels of
People's Ways of Believing: learning processes andfaith outcomes
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internalisation got progressively deeper clockwise around the types, with Discrete 
learners exhibiting the least profound levels, and Assimilative the greatest. While the 
evidence suggested that might be the case, such a conclusion must be tempered with 
the realisation that Discrete learners did find ways of internalising. The implication of 
lack of reflection must also be rejected. However, indications of levels of 
internalisation were as follows:
® A tendency o f Discrete believers to focus on the sign rather than the signified. 
These learners emphasised propositional truth to which they made an 
intellectual commitment. For a number this then became a platform from 
which to progress beyond the sign. Nevertheless, the conflict between two 
opposing, or non-homogenous interpretations of experience could often be 
accounted for by the fact that Discrete believers operated a propositional 
system.
• Interpretive believers looked for meaning, yet sometimes favoured a meaning 
that did not require them to engage profoundly. Their inclination towards an 
unrooted form of reasoning had the effect of hindering the degree to which 
meaning was genuinely seized.
• Related believers looked for links and connections, seeking significance and 
discounting dimensions of their belief system which they saw as superfluous.
Its propositions were tools; members of this group emphasised process rather 
than goal, the means of getting somewhere rather than the specific end in 
itself.
• Assimilative believers spoke in terms o f ‘illumination’, ‘insight’, ‘wisdom’, 
and of particular aspects of their belief system ‘ringing true’ in ways in which 
they found difficult to articulate. None of these terms suggest a 
propositionally-articulated focus or expression of faith; instead, clear 
similarities with Polanyi’s tacit knowing are indicated, which, Chapter Four 
argued, was the deepest level o f internalisation through reflection.
Of all the research conclusions, this is an area where the cyclical dimension of 
learning must be borne in mind. Can it be asserted with confidence that faith actually 
affected the level of internalisation, or was it more people’s own disposition and 
learning preferences that encouraged them to take this approach? If these observations
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were presented in a vacuum, separate from all the other findings, then the chicken- 
and-egg aspect would verge toward their nullification. However, the arguments of 
Chapter One, highlighting the authoritative nature of faith-content, coupled with the 
learning characteristics of each type identified in other sections, suggests faith-content 
plays a more significant role than individual tendencies.
IV.2 People’s ‘faith styles’ and learning procedures
Both sections I and II indicated that, in different ways, the interviewees were required 
to bring two (or more) potentially incompatible learning components together. The 
form/content discussion understood this occurring through a set of procedures. This 
section examines the procedures used, identifying a further way in which faith-content 
influenced learning: by requiring them to develop procedures specific to the task 
of harmonising faith-content with another area of their lives. This was particularly 
the case for Discrete and Related believers, albeit for different reasons. Interpretive 
and Assimilative believers were not faced with the same challenge. Both led more 
holistic lives, as was evidenced from the configurations presented in section II. In 
these instances, faith content influenced the way people learnt by requiring them 
to develop techniques of absorption. The thesis has classified both types of 
influence as examples of Teaming procedures’, although an overlap with reflection is 
evident and they might also be considered examples of theological reflection. Details 
of each are provided below.
IV.2.1 Linking faith content and social knowledge
In the lives of many Discrete believers, these two elements functioned as knowledge 
of a similar kind—generally propositional with ideological characteristics—which in 
certain areas clashed. At an immediate level, there appeared to be no way in which the 
two could be brought together: Hull’s (1991 [1985]) notion o f an ideological time lag 
which requires people to merge value-laden information from one time period with 
that o f another is relevant here. While the literal time lag did not appear to pose a 
significant challenge to interviewees, bringing two separate knowledge ‘sources’ 
together certainly was, requiring the employment of a number of techniques.
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a) Construction of a big picture
Denise, Tina and Martin constructed an intellectual faith framework that matched 
what they considered to be the most essential points of life and reality. It became a 
hermeneutical framework, but was generally not all-encompassing. To varying 
degrees, each was prepared to incorporate aspects of Christian doctrine according to 
appropriateness and relevance. The strategy involved a good degree o f evaluation in 
order to prioritise which aspects of people’s faith authorities were tenable and 
reasonable and could therefore be adhered to, and which could legitimately be 
discarded.
I suppose I tend to go for the big pictures o f God’s relationship with humanity. 
And possibly I would, I mean I can understand, yeah, from what you’ve said 
that., but then, you know, I would probably want to argue with people that, 
you know, a God who is willing to identify himself with the humanity that 
he’s created. Now the fine details o f that, as in the virgin birth, I probably 
wouldn’t lose too much sleep over actually. I ’m not even sure I believe it 
myself! It’s not really a problem for me. I think Joseph and Mary could have 
had sex and Jesus could have been bom out of that. You know, I don’t believe 
in inherited original sin, or whatever. (Denise)
b) Epistemology
Martin’s way of resolving the tension between faith and experience was 
epistemological. In actual fact, the two dimensions of his life remained separate, but 
they lay comfortably alongside each other.
I ’ve learnt about different .epistemological approaches that carry with them 
views of, about objective thinking, subjectivism, what is public knowledge, 
what is private... etc. Various approaches. Umm, and I think that that has 
changed my faith in the sense that I was previously thinking very much along 
the lines of objective means, factual means, everyone should accept. Which is 
a very modernist way of thinking. Which is in line with to some extent my law 
degree, and to some extent with the society I grew up in abroad, which is by 
and large fairly modernist. So having the chance to explore epistemologies 
that are not based on that distinction, between factual and personal or 
subjective, umm, that is actually workable, has had a major impact on my
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faith, because it allows for the possibility of knowledge based on relationship 
and based on trust which has much to do with the sort of faith that the church 
talks about. So suddenly that’s become credible in my own thinking. And 
that’s had a major impact, I think. In that I now have the categories to be able 
to say, Well, maybe that thinking’s wrong. Because before I only saw one way 
of thinking about the world. So, yeah, that’s had a major, and that way of 
thinking that I thought was more or less universal didn’t work for my Christian 
faith at all. Because I couldn’t prove with certainty that my faith was right or 
true in any sense, because by definition faith was private and subjective and 
non-factual. ... This whole study of knowledge as based on the revelation of 
the other is very exciting. That’s been, you know, suddenly I have a credible 
base on which to talk of, you know, talk about faith and God as personal, 
which is in my own mind, credible, and which works for, you know, works 
both for the physical hard ... as well as, you know, the human sciences. So, 
yeah, that’s quite liberating. And it’s, you know, non-dualist.
c) Hermeneutics
Tina and Penny emphasised the necessary skill o f learning to interpret their major 
faith authority, the bible, appropriately. In so doing, they would find an appropriate 
way of applying it to their lives and the bible would thus meet their interpretation of 
experience. As Martin, this followed largely modernist principles.
d) Extraction of principles
Phillip turned to the bible to provide him with guiding principles about how to live 
life. He spoke of the need for checks and balances in life in general, and these were to 
be found in and through his prime faith-authority.
I can just outline five criterias. Five criteria to determine my position. First I 
say, Is it exclusively written in the bible? For example, if the bible says Don’t 
commit adultery, or Don’t steal, it’s exclusively in the bible. And then, having 
got the direct commandment, you know, to do or not to do, the bible is very 
difficult if you are literally to determine what action involves. Like for 
example, if anyone says stealing, not to steal, does it involve plagiarism, does 
it involve ... , does it involve copyright laws. I mean, there are many other
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tilings that would also involve stealing. So the second thing I would ask is...
So the second thing I would ask is... Let me first state the points and then I 
will explain... The first is, Is it Biblical? The second is, Does it, is it harmful to 
the body? And then thirdly, I would ask, Can I do it for the glory of God? 
Fourthly, fourthly... the weaker brethren. So there are four instead of five. Can 
I cause another brother to stumble on account of this? So after you have used 
these four criterias, I accept something. But even after using these four 
criterias, I sometimes find it very, very difficult to say something is biblically 
acceptable or not.
It will be noted that each of these techniques is highly intellectual. Commensurate 
with Discrete believers’ emphasis on the cognitive, so their solution to straddling two 
forms of knowledge is cognitive. This differed significantly from Related believers, 
whose challenge was to bring faith-content and experience together.
IV.2.2 Linking faith content and experience
The techniques employed to join faith content and experience were in many ways 
more subtle and difficult to identify, not least because they might very well be 
identical to those employed to connect all forms of social knowledge with their 
experience. Certain strategies that were faith-specific were notable, however, most 
revolving around how faith could be ‘brought to life’: a concept that early stages of 
the analysis identified as particularly typical of Related believers.
a) Focus on the person of Jesus
A major common characteristic of Related believers was their emphasis not on 
Christian doctrine but on the person of Jesus. Reference to Jesus peppered the 
interviews, individuals often deliberately asking themselves what he might do or say 
in a particular situation and acting accordingly. All were self-confessed ‘people 
people’ and while their faith generally took on a traditional doctrinal shape, becoming 
like Jesus was far more significant to them than making sense of the world. Theirs 
was a relational faith, not necessarily expressed in terms of having a ‘relationship’ 
with Jesus, but certainly using him as a role model, focusing on the theological
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understandings of his life, death and resurrection, and applying all these dimensions to 
their own and others’ lives.
b) Use of imagination
Both Related and Assimilative believers used their imaginations to bring the bible to 
life. As the quote from Beth below indicates, this is a well-known technique employed 
as a particular spiritual discipline. Nevertheless, it was meaningful to her on account 
o f the fact that it provided a means of connecting her life with a faith authority.
This Ignatian thing. I t’s very biblical. And, I mean, like what I ’m doing at the 
* moment, in fact, is, umm, is imagining myself into, umm, the, well, we’re 
starting. I never know where we’re going with this, so I can’t tell you where 
it’s heading, but, umm, the nativity and imagining myself in my prayer time, 
umm, as either Mary or Joseph and, I suppose cos I ’m a woman, I tend to 
gravitate towards Mary, but, umm... And, the task is to see how, how that 
relates to my life. And I find that really, it’s been really interesting, because, I 
mean, what I ’m finding with this particular bit, especially because I don’t 
know where I ’m going for my parish and stuff like that, and it’s very 
frightening, and, umm, the, I ’ve seen Mary completely differently. You know, 
it’s like God came to her and told her that this thing was going to be done and 
put inside her, that she didn’t ask for, and, umm, although, interestingly, it was 
in line with what she wanted. You know, she was planning to marry Joseph 
and have a baby anyway. And, umm, you know, and sometimes I ’m up in the 
night and scared about my future and stuff, and I feel like, I ’m up in the night 
with a baby, you know. It feels like this baby that, that I’m, you know, I ’m 
giving birth to, and it’s really helped the bible for me.
Felicity too would ‘think [her] self into different [biblical] situations’ as a result of 
which she would have a better idea of what the core aspect o f importance was.
c) Articulation
Putting her faith more explicitly into words had been of real significance to Felicity.
I think that my faith has become more explicit. In the sense that when you 
announce to people that you’re on a Training for Ministry course, umm, you 
can’t just sort o f keep it all vague and furry. It’s got to be clear. And so I ’ve,
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umm, I’ve articulated my faith both to myself and to other people in a way that 
I hadn’t perhaps before. Umm, and I feel that in articulating my faith, umm, 
it’s become more real to me, and it’s become more liveable. Umm, everything 
was sort of behind a screen before.,. I don’t know what I think until I see what 
I say. It, it’s very wordy. I f  I can articulate it then I’ve got it clear and the 
course has made me articulate things. Even more than I did before. And the 
more articulate I become, the clearer it becomes, and the easier it is.
In general learning theory, articulation is a means o f both internalisation and 
extemalisation. However, it was also a learning technique for Felicity who relied on it 
as a means of bringing her faith to life and making it ‘real’.
d) Understanding
Frances spoke of her need to internalise and absorb aspects of her study that related to 
her faith. While the quote below speaks of her conversion, internalisation was 
characteristic of her life in general; it was the means of ensuring things became 
personal and real, and she was also concerned to allow this to happen during her 
studies.
Some of my friends who were Christians clearly had something going for 
them that intrigued me. And that sort of went on and off, down the years. And 
I didn’t... There were moments when I sort of caught a glimpse of something 
out of a corner of my eye, but it was really quite late on before that sense of 
the reality of the personal relationship really broke in. And it began to make 
sense. So I, I began to recognise at that point that what I had been taking in as 
a taught thing suddenly became a real, internal thing.
All three techniques shared the common characteristic of making faith ‘real’ and 
hence, in some way, incorporated it into their experience. Edward, too, a highly 
Discrete believer, considered that he was happier being a Christian than he would be 
if he weren’t. Wfrile this is not strictly a learning strategy, it predisposed a positive 
attitude to his faith authorities, linking them to his experience.
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IV.2.3 Merging faith-content and life
This section outlines characteristics typical of both Assimilative and Interpretive 
believers since, although their foci were mutually opposing, many o f the techniques 
used to achieve their ends were the same. Certain of the features have been referred to 
previously; in these cases, no further discussion is provided.
a) Open-ness and receptivity
Typical of Interpretive believers was the tendency to delay actively constructing their 
experience until a faith interpretation became apparent. This involved cultivating an 
open, uncritical spirit, refraining from a quick evaluation, and waiting until something 
‘struck’ them as true. Craig, an Assimilative believer, expressed a similar approach in 
stating that he acted as a ‘receptor’. This meant that he didn’t evaluate and critique 
using sophisticated intellectual and logical procedures, but received, mulled over, 
‘chewed the cud’ and absorbed by understanding.
I ’m a receptor rather than objectively thinking, Now is he telling the... I don’t 
think that way.
b) Affirmation
All three RC interviews contained expressions o f joy, amazement, delighted 
astonishment at the truth o f the faith they were exploring and developing and the 
validity o f their faith experiences. At times, this was reactive. Anne, for example, 
spoke of occasions when the wondrous truth of Jesus Christ, and the miracle of the 
overall coherence of the Christian faith suddenly struck her between the eyes. More 
pertinently, however, was the penchant o f all three deliberately to affirm the truth of 
the Christian faith as a conscious learning strategy, and this affirmation over-rode all 
other learning responses and approaches. To quote Roger:
J’essaye toujours de positiver. Je crois que je reconnais objectivement les 
choses que je ne comprends pas, mais je me dis, si c’est la, c’est que ga a un 
sens, quoi, c’est que ga veut nous dire quelque chose et, je prends pas 
forcement la peine de chercher jusqu’au bout. C’est peut-etre un tort. Trouver
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la reponse. Et 5a ne me scandalise pas plus que 9a quoi, si vous voulez. Je 
m’arrete pas au scandale. Je ne m’arrete pas.2 
He ‘positivises’ what he doesn’t understand by affirming that it has meaning, even 
though that meaning is not clear to him at the time. Not only so, but this enables him 
to move beyond an apparent ‘scandal’ or unpleasant aspect. ‘Je ne m’arrete pas.’
Anne asserts the need to trust her faith authorities.
C’est comme le premier jour qu’on prendra la bible, qu’on aille dans la 
Genese, dans des endroits pas tres folichons, enfin, pas tres interessants, 
on aura envie de fermer le livre, quoi, si on n’a pas, si on n’a pas, 
justement, cette confiance en la Parole. II faut quand meme donner sa 
confiance.3
That trust is cultivated by a spirit o f celebration which pervades the whole of her 
study and life.
Le mystere de 1’incarnation, c’est quelque chose que j ’aibeacoup plus 
creuse depuis que je suis ici par la Liturgie principalement. Et que je vais 
continuer, et d’autres choses a decouvrir quand j ’avancerai un peu en age 
monastique, puisqu’apres on fait des etudes de theologie que j ’ai pas 
encore commence. Quand on verra 9a plus systematiquement, 9a va 
certainement m’apporter beaucoup plus. Alors dans le contexte 
monastique, comme ensuite on celebre ce qu’on apprend, 9a va 
certainement... c’est un petit peu... c’est un peu la mise en pratique de ce 
qu’on apprend qui se fait tout de suite apres, done je pense que 9a va aussi 
modeler ma vie de foi.4
2 1 a lw a y s  t ry  to  ‘p o s it iv is e ’. I  s u p p o se  I  r e c o g n is e  o b je c t ive ly  t h in g s  tha t I  d o n ’t u n d e rs ta n d ,  b u t  I  te ll 
m y se lf ,  i f  it ’s  there, it ’s  the re  fo r  a  re a so n .  I t ’s  th e re  to  te ll u s  so m e th in g ,  a n d  s o  I  d o n ’t n e c e s sa r i ly  
m a k e  a n  e ffo rt to  p u r su e  it to  the  end. M a y b e  I ’m  w ro n g .  F i n d  the  an sw e r. B u t  it d o e s n ’t o v e r ly  b o the r 
o r  t ro u b le  m e. I  d o n ’t a l lo w  th e  h a r d  s t u f f  to  b lo c k  m e. I  ju s t  c a r ry  on.
3 I t ’s  l ik e  th e  f ir s t  d a y  that y o u  p ic k  u p  th e  b ib le . Y o u  m ig h t  o p e n  it at G e n e s is ,  o r  so m e w h e re  no t 
t e r r ib ly  g r ip p in g ,  n o t  v e r y  in te re st in g ,  a n d  y o u ’d  w a n t  to  c lo se  the  b o o k  i f  y o u  d id n ’t, y o u  d id n ’t, th a t ’s  
w h a t  I  m e a n ,  i f  y o u  d id n ’t t ru s t  that it  w a s  w o r th w h ile .  Y o u  h a v e  to trust.
4 I ’v e  r e a l ly  d u g  deep  in to  th e  m y s te r y  o f  th e  in c a rn a t io n  s in c e  I ’v e  been  here , la r g e ly  t h ro u g h  the  
litu rg y .  A n d  I  s h a l l  co n t in u e , a n d  th e re  w i l l  b e  o th e r t h in g s  to  d is c o v e r  a s  I  p r o g re s s  in  m o n a s t ic  ‘a g e ’, 
b e c a u se  la te r o n  I  h a v e  to  s tu d y  t h e o lo g y ,  w h ic h  I  h a v e n ’t sta rted  yet. W h e n  I  u n d e r s ta n d  e v e ry th in g  
m o re  sy ste m a t ica lly ,  that w i l l  u n d o u b te d ly  o p e n  t h in g s  u p  e ve n  m o re  to  m e. S o  in  th e  m o n a s t ic  context, 
s in c e  w e  a lw a y s  ce leb ra te  w h a t  w e  le a rn ,  tha t w i l l  ce rta in ly . . .  it ’s  a  b it  lik e ...  it ’s  r e a l ly  p u t t in g  in to  
p ra c t ic e  s o m e th in g  w e ’v e  le a rn t  im m e d ia te ly  a fte rw a rd s,  s o  I  t h in k  tha t tha t w i l l  a lso  c h a n g e  the  w a y  I  
l iv e  m y  fa ith.
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c) Understanding
Roger, Anne and Yvonne all asserted that to understand was of far greater importance 
than to seize accurate information. This too altered their way of reflecting in giving 
them an alternative focus. Those who are concerned with factual accuracy reason in a 
way that permits them to determine whether or not this is the case. Assimilative 
believers were comparatively unconcerned about this dimension o f their faith. Instead, 
their focus was on meaning, comprehension and insight. Commonly-used vocabulary 
was that their intelligence was ‘enlightened’ (eclaire) or ‘renewed’ (renouvele), both 
of which are qualitative terms rather than quantitative. As previously mentioned, a 
common way of dealing with difficulties was to seek understanding and find/give 
meaning, rather than challenge and critique.
d) Use of other people as role models of reflection
One of the characteristic features of Roger’s interview was his recourse to historic 
figures both to articulate his own views and to support his reasoning. Careful 
examination revealed that this appeared to be for two reasons: firstly because he was 
personally on more solid ground—from a faith perspective, it was ‘better’ to cite 
others than oneself—but secondly, because these fathers in the faith had lived a 
proven and admirable life of faith which he wished to emulate. The way in which this 
could be done was to follow their way of reasoning and reflecting.
Je pense a une parole de Sainte Therese de l’Enfant Jesus: ‘Je n ’ai jamais 
cherche que la verite.’ C’est vrai que 9a, 9a c’etait assez prononce pour moi au 
depart, surtout.5
Roger also provided one of the starkest quotes of all the interviewees:
Le Pretre doit transmettre ce que dit l’Eglise. Ce que le Christ, lui, a transmis a 
ses Apotres et ses Apotres ont transmis aux autres. A la limite, on a meme...
Je pense a savoir... effacer sonjugement personnel pour se soumettre encore 
une fois a l’enseignement de l’Eglise et puis transmettre le plus fidelement
5 I  t h in k  o f  s o m e th in g  S t  T h e re se  o f  th e  C h i l d  Je su s  sa id :  ‘A l l  I  h a v e  d o n e  i s  se e k  th e  t ru th ’. I t ’s  true  
tha t that, tha t w a s  q u ite  im p o r ta n t  fo r  m e, p a r t ic u la r ly  at the  b e g in n in g .
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possible ce qui dit l’Eglise. Moi, je pense que c’est ga qui, qui, un des criteres 
de justesse.6
Here, as well as following the thinking and accepting the conclusions provided by his 
faith authorities, he combines it with the need, even responsibility, to suppress and 
eradicate his own personal views.
IV.3 Forms of commitment
Throughout the thesis, different types of commitment have been referred to and 
identified as significant to the overall process of learning. Commitment was a 
fundamental dimension of internalisation, representing for both Perry and Boud et al. 
the final stage in the overall process o f transforming experience into personal 
knowledge. Perry’s nine positions reflected a progressive internalisation associated 
with where people’s dependency lay. At the early stages, this was clearly external and 
was linked to a perceived absolute; the later stages were characterised by an internal 
commitment within relativism, and was linked to the assumption of personal 
responsibility.
If  Perry’s scheme is representative o f a ‘normal’ developmental pattern, then certain 
characteristics are identifiable. Firstly, and importantly, commitments are expressed in 
singular terms. In other words, people are committed either to an absolute, external 
view of truth which they depend on, or to an internal, relative view for which they 
assume personal responsibility. Perry does not allow for the two to be held 
simultaneously: a position which Fowler too upholds. The transition from 
understanding knowledge as absolute to relative seems to be one that is commonly 
accepted in simple rather than complex terms, the two being mutually incompatible. 
Personal commitment is therefore also simple as opposed to multiple, and Perry traces 
a reasonably straight line as students move from simple dualism to complex dualism 
to relativism and finally to commitment in relativism.
6 T h e  P r ie s t  o u g h t  to  t ra n sm it  w h a t  th e  C h u r c h  sa y s.  W h a t  C h r i s t  h im s e l f  t ra n sm it te d  to  h i s  A p o s t le s ,  
a n d  h i s  A p o s t le s  t ra n sm it te d  to  o thers. I  s u p p o se  in  a c tu a l fact, w e  h a v e  to... I  t h in k  w e  n e e d  to  k n o w  
h o w  to... e ra d ica te  o u r  o w n  p e r so n a l ju d g e m e n t  a n d  su b m it  o u rse lv e s  o n c e  a g a in  to  th e  te a c h in g  o f  the  
C h u r c h  a n d  th e n  t ra n sm it  w h a t  th e  C h u r c h  s a y s  a s  f a it h fu l ly  a s  p o ss ib le .  P e r so n a lly ,  I  t h in k  that it ’s  that 
w h ic h  i s  o n e  o f  the  c r ite r ia  fo r  ‘s o u n d n e s s ’.
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This comparatively straightforward progression was not unequivocally endorsed in 
the interview data, however, which revealed, in particular, different types of multiple 
commitment which in turn appeared to affect people’s overall growth and 
development. Two alternative types of commitment were specifically noteworthy, 
enabling the research to conclude that faith-content had influenced learning by 
affecting the nature and role of commitment.
a) Artificial and/or ‘trailing’ commitment
Both Perry and Fowler suggested that a ‘commitment in relativism’ (Perry, 1970) was 
a natural dimension of the process of maturation. As such, it had a number of 
characteristics. It involved a gradual assumption of personal responsibility for 
people’s individual views, and while commitments were not made in thin air with 
little to support them, they were also not fixed and immutable for all time. Perry’s 
final position (9), he describes in terms of
... developing commitment(s) [which are] expended or remade in new terms 
as growth. Balances are developing in the tensions of qualitative polarity of 
style, especially alternation of reflection and action. Acceptance of changes of 
mood and outlook within continuity of identity. A sense of being “in” one’s 
life. (1970: chart of development, inside back cover).
Personal development is obviously an ongoing thing, characterised by the forming 
and remaking of commitments as people encounter new experiences which force them 
to re-evaluate their previous conclusions and modify their constructed knowledge, 
committing to these modified versions on an everyday basis. Normally the 
modifications are minor, but occasionally they might be major. This bears similarities 
to Fowler’s understanding of conversion as individuals shift their commitment from 
one knowledge base and understanding o f the world to another which is significantly 
different.
There were signs in the interviews conducted for the present research, however, that 
people often made ‘artificial’ and/or ‘trailing’ commitments. The former were often 
transferred from an initial commitment that an interviewee had viewed as significant
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and because this was to an element of a bigger belief system, the whole o f that belief 
system was given credibility. What the thesis has termed ‘artificial’ commitments 
took the form of a strong adherence to aspects of that belief system without people 
having had a prior experience with which to back up their conclusions. So Clive had 
discovered the validity o f the bible and its message in one area of his life, and by 
extension accepted its authority in all other areas, even when there appeared little, if 
any, experiential reason for so doing. This appeared to turn the normal experience —> 
learned outcome progression on its head, with people beginning with faith-content 
and matching their experience to it.
We had a bible study o f about ten people. The person leading it was 
deliberately and quite correctly not letting her own views come out or saying 
veiy much, so leaving her out of it, I found myself in a minority o f one. Umm, 
or so it felt, umm, on the subject o f universal salvation. Now that is, to my 
way of thinking, a fairly fundamental point. There was one chap who was 
quite willing to say he believed in universal salvation. And quite a lot of 
people unwilling to say that they didn’t. I ’m not sure that I want to disbelieve 
in it, but St Paul is firmly agin it, and I ’m afraid, and he wasn’t an apostle for 
nothing, so I mean, if that’s what Scripture says... (Clive)
Linked to this was a form of ‘trailing’ commitment. People had discovered a ‘truth’ at 
a particular point in their lives, and the experience had been so strong that they carried 
it with them as it stood into their subsequent experiences, often indefinitely. The 
modification and remaking o f their commitment that Perry identified as significant 
never took place. Instead, the commitment and its context ‘trailed’ into the rest of life, 
constructing an increasingly uncomfortable dualism as a different side of people 
developed more as Perry described. A double commitment was evident in a number of 
interviews: one which was typical o f people living in a relativistic world, the other 
holding fast to an absolute. Martin described a transition he’d made from this dualistic 
position to a more unified one.
I would say I was committed to Christianity at an intellectual level, yet knew 
little of what that meant in practice. Although I ’d been to church for most of 
my life. So the first eight months or so, first coming to Britain, no immediate 
family, making friends from scratch, everything from scratch, so that 
prompted me to re-think, well, you know, if there’s no cash value to, in
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practical terms to being a Christian, what’s the point?! Umm, and the main 
issue at that time was dealing with my father’s death. Not the fact that he’d 
died, but the fact that he’d led a pretty unpleasant life. ... He’d been a diabetic, 
his mother had died young, loads of stuff had happened that had made his life 
not very nice. But I knew him as a very nice person. So my question was, well, 
there doesn’t seem much justice in that. What does God have to say about 
this? And, yeah, that... It’s interesting that there is a ... I was watching a play 
in London where, well, Les Miserables, where the central character, obviously, 
has an awful life and, but he’s, it seems justified at the end when the young 
girl that he’s adopted as his own daughter acknowledges, you know, discovers, 
you know, everything he’s done for her and her fiance, and that’s entirely 
significant, and that made a huge impact and made me re-think who God was.
Previously he had felt that any form of commitment was problematic.
I didn’t have any way of assessing these different positions, which in 
themselves seemed, or came across as quite sure and quite convinced that this 
was the right way to go. So, yeah, I think the lack of tools to assess these 
distinct positions was disconcerting because, lacking any way of assessing 
them, they were either both right or both wrong! So that didn’t make sense in 
my thinking. And ultimately a lot, maybe a lot o f things you can leave to one 
side and say, Well, I don’t need to make a decision here. That may be fair 
enough, you know, on a day-to-day basis. But a lot o f other things are very 
important and you sort of think, well, if I am a Christian, how should I react to 
this or that, or what should I think about this or that. And that had a lot of spin 
off effects which tended to neutralise my Christian faith, or to reduce it to a 
very personal level, and beyond that it was very, very tentative. Because I was 
aware of all these options, and not being able to assess, I didn’t feel I could 
commit to any of them. So that would, how shall we say, hamper any, you 
know, any sort o f conversation I would shy away from because I would, 
because I was aware o f the difficulties and I was not committed to any, feel I 
could commit to any particular view, you know, I felt kind o f locked out, shall 
we say. Nothing to say.
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This coheres very strongly with Perry’s ‘temporizing’, when people put their growth 
on hold by avoiding making any commitments for a prolonged period which they 
eventually move out of.
Artificial and trailing commitments were particularly characteristic of Discrete 
believers and largely accounted for the dualism they experienced which required the 
development of bridging techniques in their learning. For Hull, describing something 
similar in his concept of an ideological time-lag, this was simply a matter of people’s 
Christian faith ‘into which they were nurtured ... always lagging behind realistic 
adjustment to the world as it has come to be today’ (1991 [1985]). This was 
accompanied by a developmental lag. In these interviews, the same lag was 
identifiable, but its effects were more specifically related to the form and nature of 
their epistemic commitments.
b) Existential commitment
It was difficult to find an adjective which accurately described the commitment 
exhibited by Assimilative believers. While the commitment of all three other groups 
tended to be principally intellectual and emotional, the nuns and Roman Catholic 
Priest in particular lived their commitment in a way which incorporated their whole 
selves. Something of the phenomenon is indicated in the title ‘Assimilative’: their 
commitment was one of self-transformation which involved the assimilation of faith- 
content since this was the means by which the transformation would occur. In many 
ways, therefore, their commitment was beyond that of the faith-content and the faith- 
authorities they were engaging with, although paradoxically, these authorities were 
accepted more whole-heartedly and in a less discriminatory fashion than was the case 
with any of the other groups.
Existential commitment defied categorisation within any of Perry’s positions. 
Interviewees seemed entirely at ease with a world that Operated on relative principles, 
but wrapped it in unshakable absolutes which informed the relativity. Equally 
significant was their high degree o f abdication of responsibility at a personal level for 
the construction of their personal knowledge and their self-development. The result
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was individuals who bore little resemblance to Perry’s developmental progression. 
The commitment to an absolute was not only maintained throughout but so assumed 
and ‘lived’ (hence ‘existential’) that it was never even questioned. That then informed 
all subsequent epistemological growth, which on the one hand was very weak, and on 
the other grew and developed in a way identified as desirable. To a degree, 
Interpretive believers displayed a similar commitment, sometimes sidelining any 
conflict between absolute and relative, but this bore stronger resemblances to Perry’s 
‘escape’ and/or ‘retreat’ than it did to the genuinely different developmental path 
taken by their Assimilative counterparts.
From these two examples, the thesis concludes that the overall growth and 
development of the interviewees occurred in ‘atypical’ ways. If commitment 
‘normally’ involves a simple progression from absolutism to relativism and this is 
linked to human development, then the inclusion of an absolute when people were 
clearly at home in a relative environment both affected their unity of selfhood and 
their overall path toward maturity as the process of internalisation took place in ways 
untypical o f those not aiming to keep absolutes and relatives together.
V. Faith authorities and the self
Although it was not a clearly articulated hypothesis at the beginning of the project, an 
important dimension of the research question originally focused on whether 
authoritative faith-content could hinder or impede the growth and development o f the 
self. The relationship of the self and learning was explored in the opening chapters of 
the thesis, identifying two salient components in the act of vocal self-assertion and in 
the process of reflection. This section looks at each in turn, concluding that faith- 
content can have an influential effect on the growth of the self when it is used in 
particular ways. That influence relates to, and to an extent depends on people’s 
own temperament. At the same time, as with other results, its effects can be 
simply to augment what would naturally take place in a different learning 
context.
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V.1 Faith authorities and self-assertion
One of the themes that ran throughout many of the interviews was people’s feeling of 
anger with God. Asked for her reaction to reports about God changing people’s 
ordinary dental fillings into gold, for example, Beth replied:
I think I ’d want to know... It, I ’d want to know more about the story. Umm, 
not, that’s very interesting actually. I mean, would I believe it? I sort of tend to 
want to believe it, but as well as whether you believe it or not, I ’m quite 
interested in why God would do that. I ’d be very angry with God if God had 
done that when there’s the situation in Kosovo and things like that. I ’d be very 
angry indeed actually. I really don’t think it’s... But, you know, if, if the story 
was, you know, if there was more to the story, there might have been a 
purpose or something... I don’t know. Yeah. I guess I do, I would want to 
know that the person was veiy poor or something. I don’t know... I ’d want to 
know there was some kind of justice thing there. I mean, I know God heals, 
but... I don’t know.
Penny described a period of transition in her Christian life which the thesis came to 
understand as a shift from an Interpretive to a Discrete way of believing, and this 
involved gaining the ‘right’ to be angry.
I think to some extent we’re so taught to love God no matter what, and to trust 
him and to, and I think to a certain extent they’re right. But there’s always, 
maybe in the denomination back home where I’ve come from there’s no room 
to be angry at God and there’s no room to express fully how you feel towards 
God. And I think this is the first time since I ’ve been here that I ’ve sat down 
and I’ve really said, God, I ’m so angiy that you’ve done this, or I ’m so upset 
about this. And I think I have become very honest with God. And veiy honest 
with others as well.
Miranda’s description o f her ‘breakthrough’ has already been quoted (section II. 5).
Allowing themselves to be angry with God was important in learning terms because at 
these points, individuals started to look at and use various faith authorities, and in 
particular the bible, in a different way. Simon spoke of a growing realisation that just 
because something is in the bible does not necessarily mean that God approves of it or
Chapter Eight 219
People‘s Ways of Believing: learning processes andfaith outcomes
condones it. Whereas previously he had ‘submitted’ himself to ‘God’s way of doing 
things’, he had found a way of looking God in the eye and working things out in 
partnership rather than in submissive obedience. One of the characteristics of 
Assimilative believers was their deliberate and conscious submission to faith 
authorities as a faith response and outworking; this often resulted, as demonstrated in 
Roger’s quote above, in their abandoning their own critical faculties, or perhaps more 
accurately, in the training of their reason to behave in a particular pre-determined, 
faith-dictated way.
Submission to a faith authority such as the bible was also characteristic of many 
Discrete believers, whose ultimate reluctance to transgress beyond its bounds was 
very evident. Frequently, people’s inability to bring two sides of their lives together 
was because they gave the bible an equal role and importance in making sense of and 
decisions in life, and the thesis suggests that this in turn led to the sense of a divided 
self so often experienced. For Discrete believers, this was largely a conscious, 
thought-through position that involved the imposition of a faith framework.
The weak self exhibited by many Interpretive believers, however, functioned in a 
different way. Here, faith authorities did not appear to function overly authoritatively, 
nor were the members of this group preoccupied with adhering to their precepts. 
Instead, individuals themselves expressed a range of innate insecurities and lacks of 
confidence. Sometimes this was reasoned, on other occasions it appeared instinctive. 
So Miranda marvelled at the fact that she was being encouraged to think for herself 
and form her own individual theological conclusions after spending quite some time 
retreating behind the conviction that her opinion didn’t count for much in comparison 
with those of all the eminent theologians she was being taught about. Ruth too was 
beginning to blossom as she gained confidence in herself and in her ability to reason. 
At the same time, faith authorities, or their perception of them, certainly provided a 
rationale for people with an apparently natural weak sense of self to maintain that 
weakness, and even cultivate it.
Strength and weakness of self was therefore not exclusively linked to the way in 
which people related to faith authorities. However, when this was the case, then the
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ensuing learning was affected. Imposed boundaries, coupled with a strong self, 
accounted for the tensions and disjuncture which led to the requirement to construct 
bridging strategies. Faith precepts determined that the self should be weakened 
(transformed) and provided a structure by which this could happen. This latter, in 
particular, links with the relationship between self and reflection: the focus of the next 
section.
V.2 Faith authorities, self and reflection
One of the most distinctive aspects about Assimilative believers which in many ways 
set them apart from the other groups was the fact that their entire lives and learning 
were set within a faith development context. This was regularly articulated, and 
Assimilative believers had a particular view of themselves—sinful people—that 
linked with a desired goal: eternal life. While sinfulness was understood to affect all 
areas o f life, attention was primarily focused on the self, and the means o f attaining 
then- goal was generally expressed as a matter of self-transformation. The agent of 
transformation was God, not themselves, and a means had to be found that allowed 
him to do his work. Faith authorities, of every kind (liturgy, bible, saints, Pope...) 
were therefore turned to in order to provide the means by which the transformation 
happened. This accounts for Roger’s deliberate (instinctive?) turning to other sources 
as he articulated ‘his’ thinking. By quoting scripture, by citing saints and other People 
of Faith who had provenly trodden the path before, he was not only adopting a 
method of reflection that would supplant his own, but he was allowing this external 
content to do its work in him. Roger himself, the self which other learners in 
particular experienced as developing through autonomous thought and independent 
assertion, was diminishing: a task aided by the techniques employed that radically 
altered the nature of his autonomy and independence. So his view that he had a 
responsibility to eradicate his personal judgment in favour of that of his various faith 
authorities (section IV.2.3(d)) was not an instance of retreat as it might have been 
with Interpretive believers. Instead, it was a way both of making sure that he himself 
diminished and that he was ‘taken over’ and transformed by these authorities, since 
this was the means to his ultimate end of eternal life. Each of the three Roman 
Catholic interviewees exhibited similar traits. Anne and Yvonne turned to the Pope, to
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their Bishop, Abbot and Abbess, to ‘des gens plus intelligents que moi’ in the faith 
(Anne), and were largely content both to allow them to think through the tough 
questions and to defer to them in case of need. Craig, the only non-Catholic of the 
group, nevertheless emphasised other people’s views and other people’s judgments 
for his life.
... within three weeks o f me preaching at evening service, at least fifteen 
people separately came up to me and said: Look, do you remember that you 
said you were going to consider doing this? Well, now I can tell you, you 
should be doing this. Or I ’ve been praying and I ’m telling you that you should 
go to college, etc. So, having explored it, we went for it.
All made significantly greater reference to faith scholars in their interviews than 
members of other groups; Anne and Yvonne emphasised the transformative role of 
the liturgy in their lives; while Craig again and again sought ways in which he and his 
own self-assertive nature would be diminished.
Three different types of self were therefore apparent amongst the four groups, each 
linked to reflection. Discrete and Related believers both demonstrated a strong, 
independent and autonomous self typical o f that so emphasised in western culture, and 
had developed the patterns o f reflection and the logical skills commensurate with its 
individual growth. Interpretive believers appeared often to reject the strictures of 
formal ‘earthly’ logic, constructing a system with its own regulations and modus 
operandi. Part of this involved being ‘open’, a technique which perhaps mirrored the 
rejection of autonomous thought characteristic o f their Assimilative counterparts. 
Certainly (with the exception of Chris) the Interpretive self was insecure and 
unconfident, generally relying on its own subjective judgment both because this 
appeared to be the only resource available, and because it was a necessary defence 
against the potential of their being submerged by bigger, stronger external authorities. 
Assimilative believers deliberately submitted themselves to faith authorities, yet 
developed the skills of reflection linked to and characteristic of those authorities. 
Theirs was a two-fold approach, rejecting personal independence while developing an 
autonomy that involved treading in the footsteps o f others.
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VI. Sum m ary and conclusion
It is very evident that each of the categories employed in the analysis of the data 
relates to and overlaps with others, so that an overall picture of adult Christian 
learning has emerged. The organisation of the analysis of the data has been presented 
in such a way that many of the inter-relations were apparent. So, for example, 
people’s ways of believing and learning, the overarching forms displayed by 
individuals could be accounted for through the specific way of constructing 
knowledge and the configuration of learning components put into place, which in turn 
involved different uses of experience, and different procedures as they brought the 
various components together. None of the analytic categories is self-contained, 
therefore. At the same time, it has been possible to identify a wide range of ways in 
which faith-content and faith authorities appear to have influenced people’s learning. 
The most obvious, partly also because it is the most overtly cyclical with authority 
being both exerted and attributed (the intrinsic and extrinsic varieties mentioned in the 
Prologue), was the influence on Assimilative believers. In the Roman Catholic 
interviews, we are left with the impression of a highly thought-through, well- 
developed educational system in which the f t  I conducteur of self-transformation 
guides all other ways of being and learning. The cycle involves individuals placing 
their confidence in the theological interpretation of the world and its people and the 
theological solution to this interpretation, and then working themselves to allow faith 
authorities to do their job of bringing this about. Interestingly, Craig, the only non-RC 
Assimilative believer, exhibited learning characteristics that were far less polished 
than his counterparts, emphasising the importance of the (RC) Church’s educational 
role in more sense than one. Theirs may have been a true example of a form of 
theological reflection, although this differed significantly from that of Related 
believers, their nearest counterparts in terms of successfully merging all the learning 
components (see Figures 8.3 and 8.4). Fundamentally, the different configurations 
outlined in Figures 8.2 to 8.5 may be seen to underpin and account for almost all of 
the other learning characteristics identified, with the possible exception o f the growth 
and development of the self; yet even here if this is inextricably linked with the 
process of reflection, then the configurations which permit a holistic integration
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through effective theological reflection seem to contribute to the growth of a more 
profound, rounded and authentic self.
Each section identified specific ways in which the influence of faith on learning was 
apparent. These, then, are the basic conclusions of the research, which is able to 
affirm—perhaps even more than it had anticipated—the validity of the original 
hypothesis.
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C h a p te r  N in e  
C o m m e n t  a n d  d i s c u s s io n
Introduction
The analysis of the data presented in the previous chapter raises two specific questions 
which this chapter addresses. Firstly, the quality and therefore the validity of the data 
themselves must be evaluated. Secondly, while the project set out to investigate how 
Christian adults learnt, the scene was semi set through a consideration of Hull’s 
reverse thesis o f a consideration of what prevented them from learning. Little 
consideration was given in the data analysis itself to non-learning, and the theme must 
be picked up and examined, both with regard to Hull’s own conclusions and to the 
notion of non-learning itself. Both discussions enable more concrete conclusions to be 
drawn regarding a specific response to the research question, which is the focus of the 
third section.
I. Data validity
While the subjective involvement of the researcher’s interpretation and biases is 
increasingly recognised in both quantitative and qualitative projects (Slee, 1993), its 
role in the latter is of particular relevance when evaluating the ‘validity’ of data. 
‘Validity’ may in itself be an inappropriate term, with its conveyance of qualitative 
values. Nevertheless, all research is beholden to consider the significance of its 
results, which itself implies an assessment o f its overall structure and the precepts on 
which it stands. In the case of the present study, a number of factors were identified as 
relevant.
1.1 The involvement of the interpreter
My own involvement and the influence of my personal background and biography 
became increasingly clear as the project progressed. The study originated from my 
work context, which contributed, together with other sources which were all 
personally known and familiar to me, all the interviewees from which raw data was
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collected. This had various repercussions. Some o f the issues were identified and 
discussed in Chapter Six, and revolved around the use of self-selecting volunteers, the 
fact that theology as a discipline can provoke negative theological sensitivities which 
would affect the level of trust between interviewees and myself, and hence the degree 
to which their responses could be taken at free value. More subtle ‘research 
destabilisers’ became apparent, however. The phenomenological approach 
presupposes the researchers’ ability to bracket and isolate their own presuppositions, 
experience, and expectations using a technique termed as ‘epoche’.
Epoche is a Greek word meaning to refrain from judgment, to abstain from or 
stay away from the everyday, ordinary way of perceiving things. In the natural 
attitude we hold knowledge judgmentally; we presuppose that what we 
perceive in nature is actually there and remains there as we perceive it. In 
contrast, Epoche requires a new way of looking at things, a way that requires 
that we learn to see what stands before our eyes, what we can distinguish and 
describe... In the Epoche, the everyday understandings, judgments, and 
knowings are set aside, and phenomena are revisited, freshly, naively, in a 
wide open sense, from the vantage point of a pure or transcendental ego. 
(Moustakas, 1994:33; italics in original)
With hindsight, the research achieved this only in part. While the typology did emerge 
inductively to the point of causing astonishment as its salient features came to light, 
from that point on it had a tendency to take on a life o f its own. I instinctively wanted 
to fill it out with reference to other Christians who had not participated in the 
research, reasoning that this was a way o f testing it. This may have been the case, but 
it may also have had the effect of allowing the typology to assume characteristics that 
either were not there at all, or of then actively looking for features from the 
interviewees to see if they were present. In addition, given my own Christian and 
educational background, I frequently found myself questioning where I would place 
myself on the typology, once again allowing it to fill out beyond what it could stand in 
terms o f the research itself. A growing awareness of these tendencies helped restrain 
them, but it would be erroneous to claim total freedom from them.
The same issues, of course, re-emerged throughout the analysis of the data, and at 
each stage questions had to be asked regarding whether identifiable features were 
actually there, or whether they had simply been read into the raw data. Had time and
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circumstances permitted, the results would have been returned to the interviewees 
who would have been asked to place themselves on the typology, and/or to identify 
themselves with one or other dimension of the analysis. This proved impossible. The 
interviews had been conducted three years before the project was in a position to 
communicate its results. In that time, people had moved on, not only physically and 
geographically (with the exception of the nuns!) but also in terms of their Christian 
growth. Students from both the vocational theological college and the ministerial 
training course had dispersed potentially throughout the world in the intervening 
years. Tracking many would prove extremely difficult. In addition, the many clear 
signs of movement from one type to another as people had pursued their course of 
study was an indication that few people would remain static, most shifting to new 
positions on—or beyond—the typology over time. Furthermore, I sensed that some 
might not respond positively to their placing and accompanying description. An 
emotional reaction to the types was hard for me as a researcher to avoid: one type 
gained my respect, another induced both awe and terror, another I was tempted to 
view as ‘sad’... If  these were my own reactions to data which were highly familiar to 
me, how might interviewees respond? The real possibility of denial was obvious, 
playing a significant role in determining whether returning the analysis to the 
respondents for ‘validation’ was a viable course of action. Once again, my emotional 
reaction may have played its part in the transmission of the results, and I had to make 
every effort to lift myself beyond this when attempting to provide an objective 
analysis, ensuring as far as possible that I did not home in unnecessarily on what I 
considered particularly negative or positive traits, or exaggerate features beyond what 
was contained in the data.
1.2 The place and role of the typology
One of the more difficult issues in analysing the raw data was where to stop. As 
Chapters Six and Seven indicate, there were various stages in the process, which 
began with the thick descriptions, moved to matrix, from there to the typology, and 
from there to the identification of specific ways in which faith and faith-content 
appeared to have affected the learning of the interviewees. At each stage, more precise 
information was gleaned in response to the question, but with the recognition also that 
the typology itself was one global response. As the results were written up, it was
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clear that even more precise information might be available, and that different 
approaches to analysing the data continued as viable options. A more standard content 
analysis which focused as much on the sign as the signified might have yielded quite 
different results, for example. The results as presented are therefore the product o f the 
particular approach taken, but this was one of a number which might have been 
pursued.
Perhaps because of the similarity with Perry’s ‘positions’, Fowler’s ‘stages’ and 
Belenky et al. ’s ‘perspectives’, it was tempting to draw a line under the typology and 
focus on this as the ultimate conclusions. In other words, the existence of the typology 
with its four groups itself was an indication that faith influenced learning, and there 
was little further to go in the analytic process.
This would, however, have put the conclusions on less secure groimd than I think was 
eventually the case, primarily on account of the small sample. Assimilative, Related 
and Interpretive believers each only had four members, Discrete nine. The 
categorisations were vulnerable, however. The low numbers meant that people had to 
be placed with very general shared characteristics, and while the thesis is reasonably 
confident about these, areas of lesser commonality were evident in the finer detail. At 
times this provoked questions about where a particular individual did actually belong, 
and the frailty of a typology with so small a population was very apparent.
It is therefore necessary to emphasise that the typology and its categories in the first 
instance should contribute to the conclusions o f the research in partnership with and 
alongside the results outlined in sections II to V in Chapter Eight. While clearly 
relating to the typology, these also stood beyond it to some degree and considered 
what characteristics could be identified across two or more types, rather than putting 
significant store on each of the types individually. One of the recommendations of the 
thesis is that the typology should be tested in greater depth with a much larger sample 
since its potential significance for the study of Adult Christian Education is 
considerable, but for the purposes of the present research it should not assume a 
greater importance than it can bear. It was nevertheless a valuable analytic tool for the 
purposes of the analysis which begs further investigation in its own right. Of all the
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empirical data, it is also groundbreaking in offering an early understanding of the 
nature of Christian faith and Christian learning.
1.3 Hermeneutical issues
The various analytic stages introduced a range of hermeneutical considerations 
relevant to the validity of the results also. Different levels of interpretation of data 
were apparent throughout the whole project, from the interviewees’ interpretation of 
their faith-content, to my own interpretation of the raw data provided through the 
transcripts, and further interpretive distillations in the thick descriptions, matrix, 
typology and eventual conclusions. At each point I had to make decisions about what 
was being said, what this signified, and whether and how it should contribute to the 
overall results. Gadamer makes a point which relates to the discussion of section 1.1.
It is not so much our judgements as it is our prejudices that constitute our 
being... Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they 
inevitably distort the truth. In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that 
prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of 
our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the 
world. They are simply conditions whereby we experience something - 
whereby what we encounter says something to us. This formulation certainly 
does not mean that we are enclosed within a wall of prejudices and only let 
through the narrow portals those things that can produce a pass saying, 
"Nothing new will be said here." Instead we welcome just that guest who 
promises something new to our curiosity. But how do we know the guest who 
we admit is one who has something new to say to us? Is not our expectation 
and our readiness to hear the new also necessarily determined by the old that 
has already taken possession o f us? (Gadamer, 1966:9)
Some of my own educational prejudices were readily apparent: an already formed 
view of what the ultimate goal o f adult education programmes was (autonomy, 
independence, responsibility...) and how this was best to be achieved (critical 
reflection). These not only contributed to my positive and negative reactions, but also 
provided ready-made handles by which to assess the data. One inadvertent and 
perhaps paradoxical dimension of the research was the chronological order in which 
different stages took place. The interviews were conducted relatively early, and the
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analysis o f the data was worked on and put down again, worked on and put down 
again over a period of three years. The opening chapters of the thesis, however, which 
laid the theoretical foundations for the various concepts to be explored, were written 
at a late stage, inductively identified as of fundamental relevance. This posed a 
secondary dilemma revolving around how and to what extent the research findings 
should contribute, either overtly or covertly, to those discussions. However, in terms 
of hermeneutical prejudice, the force of Gadamer’s observation was lessened.
Other significant hermeneutical aspects were also present. On a number of occasions, 
judicious decisions had to be made regarding the interpretation of educational 
terminology. This was the case even—and perhaps particularly—for some of the key 
concepts. What constituted ‘form’, for example? Perry liimself was only able to 
provide an anecdotal explanation, sidestepping the need for a definition. Similarly, 
Belenky et ah’s ‘procedures’, which became crucial for an understanding of learning 
styles, was a term which the research had to appropriate as it saw fit. Critics of the 
research would be correct to observe that Belenky et al’s understanding was notably 
loose (see Chapter Five, figure 5.4) and that the ‘procedures’ identified as 
representative of Christian reflective styles in Chapter Eight, section IV.2, bore little 
resemblance to those of the scholars whose work had nonetheless provided the 
analytic tool.
A final dimension relates to the fact that three of the interviews were conducted in 
French, amongst Roman Catholics. Both factors were significant. My own 
competence in French, coupled with the fact that I had lived in both France and 
Spain—both Roman Catholic countries—for a combined total o f seven years meant 
that I was aware of some of the hermeneutical complications. These had already 
raised their heads (French would use the singular ‘head’!) at the point of adapting the 
interview questions for the French interviewees: this was not simply a matter of 
altering obvious factors such as place names (‘monastery’ for ‘educational 
institution’, for example) but involved a reconceptualisation of what was being asked 
and for what purpose so that the question would achieve the desired results. In some 
instances, this was a question of rephrasing; in other cases, the question was 
completely reworded. While I did not translate the French interviews into English as 
full transcripts, I did make the transfer from one language to the other at the point of
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compiling the thick descriptions, but then returned to the original when conducting the 
more detailed analysis and identifying salient quotes. Here the issues were reversed, 
heightened and complicated by the Roman Catholic dimension. ‘Christ’ for a British 
Protestant has quite a different sense to the French ‘le Christ’, the latter conveying a 
much more theologically laden notion. At times during the interviews I had to 
intersperse questions that would help me in the interpretive process. As the analyses 
took place, I was also able over the three years to pose questions to other French 
friends with whom I maintain contact in order to clarify points of uncertainty. Just the 
fact that three interviews were in French while the remainder were in English 
automatically suggested a group apart, which may have been a contributory factor in 
the compilation of the matrix and typology. It was therefore heartening to discover—  
the impression was one of having blinkers removed!—one further interviewee from a 
completely different, protestant background who so very clearly displayed 
characteristics common with the three French participants.
The conclusions of the independent judge brought many hermeneutical issues into 
focus for many of the same reasons as those already cited. The judge did not interpret 
the data in the same way. He did not have the same educational background, nor, 
therefore, did he share the same prejudices, although would have introduced his own.
The hermeneutical considerations involved in the project as a whole were therefore 
considerable, and the research had to evaluate their significance. It concluded that 
enough measures had been built in for their effect to be reduced sufficiently for the 
conclusions to stand. It also took heart from the fact that all qualitative research has to 
wrestle with the same issues. While Belenky et al were able to introduce a number of 
extra precautions, these would have been going beyond the reasonable for a project 
that was immensely smaller in scale. One further factor, o f particular relevance to the 
judge’s conclusions, was the scholarly context of the research. The thesis has to make 
an assumption that those working within the field of adult education and of adult 
Christian or Theological education have a common hermeneutical base from which to 
understand and situate its conclusions. However, it is impossible to rid research o f the 
many and varied hermeneutical issues that arise, and those identified should be borne 
in mind in any evaluation of this project.
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1.4 The interview sample
The frailty of the typology when constructed with a small sample size has already 
been mentioned. A further significant issue regarding the validity of the results 
revolves around the nature of the sample itself. Interviewees were drawn from three 
main sources: an independent vocational theological college, an Anglican part-time 
training course for potential Priests, and a French Roman Catholic Convent. The 
advantages of having a diverse spread of sources are clear. However, a number of 
questions remain. In the first place, how should the fact that three of the four groups 
of the typology were largely populated, albeit with some exceptions, with individuals 
from the same source? Assimilative believers were primarily Roman Catholic.
Related tended to be from the part-time ordination course. Discrete and Interpretive 
believers were a genuine mix, but the latter was notable on account o f the fact that all 
its members were women; the former was weighted towards to independent 
vocational theological college. Other factors also come into play. Those from the 
ordination course tended to be older, most over the age o f 40; those from the 
independent college were mostly younger, many under 40. Those training to be 
Priests were highly people-focused, having deliberately chosen a people-centred 
‘ministry’. This may well have accounted for Related believers’ emphasis on the 
person of Jesus as their faith basis. The independent theological college put great store 
on the bible and its interpretation, running its only Master’s degree in ‘Aspects of 
Biblical Interpretation’. The nuns and Roman Catholic seminarian similarly came 
from and lived within a specific theological context. While these various emphases 
and backgrounds did not in any way invalidate the research results—each offered 
legitimate insights into different ways of believing and learning—-the question of 
whether the inclusion o f people from other contexts and backgrounds would have 
resulted in a significantly different typology must be asked. Astley, for example, 
commenting on the ‘openness of the Christian religious education process’, observes: 
There are limits to the openness of the Christian learner, although these limits 
are simply a function o f where we draw the boundaries around what we are 
willing to regard as Christian learning outcomes. It is clear that so-called 
“liberal” Christian religious educators draw these limits more widely than do 
“conservatives”, and are much less willing than the latter group to describe as
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a “Christian future for our children” a situation in which the children’s “own 
distinctive contribution to it” was distinctly curtailed. (1994:96)
‘Liberal’ and ‘conservative’ are difficult theological labels which have little bearing 
on the discussion at hand. However, Astley’s comment confirms the view that 
different theological positions result in different educational approaches and 
outcomes. While this is a further clear indication of the influence o f faith on learning, 
it also suggests that a typology resulting from research such as this can only 
‘represent’ those of the theological persuasions present in the sample. A much larger 
sample which extended into a broader spectrum of theological positions might be able 
to generalise to the point of constructing a typology, be that fourfold or otherwise. 
This might bear significant similarities with those presented in Chapter Eight, 
especially if the same analytic criteria of epistemic primitives, the growth of the self, 
and the relationship between faith authorities and experience were used. Nonetheless, 
the limited theological representativeness of the sample used, and the potential impact 
on the research results, must be acknowledged.
II. Learning and non-learning
The major focus of the research has been to study how people’s Christian faith 
interacted with their learning. However, the opening chapter also highlighted Hull’s 
(1991 [1985]) thesis that Christian faith prevented adult Christians from learning, 
turning to this to support the initial theoretical discussion. A brief consideration of the 
data with respect to non-learning is therefore appropriate.
11.1 Does anything prevent Christian adults from learning?!
Hull specified a range of reasons why he considered people’s Christian faith might 
prevent them from learning. These were primarily based on the ideological 
characteristics of Christianity and the cognitive dissonance and discomfort Christians 
experience when this jars with other areas of their lives and experience. Hull puts 
significant emphasis on the psychological and affective domains, highlighting the 
‘totalitarian grip’ of ideologies that people are often reluctant to break out of, their 
psychological need to be right, and a corresponding fear of being wrong. He also 
identifies a ‘pain’ within learning that contributes to people drawing back from
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engaging in the process. Specific results include the employment of thought-stopping 
techniques, vagueness, piety, authoritarianism, objectification, and spiritual passivity 
(see Chapter Two for more detail o f each of these).
Before looking at Hull’s conclusions with respect to the empirical data from Chapter 
Eight, a brief reminder of Jarvis’s position on non-learning within the context of 
theories of experiential learning is apposite. Chapter Two commented on the fact that 
his model described the two proposed outcomes of learning in different ways 
according to its various stages of development and suggested that those which spoke 
in terms o f people emerging ‘unchanged’ were less accurate than those which 
understood certain experiences functioning as a ‘reinforcement’ of people’s previous 
learning. Especially with a time-centred model, which disallows any literal repetition 
of experience, since no two experiences can ever be identical, then true non-learning 
can never actually occur. Reservations were also expressed about the possibility of 
any learning taking place which was devoid of reflection, although Jarvis’s recent 
modifications of his model and accompanying typology were acknowledged.
Strictly speaking, therefore, Hull’s position would seem unlikely, at least in its most 
literal sense. The purpose of this section is to explore the data and typology presented 
in Chapter Eight and consider the sort o f learning exhibited, assuming from the outset 
that individuals did not engage in non-leaming yet questioning whether any of the 
characteristics identified by Hull were nonetheless evidenced. If this were the case, 
then an alternative interpretation of his conclusions would also need to be found. An 
important aspect that might differentiate Hull’s suggestions from those of the research 
is the fact that the interviews were conducted among individuals who were 
deliberately engaging in formal programmes of the study of theology, albeit 
vocationally, while Hull seemed to focus on Christian learning more generally and 
apply his conclusions to the ‘ordinary’ Christian living everyday experiences.
It should perhaps not be surprising, therefore, that only a very few of Hull’s reactions 
to the authoritarian and ideological features o f the Christian faith and its faith-content 
were apparent amongst the interviewees, and even at these points a direct parallel 
would seem debatable. Assimilative believers, for example, regularly deferred to 
authorities on account of their superior knowledge and status in the Christian faith.
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Hull speaks of ‘authoritarianism’ which is represented by the conviction that the 
minister/bible knows, and hence we shouldn’t/mustn’t question. Yet for Assimilative 
believers this was as much a positive act of placing trust in individuals so that they 
could tread in their footsteps and acquire the same capacities: learn from and through 
them. The line is necessarily subtle and one could argue for a significant degree of 
overlap, much depending on the degree of individuals’ proactivity in their learning. 
Nonetheless, it is at least a demonstration that authoritarianism as described by Hull 
does not necessarily imply withdrawal from a learning situation. Instead, a different 
form of reflection is present, interpretive believers also deferred to superior 
authorities, often expressing genuine surprise that their instructors were encouraging 
them to challenge and critique them. Here again the root of the approach to learning 
vis-a-vis authority would seem to be different from purely a response to any perceived 
authoritarian dimension: people’s selves were fragile to the point of affecting their 
ability to critique and take a stand against, or in contrast to the views expressed by 
faith authorities. The chicken-and-egg aspect implicit in the research question 
resurfaces, since it is impossible to determine whether people’s weak selves result 
from an overtly authoritarian Christian faith, whether they are simply a dimension of 
epistemological development as Belenky et al. ’s study would suggest, or a mixture of 
the two. There was little in the interviews of Interpretive believers to suggest a 
specific connection; more, perhaps, that indicated a combination of the two. If this 
was the case, then Hull’s authoritarianism played a contributory but not definitive 
role. His spiritual passivity was also something potentially identifiable in Interpretive 
believers’ ‘openness’ and desire not to shut themselves off from being spoken to, yet 
as with Assimilative believers, this does not necessarily imply a lack of any 
intellectual activity or even a shutting down of emotion. Rather, these interviewees 
demonstrated a form of reflection and of ‘positivising’ (see Roger’s interview) that 
Hull could make no allowances for. Of all the types, Discrete believers demonstrated 
the most clearly a tendency to objectify, which Hull understood as a refusal to engage 
with the bible or theology at a personal or internalised level. Yet the discussion of 
Chapter Four suggested that while learning was affected, it was not prevented. This 
was a type of reflection which led to a particular level of internalisation, but it cannot 
be considered an instance o f non-learning.
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11.2 Learning and emotion
One of the important factors in Hull’s analysis were the roles, respectively, of fear and 
of pain. These emotions and affective reactions resulted in people drawing back from 
the pursuit of learning in favour of remaining in the comfort zone of apparent non- 
leaming. A similar phenomenon is identifiable in Jarvis’s category of rejection as a 
form of non-learning, and in Perry’s retreat, temporizing, and escape. In each 
instance, people either deny or withdraw from engaging with a challenging 
experience. While neither Jarvis nor Perry emphasises the emotional dimension, it is 
nonetheless there: Jarvis suggests that ‘some older people, and the not so old, may not 
wish to change their understanding o f things since their whole identity is based upon 
it and so they deliberately reject the opportunity to learn new things’ (2001:16); Perry 
describes his variants of retreat and escape in affective and attitudinal terms.
Of all the interviewees, Margaret demonstrated the greatest degree of fear and anxiety 
associated with learning and life in general, although three of the four Interpretive 
believers were unconfident and often anxious. In Margaret’s case, however, a clear 
corollary was evident between her ethic of care and her approach to learning. Her 
concern to please others, to the point of acquiescing to their perceived will, resulted in 
her fearing negative repercussions should she form her own position, much less assert 
it. Other instances of withdrawal were evident amongst Discrete believers who 
refused to transgress valued faith boundaries such as principles identified within the 
bible. If non-learning is not an acceptable option, how might these cases be 
interpreted? One of the strengths of Jarvis’s definition of learning (first cited in 
Chapter One) is his emphasis on how all aspects o f human being is a result of 
learning, including the emotional domain. Margaret, therefore, might be considered 
not to have transformed an aspect o f an experience into intellectual knowledge or 
factual information, but she may well have developed her emotional and affective 
side. She herself was conscious o f this, and conscious too of the fact that this 
development might not be beneficial or contribute to her increasing well-being. She 
spoke frequently of having to stop herself from emotionally reacting as had become 
her habit in order to re-examine and often choose an alternative path. So ‘non­
learning’ in her case would appear to take the form potentially of ‘inappropriate’ or 
even ‘damaging’ learning. Cohering well with Jarvis’s ‘reinforcement’, her fear plus
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her ethic of care regularly reinforced her emotional approach to learning and the 
associated emotional learning outcomes.
Probably a more common result of emotional retreat, however, is Perry’s 
‘temporising’, which he suggests is ‘a prolonged pause (foil year) within any of the ... 
positions, without evidence of entrenchment through structures of Escape’ (1970: 
chart of development, inside back cover). Perry’s entire focus was on how people 
made the transition from dualism to relativism, and hence his temporizing was his 
identification of occasions when that transition was too unsettling or demanding to 
make. Nonetheless, people seemed to acknowledge that the time would arrive when 
they would begin to take initial faltering steps, and their ‘temporizing’ also provided 
them with space to adjust and prepare. The variety of possible instances of this 
amongst the interviewees must be considered tentative since true temporizing can 
only truly come to light in a longitudinal study such as that conducted by Perry. 
Frances’s willingness (uncharacteristically) to accept something the bible said was the 
case might be a ‘Christianised’ version of something similar, however.
I think the whole thing about atonement is really difficult and I haven’t 
properly begun to get my head round that. And that is the area I think where I 
most have to say, Well, I believe this because the bible tells me so. But at 
some point I will get to a stage in my life where I need to unpack it and it may 
be because I’m made to unpack it on this course, or it may be because I just 
have arrived at that time in my own spiritual development when I need to 
unpack it. And at that point I will find people to talk to, and I will pray, and I 
will read, and I will theologically reflect, and all those other things. And see 
where I get to. (Frances)
Less positive examples of people not engaging with specific issues were more 
common. Many interviewees admitted to burying their heads in the sand or putting 
difficult dimensions of their faith on the shelf, particularly with reference to violent or 
unpalatable biblical passages. In the context of a study of learning, this provokes the 
question of how a simple response T don’t know’ should be interpreted. Is this an 
(exclusive) instance of non-learning? Where does putting something on the shelf, 
potentially for a significant amount of time, fit into Jarvis’s model and typology? 
While at one level it might indicate an indefinite progression around the cycle from 
which people never ‘emerge’, this supposes that they continue to think and reflect,
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which is almost certainly not necessarily the case. Frances’s quote above suggests an 
alternative is simple acceptance of something even though it is beyond her 
comprehension. Others genuinely refuse to engage with an issue and put it behind 
them, rarely, if ever, returning to it. In a time-centred model of experiential learning, 
such examples might be considered ‘non-learning’ in the sense that individuals either 
don’t appear to emerge from the cycle, or they do so reinforced. Yet in the first 
instance, this suggests no learning takes place at any point around the cycle, and in the 
second, that reinforcement is not a form of learning.
These were issues first introduced in Chapter One. No firm conclusions can be arrived 
at specifically as a result o f this project, in part since this was not its intention. 
However, the discussion does suggest that theories of experiential learning need to 
develop a more sophisticated understanding firstly of the connection between learning 
and human growth and development, and secondly, linked to the first, o f the nature of 
human change.
It is appropriate, however, to suggest one modification of the understanding of 
learning that results from this consideration of learning and non-learning, with 
particular reference to the occasions such as demonstrated by Margaret, above, which 
imply learning and non-learning can walk hand in hand.
II.3 Primary and secondary learning
The terms primary and secondary deliberately recall their use in the analysis of 
different types o f experience introduced in Chapter One. There, primary experience 
referred largely to sensual experience, whereas secondary experience was mediated, 
often through language and gesture. Of particular significance was the fact that 
secondary experience could never take place devoid of primary. So even if people’s 
attention was highly focused on speech and conversation, they would still be 
marginally Conscious of their surrounds, the physical context in which dialogue was 
taking place, and the way in which this contributed to their overall experience o f it.
It is possible to suggest that something similar occurs with learning and, potentially, 
non-learning, albeit in a different way. So, while a particular experience would appear
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to have a central core that provokes the sensation of disjuncture and which therefore 
initiates the process of learning, the latter is nonetheless also experiential, requiring 
responses to subsequent experiences of disjuncture. Boud et a/.’s (1985) assertion that 
reflection is an experience is relevant at this point, for example. Two streams of 
experience would appear to run concurrently, therefore: that of the initial experience 
and that of reflecting upon it. At first sight, it might appeal* that one follows the other 
in sequence. However, logic suggests that the initial experience has to be carried 
through until its associated disjuncture is resolved. This is the experience that people 
constantly touch base with as they move through the different components o f the 
learning cycle, and the two experiences draw to a conclusion together once a 
satisfactory meaning has been found for the first, the ‘primary’’, that allows harmony 
to be restored. So ‘primary’ learning is the outcome that results from that initial 
disjuncture. ‘Secondary’ learning, on the other hand, is the learning that comes about 
as people grapple with the demands of forming that primary outcome. When viewed 
in this way, Jarvis’s model would appear to focus on primary learning, emphasising 
the final outcome of an original experience. Although the thesis has queried the 
legitimacy of viewing any two experiences as identical, and therefore of people 
emerging ‘unchanged’, within a framework o f primary and secondary learning it is 
possible to suggest that at one level no learning has taken place, no outcome has been 
arrived at and in one way people emerge unchanged. At a secondary level, however, 
other, potentially less tangible learning has taken place, and entirely different 
outcomes have been constructed. Hence the argument that literal non-leaming cannot 
be a constituent dimension of theories of experiential learning.
It is difficult to support the argument substantially from the evidence of the 
interviews, but this was not their purpose. Nonetheless, certain observations are 
pertinent. An ‘I don’t know’ position does not imply non-learning, for example, nor 
even, necessarily, a temporary shelving of reflection. Reflection, evaluation and the 
various other components of Jarvis’s cycle can all contribute to the construction of 
smaller conclusions within the bigger overall learning outcome, which itself may 
never be reached. A number of interviewees acknowledged that some aspects of their 
faith were too big, too challenging for them ever to anticipate fully coming to terms 
with, but they were content to make progress, steady or unsteady, towards some 
resolution. Frances’s quote above suggests another route is to accept intellectually the
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final outcome and then to find ways of combining the experience and the learning 
components so that they finally converge harmoniously with the outcome. Often, it 
would seem that primary learning has a greater bias toward the cognitive, while 
secondary incorporates more of the affective, but these are by no means exclusive. 
Many of the interviewees, however, in one way or another indicated that they could—  
and did—shut down or reduce their intellectual engagement, but none appeared even 
to attempt the same with their emotions. In these cases, as exemplified by Margaret, 
affective learning continued to occur, often reinforcing itself to the point of 
imprisoning people. It is quite conceivable that this would be the type of learning Hull 
categorises as vagueness and piety.
The section has therefore argued against Hull’s overall assumption that Christian 
adults can be prevented from learning, reinterpreting his conclusions according to 
Jarvis’s model and an understanding of experiential learning that excludes non­
learning from its modus operandi. Time itself ensures that no experience and no 
individual is the same even if a situation appears familial*. Nevertheless, if learning 
can be understood in primary and secondary terms, then something akin to non­
learning may be accompanied by other, less specific and less quantifiable forms of 
learning, even if it continues to be preferable to speak of ‘reinforcement’ rather than 
‘non-learning’. This may be associated with the affective domain, but its more 
qualitative nature suggests that the traditional relationships between learning and 
human growth and development, and learning and change, need further in-depth 
investigation.
The challenge to Hull’s position of non-learning does not, however, invalidate his 
analysis of the potential for Christian faith-content to influence learning, which the 
data presented in the previous chapter affirmed in a variety of ways.
11.4 Learning and reinforcement
Pervious discussion of the various versions of Jarvis’s model of the processes of 
learning highlighted the fact that he had replaced his original outcome of people 
emerging ‘reinforced but relatively unchanged’ with them emerging simply 
‘unchanged’. The suggested unfeasibility of literal non-learning also challenges the
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notion that people can genuinely emerge from a situation unchanged. However, there 
have been a number of indications throughout the thesis that learning can reinforce 
aspects of their biographies. Prime amongst these, perhaps, was the formation of 
personal constructs which the discussion suggested could become more and more 
rigidified. Hull, too, speaks of ‘sedimentation’ in relation to his understanding of 
ideological enclosure.
Ideology narrows the field of what is available to us for interpretation. In the 
same way, there may have been and there may still be many possible ways of 
interpreting the significance of the founding event or the founding lives of the 
community, but the ideology restricts these, so creating an orthodoxy. This act 
of selection leading to an orthodox interpretation we may call ‘ideological 
enclosure’.
This creates a sort o f ‘sedimentation’ in which layer upon layer of 
interpretation is laid down in the consciousness of the group and this provides 
a kind of inertia which makes the group resistant or cautious in responding to 
the novel. (Huh, 1991 [1985]:68)
The focus of the thesis has been on individuals, not on groups. Nonetheless, the idea 
of sedimentation can equally apply to personal learning, especially with respect to 
reinforcement. A particular interpretation o f experience is judged valid and effective, 
and so is used on a subsequent occasion. If its validity is maintained, so a cycle of 
interpretation is built up, and at a certain point this becomes an automatic response, 
functioning to reinforce people in their existing positions. Margaret’s increasing 
awareness that some of her existing emotional reactions were probably inappropriate 
is a good example of this. She was now taking steps to re-evaluate these and allow 
other responses to experience to play a role. As an Interpretive believer, she was a 
member of the group which also exemplified ‘reinforced learning’ to the greatest 
degree. Interpretive believers tended to maintain their reality bubble by relying on 
tried and tested interpretations of experience, often rejecting the possibility of 
subsequent re-interpretation. So significant events retained their significance, even if 
they were comparatively small in nature, primarily because they fulfilled a role in 
maintaining an overall structure, and these then served to reinforce both people’s past 
conclusions and their present learning. The notion of biography already suggests that 
individuals are, to a degree, prisoners of themselves, certainly in the fact that they 
have to turn to themselves as a referent for interpretation as well as the external
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situation and context; this process o f reinforcement augments the imprisonment, to the 
point that it is almost surprising to see signs of movement away from an Interpretive 
stance in each member of the group. This seemed to be significantly linked with the 
growth of the self, and hence it might be concluded that as the self is given space to 
grow, so the process of reinforced learning diminishes. At the same time, reinforced 
learning should not be considered an instance o f non-learning. Reinforcement implies 
change; people grow in their existing convictions, attitudes, habits and patterns of 
interpretation... Once again, the partnership of primary and secondary learning comes 
to the fore.
III. Sum mary and conclusions
This project has therefore investigated the influence that faith-content and faith 
authorities have on the way people learn by emphasising the authoritative dimension 
of that content. Basing itself on three different types of relationship that committed 
Christians have with this knowledge— a necessary relationship, an authoritative 
relationship and an influential relationship (see Prologue)—it identified in the opening 
chapter a range of authoritative characteristics of faith-content, one o f which in 
particular had already been linked to the activity of learning, although under the rubric 
more of non-learning than learning. The concept of non-leaming was challenged 
throughout the thesis, particularly from the perspective of time-centred theories of 
experiential learning which implied by the fact that individuals and experience were 
different in every situation of disjuncture that some form of learning had to take place. 
Questions about Jarvis’s connection between non-learning and reflection were also 
raised, while recognising his own re-working of his model and understanding of the 
learning process. Nonetheless, the potential for Christian faith-content and authorities 
to influence learning in an adverse fashion was readily acknowledged and 
demonstrated, although this was not to prove the major focus of the investigation. 
Instead, a progression from considering a detrimental authority to an integral, 
necessary one was traced, primarily through the concept of internalisation. An initial 
study of the processes of experiential learning suggested that an engagement with this 
corpus of authoritative material would divide social knowledge into two, modifying 
the common threefold configuration of learning components by introducing a fourth. 
Thereafter, different outcomes and processes integral to internalisation were
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considered, and the potential effect o f the Christian authority on the way these were 
constructed demonstrated. The connections between internalisation, the 
epistemological inner/outer balance, and the form/content relationship proved 
significant in providing a conceptual framework by which the necessary relationship 
between Christians and their faith-content could be analysed, and the ‘positive’ 
influence of the former on the latter ascertained.
In this way, the project achieved its aims, and can conclude that faith influences 
learning in the ways outlined in the previous chapter. The project’s original 
contribution to knowledge therefore lies a) in its identification of four ways of 
believing which represent a close connection between people’s form of learning and 
their engagement with content; b) in its identification of four different configurations 
o f the major components in the learning process: people, two forms of social 
knowledge, and experience, and in the demonstration of how these affect different 
dimensions of the same process; c) in its identification of different procedures 
associated with the four ways of knowing; d) in its identification of ways in which 
people’s faith influence their use of experience and hence exaggerate and/or modify 
dimensions of the learning process; e) in its identification of two forms of 
commitment, neither of which figure as characteristic in studies of non-faith-related 
learning; and f) in its identification of ways in which faith premises and principles 
directly affected the growth and development o f the self.
These conclusions remain provisional, however, until subjected to a general 
evaluation of the project as a whole. This is the purpose of the next and final chapter.
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C h a p te r  Ten  
O verv iew , crit iqu e  a n d  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  s tu d y  
Introduction
This final chapter evaluates the project as a whole, asking questions about the overall 
approach taken before relating its conclusions to other relevant areas of scholarship. It 
summarises the original contribution to knowledge that it makes and recommends 
consequent areas for further research.
i. Evaluation
1.1 The research question
The thesis has already identified certain areas which, as the project progressed, proved 
problematic. The most basic o f these was the research question itself, which, it will be 
recalled, was expressed in two parts, asking:
a) Does the faith of adult Christians influence the way they learn? If so, how?
b) Does the way adult Christians learn influence their faith? If so, how?
Difficulties were identified firstly in the concept o f ‘influence’, and secondly in the 
fact that the question was based on scholarly indications suggesting that both could be 
answered in the affirmative. The questions therefore presupposed the answer ‘yes’, 
potentially directing the project into a circular argument. Both these factors 
introduced complexities into the research which may have affected its quality, 
principally in the write up o f the thesis itself—what to put where—but also by adding 
a variety of foci with the result that the desired straight line from beginning to end 
risked interruption and/or deviation. Rather than have a single-stranded question with 
a focused set of conclusions, the question was multi-stranded and the conclusions 
varied and spread throughout the final chapters. An immediate point of evaluation 
therefore has to ask the degree to which this adversely affected the project as a whole, 
which includes questioning whether a similar approach would have been taken with 
the benefit of hindsight, and if not, what might have been done differently.
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Fundamentally, however, despite the complexities, the project yielded results which I 
consider significant, and which did, at heart, provide answers to the questions posed. 
Not only so, but those questions continued to be relevant both to the study of adult 
learning per se and to that of Adult Christian Education, They also had immediate 
relevance to studies in other areas, such as the nature, even concept, of faith, when 
form and content were explored together, and the nature and role of reflection in 
human growth and development, including a differentiation between critical, non- 
critical and ‘affirmative’ reflection. The thesis was not able to enter any of these 
discussions as a routine dimension of its overall considerations. Nevertheless, the 
implications and repercussions were clearly present throughout, meriting at least brief 
introductions and explorations in this, the final chapter (see later). Additional bonuses 
which can be considered original contributions to knowledge in their own right are the 
discussions o f the opening and concluding chapters, which:
® Advanced the scholarly understanding o f the processes o f learning and how 
the various components inter-related, with reference to Jarvis’s model 
(Chapters Two and Nine);
• Emphasised the significance of internalisation as part of the learning process, 
recognising in so doing the limitations o f a time-centred, quantitative and 
‘horizontal’ approach to the study o f learning (Chapter Two);
• Reworked the scholarly concept o f learning styles, amplifying and modifying 
some of the tenets previously held as fundamental (Chapter Five).
In each instance there is further to go, taking the discussion into a consideration of 
subsequent research. This is focused on in section II.
1.2 The concept of internalisation
Core to the research methodology, of course, was the process o f internalisation, 
accompanied by Belenky et alCs educational dialectic:
Inner Outer
What factors control goal setting, pacing, decision making, and evaluation?
Who and what is experienced as validating / nonvalidating?
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A central question relating to the quality of the research must revolve around this as a 
concept, and whether the questions designed to explore its perceived integral 
components adequately served their purpose. One of the strong points of the dialectic 
was the fact that the authoritative, external nature of Christian faith-content might 
imbalance the relationship between inner and outer, thus having an effect on ensuing 
patterns of learning. In general terms, this seems to have achieved its purpose. While 
the goal-setting and pacing did not play a major role (perhaps also because the 
interview questions did not provide for this), there were many instances of people 
tinning to faith authorities to aid in decision-making, evaluation and validation.
Indeed, it was these which lay at the heart o f the conclusions presented in the previous 
chapter, supporting the view that the dialectic had served its purpose. Different types, 
forms and levels of internalisation were also apparent in the four types, with obvious 
connections to the development of the self and to the reflective process.
The interview questions also, eventually, yielded their fruit. As indicated in Chapter 
Six, they had been designed to tease out different dimensions of the inner/outer 
dichotomy with particular reference to the Christian belief system. The pilot stage had 
seen a number of modifications and refinements. It had not permitted a trial analysis. 
As was evident in the main thesis, the analytic process was complex and immensely 
time-consuming. Part of this was due to my own inexperience in analysing qualitative 
data. It would seem probable that it was also on account of the questions posed and 
the desire to pursue an inductive yet structured analysis. The questions did not tackle 
the issues head-on, asking directly, for example, how people used the bible to validate 
their knowledge and construct their experience, but approached the same issues ‘from 
below’, preferring not to make assumptions about how individuals behaved. This 
necessarily complicated the analysis, since the responses were very wide-ranging and 
at times appeared to have little in common. While to have used a bigger sample would 
have been advantageous in the expectation of more shared characteristics coming to 
the fore, this had to be balanced against the time needed to transcribe and analyse 
each interview. Although Belenky et alfs project was much wider, in terms of sample 
size, researchers and timescale, the ratio from one project to the other may not be 
disproportionate. The advantages of an inductive approach are that people find it hard 
to second guess what the interview question is focusing on, and that unanticipated
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common dimensions can come to the fore and play their duly significant role. The 
disadvantages are the complexity o f analysis, coupled with the fact that with a small 
sample, conclusions are vulnerable to over-generalisation. In this particular instance, 
the inductive approach proved its worth in highlighting the cognitive/experiential 
dichotomy which in turn led to the formation of the matrix. However, since for the 
most part the dichotomy was only apparent in respondents’ answers to one of the 
interview questions in particular, the matrix became very flat, and one dimension of 
the typology was constructed on comparatively fragile evidence.
Were the project to be developed, it would benefit from certain modifications. Firstly, 
following Perry (1970), it might be useful to devise a ‘checklist of educational views’ 
(CLEV). Perry used this as the initial means o f trawling and then sorting a much 
larger sample than he then interviewed. Interview questions could be subdivided into 
categories according to the significant dimensions which had arisen. Belenky et al, 
for example, wanting to gain a much broader overall picture o f women’s 
epistemological behaviour than I had needed, had nine sections:
A: Background
B: Self-descriptions
C: Gender
D: Relationships
E: Real life moral dilemma
F: Education
G: Ways o f knowing
H: Hypothetical moral judgments
I: Conclusion
(1996 [1986]:231-36)
A similar approach would ensure a more even balance between the various salient 
components. From there, the inductive approach would continue to seem appropriate, 
while affirming Belenky et al’s estimation of their own conclusions:
We recognize (1) that these five ways of knowing are not necessarily fixed, 
exhaustive, or universal categories, (2) that they are abstract or “pure” 
categories that cannot adequately capture the complexities and uniqueness of 
an individual woman’s thought and life, (3) that similar categories can be
Chapter Ten 247
People’s Ways o f Believing: learning processes andfaith outcomes
found in men’s thinking, and (4) that other people might organize their 
observations differently. Furthermore, the small number o f women in our 
sample who fell into the position of silence makes these observations 
particularly tentative and underscores the need for continued efforts to 
understand the developmental consequences of severe violence and social 
isolation. Our intention is to share not prove our observations. (Belenky et al, 
1996 [1986]:15-16.)
This thesis reiterates their statement and its underlying thrusts with respect to its own 
conclusions.
1.3 Faith-content and faith authorities
One of the research techniques employed was the argument that the Christian 
propositional set of doctrinal content— its faith content—could be isolated from other 
forms of social knowledge. While continuing to consider this to be the case, questions 
must nevertheless be asked about the effect of this position on the research. Can faith- 
content be as totally isolated from other forms of social knowledge as the thesis has 
suggested? If not, what are the implications for the research? What does the typology 
reveal? Are people’s ways of believing in any way indicative of how they live the rest 
of their lives? If not, how should they be interpreted and their significance 
ascertained?
A number of responses can be made. Since the object of the exercise was to 
investigate how faith-content impacted upon learning, then some way o f isolating this 
had to be found. Perhaps an equally relevant accompanying question is whether the 
research managed to isolate faith-content effectively enough! Ultimately, however, 
the project had to rest with the awareness that boundaries are necessarily fuzzy. Faith- 
content and faith authorities were often understood almost synonymously on the 
grounds that the latter very frequently established, communicated and represented the 
latter. While a core of specific faith-content might be common to all, it was 
potentially very small and itself subject to different interpretations and uses. At a very 
basic level, the research aimed to explore the process of internalisation with regard to 
how people interacted with authority, but this authority was set within a faith context
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which presupposed a role o f certain identifiable sources such as the bible. Within 
these overall parameters, it was left to individuals to define where their authorities lay 
and the extent of their power. This, in fact, provided the means for the variations 
leading to the typology itself to come to the fore.
It is impossible to know whether the ways of believing outlined in the typology were 
indicative of how people lived the rest of their lives. Tins was not the purpose of the 
research. However, given the social context of vocational training which presupposed 
a high degree of individual commitment to the Christian belief system, then it is 
reasonable to presume that the title ‘ways o f believing’ reflects a significant 
dimension o f interviewee’s lives. A proportion o f the interview questions extended 
beyond the exclusively ‘Christian’ into wider life in general in order to give the 
opportunity for individuals to demonstrate whether and how their faith principles 
influenced other areas. As the thesis argued previously, therefore, in these particular 
instances, people’s Christian identity was inextricably bound up with their Christian 
commitment and with their whole lives. Had the research been conducted with 
Christians in different life contexts, the results and conclusions might have been 
different. Perhaps the best way to view its findings is therefore as ‘pure’ or somewhat 
extreme examples of ways of believing and o f how faith influenced learning, more 
modified versions of which might be typical of people in less focused situations.
II. Significance of the study, and recommendations for further 
research
The thesis proposes that its overall content, typology and final conclusions are 
significant to three specific areas o f scholarship. Firstly, and most substantially, to the 
area of formative Christian education, although the term must be understood loosely, 
acknowledging and endorsing Astley’s (1994) objections to indoctrination. The 
context in which the research took place was that o f vocational Christian education, 
amongst people and within institutional frameworks that were concerned for 
individuals’ Christian growth and development but in ways that allowed for this to 
happen as each saw fit. Of the four types, Assimilative believers followed the 
‘strictest’, or best defined formation, to the point that a potentially well-formed
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underlying theology of learning was sensed. Nonetheless, this did not involve a 
significant focus and emphasis on faith-content and belief, but rather on the desired 
goal and the method by which this was to be achieved. Section II. 1 outlines a variety 
of ways in which it considers the research results are of importance to those pursuing 
vocational Christian education, both for educators and learners alike. Some o f the 
discussion overlaps with the second area of significance which steps outside the 
specifically Christian domain and discusses the relationship between adult learning 
and ideologies. This is an underworked area of scholarship, and section II.2 explores 
the major issues involved. Thirdly, the section turns to the concept o f faith, suggesting 
that the research results (embryonically) challenge Fowler’s conclusions and indicate 
that the relationship between form and content is less separable than he proposes. The 
final section provides a summary of the various discussions, drawing the threads 
together and identifying a range of areas recommended for further research.
11.1 Formative Christian education
The distinction between formative and critical Christian education was first 
introduced in Chapter Four. Astley (1994) acknowledges that it is an overly hard 
distinction. Referring to McKenzie, he states:
All critical education involves some formation in values (including, 
presumably, the value of critical thinking); and most formative education in 
our culture goes along with at least some elements of critical education.
Further, formative and critical education really occupy two points on a 
continuum along which actual education programs may be plotted. (Astley, 
1994:78-79)
The area of the thesis where the two forms, to an extent, appear to merge relates to the 
growth and development o f the self. The four types on the typology exhibited very 
different forms of selfhood, from Assimilative believers whose learning was designed 
to eradicate and transform, to Interpretive whose sense of self was generally insecure 
and unrooted, to Discrete, some of whom experienced a divided and schizophrenic 
self. Only Related believers appeared to harmonise the different elements in a way 
which allowed them to live a reasonably harmonious, integrated yet balanced life. The
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thesis has already commented also on the different levels of internalisation apparently 
characteristic of each type.
One of the significant aspects of the research for those involved in any form of 
formative Christian education, therefore, is the provocation of the question of what 
sort of self is understood as desirable. The question is fraught with difficulties. Some, 
for example, might consider it inappropriate even to attempt to define the 
characteristics of a ‘desirable’ Christian self. Is it possible, either theologically or 
otherwise? If so, does it not imply a closed educational programme that verges on 
indoctrinisation? One of the strengths of the Assimilative position was that the precise 
outcome was not specified; by contrast, the means of transformation was. Yet most 
societies and cultures have values and understandings of selfhood embedded within 
them which are transmitted in a formative way. Christian educational programmes 
cannot be considered alone when (if) attempting to define what constitutes a ‘good’ or 
‘desirable’ self. The thesis too has committed itself to the same, suggesting in its early 
chapters that developed, mature selves are those able to take responsibility for their 
autonomy and independence, exercising these in acts of self-assertion.
It is not appropriate for the thesis to engage in theological discussions about selfhood. 
However, it is interesting to note that little, if any, of the literature on theological 
reflection includes a specific discussion on the subject. Perhaps even more 
significantly, rarely, if ever, does this literature outline exactly why the activity is 
considered to be advantageous, necessary, beneficial... . Pattison’s observation 
referred to in Chapter Four that teachers requiring students to engage in the activity 
find it difficult to say what it is they are looking for should almost certainly be 
prefaced with the acknowledgment that the rationale for theological reflection is also 
largely undefined. Yet the growing thrust of the thesis has been to link learning, 
internalisation and reflection with the growth of the self. The argument would also 
suggest that the evidence from a large sector of interviewees indicates that for many 
this growth results in, at the very least, uncomfortable and/or weak selves. The 
implications of this are significant for the Church at large which sees itself as having a 
message to communicate to its secular surrounds. While recommendations for further 
research do not include a call for a ‘theology of the self for the reasons provided
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previously, the thesis considers nonetheless that a more thorough understanding of 
how the Christian self has developed through the ages and across denominations, 
cultures, and theologies would be o f real significance. This would focus on the 
dimensions identified within the thesis as important: internalisation, reflection, 
reflective styles, self-assertion. It would include gender, and would consider the 
educational means by which different forms o f the Christian self were fostered, 
constructed and formed. Such a study would deliberately avoid, as far as possible, 
forming and/or communicating any value judgments. Its purpose would be to in form., 
not persuade. However, the value of the information would be to allow those 
providing programmes o f Christian education, at whatever level and for whatever 
purpose, to understand more fully the role o f these processes in the educational 
endeavour. If self-assertion through the medium of voice is accepted as integral to the 
concept, then the thesis suggests that the Church getting to grips once again with an 
understanding of self may well be one way in which it can resume its role of having 
an authentic and authoritative prophetic voice.
A second dimension in which the conclusions of the thesis impact on formative 
Christian education revolves around the question o f epistemology and cognitive 
learning styles. The case was made previously for people’s ways of believing to have 
a direct correlation with their way o f knowing and of learning. Section II.2 considers 
the relationship between ways of believing and the concept o f faith. Nevertheless, 
there were clear indications of a Separate and a Connected learning style amongst the 
four types, which linked, necessarily, with the way in which they lived and 
understood their faith. Those of a Separate inclination, while often demonstrating 
strengths in skills valued by education—analysis, logic, intellect—also seemed to 
encounter the greatest difficulties in internalisation and in constructing a whole, 
united self. This is significant to educational programmes which take the development 
of people’s faith seriously, even if it is not their central focus: to the vocational 
institutions amongst whose students the research was conducted, for example. If, as 
scholarship into learning styles suggests, people are predisposed to leam in a 
particular way, then this suggests that their way of believing will bear similar 
hallmarks. While it is almost certainly stretching the point too far to suggest parallels 
between Connected ways o f knowing and the conformist, passive acceptors of
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authority Astley (1994), following Hull (1984), rejects, the discussion on learning 
styles suggests that some learners critique and evaluate in a different way from others, 
and that people’s relationship to authority is not as cut and dried as simply 
‘submissive’ or ‘self-assertive’, ‘conformist’ or ‘challenging’. Further study into how 
these dimensions relate to the formative and critical dimensions of Christian education 
would nonetheless be beneficial, especially with regard to how Connected knowers 
critique and how Separate knowers internalise, with a view to strengthening their 
respective weaknesses.
11.2 The concept of faith
Chapter Two raised the question of how Perry’s, Belenky et al’s and Fowler’s 
respective studies inter-relate, asking whether in fact Fowler’s stages should not more 
accurately be viewed as sophisticated portrayals o f general human growth and 
development. Little in the ensuing discussion has suggested otherwise. His emphasis 
on faith as a human universal, plus his use o f scholars whose life work was the study 
of aspects of human growth and development (Piaget, Erikson, Kohlberg...) rendered 
it almost impossible for him to avoid the tension. Retrospectively, a more appropriate 
title for his Stages of Faith might have been ‘Stages of human and faith development’, 
or even ‘Stages of human and spiritual development’, since this would have 
acknowledged more overtly his emphasis on the spiritual dimension which he 
considered integral to human life. In today’s climate ‘spirituality’ is becoming a buzz 
word often used in contradistinction to ‘faith’ which, as Fowler’s work and Cantwell 
Smith’s before him, reveal, has for decades been contrasted against ‘belief. Faith and 
belief have traditionally been associated with specific religions, hence the difficulty 
Christians have often had with Fowler’s separation of form from content. Spirituality, 
on the other hand, is increasingly readily accepted as a human universal, and one area 
of further research recommended by the thesis is that o f the distinction and inter­
relationships between spirituality, learning and faith. For Jarvis (1999), learning too is 
a religious (spiritual?) activity and/or experience, lending weight to the 
recommendation for more work in these areas to be conducted.
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More immediately, however, the conclusions of the research challenge Fowler’s 
separation of form and content. The thesis chose to understand the four types of the 
typology as ‘ways of believing’, or ‘ways of faithing’ if a noun can be made from the 
verb. However, in essence they bear remarkable similarities to Belenky et al’s ‘ways 
of knowing’, despite differing in content and being far more limited in scope. ‘Ways 
of believing’ seemed an appropriate title since this unequivocally conveyed a 
form/content relationship in a faith context. Do the ways of believing presented in the 
typology cohere with Fowler’s scheme, however? And if not, what might this say 
either about these results, or about Fowler’s stages and his form/content separation? 
Discrepancies are quickly apparent. Nowhere in Fowler’s stages is a relationship with 
the ‘ultimate conditions of existence’ described in the way it is depicted by 
Assimilative believers, for example. Fowler’s scheme presupposes a steady, 
progressive development of the self, very much linked to the shift from an absolute to 
relative perspective of life equally propounded by Perry. (It is interesting to observe 
that Fowler was apparently ignorant of Perry’s work despite the fact that the two men 
shared a scholarly context at Harvard and only eleven years separates the publication 
of theft respective works.) Its mechanism for allowing the simultaneous cohabitation 
of absolute and relative is fragile, yet this is precisely the scenario that virtually all the 
interviewees of the present research constructed, and is something that can only be 
accounted for by the impact of content on form. One of two conclusions may be 
drawn: either Fowler traced an ‘ideal’ progression and development in faith the likes 
of which was only possible because o f the separation of form and content, or, when 
faith is examined within a specific faith context which emphasises the role of content, 
then the separation is, in fact, inappropriate. In both instances the real contribution of 
his study is called into question. The thesis treads cautiously at this point, recognising 
and respecting both the significant impact that Stages of Faith has had within the 
Christian community at large, as well as the particularly small scale and sample size 
of the present project. The typology, as previously emphasised, is far more fragile 
than any dimension of Fowler’s study. Nevertheless, Smith calls to attention Mosely’s 
three terms to ‘distinguish different relations between structure and content in a 
conversion experience’ (see Prologue for Fowler on content and conversion):
(a) lateral conversion: a change of content but with no change of stage structure;
(b) conversion: a change in both content and structure;
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(c) intensification experience: a renewal and enlivening of the faith which already 
exists but with no change of contents or structure. (Smith, 2003:192)
In each of these instances, content is perceived as something ‘inanimate’, entirely 
separate from individuals, and without the power to act as an influential agent. The 
significant difference between this and the approach taken by the thesis lies in the 
notion of learning styles, conceptualised as people having a relationship with their 
external knowledge and content, a seesaw balance existing between the two players. If 
this is truly the case, as constructivist theories must necessarily afihm, then Fowler’s 
stages can only be understood as telling part of the story.
The discussion is significant in a number of areas and calls for further investigation in 
a range of directions. Since people’s four ‘ways of believing’ He at the heart of most 
of its contentions, then the need for the typology to be consolidated and its 
fundamental characteristics and features confirmed, adjusted or refuted (as 
appropriate) is paramount. A much larger sample must be used, and alternative 
methods employed to discern the reliability of its structure, as well as those 
incorporated into this study. Secondly, as indicated above, renewed investigation into 
the concept o f faith and how this relates to learning and spirituality is a pressing 
concern in a contemporary climate which suggests the boundaries between the three 
are increasingly ill-defined. Thirdly, the relationship between form and content in a 
faith context, and in particular in the Christian faith context would benefit from 
lurther consideration with regard to people’s individual faith development.
Both the development of the Christian self and that of individual faith development 
fall in the domain of adult Christian education, and potentially into that of formative 
adult Christian education. The study is significant to the area of adult learning in its 
own right, however, albeit in a slightly less direct way This is the focus o f the next 
section.
11.3 Theories of experiential learning
Many aspects relating to the relevance of the research to the study of adult learning 
have been highlighted as the discussion has progressed. Different theories pertaining
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to different dimensions of the learning process were used as tools for data analysis 
and suggestions for modification made at each stage. The research results, therefore, 
do not directly indicate the need for further revisions. Two loose ends can usefully be 
tied, however, springing not from the actual results, but from the general research 
context.
The early chapters identified the fact that Jarvis’s model of the processes of learning 
was strongly dependent on the role o f time. Not only did this result in a sequential and 
quantitative understanding of the learning process which the thesis suggested was 
overly simplistic, but it was also unable to do justice to the process of internalisation. 
While the model served its purpose in providing the means of understanding a variety 
of ways in which people’s faith-content and faith commitment influenced their 
learning, the question of the appropriateness formulating theories of experiential 
learning by starting with time (see Jarvis, 1995:65) requires further scrutiny. It will be 
recalled that Jarvis uses the concept of time as a means of understanding that of 
experience, linking it with degrees of consciousness. Repeating for ease of reference, 
he defines ‘experience’ as:
Experience is a subjective awareness of a present situation, the meaning of 
which is partially determined by past individual learning. (1995:67)
Marton and Booth, on the other hand, suggest:
An experience is an internal relationship between the person experiencing and 
the phenomenon experienced: It reflects the latter as much as the former. If 
awareness is the totality of all experiences, then awareness is as descriptive of 
the world as it is o f the person. A person’s awareness is the world as 
experienced by the person. (1997:108)
At first sight there is little of significance to distinguish the two. However, Marton 
and Booth, commensurate with their overall concern to do away with the division 
between the internal and external, understand experience in relational terms, and in a 
way which deliberately internalises, or unites people and environment. The chapter 
does not propose to rehearse the arguments made previously that critique the scholars’ 
position. Nevertheless, this learner-centred approach has much to commend it in its 
ability to incorporate both the processes of learning as delineated by Jarvis and the 
process o f reflection which recognises different levels of internalisation.
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The challenge would appear to lie in where the origin, or root, of learning theories is 
placed. Jarvis, faithful to the name o f ‘experiential’ learning, sees learning as 
originating with experience and therefore experience ‘opens’ his model. Marton and 
Booth make no attempt to formulate a model of the processes of learning in the way 
Jarvis has. They also clearly recognise the importance and significance of experience 
in learning, and for that reason may be considered to be working within an overall 
framework of experiential learning theory. However, rather than place experience as 
something external to people, something to which they respond and react, they place it 
within people’s awareness, and this awareness precedes, accompanies and continues 
beyond each experience. Experience is placed within the context o f individual 
learners, rather than within that of a situation and social context. Two models of 
theories of experiential learning begin to emerge: the socially-centred version 
developed by Jarvis, and the learner-centred one embryonically present in the work of 
Marton and Booth.
This is a significant area in which the thesis recommends further research. The 
development of a leamer-centred model o f the processes o f learning has the potential 
to address a number of the difficulties that arose during the analytic process, namely 
the issue of time, the incorporation of reflection as part of the process of 
internalisation, and the reactive view of learners. An interesting observation with 
respect to the analysis of the interview data is that in holistic terms Jarvis’s model did 
not offer the opportunity for the influence of faith on learning to be understood: only 
certain dimensions o f the model proved relevant. This may of course have as much to 
do with the data themselves and the means used to collect them as it does with the 
model. However, with a strong focus on the inner/outer relationship, a horizontal 
approach was limited in its usefulness. The potential for a leamer-centred model of 
experiential learning to overcome these difficulties, even if only in part, is clear.
11.4 Learning and content
One of the questions that must be asked as a result of the conclusions of the study is 
whether they are applicable to other subjects and other disciplines. Christianity is not
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the only religion which falls into an ideological bracket, although Cantwell Smith’s 
(1970) view that it alone is based around a set o f propositional doctrines should be 
borne in mind. Nor are religions the only manifestation of ideologies. By implication, 
therefore, the conclusions of the research are of significance to a wider scholarly 
audience than purely that o f Christian educators. Other questions are posed with the 
re-introduction of ideologies also. Brookfield, for example, argues for a ‘critical 
theory of adult learning’ which ‘should have at its core an understanding of how 
adults learn to recognize the predominance of ideology in their everyday thoughts and 
actions and in the institutions of civil society’ (2001:20). As Hull, Brookfield sees 
exposure to ideologies as an inescapable dimension of human life, and one which 
necessarily impacts upon the process of learning. In a discussion of Gramsci’s 
analysis of hegemony he laments:
The dark irony, the cruelty of hegemony, is that adults take pride in learning 
and then acting on the beliefs and assumptions that work to enslave them. In 
learning diligently to live by these assumptions, people become their own 
jailers. (2001:17)
Later he states:
Getting adults to learn oppression is the central educational task of hegemony. 
(2001:17)
The issues are complex when resituated in a formative Christian educational context. 
Astley (1994) endorses Hull’s view that Christians have to find a way of critiquing 
while remaining committed to certain (unidentified) basic tenets of the faith. Without 
this, as the thesis argued previously, Christian identity is called into question.
The acceptable limits to criticism are presumably partially defined by the firm 
ground on which the Christian is to stand while critically testing and assessing 
more doubtful terrain. Criticism is therefore “directed towards the 
uncertainties but it (springs) from the certainties”. (Astley, 1994:95, quoting 
Huh, 1984:193,220)
The scholars call for a ‘critical openness’, or, with reference to Watson, a ‘critical 
affirmation’, each of which involves both critique and confirmation, evaluation and 
acceptance. Paradoxically, in the light of the basic premises of the research, they do 
not acknowledge the oppressive side of ideologies, although Hull touches upon it in 
his What Prevents Christian Adults from Learning? (1991 [1985]).
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It would seem that Brookfield’s call for a critical theoiy of adult learning should 
encompass not only an understanding and critique of the oppressive sociological 
factors surrounding ideologies, but also incorporate an awareness of the ideological 
dimensions of language (see Kress and Hodge, Chapter One). This is o f particular 
relevance to Christian education and Christian educators, especially if their 
‘schooling’ is to be considered one which develops a critical openness. The ability to 
critique the prime medium of ideological communication must surely be an essential 
tool in the critically open Christian’s box.
111. Summary and conclusion
As a research project, this study was complex and multi-stranded, not helped by the 
ambiguous nature of the original research question and the necessary overlap between 
the study of adult learning and that of formative Christian education. With hindsight, 
it is tempting to cite the well-known story of a traveller stopping a local person and 
asking directions for a town at quite some distance. The reply? If I wanted to go there, 
I wouldn’t start from here! While the intention had been to conduct a study into the 
impact of an authoritative entity such as the Christian belief system on the learning 
process as a means of enhancing scholarly understanding of the latter without 
necessarily entering the realms of Christian education, the subtleties and variety of 
dimensions contained within the notion of ‘influence’ resulted in a more multifaceted 
investigation than originally anticipated. It also became of more direct relevance to 
those involved in the field o f adult Christian education than to the study o f adult 
education per se.
Nevertheless, in general terms, I consider its ultimate goals were achieved. A study 
was conducted which considered a variety of ways in which people’s Christian faith, 
and specifically their faith authorities in the form of faith-content and its transmitters, 
impacted on different aspects of the process o f learning. As a result of the 
investigation, this was shown to affect: a) people’s use of time; b) people’s patterns of 
reasoning and their reflective procedures; c) the growth and development of the self; 
d) the functioning and role o f ‘normal’ learning processes; and e) their
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epistemological make-up. These outcomes were a consequence of different forms of 
influence, both intrinsic and extrinsic, as well as the correlative influence implicit to 
formative Christian education. It was the latter which proved the most significant, and 
for that reason the research can also be seen as providing a study into the formative 
learning processes of adult Christians..
In response to the research question, therefore, the thesis affirms the hypothesis that 
adult Christians’ faith influences the way they learn. It also affirms the hypothesis that 
the way they learn influences their faith on account of the conceptual and 
epistemological relationship between learning styles and faith.
As a result o f the study, a range of original contributions to knowledge have been 
made. No other empirical study o f Christian processes of learning has previously been 
conducted in a context which demonstrates not only a variety of specific 
characteristics, but distinguishes these from other learning patterns outside the 
Christian context. Never before have the inter-relationships between the scholarly 
concepts of learning styles, reflection and internalisation been demonstrated. A new 
approach to the study of experiential learning has been propounded. Within the 
context of Christian Education, the form/content relationship has been shown to be 
more significant than previously understood. Each of these leads to a series of new 
questions, ensuring the furthering of more research pertinent to these domains in the 
future.
It is hoped that this project will inspire such research. It is hoped that both those 
involved in the study of adult learning and in that o f adult Christian education will 
find the conclusions relevant and significant enough for them to be influential in their 
work. Most of all, it is hoped that this study will contribute not only to scholarship but 
also to an understanding leading to changes in practice so that learners, Christian or 
otherwise, will grow to become themselves.
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A p p e n d ix  A  
In te rv iew  q u e s t io n s
1. Why did you decide to come to college? Has it met your expectations? 
(Variations: Why did you decide to seek ordination and come for training? 
Why did you decide to become a nun?)
2. Give me a brief outline of how your faith and your learning at college have 
interacted in your life.
(Variations: ‘on your course’, or ‘as a nun’.)
3. Please outline and give examples of any or the various roles the bible has in 
your life.
4. Do you engage in debate about matters of faith with friends? If so, could you 
please describe an example or two?
(Respondents often enlarged this to include family.)
5. If you had to give a defence of your faith, what would you use as the basis for 
your justification?
6. Do you make a specific difference between reading books to aid you in 
devotion and reading books for study? How does your reading of the two 
differ?
7. Do you read theological books or listen to preachers and lecturers with an eye 
to whether they are ‘sound’ or not? If so, what criteria do you use?
8. When presented with a number of alternative positions or interpretations of 
biblical teaching, what is your normal reaction?
9. Tell me something you’ve learnt which has resulted in your faith changing in 
some way? What? How?
10. Tell me something you’ve experienced in your life which prompted you to 
revisit your understanding of your faith.
11. Are there any instances when you disagree with or react against something the 
bible says? What do you do with those passages?
12. Are there times when you find it difficult to accept your faith because people 
say, or you feel that what you believe is irrational?
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13. Have there been times when your experience of life has not backed up what 
you have been taught at college either generally, or from a specific lecturer? 
How did you respond?
14. There have recently been reports about God miraculously changing people’s 
ordinary dental fillings into gold in a church service. How do you react to such 
reports?
15. Is there an ethical issue or major social issue that you feel particularly strongly 
about? Could you explain to me the way you went about deciding on the 
position you adopted? What criteria did you use?
16. Do you think the faith position you hold affects the way you perceive the 
world and process information about it? If yes, can you explain how?
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A p p e n d ix  B  
S a m p le  in terv iew  t ra n sc r ip t s
Four sample interviews have been included, with no claims to representativeness. All 
twenty-one interviews were very different and space precluded even a sample based 
on such fundamentals as age, educational context, sex, nationality, churchmanship 
(denomination) and way of believing. The four provided were selected to give one 
example from each way of believing that included two men and two women, and one 
of the French interviewees. The latter is in French. A translation can be provided if 
required, although I did not translate the interview in order to work with and on it.
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Margaret, 32, Interpretive believer
Right, well here’s your first question then, which is ever so easy. Why did you decide 
to come to college, and has it met your expectations?
OK. Right. The first part of the question: for several reasons really. I was a teacher for 
the last seven years before coming to college. That’s something which I’d felt was 
going to be my life work as it were, when I started, but after seven years of teaching I 
realised that I didn’t want to spend the rest of my life doing that, and coming to 
college is partly to seek where my life ought to be going from here. That’s one reason. 
Another reason is that I have never engaged with my faith in the way I’d engaged 
with other issues, umm, and I wanted to do that. I felt a very uninformed Christian 
really. And with coming up against quite a few people in my church and other 
contexts, throwing things at me that I didn’t really know how to deal with and felt I 
should be able to deal with, umm, and then on a personal level as well sometimes 
coming up against things which I was seeking an answer for and felt that I needed 
better equipping, for that. As far as has it met my expectations (laughs), umm, I don’t 
think that I would ever have guessed what it could have been like really, before 
coming. Umm, it’s beginning to answer the thorny question of Where do we go from 
here? Though not in any very concrete way, it’s just throwing up options, really. As 
far as dealing with questions, answering challenges maybe that were thrown at me by 
other people, other Christians, or sorting out issues for myself, yes I can see I am 
working towards more confidence in that area. Umm, but at the same time, I can see 
that where I’d hoped to find answers, I’m maybe just in some cases finding that even 
the experts don’t have answers and that really all there are are a lot o f opinions. So in 
some cases where I was really hoping to come to a conclusion on something I’m just 
learning what the questions are, and realising that finding answers is a lot more 
difficult than I had thought.
Yes, (laughing), llmow what you mean! OK. Next question. You may find as you go 
along some of these questions overlap, so that won’t matter, but could you give me a 
brief outline of how your faith and the learning that you’ve experienced through your 
study have interacted in your life.
Right. Umm. My immediate thought is to talk about umm, how it interacted with my 
serving God. Will that be OK? Umm, the point that I came to college, as well as being 
quite disillusioned I suppose and having lots of questions about the career I’d been in 
and sort of feeling that wasn’t right for me any more, I’d also had a lot of questions 
about how I was to serve God particularly in my local church. I’d been you know in a 
lot o f situations where umm, specific umm avenues o f service had been thrust upon 
me rather than me choosing them really, and there’d been always a lot of pressure 
applied. I’d been at the same church ever since I was a child so I’d sort of grown up 
with this really. A lot of pressure applied (tape unintelligible) that this is something 
you ought to do or we really think this is something you’d be really good at and I’d 
very often felt that after I’d done whatever it was for a while that I really wasn’t very 
happy doing that. One of the significant changes that happened about the same time as 
coming to college was that I made a decision that I was going to find out how I
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wanted to serve God in my local church. So it meant cutting off a lot o f the things that 
I’d been cjomg before and exploring ways of serving God that I felt fitted to my 
particular gifts and tilings that I liked to do. And I approached it from that point of 
view. What do I like and enjoy doing? Rather than what do I feel other people are 
pressuring me to do? Or where are the gaps that I feel ought to be filled in? Umm, that 
has been something which I, I felt supported in in what I’ve learnt here, that, the 
whole idea of seeking service where you are happiest and most fiilfilled rather than as 
I say where people are throwing you. Umm, and yes, in what I’m doing at the 
moment, and in what I have done in my practical placements in my work and my 
service at church since I’ve been here has actually been informed an awful lot by what 
I’ve studied. And I think that’s happening on two levels really. There is the direct 
input and information from lectures and the application issues I’m being forced into 
doing by following the course, but also of course with the whole practical training 
structure there’s a whole lot more option for reflection and feedback and monitoring 
how things are going. So that’s helped in that area too. I think as far as, what I’m 
learning is reacting with my personal faith and I probably touched on that with the last 
question. Sort of where are the answers. This is more things like practical.
Good. Thanks. Third one. Please outline and give examples of any or the various 
roles the bible has in your life.
(Pause) That’s changing an awful lot at the moment, so (tape unintelligible) there’s a 
shift. (Pause) As far as reading the bible, in the time before coming to college, I would 
use various study guides or devotional aids to read the bible quite devotionally, and 
probably not that critically really (laughing). That’s changed an awful lot since I’ve 
been here. At the moment, I don’t spend time very regularly reading the bible in that 
way because I’ve, I’ve not found it a helpful exercise given all the other things that 
I’m thinking about and grappling with as far as the bible is concerned, in my studies. 
But that is not to say that it’s not having an impact cos as I study and read and think 
about what it has to say more critically I find that it’s impacting in a different way. 
(Pause).
Can you give me any examples?
Yes, I’m trying to think of one. Umm, I think that one of the most obvious ones and 
clearest ones for me would be the way that I would probably have read the Psalms 
before I came to college. In a very sort of ‘this is reflecting my situation’ type of 
response and umm, ‘I’m feeling very down today. Where can I find a Psalm that 
reflects my mood and bat it back to God?’ That sort of thing. And that’s something we 
actually discussed in our Old Testament lectures last year, the beginning of this year 
at some point. Umm, and I would now be reading those in a very veiy different light. 
Umm, I definitely wouldn’t be jumping to them very quickly in a situation like that. 
Quite what I’d be doing I’m not sure. I’d probably be going to other books as well to 
sort of back up what I was reading. Just trying to think if there was any other .... 
(pause) I feel, I sometimes sort of question this whole thing really, with the critical 
approach to reading the bible. I’ve been part of the Navigators group that’s been 
meeting in college, and we’ve had bible studies as part of that, and we’ve all noticed 
how hyper-critical we’ve been almost to the extent that well, Can it actually say 
anything to us any more? Are we just going to keep adding caveat after caveat? It
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might say this after all, or it could say that. So I’m aware of the danger of maybe 
difficulties, being so aware of questions and issues on a more academic critical level. I 
think I’m finding this quite difficult to answer and I think it’s something which I’m 
right in the middle of. It’s blowing up at the moment.
Mmm. Right, that’s fine. Yes, no problem at all. Absolutely no problem. Let’s see.
Here’s the fourth one. Do you engage in debate about matters offaith with friends? If 
you do could you describe an example or two?
Well definitely yes, for the first question. Umm, and on two levels really. Umm, one 
in the context of our studies, very very (tape unintelligible). Why do issues or specific 
issues that we’re studying umm touch on us, on our lives, umm, just being involved in 
whatever ... somebody’s writing an essay on divorce, which I’ve just done last term so 
we were having a very very deep discussion about the whole issue o f divorce and 
remarriage, so that I suppose for most of us there was an issue that was a little bit 
outside of our experience but none the less quite sort of relevant. Umm, (pause) and 
yes, I would also be debating umm matters of more personal things, maybe things less 
connected specifically to studies. Umm, something which, to give a specific example, 
has come up a couple of times recently has been an appreciation o f how God, or as 
myself and a friend concerned have seen it, has spoken to each of us very differently 
about the same situation. Umm, to move us from maybe the extreme position that we 
stand in somewhere further towards a middle ground somewhere. Umm, and the 
friend concerned really felt God speaking to her concerning being more strict with 
herself, more disciplined with herself in her devotional life, and in her faith and 
perhaps in general. Umm, she felt that she’d been taking grace for granted, almost, 
whereas I felt that because I’ve been in the habit o f taking, of being quite harsh on 
myself, that I, I was being spoken to about relaxing a bit more, almost coming back to 
what you were talking about in chapel a few weeks ago, about being rather than 
doing, things like that, but our reactions were set off by the same incident and we 
actually spent quite a lot o f time arguing at complete cross purposes with each other 
about it until we realised where we were both coming from and why we had such a 
different reaction.
Mmm. That’s interesting.
The matter which set it off was umm, a Keith Green song which I react to very very 
badly (laughing), because I sort o f heard the very powerful message and immediately 
felt quite condemned about what it was saying and then sort o f felt, well, why should I 
feel like this? She said, Oh no, I don’t feel it’s condemning me at all, I just feel it’s 
encouraging me to be more disciplined! And so that was what set it off. And then we 
began to notice that we were reacting in similar ways to all sorts o f other stimuli as 
well.
Mmm. Thank you! OK. Here’s another one. There are sixteen in all. And they’ve got 
numbers so you can see how far you’ve got up to (laughing). So number five: If you 
had to give a defence of your faith, what would you use as the basis of your 
justification, and why?
(Pause) My justification, or my justification of my faith?
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Both and; either or...
Umm, before I came to college, I would have always tried to defend Christian faith by 
trying to use as logical an argument as I possibly could, given whatever the situation 
was that was being discussed. Umm, and one of the things that really struck me in the 
first year here was that that has a definite limit. And I was really really stunned by 
lecturers and cases in books as well where people that I maybe would have looked to 
for the ultimate logical argument would just turn round and say, Well in the end my 
experience is all I can offer you here, as a defence o f the Christian faith. Umm, so I 
would now be more inclined to use that as a (interrupting: Your experience?) my own 
personal experience. That’s not to say discounting logic at all (sure) but I think 
previously I would have felt I’d lost the argument completely or I’d failed completely 
if I hadn’t managed to persuade someone of the logic of something. Umm, so that has 
undergone a change there. (Pause)
Would you be able to think of an example of an experience that you would use in that 
sort of an argument?
I don’t think I would necessarily be able to use one specific experience. I think I 
would have to talk about God’s leading and guiding in my whole life. Particularly in 
retrospect. I’d have to use that rather than any one dramatic experience.
OK. That’s great. Thank you. Umm, here’s number six. Do you make a specific 
difference between reading books to aid you in devotion and reading books for study? 
And then if you do, how does your reading of the two differ?
(Pause) In principle yes, I do. Umm, although I find myself sometimes slipping from 
one to the other in the sense of reading a book for study which is really impacting me 
in some way, which can become devotional. But I do tend to keep the two separate. 
And I would separate them out by the time and place of reading. And also when I read 
to study, I make copious notes, which I wouldn’t do if I was reading devotionally. I’d 
just be reading, basically. Relying on my memory to take things on board. Umm, I’m 
also aware of reading much more critically when I read to study, which I often get 
caught out in, because I can get very carried away in reading devotional books, and 
maybe not be as critical as I ought to be. Does that help?
When you take notes when you study, what sort of notes do you take?
It depends really on how the whole thing’s set out. I’m trying to train myself at the 
moment to take less notes than I have been in the past. Umm, so I’m now trying to 
read two or three pages and then to do a summary... whereas before it was kind of 
paragraph by paragraph almost. Very very detailed. Umm, but obviously it depends 
on the structure of the argument and the way the whole thing is set out. And I am also 
now trying to read books for study purposes and actually not make notes at all. 
Sometimes, in some cases. Cos I just find myself too boimd to the whole process of 
writing and not thinking. Does that answer your question?
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Yes, that’s fine. Thank you. OK. Umm, so number seven. Do you read theological 
books or listen to preachers and lecturers with an eye to whether they are sound or 
not? If so, what criteria do you use?
Hmm. Yes, I touched on that there. I possibly, if I’m reading theological books for 
study then I’m more likely to read, have my critical antennae up, than if I was reading 
for devotional purposes. Although I, I find now umm, after my ... here that I’m getting 
much more critical. Just generally. And I’m not always sure that I like that in myself. I 
sometimes wish that that wasn’t the case. I can almost feel myself becoming hyper­
critical in some cases. Umm, (long pause) the criteria I would use for judging whether 
somebody’s sound or not, that’s difficult. I’d probably be looking for or considering 
how they’d base their argument on scripture. Whether they based it on a passage that 
they claimed to be drawing it from, or if what they said matched with ideas on the 
same subject, or could ... to the same subject elsewhere in scripture. (Long pause). I 
can’t really think of any other...
No, that’s fine. If, you know, as we go on, if you want to come back to any of them, 
that’s also fine. Sometimes that happens, doesn’t itI
Yes, it does. It’s sort of a...
Right. Here’s the next one. When presented with a number of alternative positions or 
interpretations of biblical teaching, what’s your normal reaction?
Despair! (Laughter) Umm, this is a situation which I can think of principally as 
occurring when I’m writing an essay. I would be going into a number of positions. It 
could come up preachers mentioning two alternatives in a sermon, but it actually 
makes me think more o f my studies in essays. I’m trying to think o f any specific 
recent examples. Yes, I mean, my essay on divorce I suppose, that I’ve just done for 
the (tape unintelligible) and the approach, the reaction that I took. The approach that I 
took was to, obviously for the purposes of the essay, reading up on all four of them 
and then coming to a decision, not just for the sake of the essay but for myself 
personally, which one of the four I felt was the one that I (tape unintelligible: took a 
stand on?).
How did you come to that decision?
In reading. In reading round. And thinking also of specific instances, tilings that had 
happened in my church, trying to think of applying situations pastorally rather than 
just academically. Yes, I’m not happy if I end up sitting on the fence when there’s 
more than (tape unintelligible). My ideal would always be to try and work out where I 
was on a particular issue. I’m not particularly happy with loose ends. Umm, although 
as I said before, having come here, I’m beginning to understand that there are so many 
of them, and that maybe some things I’ll just have to leave in that position. But I still 
sort o f have this feeling that wanting to find answers and knowing that I’ll be 
expected to have answers. Umm, so yes, I would want to, you know, come to 
conclusions.
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Right Thank you. Tell me something you’ve learnt which has resulted in your faith 
changing in some way. How has it changed, and why?
(Pause) I’m trying to think of something that I’ve learnt here.
It doesn’t need to be, actually.
(Pause) I’ll just have to start talking and hope that this comes out! I may have to 
backtrack and go over it a few times before it, it’s clear (OK). Umm, the biggest 
change, biggest lesson that I’ve, I believe I have learnt in my Christian life, which is 
going back now nineteen, eighteen years, is the relationship between faith and works. 
Umm, I spent a lot of my early years as a Christian in a fairly nominal Anglican 
church where obviously, you know, one was ‘doing the right thing’ being moral and 
upright, that’s my family background anyway. And that sort of teaching laid over 
what was actually a very, a fairly typical conversion experience in evangelical terms.
It drove me into a position o f always feeling that I had to somehow earn God’s favour. 
It’s quite complicated, but that was essentially what it was. And that, that came to a 
head when I was at university previously being challenged with all kinds of 
(mission?) opportunities and (...) opportunities which were just so huge and realising 
for the first time just how much there was out there that could be done. The challenge 
of being faced with that, and against the background of feeling that God’s favour was 
something to be earned was almost too much to cope with really. And (tape 
unintelligible) trying to sort out the relationship between faith and work, and being 
clear about that, trying to be clear about that. That, that came about by being in 
situations where there was better teaching on that particular issue than what I was 
subjected to earlier on. Only because it’s been something that I’ve really had to pursue 
for my ow n... because it’s been such a big issue for me. So it’s something which I’m 
working out. (Tape unintelligible) And I think it’s also related very much to what I 
was talking about in terms o f learning to serve through things I enjoy rather than 
things I feel I ought to do. It hasn’t been something which I’ve learnt necessarily in an 
academic channel, it’s something I’ve gradually picked up through experience as it 
were. And has been reinforced.
Mmm . That’s grand. Yeah. Great example. Thank you. This one is a little bit similar, 
but it’s got a slightly different nuance to it. Tell me something you’ve experienced in 
your life which has prompted you to revisit your understanding of your faith.
(Long pause) It’s difficult to think of something which is bigger. Than ... that’s the 
example which I have come back to time and time again and got wrong and failed to 
understand and had to rework through again.
Could you... OK, don’t change the example then, but that one was looking at the 
learning, and this is looking at the experience. So what was is that you experienced 
that... (Right) Can you see what I’m saying?
Yes I can, yes.
What was it about the experience that made you...
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The experience which prompted seeking I suppose. The idea that this awful feeling of 
I can never be good enough and I’ve got to keep on doing as much as I can and more 
has come to a head several times by being challenged with something which is just 
too huge for me to cope with. A feeling that there was a need which I ought to have 
met, somebody else’s need which I ought to have met and wasn’t able to, or being 
shocked maybe by my own selfishness and having to re-evaluate where ... I suppose 
an example would have been something similar to listening to the speaker on 
Wednesday evening. And obviously what she had to say was very very challenging, 
and my experience, my response at one point in my life would have been a sense of 
condemnation, that here was this woman doing all these wonderful things, so 
obviously it was humanly possible, and to feel that well I jolly well ought to be out 
there doing the same tiling really. It was tilings like that that brought that on. Whereas 
now, although that was my first reaction, my second reaction was to get hold of 
myself and say right, this is the issue that we’re always trying to deal with now, so sit 
down and try and work out how God wants you to react to what you’ve just heard. 
And what your response should be rather than the immediate tiling of condemnation. 
And just being totally unworthy.
That’s great. Two different sides of the same question, really. That’s lovely, thanks. 
OK. Now we go back to the bible. Are there any instances when you disagree with or 
react against something the bible says? What do you do with those passages?
(Pause) Yes, is the answer to the first part of the question. Definitely. I, what I do with 
those passages depends very much on what it is that I disagree with. Sometimes it’s 
plain disobedience. In which case I struggle with it and hope that one day I would 
learn to obey it, or come to want to obey it. My first reaction is to try and find a way 
round the obvious meaning, I think, really (laughter). By reading an interpretation I 
actually like. But I’m aware when I’m doing that, that I’m playing games with myself. 
Yes, usually what I do now is try to stand back and say, does this actually say what I 
think it says? Let’s try and find that out first. But then, well I can do that one of two 
ways. I can either be back again faced with the same issue that I didn’t like when I 
first read it cos, how I’d reacted to it was actually the way that most people do 
anyway, qr maybe discover that there is another way of looking at it.
Mmm. Any examples?
I’m just trying to think. Umm, Again, this (tape unintelligible) and it’s something 
which I’m in the middle of working through at the moment, so I may not have a valid 
conclusion, the whole issue of singleness is something which I’m working through 
before God at the moment. And when I read certain passages which seem to suggest 
that that is the, almost the preferable way of Christian life, something inside me rises 
up in revolt (laughter) because I don’t want that to be the answer. Umm, so my 
reaction has been to go and get commentaries on 1 Corinthians 7 and try and find out 
it doesn’t actually mean that after all. Umm, and obviously it’s always possible to find 
people who say that it actually doesn’t, but then I’m always brought back to the fact 
that there is something there that I need to face up to and work through.
What brings you back?
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I suppose if you read enough you always come back to somebody with the opposite 
point of view. (Pause) I suppose different tilings, that, and just going back to the 
passage again and reading it again and thinking, well actually, from all the 
interpretations o f ... I have read, there’s still something here which I do need to 
explore because it is my situation. Even though I don’t like it. I’d much prefer it if the 
bible said you should get married. That’s something that is very personal. I (tape 
unintelligible). I can’t think of anything else that would bring me back. There again, I 
think it’s just because I’m, having read that, I would then go out and explore different 
(tape unintelligible) bring you back to what you felt when you first read it. But no 
conclusions on that one!
No conclusions. OK! (Laughter) Fine. Thanks. Here’s the next one. Are there times 
when you find it difficult to accept your faith because people say or you feel that what 
you believe is irrational?
(Pause) I think I mentioned earlier there are certainly times when I’ve tried to argue 
the logic, rationality of my faith, believing in a way that I would try to persuade 
people, justify it. (Pause). Yeah, and I would still like, I like people to think that I’m 
veiy well thought out and worked out. So yes, having this sort of unexplained element 
which I can’t quite get a handle on it is very difficult at times. (Long pause).
An example? (Laughter)
No, I’m just reading again the first bit where it’s ‘finding it difficult to accept my 
faith...’; Umm, I suppose the situation it tends to put me in is that I just shut up about 
it really. I don’t think, it doesn’t give me any problems with my faith in myself, umm, 
because as I say, it’s irrational and I don’t have a problem with that in myself but I 
would then go on to not share with people, not talk about it. (Long pause). It’s more 
likely to come from people saying, than me feeling that what I believe is irrational.
So you don’t particularly
No, no, it’s not something that comes from me. I’ve always seen I suppose the need to 
justify logically something that other people need rather than me as a believer as it 
were. (Pause) I can’t think of any specific situations...
That’s fine. I don’t want to, you know, prolong things if there’s nothing more to say; 
on the other hand I don Y want to shut you up if you ’re thinking still (laughter).
Yes, they’re getting shorter my answers.
No, not really, not really. Umm, have there been times when your experience of life 
has not backed up what you’ve been taught either generally or from a specific 
lecturer? If so, how did you respond?
(Pause) I can’t think of an example, from a lecture. I can think of an example from the 
reading I was given for an essay, which, where, in the context of a pastoral theology 
essay, where the advice that was coming from a lot of what I was reading was not 
matching an experience. I was pursuing this particular topic because of the experience
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of a friend at church who’s had a particularly serious mental illness, and has 
undergone counselling and has been told there are things in her background as a child 
which have contributed to this, and so out o f interest, I was exploring those issues, for 
a pastoral theology essay. And having spent a lot of time with that friend, and having 
seen how that experience completely undermined her faith, her ability to respond to 
Christian encouragement, I found the advice I ... the reading that I was doing on how 
to deal with that particular situation pastorally, quite inadequate. It was coming from a 
very very specifically Christian viewpoint. That particular issue wasn’t touched on in 
lectures, but that’s where I found a mismatch, and because she’s now very much 
better, I showed her some of the literature that I was reading and she was absolutely 
aghast at the idea of having some of these ideas thrown at her in that particular state.
So that made quite an interesting conclusion to the essay as well! To come back with 
the actual specific experience... Yes, I can’t think of anything other, apart from that 
one.
That’s fine. There have recently been reports about God miraculously changing 
people’s ordinary dental fillings into gold in a church service. How do you react to 
such reports?
I was reading about it in the Students’ Centre and my reaction was just, how stupid! 
(Laugher). Why would God want to do that? Scepticism, with a huge S, I’m afraid.
Yes, so scepticism to the report, or scepticism to God...?
Scepticism about God actually doing this.
And could you push that a bit further? Cos there are implications to that...
Yes. Umm, for me it smacks o f prosperity theology really. And I don’t see how 
there’s any gain physically or spiritually to be got for anybody by having their dental 
fillings changed into gold. I think that’s, actually not a good explanation.
Yes, sort of I mean... I suppose what I was trying to get at was more ... because my 
reaction also is the same, so therefore do I believe the reports, does it actually 
happen? Does God do that?
OK, in theory, yes, God can do that. I don’t have a problem with the idea that it’s 
possible in theory. But I suppose my, just my view maybe of what God is about, or 
what, I suppose my expectations of what he would or wouldn’t do maybe are driving 
this one. (Long pause) I don’t know what else to say! (Laughter)
No, that ’sfine. That’s fine. That makes me laugh, that question. Yeah, no, that’s fine. 
We ’re nearly at the end here, so... Is there an ethical issue or a major social issue that 
you feel particularly strongly about and if so, could you explain to me the way you 
went about deciding on the position that you adopted and what criteria you used?
(Pause) Umm, I suppose in this case I could give a specific example of an issue that 
challenged me in the way that the lecture last night did. Umm, when I was at 
university before, I came across for the very first time in my life homeless people...
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which I’d never noticed before, walking around my home town. But when I went to 
university, there were the homeless, very very obvious. My reaction was at the time 
was, I ought to do something about this, which was very typical, for me, in that 
particular state of mind. The problem was what and how to react, and as I explained 
earlier on, it actually became quite a theological issue in working out, part of the 
working out of the relationship between faith and works really. (Pause) Umm, 
because at the time it was obvious that I had more of a, a problem with the theological 
aspect of the issue rather than actually getting up and doing anything, umm, I chose 
to, to not do anything at that particular time but to try and sort out what my 
motivations were for wanting to do something, and to try and really sort out my view 
of my salvation and serving God and the relationship between faith and works... umm, 
(pause) and I suppose in a way, that situation now is an ongoing extension of that, 
because, well, I have an interest still and support from a distance, as it were, and 
through supporting the right... charities, and things like that. I’ve never actually got 
into the situation where I’ve got personally involved and actually done something 
about it, or rather, I’ve actually (tape unintelligible) umm, yeah, I think for me, in 
trying to react to that issue, or another issue like it, first of all making sure I’m feeling 
what I’m feeling or doing what I’m doing for the right reasons and the right 
motivations, and ... my relationship with God, rather than just this gut reaction of 
guilt, that I didn’t have... And that would be the criteria I would probably use again. I 
now realise I’m absolutely sure I made the right decision to stop (tape unintelligible) 
was actually moving in the other direction and thinking, well, that’s fair enough, but 
now that maybe you are a bit more sorted, what are you going to dol The practical 
thing came back again. I have really struggled with the whole issue o f practical 
outworking and my relationship with God. (Tape unintelligible)
Right, that’s fine. Thank you. That’s great. Don’t ever get worried, That’s fine! Here’s 
the last one. Do you think the faith position you hold affects the way you perceive the 
world and process information about it, and if yes, can you explain how?
I would definitely say it does, yes. Umm, I’ll have to think for a bit to give you some 
examples. (Long pause) I’ve got two tracks going on ... global, and my environment.
Talk about both, if you want. Or one or the other, it really doesn ’t matter.
(Long pause) (Tape unintelligible) I’m not being very helpful here. (Laughter)
Don’t worry.
I mean, I want to say yes, in every way. You know, it’s the ... through which I think 
through everything, but how to get a handle on, where to start, by describing that... I 
suppose in a general way, well, in both senses, in my immediate world and the larger 
world, I would always want to ... and wondering what God ... trying to do in that 
particular event. Umm, I suppose, maybe, maybe the issue about providence, you 
know, is this something which is of God, or not of God in a particular event on both 
levels. In my immediate world, my immediate environment, the question would be I 
think it’s something which I have to just accept and learn from, or am I meant to try to 
change things. And in the larger context, as it were, international events, trying to 
work out what my reaction in prayer should be to that. (Tape unintelligible). I wanted
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to say something about having a particular slant on my view of tilings in the world, 
because I know that in the past I have reacted to situations almost unthinkingly, I’ve 
been really taken aback by non-Christian friends who have just turned round and said 
‘How could you possibly have thought that?’ and just been really, totally unaware that 
my reaction to an event or incident was just not the same as other people’s. Umm, but 
I’m afraid I can’t think of any specific example. As I say, in that sense it is 
unconscious, but it’s very different and I’m not even aware most of the time of the 
way my faith position does affect the way I perceive the world, but I know that it 
does. And that’s what I’m struggling to try and find a concrete example, but I really 
really can’t think of something specific, but I know it has happened. I also think that 
(...) I’ve reacted to things with other Christians and I’ve realised at that point how 
within my faith position, my personal position is veiy blinkered, and my reading of 
what I was expecting Christians ... not the only one. So I think the faith position you 
hold has also got a double-edged thing. Christianity ... my own personal faith ... 
(laughter). So the more I look at this and the more I think about it, the more sort of 
permutations I can think of. Ways of answering it.
You tell me when to switch the tape off If you think there’s no more you ’d like to say, 
then that’s fine.
I probably need to write an essay on it actually! (Laughter). Yes it does, I know that 
much. In a personal way and in an overall way. But because no specific examples 
spring to mind at the moment, I really can’t explain. I think I need a, I need a concrete 
example to get my hands round if I’m going to give you that information. That’s as 
much as I can say.
That’s fine. Thank you very much indeed.
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Frances, 52, Related believer
OK. The first question is fairly predictable I think. Why did you decide to train for 
ordination and has the training met your expectations?
It was not really a decision about training for ordination. The decision was about 
whether or not I acknowledged a vocation, and then having acknowledged it, whether 
I decided to test it. And so, in a sense, the training was a given if my sense of vocation 
was confirmed. And so it wasn’t a, it wasn’t a decision about the training, it was a 
decision about something else, about responding to something else. Umm, and 
because it was a given, I don’t suppose I actually stopped and thought about it. In my 
youth, I trained as a solicitor, and I had fairly clear expectations about what that 
would do. And I didn’t think about this in the same way. And, I think as far as I had 
expectations, it hasn’t met them. I expected that it would be more, more practical. 
More about the doing and less about the believing. Umm, and so I was surprised at 
how much of the course is actually really a theology course, and how little we are 
getting, so far, although I’m sure it will come...
This is the end of year one, isn’t it.
Yes, that’s right. About other aspects. About things like organising worship and, 
umm, we get taught about the theory of tilings like baptism, but we have not had at 
this stage tucked into it a chance to practice, umm, the difficulties of being gowned 
and holding a baby and trying to pour water on it without dropping it on the stone 
floor.
(Laughing) I’d never even thought about that!
And it’s those sort of things, umm, that I had expected there would be more of. And 
again, some of the work we’ve been doing this week is useful but it has again 
surprised me I think, because it has been more focused on us as people than on 
working with others. And I can see why that is, and now it’s happening I can see that 
that is almost certainly right, and appropriate, and that it will be helpflil and that I will, 
as I work through it, internalise it, and it will be extremely useful, but it is not what I 
expected. And I think that’s it.
Mmm. I can see... to prod you a little bit then, umm, why ordination, then?
Why ordination? Umm, because for a long time I had this sort of prodding, poking, 
being umm, whatever it is a sheepdog does, having that sort of done to me. And I tried 
all sorts of other things, because I didn’t really want to be ordained. And I kept 
thinking, well if I... It’s how I got into the work I’m doing, for goodness sake. Well, 
this is useful, it’s nice, it’s helping people, I can express my faith here. In a pragmatic, 
practical, useful way. Umm, and so I kept on trying different things, and they were 
none of them right. And so eventually, this was about all that was left. Umm, and it 
was a very long and in some ways quite painful process. And I was very fearful when
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I went and spoke to my parish Priest and said, I do have this horrible feeling that... 
And he said, Oh, I’ve been waiting for you to come...
Oh really.
Yes. I mean, it had been there, I think, in, in his mind for a while. And so he was very 
supportive. And then there was a series o f discussions with the ADO and, uh... But 
once I’d, I’d started down that road, all the internal, spiritual discomfort and the 
proddings and the pokings and the, the being drawn back from paths I’d chosen, 
stopped. And it just felt right. And although it hasn’t been easy, and I don’t expect it 
to be easy, there is an internal comfort and tranquillity that wasn’t there before, even 
at the worst times.
Mmm. I can understand that. Highlights of the course? And lowlights?
Highlights. Oh, well. Umm, some o f the highlights are some of the things that have 
been intellectually most difficult. I think partly because they have been taught by 
someone who just, well, he’s got a Rolls Royce mind. There is no, no other way I can 
find to describe it. And because he has that sort of mind, he is not afraid to share with 
us in humility. His questing and journeying and voyaging, and that is actually very 
encouraging when you see someone who has spent years and years wrestling with 
these very complex, difficult, unfathomable things, trying to make some sort o f  
human sense of them. And having the, the generosity to, to try to express them in a 
way, or indeed to succeed usually in expressing them in a way that makes them 
accessible to the likes of me, who do have difficulty with them, so I think those are 
highlights. Umm, some of the, some of the things we’ve done which have been fun. 
That have made us laugh and that we have shared in those ways, I think have been 
highlights, because again it could be terribly stodgy and solemn and pie, and I don’t... 
I think if all the time you’re being solemn and focused on the task and not taking that 
relief and relaxation that comes with laughter, it’s hard. Lowlights. Lowlights... the 
first weekend we had away, we had a man who came and talked at us for an hour and 
a half at a time about the origins of the communion service.
(Laughing) For your first weekend!
And we discovered afterwards that he’s claustrophobic, so that clearly was difficult 
for him too. But he, he gave us what he described as umm, an abridged book list, and 
it ‘was two very closely typed sides o f A4. And he had clearly just put down 
everything on it that came to mind, whether it was accessible, whether it was in 
English, whether it was in print... And as I say, he talked to us for an hour and a half 
at a time. And when you’re my age, your joints do begin to protest if you have to sit 
still for an hour an a half, and pay attention, faithfully! Umm, and I think he was a real 
lowlight at that point. And the other thing that was a lowlight, and again I think it’s 
because of where I come from. We had a few sessions on looking at social issues. 
Issues in society, and there were things in there like crime, and discrimination, and 
I’m not at all sure what the objective was or what we were meant to get out o f them, 
and I felt that in some ways they actually confirmed people in their prejudices rather 
than making them think again, and the evening when we were looking at race in 
particular was difficult because we had a visitor. And he was veiy full o f himself. And
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he was, there were a group of four, five of us, and he and the person he’d come with 
were clearly not, no I’m being judgmental, the impression I gained of them on that 
evening was that they did not really understand what the question is when it comes to 
thing like racial discrimination and prejudice. And the other members of my group 
began by trying to have a sensible discussion and we rather got swamped by this 
character and in the end, they shut up. And as we left, one of the others came up to me 
and said, I really wanted to hit him. And I said, Well, I do wish you’d said something, 
cos I would have held him so you could! And he woman who’d been sitting in the 
next group who’d been having a not dissimilar thing, and she said, Did you notice 
there was a point in the evening when I was rolling my sleeves up and clenching my 
fists! And so that was a bit of a lowpoint because all that we achieved was to confirm 
ourselves in our own positions and we didn’t actually meet in any constructive or 
educative way. And so there was no possibility of movement. All we did was dig 
ourselves into trenches. And I’m sure that wasn’t the purpose, but it was what 
happened.
Mmm. The result.
Mmm.
OK. Thank you. That’s fine. Let’s move onto the next question then, which asks you to 
give me a brief outline of how your faith and your studies on the course have 
interacted in your life.
Gosh. That’s a big one.
Yes, it is. Probably the biggest, actually.
Umm, (pause) I think they have... A number of things have happened by starting 
down this road, and by being on this course, it has become much clearer to many 
more people what my faith is and how important it is to me, which is an indictment of 
how I was before, I suppose. But nevertheless, it’s what’s happened, and it was 
possible before to go, say, to regional meetings o f the association I work for, and it is 
quite possible to be in those meetings with a whole lot o f people who are all 
committed to a juster society... I don’t think you can survive in the association unless 
you have some sense of a more just society. I really don’t. So it was possible to be in 
those meetings and look round them, and not be able to distinguish people by 
religious conviction or anything else. And there was no reason why you should. And 
indeed, if you’ve got people there who were particularly proselytising in any way, 
then in a sense, they weren’t getting it right, because one of the things in the 
association is you, you cannot impose your views and ideas on others. So in a sense 
that was right. But since I started on this course, it has meant that people have known 
about it, because they say, What are you doing now, and I tell them. And so it has... I 
don’t think it’s actually changed a lot about how we relate, but it has added something 
to their information about me. Umm, and in some ways I’m quite glad if it hasn’t 
changed how we relate because it means that neither then nor now have I been false 
either to myself or my faith, which I’m pleased about. At home, the only real 
difference it’s made is that there are times when I say very firmly to the family, Look 
I have got to get my head down and do some studying, or I’ve got to be away at the
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weekend. And so we’ve had those sort of negotiations, but again it’s not major, it’s, 
umm, more about the practical things in life. And making sure, because I’m a widow 
and I have, for most of this year, had three adult children at home, all of whom have 
needed different sorts of support and what have you. It has been a case of making sure 
that they have felt that I am not going off and doing this and abandoning them, and 
that I do still have time for them, and they are still important. In the wider family, 
almost all my other relatives and a great many of my friends are atheists, and they all 
now have this slightly suspicious view of me. My parents are particularly anxious, and 
it really has affected my relationship with them and my brother, quite seriously, and 
we’re having to work on that, hard. And I’m not sure that they have recognised how 
differently they are treating me as a result. But my friends have been OK, and it hasn’t 
been the same problem for them, interestingly, as it has for my blood relatives.
Mmm. It’s often the case, isn’t it.
Yes. How else have they interacted with my life? The other thing that I think has 
happened is that, as I’ve come across different ideas and new ideas, and new 
perspectives on things, it has related back into all sorts of aspects of my life in various 
ways, anfl I suddenly will find myself in the association or at a school governors’ 
meeting ar whatever, suddenly making links that I don’t think I would have made 
before.
Can you think of any examples of that?
Umm, not immediately. If I think of one I’ll tell you later.
OK. That’s fine. Well, let’s go on to number three, which is, Please outline and give 
examples of any or the various roles that the bible has in your life.
Gosh! (Pause) I think it’s a source book. I think it is a book that tells us about God’s 
relationship with his creation and about how that has developed, and what it means, 
and as a result, I think it contains guidance on how we should behave towards other 
people, towards God, towards creation, and not necessarily in that order. I, having 
said that, I get very uncomfortable and have never been able for myself to see it as a 
book where, when somebody says, Is this right or wrong, I can open it and find 
something that says, Yes, this is right or wrong. And this relates particularly... One of 
the great things at the moment is the debate on homosexuality that’s going on, and 
some of the things around sexual matters generally and some of the tilings about 
authority, and I do have problems with some of the things in there about the role of 
women, because I’m aware that there is a danger when you pick and choose and say, 
yes this is universally applicable down the years, and that is culturally moderated and 
we can disregard it. But nevertheless, I think one has to be intelligent about it and 
look at, look at it as a whole, almost. And pick out the things that are consistent, and 
stick with those. And I think there are things in there that are just wonderfully 
consistent about God’s love and God’s patience, and about the need to treat 
everything that is with respect because it is made by God, because it is good. And 
because this is what is asked of us, I think. I think if that’s where you come from, then 
a lot of the other issues actually begin to sort out. But that’s a personal view. I think 
the bible can be an inspiration in all sorts of ways. Umm, sometimes reading it and
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looking at it, thinking about it, praying it through, finding what it says at that moment, 
either as part of a course of study or regular bible readings or just those moments 
when you sit down and think, I’ll open it and see what’s there. That can be usefiil. 
Umm, I think it can be... I use it sometimes when I cannot find the words to say what I 
want. And... what else... I think it is also something that prompts a lot of questions, 
because the more I look, and the more I read, the more I realise I don’t know. Or 
haven’t thought through.
Mmm. Yeah, yeah. It’s a challenge, too, isn’t it.
Yes.
Great. Thank you. Number four. Do you engage about matters offaith with friends or 
family? If so, please describe an example or two.
I think it’s probably truer to say that friends and family engage in debates about faith 
with me!
(Laughs) Alright.
Yes. Umm, which can be quite uncomfortable, because they sort of suddenly come at 
you from out of vision, and plonk something down in front of you.
And say, Deal with this!
Yes. And it’s not always a good answer to say that that’s in year two of the course! 
And I haven’t done year two. Umm, I can remember sitting in a garden in Somerset a 
year ago, nice weather, having had a really good meal with very dear friends, and one 
of them suddenly said that How can you believe in God when there is suffering? And 
I began to discuss this, but one of the difficulties we had was that they were, it felt 
that they were unwilling to hear a distinction I would make between suffering which 
is in a sense naturally occurring and suffering which is created by man, because I 
really think it is wrong, deeply wrong, to blame God for what we do. And I would 
include in that some of the things that humanity has done, like building cities in places 
that are perhaps, umm, commercially desirable but subject to flood or earthquake or 
whatever. Take the earthquake in Turkey today. It seems to me that a lot of the 
problem there is that humanity has not worked with the rest of creation but has put up 
buildings that in fact work against it. And I think it’s revealing that houses built by the 
Ottomans in the fourteenth century have survived pretty well intact, and it’s the 
twentieth century concrete blocks which are designed to get maximum 
accommodation, and so presumably maximum rent or maximum land value out of a 
small space, that have failed. So that was difficult, umm, and we didn’t actually 
resolve it. And another occasion, I was staying with my brother, and he suddenly said, 
I can’t agree with you because you won’t accept Buddhism or anything else. And 
again, we had this... It was a conversation where we missed each other because he felt 
he knew what I believed and was telling me, but wasn’t asking. And was not 
altogether comfortable when I tried to explain. But something must have gone in 
because when my daughter went and stayed with him this year, she said that he 
suddenly said to her, Well of course, the problem I have with your mother is that she
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won’t accept Buddhism and all these other things. And my daughter started explaining 
where she thought I was coming from, and she said, he suddenly reacted as if he’d 
heard part of it before and could hear more, so that was useful for me, because even 
though I feel I’m not being listened to at the time maybe some of it is sinking in and I 
can come back and... But those are the two that spring to mind most forcefully.
Mmm. They ’re good examples. OK. This one I think you ’re probably having to do 
quite a lot of. If you had to give a defence of your faith, what would you use as the 
basis for your justification? And I suppose in the first instance what I’m thinking of is 
how you defend your faith to yourself. In other words, why are you a Christian, ifyou 
had to explain to somebody else why you are a Christian...
I am a Christian because I feel I have met God and experienced God. And felt his 
presence and his love. And that there is a relationship between us. And so, in a sense, 
for me it is not a lot different from being a friend or a partner or a parent or a child or 
whatever. It is a real relationship, one to one, with somebody else. And why that 
relationship is expressed through the Christian faith is, I suppose, partly because of 
where I was bom and brought up, in that nothing else was presented to me until really 
quite late in life. But also because even allowing for the very, very limited knowledge 
and understanding I have of other faiths, the relationship that I feel I have seems to me 
best expressed through the, through what the bible says and through my understanding 
of that loving, concerned, present, unique, forgiving, reforming God. And I mean 
reforming in the sense of taking all the mess we make and being able to reshape it. 
Like a good potter, into something which is good and beautiful and right.
Which came first? Your, umm, your relationship with God or, or the Christian part, if 
you see what I mean.
I think the Christian part came first, and it was quite an intellectual thing for a long 
time. And it began, really, when I was in my teens. I, as teenage rebellion I joined the 
church youth club. Sad, but true!
Wonderful! Was that to rebel against your parents?
Yes. Umm, and part of the reason I did that was because my friends went, and part of 
it because it was, it was a way of expressing me, safely. But part of it was because I 
couldn’t see any other explanation for the existence of people and the world and 
everything else. And I still can’t. I think if you don’t have a God, if I don’t have a 
God I can’t explain how tilings come to be. And when scientists got wonderfully 
excited about a year ago because they thought they’d found the origin of life on earth 
and it came from Mars, I didn’t think it actually answered the question, because it was 
just moving the locus away, but it didn’t actually explain how life began on Mars in 
order to translate to earth. So I sort of began from there. Really. And some of my 
friends who were Christians clearly had something going for them that intrigued me. 
And that sort of went on and off, down the years. And I didn’t... There were moments 
when I sort of caught a glimpse of something out of a comer of my eye, but it was 
really quite late on before that sense of the reality of the personal relationship really 
broke in. And it began to make sense. So I, I began to recognise at that point that what 
I had been taking in as a taught thing suddenly became a real, internal thing.
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Mmm. That’s great. Thank you. OK. We’re moving into study, so this is number six. 
Do you make a specific difference between reading books to aid you in devotion and 
reading books for study? If so, how does your reading of the two differ?
No I don’t make a difference. Umm...
Now, or at any time? Never have?
No. Umm, and I think it’s because I can’t separate them out in a way, and so I may be 
reading a book that I might not have chosen to read but because it’s on the booklist 
and I need to read it to study. And it throws up all these wonderful ideas and insights 
and... casts light into dusty corners, shows me where my spiritual garden needs 
weeding, which is part of what devotional reading is about. Or just suddenly brings 
me up short. Umm, and in the same way, reading devotional books, which I don’t do 
as much, it must be said, I will suddenly find something in there that relates to study 
and, again, casts light on that. And I suppose the only way that my reading of the two 
might differ is that if I’m reading something for study and there’s a lot of it, I might 
make notes on it. Umm, and I’m less likely to do that with a devotional book. But in 
terms of using the content, I don’t think I do make a difference.
Mmm. So would you call it an intellectual exercise? Or a spiritual exercise? Or do the 
two join together?
They join together. Sometimes it’s more intellectual than spiritual and sometimes it’s 
more spiritual than intellectual. But I don’t find that I ever pick up a book intending 
that my approach to it would be either specifically spiritual or specifically intellectual.
Sure. Yes. And does one feed the other, would you say? The intellectual feeding the 
spiritual and the spiritual feeding the intellectual?
Yes. Yes, I think for me they have to. I don’t think I can do the one without the other.
I don’t suppose you can give me any examples, can you?
Oh gosh... Yes, I can. We had, recently, this term, to write an essay on the Trinity. Or 
Christology, or something in that area.
In year one!
In year one. Being asked to read through impossible things before breakfast and give 
reasons for my answer, really! And one of the books that was recommended for us to 
read was by two American sociologists who were applying sociological theory to 
wide aspects of Christian faith. And as I was reading that, which was quoting various 
psychologists, sociologists and what have you, and so it was in many ways quite an 
intellectual exercise, there was this wonderful truth leapt out about the most effective 
way of persuading people is by non-violent means. And that was a really, that was a 
devotional experience. The stopping and the thinking about it and how it was 
exemplified in Christ’s life and about that conflict between the innocent Jesus by his
Appendix B A21
People‘s Ways o f  Believing: learning processes andfaith outcomes
actions and his death, calling into question the whole value of earthly human power 
and authority, with its corrupt and abused form which we still have today. And that 
informed my thinking and my praying, and in fact turned out to be the main meat of 
my first sermon. And that for me was quite a devotional thing, because, I mean, I ’m 
still finishing working through it. But it was from a book which was ostensibly a 
scientific treatise.
Mmm. It’s great, isn’t it, when that happens!
Yes. Loved it.
Yes. I’ve had sort of similar experiences and it really sort of makes your heart jump. 
Great. OK. Thank you. Number seven. Do you read theological books or listen to 
preachers and lecturers with an eye to whether they are 'sound' or not? If so, what 
criteria do you use?
Yes, I do. And the sort of criteria I use are first of all how closely or otherwise they fit 
with what seems to me to be the major themes that run through the bible and 
Christianity. And sometimes people are wonderfiilly selective, and that always makes 
me suspicious, if people are being that selective, what is it that they are leaving out 
that would counteract their arguments. Some of it relates to whether or not it fits with 
my own personal experience and what I have seen and observed around me. And there 
will be times when people will say things which are just so out of tune with my own 
experience of God that I, I find it very hard to give it credence. Umm, and there was 
something else in there which was... it’s slipped for a minute, umm, sometimes too it 
depends on whether or not I think they’ve got a particular line that they want to throw 
us.
Mmm. A drum to beat.
Yes. And sometimes I think, umm, and I, I get particularly anxious about people 
writing or preaching on the New Testament. I have great trouble with Alpha material 
because of some of this. People using the Gospels and quoting some of the sayings 
attributed to Jesus in the Gospels as though they had the same validity as an accurate 
record, word for word, as say, a court-room transcript. And...
This is your background training coming out, isn ’t it!
Yes, it is. Umm, and I think it’s because... Yes, I believe the Gospels, but I think that 
what the Gospels record is the story and the message, and I don’t think they 
necessarily record verbatim all that was said. And I think also there’s a lot they leave 
out. And so when you have people standing up and saying, And Jesus said... And 
expecting people to hang on it, and we’ve got all these problems. We’ve got the 
problems that it’s come to us in translation so it’s been filtered through the translator’s 
mind; we have the problem that it comes to us through corrupt manuscripts so we 
have that problem, you know, the people who put together the best understanding of 
the text they could get; and it comes to us through the person who wrote it down; 
through the people who told the person who wrote it down. And even if it came from 
a culture that was very orally based, by the time it’s gone through all those sifts and
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has also been through my brain to see what I understand by those words, then I think 
it is potentially quite dangerous to rely on that, that sort of absolute, evidential 
accuracy. I think there are other ways in which it can he used as evidence. But I think 
saying, Teacher told us we should sit over here and not over there is not the way that 
it’s meant to be taken, and so that’s a criterion.
Mmm. Mmm. Yeah. That’s fine. How do you use it? No, sorry, I was sort offollowing 
that train of thought and forgetting the question! No, that’s fine. No, that’s fine. Cos 
you were referring to the bible, and I was thinking, well how do you use the bible? Do 
you use the bible as a proof text? Obviously not. At all.
No. Not in that sense. And I do get anxious about people who do.
Yes. That was what was coming through. Great. OK. So let’s go on to number eight 
then. When presented with a number of alternative positions or interpretations of 
Biblical teaching, what is your normal reaction?
Oh good! (Laughs) Because, I suppose because I’m fundamentally lazy and it gives 
me something to start work on without having to do that bit of work myself. Because 
it gives me a degree of confidence that I’m not being sold a line. Because it gives me 
an opportunity to work out what I think and what I believe, and to be able to live with 
that, because if I have worked it out for myself, then I am much more likely to be able 
to explain it to someone else than if somebody says, This is what this means, and 
there is nothing else to be done, or said. So I really quite enjoy it, and one of the 
great... when I look back about six years ago I started on another course of study 
which was home study and group study, and we began with Genesis, and very early 
on it talked about the different sources. And that was just... it was wonderfiil. For all 
sorts of reasons. It explained to me why there are two creation stories. Which nobody 
had ever done before. And I suppose I could have gone away and found out, but I 
didn’t.
Well, this was going away and finding out, in its way, wasn’t it!
Yes, that’s right. And, but that was just wonderful because it, it opened up so many 
possibilities, and new ways of seeing things, new ways of looking at them, new ways 
of understanding what the bible was saying to me. About why the Priestly source was 
included and why people thought... and why, for goodness sake, why the Priestly 
source actually bothered to write the Priestly source! And, so yes, that was great. And 
it still is, and I find that more helpfi.il than being presented with a much more 
fundamentalist, I suppose, approach, which says, There is only one way of looking at 
this, or hearing this. And again, part of it, I think, is that for me, if somebody tells me 
that this is so, and something crops up later, to make me think, maybe this isn’t so, 
then it, it’s a great fracturing. And it raises questions and destroys credibility in all 
sorts of other ways. But if you know that there are alternative positions, it gives you... 
I suppose it’s like the difference between living in one of those awful cells where you 
can’t sit down or he down, and actually having a room that you can move around in.
Mmm. That’s a good analogy.
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And it’s, I think, about being comfortable and not having a small God, for me.
Yeah. I can identify with that. Now, I’m going to give you numbers nine and ten 
together because they3re similar but there‘s a different emphasis in each of them. So if 
you look at number nine it asks you to tell me something you've learnt which has 
resulted in your faith changing in some way. And number ten is something you’ve 
experienced. So number nine is emphasising very much the sort of cognitive, perhaps 
something that you’ve, you know, learnt in your course work - in fact, you ’ve already 
touched on, on one or two things - and number ten is something that’s happened in 
your life. Something, you know, a real life experience. A crisis of some sort, perhaps, 
or... And you can do them in either order. I don’t really mind.
Umm, does it have to be something I’ve learnt on this course?
No, not particularly. No.
No, because I think, I do think one of the things that really stands out for me is that 
business of finding that there are lots of different sources from the bible. And that was 
wonderfully liberating...
I was just going to say. Yeah.
Because, oh, for all sorts of reasons. It opened doors and windows and let the light in 
and blew the cobwebs away. It made me realise too that as the bible came to be put 
together in whatever way it was, that the people who put it together recognised that 
different people had different perspectives, each of which had something really 
important to tell posterity about God. And that was liberating both in the sense of, of 
realising that there are different perspectives in there which all contribute to a 
coherent picture. And make it a sort of 3D tiling rather than a 2D thing. But it was 
also about, if it was true then, then it must still be true now. And again, it allows us... I 
mean, God is so vast. We can all of us only see a tiny fragment. And I don’t believe 
we all see the same fragment. So if we share our little bit of the jigsaw puzzle, as it 
were, we get a better picture. A better understanding, a better relationship, I think.
When you say, blow the cobwebs away, and you know, let in the light, how would you 
have been before?
Well, I think before, it felt very dull, and it felt more like a children’s story. More... It 
didn’t have the same layers in it. It, umm, it had less meaning for me, because it felt 
much more like a simple sort of one thread faith.
Mmm. One dimensional.
Yes. And it’s not. It’s shot silk. With the most wonderful colours in it. And so instead 
of all being woven from natural cotton, it’s actually got all these other wonderful 
things in it. And you can keep looking at it and exploring it and seeing different 
things.
And so how has your faith changed? It’s become more vibrant.
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Yes. And, umm, I think the other thing that has changed is allowing that to become 
more than one dimensional. Because it doesn’t have to be constrained in this... I think 
the change in my faith really is about being freed from that childhood narrow, 
stereotype of God into something much bigger and grander and more varied. You 
know. It’s a dreadful thing to say it took me so long to get there, but it did. Umm, 
something I’ve experienced in my life. I think the thing that had the biggest impact on 
me was when my husband died and it was a dreadful time in many ways but it was 
also a time when I really, really felt God. And... that really did change my faith, 
because although it was such an awful time it was also a very beautiful time. And I 
think that’s probably all I want to say.
Sure. That’s fine. Great. Number eleven. Are there any instances when you disagree 
with or react against something the bible says? What do you do with those passages?
Umm, I think there are some things, and I think they relate mainly either to the 
position of women or some of the, umm, laws in the Old Testament. Umm, I do enjoy 
bacon, for example! (Laugh)
(Laughing also) And shell fish!
Yes. Exactly. And there are other times when I come up against something which it is 
not so easy for me to look at and say, Well, of course, the laws about food were 
because of the climate and where they lived and you can see that if you’re wandering 
around the desert there are sure fire ways of getting food poisoning, and these laws 
actually protect against most of that. Umm, and some of the stuff about women, you 
can say, Oh well, it’s the culture. And, and I can separate that out in my own head, 
rightly or wrongly, from things that seem to me much more related again to this, this, 
I mean, the whole of my faith at the moment is about this God-creation relationship. 
And being in it, and so on. So, I find it fairly easy to separate out some of those things 
that seem to me cultural. I mean, I really don’t see why God should want me to have 
my head covered in church. I really don’t think it makes a ha’p’orth of difference. He 
knows the hairs on it anyway, so why do I have to wear a hat? Every one! So, you 
know, why do I need to wear a hat? Umm, so those are... I don’t exactly sort of write 
them off completely, but I, I can see... I can find ways of saying that I think they don’t 
apply. Others do sometimes bring me up short, and I can’t immediately call to mind 
something, I’m sorry. But those, I think, I have to go away and think about and read 
my way round, and discuss with other people, and pray about, and reflect on 
theologically. To see if what is going on there is something in me or whether again it 
is something that I can honestly and faithfully say, we may, as a society, have 
outgrown.
Mmm. What about, umm, if I prompt you, cos people sometimes find it difficult to 
think quickly, but things like the imprecatory Psalms, where you know, the Psalmist is 
praying for the complete destruction of his enemies, or...
I tend to put those into the culturally desirable at the time things.
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The, umm, the sacrifice of, uhh, is it Jephthah’s daughter where he vo w  that the first 
living thing that he sees coming out of his home when he returns home...
Yes, but again, everything else about that stoiy is so culturally alien to me in terms of 
the way the business was conducted, that I f i t  it into the culture.
So what does it.. What’s it there for, then?
It is there, I think the theological message in it is that one needs to be careful when 
one... It’s like a lot of things, it’s like praying appropriately, isn’t it. Because 
sometimes you ask something and you get what you ask for, and it was not actually 
what you meant at all! (Laughs) And I think...
(Laughs) Sounds like the voice of experience here!
And I think in the same way, I think the theological message of the story is to say that 
in your dealings with God, you have to say what you mean and mean what you say. 
And having said it and promised it, you are bound, whatever happens next. Umm, and 
I don’t have a problem with that as a theological message.
Mmm. Mmm. Yeah, sure. So a lot of the ones that, a lot of the instances where it 
would be culturally, uhh, where you can in a sense bracket it culturally, you would 
then look for a theological message.
Yes. But I still have trouble with the hats in church!
You do?
Well, I mean, I just don’t see why. I mean, I can see why it was a cultural thing then, 
but I have not yet found the theological message in it.
OK. You’ve already touched on this one also, but you might want to say a little bit 
more about it, I don’t know. Umm, Are there times when you find it difficult to accept 
your faith because people say, or you feel that what you believe is irrational?
No. There aren’t, actually, because I think it is of the nature of faith that it is not 
entirely susceptible to reason. I think if it were, if it were one of those things that 
could be proved like Pythagoras’ theorem, it wouldn’t be faith, it would be 
knowledge. Umm, and it seems to me, what is of the essence of faith, that it is 
knowing something that you can’t ultimately demonstrate to anybody else. However 
real it may be to me, I cannot prove that relationship. And when my family and 
friends say how irrational it is, it occurs to me that there are all sorts of things in their 
lives that they do and believe that they can’t possibly demonstrate. I think, for 
anybody the act of getting married is an act of faith. But if you try challenging people 
on that, they will defend it completely. I think having children is an act of faith. 
Umm...
Mmm. It’s like entering the unknown, isn ’t it.
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Yes, that’s right. And so I don’t find it difficult to accept my faith on that basis, umm, 
it is irrational And if it wasn’t irrational then it wouldn’t be faith.
What aspects... Can you just give me one, one, one example of something you would 
think is irrational and in fact...
Umm, yes! Working in the association, one sees all sorts of people. And we had a 
client who knew that she ‘had’ a radio receiver in her stomach! Which was receiving 
messages transmitted from a local transmitter telling her all sorts of things about Mrs 
Thatcher’s private life. And I thought that was irrational and unbelievable.
But your faith... 1 mean, a specific example of your faith?
My faith. All, yes. Sorry. Yes. Umm, go back to the question... I think the whole thing 
about atonement is really difficult and I haven’t properly begim to get my head round 
that. And that is the area I think where I most have to say, Well, I believe this because 
the bible tells me so. But at some point I will get to a stage in my life where I need to 
unpack it and it may be because I’m made to unpack it on this course, or it may be 
because I just have arrived at that time in my own spiritual development when I need 
to unpack it. And at that point I will find people to talk to, and I will pray, and I will 
read, and I will theologically reflect, and all those other things. And see where I get 
to.
That’s great. Thank you. Thirteen you have touched on also. As I say, as we go on 
they tend to sort of merge a little bit... But you have made an allusion to an instance of 
this. Have there been times when your experience of life has not backed up what you 
have been taught either generally or specifically? How did you respond?
You say I’ve alluded to it. What did you...
I think you did. If I’d have been taking notes I would have been able to return to it.
Right, that’s fine. Umm, I think... I’m sure there have been, and I’m afraid right at this 
minute I can’t think recall anything specific. But my general reaction when that sort of 
thing happens is one of two tilings really. If it’s so stark that I can’t keep it to myself 
then I will actually challenge it at that point and say, But I don’t find this, or I don’t, 
you know, it’s not how it is.
That’s... It was in the question about listening to preachers and their being sound.
Yes.
And that’s when you made a reference to...
Yes. Yes. That’s right. So that’s one thing. The other thing is that I might... indeed, I 
would go away and think about my experience and think about what I understood 
we’d been taught, checking both to see if my recollection was right and if I’d 
understood the teaching properly. And if there were still a distance between them, I 
think I would set about trying to work out why. And trying to see which one seemed
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to me the more valid. Because there are times when I have life experiences and I 
interpret them one way, and can see years later that in fact my original understanding 
was wrong. Umm, and so I think, if after time spent trying to relate them I still 
couldn’t get anywhere, then I think I would go and find someone I trusted to talk to, A 
spiritual director or my Parish Priest, or my course tutor, or whoever.
You mentioned 'valid’; umm, valid... Do you have a gut reaction, you know, does your 
inside tell you when something is valid or is it..
They tell pie when it’s valid for me.
Yes. OK.
Don’t think I can answer for anybody else but, yes, they tell me when it’s valid for 
me.
So it’s an intellectual and a, a sort of gut reaction in the process that’s going on.
Yes. Yes. So that the work we’re doing this week on the course, for example, I find 
very valid and very real for me as well as intellectually quite, umm, satisfying. But I 
know from conversations I’ve had with others that they don’t find it valid and they 
have all sorts of concerns about it, and, uh, use words like manipulation, which I 
don’t, I don’t agree with. Umm, but that’s their choice.
Yes. Yes. Yes, absolutely. OK. Three more to go. Here’s number fourteen, which is 
probably the most amusing. There have recently been reports about God miraculously 
changing people’s ordinary dental fillings into gold in a church service. How do you 
react to such reports?
With great scepticism.
Yes. Scepticism about what?
That it happened. I... I’m not sure what God would be saying to us. If you suddenly 
took a church full of people with mercury amalgam fillings and changed it into gold. 
Umm, I’m not sure what the benefit, apart from some sort of weird financial benefit 
might be to the individuals. I’m not sure what the benefit would be to the church. And 
I’m not sure what the benefit is in terms of witness to the world. Because it seems to 
me to be saying... It could say two tilings, couldn’t it. It could say, I, the Lord, have 
the power to make anything of anything, and I wouldn’t argue with that. Or it could 
be saying something much more mercenary about material things, and that is so 
completely outside my experience of God. It’s outside everything really, isn’t it. It’s 
outside what the church teaches, what the bible tells us, what my experience is, that 
God is a God of materialism. So I find this... It may well be true, but my reaction is 
scepticism.
Yes. Interestingly, one person has actually sat in that chair and said to me that she 
knows, personally knows people to whom that has happened. And my jaw sort of 
went...!
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I’m not surprised! Yes. I mean, all things are possible with God. But that, I really, I 
find that so, so out of line with everything else. But maybe that’s it. I mean, maybe 
it’s to stop us thinking that there is a line that can be drawn. In which case, hooray(?).
OK. Fine. Thank you. It always makes me laugh, that one. Now fifteen, Is there an 
ethical issue or a major social issue that you feel particularly strongly about? Could 
you explain to me the way you went about deciding on the position you adopted? 
What criteria did you use ?
Oh gosh. Where to begin.
Yes. Given your background, I can quite see.
Something about which I feel very strongly at the moment, very strongly indeed, is 
what this country has been doing in the past few years, first about reducing the 
possibility of people coming to live here, uhh, becoming immigrants, but much more 
particularly, the way in which this government has, and the last government, and large 
sections of the media, have used fears of being overrun by idle benefit-seeking 
whoevers, to try to shut down the asylum system and to try to prevent asylum seekers 
from reaching this country. I... It shows a lack of understanding of all sorts of 
situations in other parts of the world. It seems to me a fundamentally unloving, 
disrespectful approach to other people, and I think one of the reasons I feel so strongly 
about it is because I have sat and listened to all sorts of people who either have 
relatives that they have been trying to get into the country, away from persecution, or 
people who have entered the country illegally and are trying to find a way of getting 
to stay, or people who are trying to avoid going back to a dangerous situation. And the 
whole structure of the machinery that is used is brutal and inefficient. And so these 
people are made to suffer for the inefficiencies that are built into the system. And they 
are made to suffer because they are disbelieved and they are... Something really quite 
core about them is denied. And in the process, they are dehumanised, and demonised. 
And the lack of generosity and the lack of love and the lack of understanding in 
people with whom I should be feeling some sort of affinity as part of my society, is 
deeply wounding. It really, really upsets me. I, I cannot, cannot accept any of what is 
being done or said in my name. And so much of it happens out of sight, and that we 
don’t even know about, but still in my name. And that really, really gets me.
Mmm. This, I think relates, or leads into it as the final question. Do you think the faith 
position you hold affects the way you perceive the world and process information 
about it? If yes, can you explain how?
Yes. Yes, it does. I think it affects the way I perceive the world and process the 
information because I’m coming from a position where I think I can do no less than 
value everyone. And I mean everyone. In the way the God values them. And that 
actually does include Myra Hindley, and wife beaters, and mass-murderers and child 
abusers. Umm, it also affects the way, it affects the way I process information about it 
because I suppose I measure what is done and what happens against that same 
standard. Against the standard of, Is this valuing of and affirming of people? Is this a 
loving thing? And also in relation to the wider world, A sense of, umm, I suppose in a
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way it’s a sort of slow motion suicide, isn’t it, the way that we’re damaging our, our 
environment. And that too is about not, ultimately about not being in a right 
relationship with God because we are not valuing what lie values. So, yes, it affects it 
mightily. (
Great. Well, that’s the end. Many thanks indeed.
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Clive, 52, D iscrete be liever
First question is slightly badly wordedin that it said, Why did you decide to Wain for 
ordination, and I know you don’t make the decision to Wain, so it’s probably more a 
question of why did you feel that you wanted to take the step of being ordained? And 
then, has the training met your expectations?
You’re not going to like this! I’m not training for ordination!
Oh, you’re not an ordination candidate? Well, that’s OK. Explain what you’re doing.
Right. The... the, the ministry course is predominantly a training for ordination, but it 
can be a training for other things, and one of the things it can be a training for is lay 
reader. Umm, now, my position, in fact, this is probably starting to answer the 
question so far as I can answer it, is that I felt I was being called to train for 
something, umm, and I’ll try and elaborate on that in just a moment. Umm, then I 
went to see the lady, who is the, half the DDO if you like for this diocese. She deals 
with I think it may be all women candidates, and those for non stipendiary ministry. 
Umm, she sent me off to talk to people, which is the standard initial bit, umm, and in 
the light of what they said, she thought I should not go forward to ABM. Umm, and 
having talked to our incumbent, he didn’t feel inclined to challenge that view. I have 
also approached the Reader board whose view was that they were not going to 
recommend me for training at this stage, but feel free to come back to them towards 
the end of the course, which would be sometime in this year. Uhh...
So the course lasts...
The course is a three year course. I’m just about to enter the third year of it. I think 
that when they said that, it may well be that they felt I should, I should be keeping 
options open. So, why did I decide to train for whatever it is I’m training for?! 
(Laughter) Umm, it... the stoiy goes back several years. I, umm, it’s almost a question 
of where to begin. I’ve been a Christian ever since university. Umm, going to our 
present church for quite a long time. When the Toronto blessing came along, I got the 
chance of a business trip to not too terribly far away and umm, came back via 
Toronto. Our vicar and his wife went to Toronto not too much after me and life and 
the church have never been the same since. Not, umm, I won’t say it’s necessarily 
affecting everybody in the church, but there are certainly differences, umm, and in the 
period not too long after that, our vicar felt that we were in need of outside input. And 
he got some help from the pastor of the local Vineyard church, or assistant, oh I don’t 
know. It doesn’t really matter. Somebody. Umm, and on one occasion a number of 
people from that church came round, umm, and during the course of the evening, one 
of them said to me, T’ve had a picture for you.’ Which seemed to be a slightly 
ministiy sort of context, perhaps.
What, the picture did.
Appendix B A31
People‘s Ways o f  Believing: learning processes andfaith outcomes
Yes. Umm, a bit startled, didn’t do much about it, umm, another time I went to a day 
at a local church. There was a ministry time at the end of the afternoon and suddenly 
one of their ministry team is fighting her way along the little tiny narrow rows they 
have there to get at me! Umm, so she had a picture for me. Umm, rather more direct, 
this one. Umm, talking in terms of burning off stubble. To make the ground fertile, 
and there being sort of infertile. Bit startled, very nice, umm, didn’t do much about it, 
and then over a period of time the idea began to grow, and don’t ask me where it came 
from, like Topsy, it just growed, you’ve heard stories like this before, I’m sure, umm, 
but that I ought to be doing something about it. Umm, eventually got round to telling 
my wife, and the following day one of the church wardens, the other one of the church 
wardens, because my wife was a church warden at the time, comes up to me and says, 
Have you thought of ministry? Or words to that general effect. I was absolutely 
gobsmacked, but that was what made me start looking. Umm, and it’s, it was a 
sufficiently convincing series of events that made me think that, coupled with the fact 
that I’ve had this feeling growing that I ought to be doing something. Umm, as to 
what it is, umm, Fm still waiting to find out. Right. Second half of the question. Has 
the training met your expectations. Since I don’t know what the expectations were, 
umm, or didn’t have too much idea, it’s not easy to, to say that I came along with a 
preconception. I think in so far as I had a preconception it’s doing tolerably well. And 
where it hasn’t met the preconceptions, I think I’m inclined to say it was the 
preconception that was wrong and the training is right. The sort of thing which I’ve 
got in mind there is that I would have expected it to focus quite a lot on biblical 
material and theology. Now, it has that in it, but the content is a bit less than I would 
have expected. Umm, some of the other things that come in, there’s a certain amount 
of psychology in there, or, now, it’s not frill psychology but a certain amount of 
human awareness and self awareness figures quite strongly. Now, I didn’t expect it, 
but I’ve found that very valuable.
Yes. So what would the highlights and the lowlights of the two years that you’ve done 
he?
Umm, highlights and the lowlights. Ohh. Umm, the group of people is wonderful. 
Umm, we’ve got over twenty in our year. And we have come to become a veiy 
closely bonded group of people. Partly, I think, out of sheer, umm, self-defence 
against the, the training. We, we had one rather unpleasant weekend which I think 
pushed us into uniting against what we reacted to as a common enemy. And we’ve 
been a lot closer, I think, ever since that weekend. Umm, the, there’s a lot I’m getting 
out of it. Umm, I know I’ve changed. And I wouldn’t want to go back. I, umm, the 
doctrine and the theology I find fascinating. Umm, the, the biblical materi... I would 
say about 80% or more of the content of the course I find very interesting. Umm, even 
if I don’t do too well with one particular lecture. When I get to it with, umm, umm, 
having to do an assignment in the area, it turns out to be fine. The lowlights? Some of 
the psychological self awareness type material. The presentation of it has been to 
experience it rather than be taught it. And that rattled some people. Umm, we did the 
Myers Briggs weekend and I think it took me a month to get over it. And yet I found, 
I have actually found that, of all things, the thing which I could apply most 
immediately. Partly because it enabled me to cope with somebody I work with. To 
understand where he’s coming from. Don’t think I can do much more with that one.
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That’s fine. No problem at all. Now, could you give me a brief outline of how your 
faith and your studies on the course have interacted in your life...?
Gulp. Umm... (pause) I think I once wrote something for the church magazine and 
gave it the heading ‘Nothing has changed and everything is different’ and it almost 
was an answer to this question. Umm, my, I think my belief in Christ and in the 
Gospel message hasn’t changed. Umm, the course hasn’t managed to convince me 
that the doctrine of salvation is other than what I thought it was.
Mmm. Has it tided?!
At least unwittingly, yes, it has.
Gosh.
Umm, and, umm, so what I believe in remains the same. I think my understanding of 
it has filled out. Umm, the course has not surprisingly put some pressure on 
spirituality. Umm, I do think it tends to undo all the good work by then asking for 
assignments to be got in, because, umm, as far as, actually, spirituality can’t be done 
quickly, and having too much to do like assignments is a deadly enemy of, of, of a 
spiritual life. But nevertheless, umm, hanging on to discipline, or at least some 
semblance of it, does seem to be a bit better. Not a lot, but a little bit. Umm, so that is 
I think a bit of a change. Uhh...
Do you find your life has, has altered? Your sort of working life? Your more general...
Right. Well, there has been a change there. I’m just wondering whether there may 
have to be another one, in this way. The, umm, the job I was doing, am doing, sort of, 
is to be a partner in a, a private practice. We tend to be driven by the demands of 
clients. Umm, if a client wants something and has a tolerably good reason for wanting 
it for a specific date, we try to comply if it’s possible. Umm, it is not a well-managed 
system and I’m possibly a bad manager of the system anyway. But it tends to be 
pressured. At the start of the course, I, or no, before the start of the course I felt I 
wasn’t going to cope. And I actually went to my partners and said, look I want some 
sort of leave of absence, or something. Well, I didn’t get it, but I did get a, something 
of a change of status. Umm, with a corresponding reduction in what I’m paid. It’s still 
pretty good. Umm, and the idea was to reduce the workload. It hasn’t actually worked 
out as well as I’d hoped and this last couple of weeks have been particularly viciously 
bad. Umm, so that has made... There was a deliberate decision to make a difference, 
and actually carrying the decision into effect has proved difficult.
Yes, so that’s a practical thing. Would you say that the, the actual spiritual aspect 
has, has changed your life? Has the course had a direct effect on your spirituality that 
you do in a day to day context?
It’s not an easy question to answer. I mean, the answer is yes. More difficult is to pin 
down how, and also more difficult is to pin down how far it is the course which is the 
causative factor. Umm, I think always when answering a question like this, you 
cannot separate, umm, what the course principal and the staff try to achieve and what
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God is determined to achieve. Umm, since one of them is working through the other, 
umm, the boundaries, it’s very hard to determine. Before I started the course it would 
be fail* to say that if I got excessively pressured at work I tended to get my head down, 
tried to get on with the work, and quiet times went out of the window. That is not 
quite as true. I still have a tendency to get my head down and get on cos I can’t see 
how to escape from it. Umm, but quiet times don’t go quite so far out of the window, 
and I sometimes manage to reach out and grab them before they’ve gone all the way 
down. Umm, there is, I think, a proc... I think I’m aware in myself of a process of 
growth, and of increasing faith. Whether I would blame that on the course, umm, or 
whether I’d blame it on surrounding circumstances and other things that have 
happened is very hard to tell. Umm, I mean, as a for instance, umm, my daughter in 
the middle of A levels, had a particularly bad time half way through a four day exam 
in Art. I was all for going and banging on the headmaster’s door. Well, actually what 
happened was that I ended up praying with a small group I’m in, other people were 
praying, we had a wonderful... she sort of got her jaws back together, and I kind of 
think, well, if it can happen once it can happen again, can’t it. Umm, and I don’t think 
I’m ever going to be the same again, but you can’t blame that sort of thing on the 
course. Would it have happened if I’d not been on the course? I’ve no idea.
Mmm. Maybe you were more willing to try it because of the course.
Possibly. Possibly, yes. Umm, and possi.. yes, thinking about it. Yes, to that one. 
Umm, so the course certainly pushes us towards spirituality. It’s not the on.. I think 
what I’m saying is it’s not the only input and you can’t blame the results on only one 
input. I think that may be the best I can do with that one.
That’s fine. No, that’s fine. That’s quite a complicated one, or a complex one, isn’t it. 
This one’s a bit more straightforward. So number three. Could you give me, could you 
outline and give examples of any or the various roles that the bible has in your life?
(Pause) It’s... oooh... it’s a teaching book, and it teaches first of all a belief, it teaches 
a system of belief and it is a system of belief which, amongst other things, says that 
there is an afterlife, to which those who believe are going. Now that has, an effect of 
that, and an essay done recently has rather rubbed this one in, does change the 
approach to life. Umm, I look at someone I’m in business with, umm, very moral, 
upright character, but for all that, just occasionally you pick up an awareness from 
what he says that he is aware of his own mortality and what’s he got to look forward 
to. I know I’ve got something to look forward to and so this present life is somewhat 
temporary. Which means that success in career maybe is not so important as umm, 
God’s appreciation of me over a much longer term. This world suddenly becomes a 
short term expendable. Now that is a fairly fundamental difference in thinking, and 
that is certainly one that has gone home to me. It doesn’t make immediate difference 
much of the time. Umm, if somebody offers to buy me a drink, the answer’s going to 
be the same whatever. But in terms of strategic thinking, I think there is a difference 
there. Umm, occasionally, I am confronted by an issue where I will consciously look 
for a biblical answer. Umm, it doesn’t happen that often because the effect of the bible 
and its teaching ought to be, and I hope to at least some extent it’s not, umm, 
something put into practice, but something that becomes pervasive. It, umm, you 
know, it changes your whole mindset. But then when you actually start doing things
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which actually are with reference to biblical teaching, you’ve forgotten you had the 
input. Umm, but I mean, for instance, we did have an issue at work, oh, a couple of 
years ago, over somebody, and I’m actually trying to think, what would the biblical 
answer be? Umm, the bible is consciously a source of role models. Umm, particularly 
over questions of faith and believing and trusting. Umm, and the other one which is in 
some ways the most difficult to put into any form of words, is the effect of the Psalms. 
Umm, this is partly the effect of something the course has done, but I’ve taken to 
trying to read a Psalm every morning. As often as not on the train, and they have a 
confoundedly uncanny habit of turning out to be exactly appropriate to the 
circumstances that day. It defies all laws of probability, it’s also quite improvable. But 
there is an aware... the effect is very often to stop me short and stop me looking at the 
short term issue and the circumstances and how I feel ugh, and look further, or to feel 
I’ve got support. As David no doubt did. I didn’t know he took (?) on Thameslink, but 
I think he did, you know!
So have you tried 119 on the way into town?
I haven’t tried that one yet. I think it may take one... If I manage to get through that in 
one trip, it will be a letter to the complaints department! But, umm, I’m not sure how 
helpful an answer that is. A lot of it, I’m aware that it’s there but it’s sufficiently 
intangible, it’s very hard to put into words.
No, that’s grand. Thanks. Alright, so number four. Do you engage in debate about 
matters of faith with friends or perhaps family? If so, please could you describe an 
example or two.
(Pause) The answer is almost no. Umm, the... everyone in my immediate family, my 
wife, my daughters, is Christian. Umm, of the generally evangelical if not downright 
charismatic persuasion. And, right, there is then, there is certainly then discussion of 
matters of faith sometimes. It usually takes the form of one of the children throwing 
some awkward doctrinal question at me over breakfast.
Saying, You’re doing this course...
Well, not necessarily because of that. Just, Do you know...? Umm, there was the 
episode when I walked into our small bible study group, umm, two minutes after 
somebody had asked a question on predestination and I got asked to explain 
predestination. Umm, working out a doctrine of predestination in thirty seconds flat 
was an interesting exercise, but I think I put up quite a reasonable answer. Umm, so 
that has happened to me, Umm, I, I haven’t got very many friends in the area who are 
not in church. That is partly I think because I commute. Work colleagues don’t live 
locally and so any work friendships don’t easily translate into social relationships at 
home. Umm, discussion of matters of faith at work generally doesn’t happen. I think it 
would be wrong to push it. Umm, I have had a couple of chats with one lady, umm, 
not even in our London office but down in Bristol, umm, she heard a bit about what I 
was doing, expressed a bit of interest, umm, I think she might be teetering on the 
brink. She feels she’s lost her faith. Her husband’s a believer, her mother’s a believer. 
Umm, she may feel vulnerable, or interested, or some mixture of the two. But
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generally opportunities don’t present themselves and I’m not very good at making 
them.
Mmm. And with people on the course? Do you, you know, would you find that 
lecturers and things stimulate debate and discussion?
Rather rarely. Umm, now that may be a feature of this particular course. Umm, it is a 
course which extends over almost as wide a range of churchmanship as you can get. 
Almost. Umm, we can certainly produce the Anglo-Catholic wing of the church, 
umm, through to fairly aggressively charismatic, umm, I think I have heard 
suggestions that this has caused some stress in other years, but I don’t know them well 
enough to know that sort of thing. In our own year, any such stress is avoided. I think 
there is almost a conscious avoidance of it. Umm, I don’t remonstrate particularly 
with the, umm, with the people who would say they are sacramentalists, particularly 
since she so obviously knows more about spirituality than I do. I’d rather learn, thank 
you very much, cos I’ve got somebody in mind there. Uhh, the, the conversation tends 
to he social rather than faith oriented. Umm, possibly almost as a reaction to lectures, 
I don’t know. Umm, the only time I can really think about debate happening was a 
debate in a bible study. So it’s not a regular thing.
OK. That’s fine. Thank you. Number five then. Umm, if you had to give a defence of 
your faith, what would you use as the basis for your justification? And the question is 
in the first instance focusing on how you defend your faith to yourself. Why are you a 
Christian? Umm, rather than me asking you to debate who you are talking to.
Right. Umm, OK. Let’s start with the hist half of those. Umm, I... At one time, 1 think 
I would have said, umm, that the, I was convinced of the historicity of Christ and that 
that was a central thing. Umm, and yet it has never been quite central. When I came to 
faith, it was a realisation that the Gospel message and the message of forgiveness was 
something I needed. Umm, subsequently, I started thinking, well, this is all very well 
and veiy nice but has it actually got an adequate basis. And that’s when I think the 
historicity of Christ became fairly important as a part of the overall structure. And the, 
the part that had some tangibility to it. I still firmly believe in it, and if I were to cease 
to believe in the historicity of Christ I’d be in fairly serious difficulty, because as Paul 
said, if Christ wasn’t raised, we of all men are the most miserable. But I am also, now 
that, in the, it’s really I think since the time I went to Toronto, I am much more 
conscious of God being, and he’s visibly present. Actually, visible it isn’t, but there is 
a very conscious reality. God is much more something that can be felt. And who 
answers. Sometimes when you don’t want him to, but the reality of God being there 
and present and speaking and available, and doing miracles. We’ve seen a few, umm, 
and even the historicity is eclipsed by that and yet that is still the thing which is in 
many ways the tangible historical thing. Now that’s I think my sort of internal 
justification of it. Umm, if I were to be talking to someone else, I would probably, 
depending on how the conversation went, be quite willing to mention all the things 
I’ve just said. I could hardly expect someone else to be convinced by the fact that I 
feel the presence of God. It’s not a very verifiable fact, mostly. Umm, and I would, I 
think, put quite a bit of stress on the historicity. Umm...
Of...
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Umm, I think of Christ and of, of Christ of the resurrection and of this fundamental 
change in the disciples and the growth, the explosive growth of the church after the 
resurrection. Umm, somebody once said they felt the virgin birth was terribly crucial. 
While I do believe that’s important, as a historically verifiable fact it must be 
notoriously the least verifiable of everything! But the resurrection, appearing to more 
than 500 people at one time has, I think, got slightly better evidence for it.
Mmm. Fine. Grand. Thank you. Now we go on to reading books. So this is number six. 
Umm, do you make a specific difference between reading books to aid you in devotion 
and reading books for study? If so, how does your reading of the two differ?
The answer’s... Right. The answer to the first question is yes and no. Umm, I hadn’t 
really thought about it and so I hadn’t already got a prepared conception in my mind. 
Umm, there is a difference. Now, when you say reading books for study, I’m 
assuming you’re meaning books with an overtly Christian content. Rather than... 
Well, you see, for instance, I’m sort of ground clearing a bit for the moment. If we’d 
done a module on human development, an entirely secular book on human 
development may be extremely interesting, but I wouldn’t expect it to have any 
devotional content. Umm, whereas if I’m reading say, a book on the theology of St 
Paul, that may well be a highly academic textbook and not at all written with devotion 
in mind, but nevertheless, umm, it don’t always stay in the box. And that’s part of the 
answer. If I’m reading a book for study, it may well be succeeding in showing me 
what the bible says and what St Paul thought, and then behind that you get to what 
God did. Umm, and I was absolutely bowled over when I had to give a lecture on 
Luther, and it suddenly dawned on me that I think Luther was set up. Umm, he didn’t 
seem to be going particularly out to become a leader of anything, he simply put 
something up in academic debate and some wretch printed it. But for a man suddenly 
thrust into the limelight, it’s not many that stay there for 30 years after having got 
there by accident, are there! It looks like a put up job to me! Umm, and I got bowled 
over by that. And what St Paul thought... So, a textbook can suddenly show me 
something of what God did, and there’s a large devotional element. On the other hand, 
if I am reading a book which is overtly devotional, well, I don’t do that very much. 
Umm, I am probably looking at the subjective view. So part of the answer here is that 
a book which is expounding Scripture or recounting history I will treat in a way, 
really somewhat similar to the way I treat a scientific textbook. I don’t make much 
distinction between that sort of book and a book on chemistry. Uhh, they are actually 
accounting for objective facts, as far as I’m concerned. Umm, a book which is an aid 
to devotion is probably someone expressing their subjective view of God, or their 
perception which even if they don’t think so, I won’t think need be the same 
perception that everybody else holds. And so that distinction will be consciously in 
mind. Umm, so, the distinction is probably there for those reasons, but I haven’t been 
particularly aware of it and it does sometimes blur itself. And I’ve probably answered 
the second half of those, how does your reading of the two differ, in everything I’ve 
said.
Yes, I think you have. Thank you. Alright, number seven then. Do you read theological 
books and listen to preachers and teachers with an eye to whether they’re ‘sound’ or 
not, and if so what criteria do you use?
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Uhh, answer is yes. And the criterion is, is it biblical. I’m not sure I need elaborate 
that one all that much. The view I take is that Christianity is a revealed religion, and 
the revelation is firstly in Scripture. So if someone says something which is 
consciously against what I believe Scripture says, I will react to that. And will either, 
or will be possibly critical of what they’ve said, or taught, with that in mind. So there 
is constantly a standard of, is it, is it in accordance with Scripture.
Mmm. And in accordance with an interpretive position that you have formed? In other 
words, how do you know what Scripture says in terms of interpretation?
Reading it! Sorry, that... That of course is partly what we are being taught. And it 
may, it may well be that the, somebody’s view of Scripture isn’t my view of 
Scripture. Now, the course, this course is trying very hard not to tell us what to 
believe. It tries to confront us with the issues and make us aware of the issues, but not 
to force our own views or belief. Umm, there is almost a tendency amongst the 
lecturers to hide their own views, umm, to varying extents unsuccessfully. Umm, the 
Principal makes no secret of his views, umm, firm evangelical, got criticised at his 
previous place of employment for not being quite sound enough.
So I hear!
Umm, so, umm, but views aren’t forced upon us. The, the position I take at the 
moment is that if you read Scripture, you, what comes out of the New Testament, and 
I think the Old, well, the Old is less overtly doctrinal, is a position which is fairly 
consistent. Umm, somebody, we had one weekend on Scriptural interpretation which 
for me actually left some unanswered questions, umm, and somebody used the phrase, 
‘it feels fairly firm’. And I think that did put it into words quite well, that if you read 
what St Paul says, umm, you get a fairly consistent whole. You will find little pieces 
that look very odd and that you can’t quite cope with and don’t appear to match up 
with something else, and then you’ve got to try and make sense of the two in tension. 
And it, so far, it has pretty well made sense, and I haven’t come across a contradiction 
that really troubles me. Umm, I did feel a bit troubled about something for a while, 
but it sort of fell into place all by itself in odd circumstances. Has that...?
Yeah, that’s fine. Thank you. No problem. And in fact, you’ve just started touching on 
this one a little bit, so we Tl carry on in the same vein. Number eight, when presented 
with a number of alternative positions or interpretations of biblical teaching, what’s 
your normal reaction?
Umm, a bit of background which might turn out to be of importance so I’ll mention it 
now, is, is what I do. Umm, my initial university training was a training in, in a 
scientific subject, as it happens, chemistry. Umm, but I’m working in an area of law, 
which involves quite a lot of written material. I am not a lawyer, I have not trained as 
a lawyer, and have no intention of doing so. On the other hand, a certain amount of 
law goes across our desks and a certain amount of it soaks in. Perhaps not veiy 
effectively, not the right bits, umm, but that is a little bit of my background which is 
going to emerge. Umm, if I’m confronted with different interpretations of Scripture, 
on a point that is not very important, I tend to forget about it or dismiss it as not
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important. Umm, if I am confronted with a, an issue which is fundamental in its 
importance, my reaction is to rush frantically back to Scripture and check whether I 
am right. Uhh, we had an illustration of this at the Summer School. We had a bible 
study of about ten people. The person leading it was deliberately and quite correctly 
not letting her own views come out or saying very much, so leaving her out of it, I 
found myself in a minority of one. Umm, or so it felt, umm, on the subject of 
universal salvation. Now that is, to my way of thinking, a fairly fundamental point. 
There was one chap who was quite willing to say he believed in universal salvation. 
And quite a lot of people unwilling to say that they didn’t. I’m not sure that I want to 
disbelieve in it, but St Paul is firmly agin it, and I’m afraid, and he wasn’t an apostle 
for nothing, so I mean, if that’s what Scripture says... Now, that quite got me going on 
that point, and I, I did make a conscious effort to tiy and pin down why people 
seemed to think something different and to check my own, my own view of Scripture. 
I tried to check my own view on Scripture, and indeed went off to a friend to see if I 
was being silly. If it’s a, umm, if it’s a less important issue, then I might simply live 
with an ‘I don’t know’. One view which I’ve rather come to as a result of the course, 
is to say that I wouldn’t treat Scripture as law. Umm, when St Paul was writing the 
Epistles, he was not writing a legal text. Indeed, if you wanted me to recommend 
somebody as parliamentary draughtsman for the wilting of statutes, I would not think 
of St Paul as qualified for the job. And I read his letters in the light of that. You need 
to look at the whole, well, this is just to my way of thinking, you need to look at the 
whole, and if you pin down one isolated bit, umm, and take it out, even if you take it 
in context but don’t look to see whether the teaching squares up with the rest of 
Scripture, you may find that you’ve accidentally accentuated something he never 
intended. Umm, hats in church being a fairly obvious example.
Mmm. Grand. Thank you. Now, numbers nine and ten sort of inter-relate, so I’m 
going to give them both to you. They focus on different aspects of the same thing. So 
number nine is, Tell me something that you’ve learnt which has resulted in your faith 
changing in some way, and number ten is, Tell me something that you’ve experienced 
in your life which has prompted you to revisit your understanding of your faith. So, 
number nine is focusing very much on the cognitive aspect, something that you may 
have learnt on the course, whereas number ten is something, an event in your life, 
perhaps a crisis, or something which has happened, which has made you re-think 
your faith. And you can take them in either order, I don’t mind.
Right. OK. I’m going to have to reinterpret the question a little bit. Umm, possibly to 
what you meant anyway, I don’t know. But, umm, faith can mean, what do I believe 
in, or it can be taken to mean, umm, a whole system of belief which both has a 
fundamental core and things which flow from it. Umm, I’m not sure that anything I 
have learnt on the course has touched the fundamental core. Umm, I didn’t go to the 
course a Hindu and become a Christian, or anything as fimdamental as that, and of 
course it would he out of the question that that sort of thing would happen. So in that, 
rather restricted sense, the course has not changed my faith. In terms of the system of 
belief changing, umm, I would be tempted to say that it hasn’t changed, but that 
wouldn’t be right. What has happened, I think, is that some areas which I never paid 
very much attention to have become expanded. Umm, and the area which I think I 
would pick out as the one that’s most obvious to me is in fact connected with the 
second coming. Umm, this is partly because I think it is the most significant area of
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change, and partly because it’s reasonably recent. The, in the course of writing an 
essay on Paul’s understanding of salvation, and in fact also, for the same lecturer, 
trying to write a sermon on the second, on the passage in 2 Thessalonians to do with 
the second coming, umm, and then getting stuck on one and starting the other, the two 
did get very much related together. And it rather led me to see, and then I found 
textbooks that were actually saying not dissimilar tilings, although not spending the 
entire book saying it, that the second coming was more important to Paul’s 
understanding of faith, salvation, and the belief system, than I think our churches 
actually bring out. So that is an area where an under-emphasised area has come into a 
much greater prominence. It’s the nearest you’ll get to a change, I think.
Yeah. Thanks.
Umm, number ten. Something I’ve experienced in life. I think it would have to be 
homosexuality. That’s the, the one which seems to be the most crucial issue. Now, 
again, this is not veiy much to do with the core of faith, it’s the, it affects the 
outworking of faith. Umm, I seem to have been confronted with a few people, either 
known to me or children of good friends who are homosexual. If you’d asked me ten, 
fifteen, twenty years ago you’d have got a very naive and doctrinaire point of view. 
Oh, it’s wrong. Umm, it’s not so easy to maintain that view when a) the person you’re 
talking about is the dearly loved son of somebody I love very much, umm, and 
secondly when you’ve met the guy and he’s just so jolly helpful and you see how kind 
he is to everyone else. Umm, so that is one way in which I’ve had to re-think and I 
don’t think I’m at the end of the re-thinking process.
Mmm. How would you say your faith had changed as a result of that? Is that affecting 
your interpretation of the bible, for example?
Umm, nnnoooo, I don’t think it would be doing that. Umm, I think, I mean, I hold to 
the view that the bible is God-breathed, and you don’t change the interpretation of 
Scripture merely because circumstances make you look for a change. Indeed, if 
somebody starts suggesting that, I tend to get very angry indeed and either walk out or 
hit them! Umm, on the other hand, umm, an understanding of Scripture and the nature 
of Scripture is something which does change. Perhaps I grew up a bit, or got more 
sensible, or weaker, or something. I mean, certainly the point I made earlier about no 
longer seeing it as a legislative document, but as a document, I didn’t say it then but I 
will say it now, written by man who was at times very polemical, it doesn’t invalidate 
what he said, it doesn’t mean you can’t understand what he said, you just read him 
slightly differently to see what is there. Umm, I think, ahh, something’s coming to 
mind. Umm, in a way it’s homosexuality and in a way it’s feminism. And actually, the 
two link together because we have a few people who either are or were feminists, on 
the course, and I began to see that, where they were at, I nearly said coming from, 
changed it, where they were at, and where homosexuals who want to have Christian 
belief are at, is a feeling of being an isolated, rejected group. And to that extent, 
they’re in the same position. Umm, if I’m treading on your corns, I’m sorry!
No, not at all. It doesn’t offend me in the slightest.
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Umm, but, umm, I was asked to lead worship for one evening and it happened to be at 
a weekend when we were on the subject of Scriptural interpretation, and feminist 
interpretations were quite clearly going to come in, and indeed they did. Umm, and 
one of the two people that was doing it with me suddenly came up with the idea of 
doing an overtly feminist version. And that was something I’d not had to cope with 
before. And I found myself struggling quite a lot. Umm, and having to go away and 
think very quickly what I did believe, umm, in fact, asking church, please could, 
please God, umm, if we want prayer in church it’s always available, and I got 
someone to pray with me. Umm, but that would God mind telling me what His view 
of the matter was. It seemed to me that he didn’t care very much for the isolation of 
these poor people either, and that that bothered him too. Umm, which might not be the 
first thing that the, umm, traditional evangelical viewpoint will come out with. It did. 
Has it changed what I believe? No. Has it made me aware of bits I don’t understand? 
And I know I don’t understand? Yes. Has it changed the emphasis of what I say, and 
what parts of belief come out first? Yes.
Mmm. That’s great. Very coherent. Thank you.
No, very incoherent!
No, it’s fine. Right, here’s number eleven. Are there any instances when you disagree 
with or react against something the bible says, and what do you do with those 
passages?
We’ve probably touched on this sort of thing already. Umm..
Yeah. I’ve been keeping an eye on the time as well, and realising that in fact, as we go 
on it will get quicker because you’ve covered some of it already.
Yes, fine. Yes. Are there instances when I react against something the bible says? 
Yes. Umm, where our modem twentieth century culture appeals to clash with a 
biblical teaching which is somewhere in the fourteenth century, or maybe the 
seventeenth. Umm, I have problems. And the sort of thing which, where it, it comes 
up, umm, could be the, where the bible seems to put women in a very subservient 
place, which is certainly not modern culture. Umm, two years ago I wouldn’t have 
said that! And I’m suddenly aware that I wouldn’t have said it two years ago. Umm, 
but some of Paul’s statements do seem to be a very harsh, harsh and unnecessary 
subjection of women. Now, how do I cope with that? Well, in part I’ve already said 
that I no longer see Paul as a legislator, and then you look elsewhere in what Paul says 
and you begin to find a different message. Umm, for somebody who was apparently a 
misogynist he had a pretty high view of Christian marriage and the status of women in 
marriage. Umm, women are not allowed to speak in church, unless they’re 
prophesying, which apparently they have to do silently. It’s illustrations of the way I 
now see I have to interpret Paul. So, I suppose when I’ve run into these passages 
which I might disagree with, I’ve looked at the broader context and in some cases I 
have found a satisfactory answer in saying Paul is being polemical, or because you 
cannot reconcile a legalistic interpretation of that sentence with elsewhere in 
Scripture, you have to see Paul as being polemical and in the context of his culture. 
That’s a slightly dangerous thing to do, cos then you discover you can dismiss
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everything in terms of culture and you’ve got nothing left. Umm, but I think on the 
broad reading of Paul you can sort out what is and is not. A consistent view on what is 
and is not cultural, you may have to work at it here and there, but I’m not, there’s 
nothing that’s left me in serious difficulty. So generally I’ve been able to sort out that 
sort of thing in that way. Umm..
Old Testament passages? Violence...
Oh. Desperately difficult. Bury my head in the sand is my answer to that one! Umm, 
yes. When I was confronted with the bloodthirstiness of the book of Joshua, it is a 
difficulty, and I think there are tilings there that I don’t understand. I, I suppose I’m 
left with the somewhat unsatisfactory explanation that, umm, I think some of the 
tribes who were, umm, demolished by the Israelites, umm, may well have been so 
immersed in fairly dire practices that umm, maybe what they got was no more than 
they deserved. It’s just that we’re not used to people getting as much as they deserve. 
And it’s hard to reconcile that with a Christian culture where Christ’s done a great 
deal to stop us from getting what we deserve. But, it is an unresolved question. And I 
don’t have all the answers by any means. And I know I don’t. I suppose because I’m 
sufficiently convinced by other bits, I manage to live with the unresolved issue.
Mmm . Thanks. You ’re not alone.
I’m sure I’m not.
Mmm. Number twelve, then. Are there times when you find it difficult to accept your 
faith because people say, or you feel that what you believe is irrational?
No. Is probably the answer. Umm, one of our lecturers, and he was mentioning a 
particular book at the time, either said or came very close to saying and the authors of 
the book say that God does not coerce faith. And I think I’ve rather come to believe 
that that is true. Umm, although it is not, that I’m aware of, explicit in Scripture. 
Umm, so I think I am persuaded that it is not God’s plan to make faith and his 
existence so apparent to force people into belief. Consequently, I know that there is 
going to be, that what I believe is something which is not going to be so 
comprehensively provable that nobody can deny, whether they want to or not. Umm, 
and so I’m going to find that people won’t accept what I believe. Umm, I’m also 
conscious that the subjective feelings are personal and I could not completely share 
them with another Christian. Umm, if they have similar subjective feelings we might 
each understand what the other is talking about, but that’s the nearest we will come to 
it, and so to some ex... That is, I won’t say it’s irrational, although the boundary 
between supernatural and irrational is probably a bit vague. But I, I accept that some 
of that is going to be considered not provable. Umm, I’ve not, I think, had anyone 
determinedly saying that what I believe is contrary, is, is overtly disprovable. That 
might cause me some difficulty if they sounded more than, if they were convincing 
rather than ranting, but I haven’t had it.
Mmm. Fine. Thanks. Now, number thirteen. Have there been times when your 
experience of life has not backed up what you have been taught during your 
theological training? And if so, how did you respond?
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(Pause) I think first of all the answer is not much. Umm, the, this is a course with a lot 
of mature people on it, many of them a lot older and wiser, possibly younger and 
wiser than I am. Umm, that... the course could not survive if it was teaching things 
that were naive and doctrinaire and so inconsistent with life that people are confronted 
by this, the people saying, oh the lecturers are being daft. It just wouldn’t happen and 
it doesn’t happen and there hasn’t even been an attempt to make it go that way. Umm, 
so since I think we, or that we’re being taught is being taught with a lot of people with 
experience of life, who themselves have dealt with these issues, we’re not really 
actually getting situations where experience and teaching have parted, badly parted 
company. Umm, I think there are times when local churches, our own particularly, 
umm, can get a somewhat one-sided view of life and not give sufficient account, 
sorry, not sufficiently take into account circumstances of individual members of the 
congregation. And that actually can be quite hurtful. That’s churches not the course. 
The course hasn’t caused me trouble in that way.
Fine. Thank you. Now, number fourteen, miracles. There have recently been reports 
about God miraculously changing people’s ordinary dental fillings into gold in a 
church service. How do you react to such reports?
Quite possibly he did! I think it might be slightly out of character, but there again, 
maybe not. I believe in a God who does miracles. We, there’s one lady I know in 
church, umm, we actually both taught Pathfinders some years ago, and she came to 
church one Sunday having been diagnosed with cancer, absolutely out of the blue 
three days before. As it happened, two very charismatic people who had actually been 
pushed out of their church for being so charismatic, umm, were there visiting. And I 
got the two together. I don’t think she had cancer when she walked out. Umm, I have 
no doubt that that is what God could do. Given what I was saying just now about 
coercion, umm, he don’t show off that much, but just now and again he does. Yeah. 
There we are.
Fine. Thank you. Alright, penultimate. I think we’ll be OK. Is there an ethical issue or 
a major social issue that you feel particularly strongly about? Could you explain the 
way you went about deciding on the position you adopted, and tell me what criteria 
you used.
(Pause) Mmm. (Long pause) I’m finding some difficulty, which is why I’ve gone very 
quiet, umm, to think, and not even think very effectively. Umm, there are plenty of 
ethical issues, umm, and social issues, major or otherwise, on which I have views. 
Whether I would pick out any one in preference to others, I don’t know, and knowing 
me, the chances are that if I pick on one it’s not because it’s the most important but 
because it’s the one that’s most recently been in front of me. Umm, the, uhh, maybe 
the best thing I can do is try and pick on one issue, as it happens, one that has come up 
on the course, umm, and try and say how I go about thinking about that. Umm, we, 
we, one of the things which we had was a weekend on marriage, and one of the issues 
which was aired, though nothing was ever resolved, umm, was to, was the question of 
re-marriage. Umm, we were actually given the titles of two books taking directly 
contrary opinions, to, so that we could see both views, umm, reading the book that 
was flatly against re-marriage after divorce, you realise just how much pain it could
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cause, particularly where the first maniage was not long-lived and plainly a mistake. 
Umm, it’s an issue which I haven’t completely sorted out in my own mind, umm, 
probably because if I were to really make an attempt to sort it out, or felt I had to sort 
it out, I’d want to do quite a bit more reading and I haven’t had time. Umm, but how 
did I go about deciding on a tentative position. Umm, I think it would be partly 
through looking to see what Scripture said, or didn’t say about it. Umm, partly 
through, whether I would have done it or whether I found I had done it cos somebody 
had the sense to make me do it, I’ll skip over. Umm, trying to look and see what the 
different positions are and why people hold them, and what the implications are. This 
is probably I think a bit more idealised than what I really do in practice. Umm, but 
those would be good criteria even if I might forget to use them. Umm, and I think 
probably to try to understand what the Scriptural position is, umm, and perhaps taking 
the view that Paul isn’t entirely a legislator. And try to make some sense of it. Umm, 
the, one of the passages which I think is quoted against re-marriage, umm, is Paul 
saying that, I think this might be in the context of a Christian, somebody who 
becomes a Christian and their spouse doesn’t want to, but if they want to separate, 
then they must, then let that happen. But he or she shouldn’t promptly go off and 
many some, you shouldn’t go off and marry someone else, which is taken as you 
should never. And thinking about that, I think I might say that what was in Paul’s 
mind was, there should certainly be no rushing straight off to someone else, but he 
probably isn’t legislating for years and years ahead. Umm...
Sure, Yeah. That’s grand. Thanks. I think, because in many ways you’ve already umm 
spoken on this subject, uhh, do you think the faith position you hold affects the way 
you perceive the world and process information about it? And if so, can you explain 
how?
I think I’ve said a lot about it already, haven’t I. Umm, I wouldn’t regard myself as 
someone whose faith or belief lived in a box and only came out on Sundays. Equally, 
I might very well find that in some areas it’s just not occurred to me to see how my 
faith can carry into the area concerned. Even if I’ve been told it’s possible, sometimes 
I can’t see it. Umm, people who talk about theology of work haven’t quite managed to 
get me on board. Umm, I suppose the fundamental is that since I believe that God is 
real and present, umm, he is as entitled to have a view about anything as anybody else 
umm even though in one case I can see them and in the other case I can’t. Umm, he’s 
King, they aren’t. So it should affect everything. Umm, and where I’m aware that 
there’s a need to think about it that way, then I try to do so. Umm, not always 
successfixlly, umm, Scripture is the revelation of God and I would say it ought to be 
the standard to be applied to everything. Now of course that doesn’t mean it has all 
the answers to eveiy detailed question. Of course it doesn’t. It gives principles. And if 
you don’t have the detailed answer you may have to ask for it. If you need to ask, if 
you need the answer. Umm, but then the answers are there when they’re needed, so I 
believe that too. So I suppose I’d say that everything relates to God’s revelation, and 
if you don’t know what God’s view on the matter is, umm, I would say, ask him. He 
always seems to me perfectly willing to answer sensible questions.
I think we Tl draw to a close, if that’s alright with you. Many thanks indeed.
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Roger, 31, A ss im ila tive  be liever
Bonjour. Vous pouvez m’expliquer un peu qui vous etes, votre nom, votre age, s’il 
vous plait, et ce que vous faites, tout ga, dans la vie.
D’accord. Done je m’appelle Roger, et j ’ai trente et un ans, et je suis actuellement 
seminariste. Je suis en, j ’ai temiine ma troisieme annee de theologie. Avant de rentrer 
au seminaire j ’ai, hum, j ’ai fait une ecole de commerce pendant quatre ans a Paris, et 
j ’ai travaille deux ans. Apres, je suis rentre au seminaire.
Ah oui. Done qa fait, c ’est la fin de la troisieme annee.
Bah, c’est ga. Done, heu...
Et qa marche en trimestres comme chez nous? Vous avez trois trimestres d’etudes, 
avec des grandes vacances?
Oui, c’est ga. Oui. C’est pareil.
Ah oui. Effectivement. Done ily a beaucoup de liens. C’est vrai. La Soeur avait 
raison! Bon. Je vais voir si qa... Si vous etes pret, on passer a a la premiere question. 
Elies sont toutes ecrites sur un papier, vous voyez ici, mais j ’ai fait les papiers pour 
les moniales puisque je ne savais pas qu’il y aurait la possibility d’interviewer 
d’autres personnes. Done pour la premiere, c ’est pas devenir Moniale, c ’est devenir 
Pretre, finalement, pour vous. Pourquoi vous avez decide de devenir Pretre? Est-ce 
que votre, euh, vos etudes, euh, vous ont permis de realiser vos aspirations 
originelles?
Euh, attendez, vos etudes, c’est a dire que vous marquez...
Oui, je sais. Mais c ’estpour les Moniales.
D’ accord.
Done, ce serait... Avec mes eleves j’ai dit, Est-ce que vos etudes ici dans notre institut 
vous ont permis de realiser vos aspirations?
Done, pourquoi j ’ai decide de devenir Pretre?
Oui.
Je crois que c’est avant tout pour, euh, par amour du Christ, euh. Parce que je pense 
souvent a cette parole du Cure d’Ars, qui dit: ‘Le Sacerdoce, c’est 1’amour du coeur 
de Jesus.’ Et je pense que c’est, avant tout un amour du Christ, et puis, euh, de par la 
meme un amour qu’on a envie de, de, de transmettre aux autres. Fake decouvrir la foi. 
Done amour du Christ a travers les Sacrements et a travers la Parole.
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Oui. Vous avez senti un appel?
Oui. (II rigole)
Vous savez expliquer un tout petit peu?
Ben, disons, je crois que c’est, c’est hurnm, c’est un appel, c’est pas, c’est pas quelque 
chose qui a ete tres, euh, c’est pas, 9a n’a pas ete tres, comment dire, 9a n’a pas ete un 
moment decisif, donne. C’est plus un cheminement. Cet appel est sous forme de 
cheminement. Et, euh, done un chemin, un chemin avec le Christ.
A partir de quel age?
Vers seize ans. Seize ans.
Et comment vous avez senti... c ’etait comment votre cheminement... C’est trop 
personnel?
Non, mais non. Je suis en train de reflechir. Qu’est-ce que vous voulez savoir, 
exactemment?
Ben, ce que je ne comprends pas Wop, un cheminement pour etre PreWe, c ’est Wes 
loin de mon experience. Je ne comprends pas Wop.
Et qu’est-ce que vous ne comprenez pas?
Euh, qu ’est-ce que ga veut dire un cheminement, un cheminement de devenir PreWe.
Euh, c’est une rencontre. Une rencontre avee une personne, un amour, qui grandit. 
Une rencontre avec une personne qui est le Christ. Et, et qu’on rencontre, justement, 
done, a travers les Sacrements. Principalement l’Eucharistie, et la, et la, la 
reconciliation. Et qu’on rencontre aussi, euh, done, a travers les autres, a travers les 
grands rassemblements comme par exemple des, les grands rassemblements... les 
joumees mondiales de la jeunesse, que, j ’en ai fait plusieurs. Et c’est une rencontre 
aussi a travers la Parole de Dieu, et 1’oraison, des temps de silence. C’est aussi une 
recherche de la verite. Je pense k une parole de Sainte Therese de l’Enfant Jesus: ‘Je 
n’ai jamais cherche que la verite.’ C’est vrai que 9a, 9a e’etait assez... assez prononce 
pour moi au depart, surtout. Et puis, c’est, euh, c’est 1’experience de, de, comment 
dire, de... Je vais a Lourdes depuis Page de huit ans, tous les ans, pour servir les 
malades, et je crois que la, 9a aide aussi. Le contact de Sainte Bernadette, la ville de 
Lourdes, ce qui se passe a Lourdes. Et la, demierement j ’ai lu un livre justement sur 
Lourdes, dcrit pai* Monseigneur Theasse: ‘Ce que croyait Bernadette.’ Et, et je me suis 
rendu compte que j ’avais beaucoup re9u a Lourdes, notamment l’essentiel de la foi, 
mais que e’etait pas toujours, e’etait pas tres conscient en moi. Et qu’en fait, 
l’essentiel du message de la foi est divulgue a Lourdes, a la fois par la vie de Sainte 
Bernadette, a la fois pai*, euh, par la ville de Lourdes, ce que 9a represente, les 
apparitions, et le lien en fait qui existe entre Lourdes et Rome, Lourdes et le Pape et 
l’Eglise.
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Oui. Je connais Lourdes. J’y suis allee deux fois. C’est beau, euh? J’aime bienl La je 
comprends mieux. Merci! Alors, on passe a la deuxieme. Et alors... Decrivez, s’il vous 
plait, comment votre vie de Seminariste, done votre vie, pas votre vie ici, mais votre 
vie de Seminariste, et les leqons apprises dans vos etudes ont modele votre vie de foi. 
Et comment votre vie de foi a influence les leqons que vous apprenez en tant que 
Seminariste.
Moi, je, je dirais que les le9ons apprises, c’est vraiment un eclairage au niveau 
inteUectuel, mais justement qui, cet eclairage appelle a une mise en pratique. Done je 
pense que le Seminaire, c’est vraiment un lieu ou il y a vraiment une unite de vie entre 
ce qu’on nous enseigne et ce qu’on nous demande de vivre. Et, euh, done les cours 
que 1’on recevait le matin etaient vraiment une incitation finalement a, a vivre de plus 
en plus ce qu’on nous demandait de vivre, c’est a dire, a la fois l’Eucharistie que 1’on 
faisait entre les cours, et notre, done, il y a la dimension spirituelle, la dimension 
communautaire, notre vie fratemelle, et puis notre vie de priere. Done la vie de priere 
etait eclairee par la vie de 1’intelligence, et de meme, 1’intelligence etait eclairee par la 
vie de priere.
Je comprends, mais est-ce que vouspouvez me donner un exemple? Un exemple 
concret, euh...
Oui, oui... euh,
Si non, c ’est pas grave.
D’accord. Comme 9a, j ’en vois pas tres... J ’en vois pas des (?masses?), mais c’est sur 
qu’il y en a plein, quoi! Comme, par exemple, on a eu des cours sur, Si, un exemple, 
on a eu des cours sur la confession, par exemple. Done, c’est sur qu’apres, dans la 
mise en pratique, moi, cette annee, 9a a change ma maniere de confesser. Pas encore, 
mais, euh, c’est un projet, quoi. L ’exemple etait de dire, euh, il faut surtout se 
confesser a la lumiere de la Parole de Dieu. Parce que c’est Dieu qui nous eclaire.
C’est sa parole qui nous eclaire sur ce que nous sommes. C’est pas nous, notre propre 
intelligence qui eclaire sur notre propre vie, on doit, on doit, on doit regarder sa vie a 
la lumiere de la parole de Dieu. Qa, c’est quelque chose que je ne faisais pas 
tellement, Je pense que j ’a i... Je vais m’y mettre.
Oui, d’accord. Et la confession commence a changer, done?
J ’ai pas encore, j ’ai pas encore tellement, j ’ai pas encore passe a l’acte, quoi.
Oui. Vous savez deja comment qa va se faire? Ou qa va se faire au fur et a mesure, 
petit a petit comme qa.
Je crois que 9a va se mettre en place petit a petit.
Oui. Oui.
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Ou alors, si, d’autres exemples sur...par exemple, on a eu des cours sur les funerailles. 
Done, moi, j ’ai pas encore mis en pratique, mais bien souvent je pense que quelqu’un 
de ma famille meurt, et ben, je serais un peu plus au courant.
Au courant de quoi?
Ben, des differents etapes des funerailles. Comment ga se passe concretement pour un 
Pretre. Pour une famille, comment est-ce qu’il faut preparer les funerailles, le choix 
des lectures, les intentions de priere, le deroulement des funerailles en elles-memes, 
est-ce que par exemple le coips, moi je ne savais pas, est-ce qu’on a interet a garder le 
corps de sa famille chez soi, ou plutot, ou non. Done, c’est plutot oui, parce que c’est, 
c’est, c’est mieux pour, euh, pour 1’ensemble de la famille. II y a un temps de priere, il 
y a un temps de... c’est, beaucoup de choses qu’on a decouvert. C’est sur que par 
exemple dans un autre domaine au niveau metaphysique, c’est sur que moi, je me suis 
rendu compte que des que je suis arrive la oil je suis, la metaphysique repondait, la 
philosophic repondait a beaucoup de questions que je me suis posees. Que je me 
posais et dont j ’avais pas les reponses.
Comme?
Ben, toute cette, euh, done la au niveau metaphysique, c’est assez loin, euh. Et c’est, 
uhm, alors, plus au niveau anthropologique, ga repondait a, Qu’est-ce que l’homme? 
Done, toute le, toute, on a fait une annee d’anthropologie sur l’homme. La volonte, 
l’utilisation des sens, 1’intelligence, la memoire, 1’imagination, comment est-ce que 
tout ga se met en place. Done ga aide a mieux, a mieux se connaitre, et puis...
Oui, tout a fait. Nous on fait moins de qa. On fait moins qa. Ce serait bien de le faire, 
mais on en fait moins.
Ou alors, la metaphysique aussi. C’est vrai que j ’aime beaucoup aussi la 
metaphysique. C’est plus... c’est sur l’etre, done, Qu’est-ce que l’etre? Done, euh, 
c’est plus complique.
Oui. fa influence votre foi?
Ben, ga repondait surement a des questions beaucoup, tres profondes. C’est sur que 
j ’ai ete emerveille quand j ’ai lu ga. Notamment, un livre du Pere Hemoney, Pierre 
Marie Hemoney, qui s’appelle, ‘La Metaphysique pour les Simples’ . Done c’est un 
traite, il a fait une triologie: ‘La (?) pour les Simples’, ‘Une Metaphysique pour les 
Simples’, et puis, le troisieme livre je ne me souviens plus. Done c’est vraiment, bon, 
c’est un Dominicain qui a... pas loin de quatre vingts ans, et qui est de Fribourg. Et, 
son but etait vraiment de rendre accessible a tout le monde les donnees fondamentales 
de la metaphysique.
Ah oui, en effet. C’est bien. C’est interessant. C’est ce que j’aime bien avec les 
questions. J’apprends beaucoup de choses aussi!Bon, la tf'oisieme. Decrivez, s’il 
vous plait, et donnez des exemples du role que la bible joue dans votre vie.
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(Longue pause). Moi, je prendrais plus, umm, je prendrais un aspect un peu... hum, 
d’ordre mystique. De la priere. Umm, il y a une parole que j ’aime beaucoup, c’est, et 
puis, c’est surtout une methode d’oraison, parce que, comment dire, la distinction 
entre oraison, meditation, contemplation n’est pas tres, finalement, pas tres facile. Et, 
euh, et done, moi je sais que j ’aime bien partir, pai* exemple, a partir des Chartreux, il 
y a notamment une phrase de Guy de Chartreux sur la Lectio Divina. Done, la lecture 
meditee de la bible, et qui dit, qui dit 9a en fait: Euh, Chercher en lisant, avec 
I’Ecriture, Trouver en meditant, euh, Frapper en priant, et Entrer en contemplant. Et 
alors apres il explique, et il dit, La lecture porte la nourriture a la bouche, la 
meditation done de l’ordre intellectuel, (c’est moi qui rajoute), la mache et la broie, la 
parole, la priere on acquiert la saveur, et, et, et la contemplation, cette saveur est elle- 
meme qui rejouit et refait le coeui*. Done, moi, c’est plus, comment dire, pour revenir 
a la question, euh, je pense que la Parole de Dieu est source de joie si elle est, si on 
prend le temps de bien la mediter, de bien la lire, de bien la, la prier. Elle peut 
vraiment etre source de joie, et je pense que e’est la source de joie qui peut vraiment 
combler le coeur humain.
Oui. Oui, je comprends tres bien. Est-ce qu’elle a d’autres roles, vouspensez, dans 
votre vie? Ou c ’estprincipalement ga?
Non, c’est sur qu’elle a surement beaucoup d’autres roles, comme, euh, la revelation, 
la revelation chretienne, done la bible, c’est la revelation chretienne. C’est, c’est, c’est 
une loi qui, qui peut etre pei*9ue comme exterieure a nous-memes. C’est d’abord une 
loi qui, qui, qui est plus un guide, un chemin. C’est a dire que, je penserais plutot a St 
Bernard, sur la liberte humaine, parce que j ’avais fait un travail qui m’avait beaucoup 
eclaire sur ce que je voulais savoir, un peu 1’articulation entre le libre arbitre et la 
grace. Comment 9a s’articulait. Et euh, et alors, St Bernard distingue le libre arbitre, le 
libre bon vouloir et le libre bon plaisir. Et en fait, il dit que le libre arbitre c’est la 
volonte, le libre, euh, le libre bon volonte c’est le savoir, et le libre bon plaisir, c’est le 
vouloir. Et en fait il dit que tout le monde est doue de volonte, meme, chaque etre 
humain est doue d’une volonte humaine. Qa, c’est ce qu’il appelle le libre arbitre.
Mais, euh, si vous voulez, c’est bien d’avoir de la volonte, mais il faut savoir ce qu’on 
peut en faire, ce qu’on doit en faire. Et le premier role, d’apres moi, de l’Ecriture, 
c’est de nous indiquer ce qu’il faut faire. Et c’est pas quelque chose qui vient nous 
contraindre notre liberte, mais qui vient, justement nous la donner. Et je pense souvent 
a 1’exemple d’un petit enfant, par exemple, qui est dans une cuisine, ou il y a une 
plaque chauffante, et le pere dit, ben, ne mets pas ta main sur la plaque. II peut tres 
bien percevoir 9a comme une contrainte, s’il le fait, il verra qu’il se brulera. Eh ben, 
moi, je pense que la revelation chretienne, la loi que Dieu nous donne, c’est du meme 
ordre. Done c’est un eclairage de notre intelligence, pom* savoir ce qu’on doit faire. Et 
le libre bon plaisir, parce que St Bernard dit ‘C’est bien de savoir ce qu’il faut faire 
mais encore faut-il pouvoir le faire.’ II dit que sans le Christ, on ne peut pas. Sans la 
grace, on ne peut pas. Dans la priere on obtient le pouvoir de faire ce qu’on sait, ce 
qu’il faut faire. Voila un petit peu.
Oui, oui. (fa, ga rejoint notre tradition aussi un peu. Si vous voulez, apres, je peux 
vousparler de ga. Bon, c’est bien. Merci. Alors la quatrieme. Trouvez-vous qu’ily a 
des aspects de votre foi qui entrent en conflict? Pouvez-vous donner un exemple, s ’il y
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en a, et si vous n ’en avez pas, quels sont les aspects de votre foi avec lesquels vous 
avez le plus de difficult e a vivre?
(Pause) Je ne pense pas qu’il y ait, enJfin, comme 9a, a brule pour point, je pense pas 
qu’il y ait des aspects de ma foi qui entrent en conflict. Je ne pense pas. Je pense que 
c’est justement quelque chose qui unifie. Qui nous unifie, qui est unifie. Et, euh, je 
pense que les differents mysteres de la foi s’eclairent l’un l’autre. Et n’entrent pas en 
contradiction. Je crois pas. Je crois pas qu’il y ait de contradiction interne dans les 
differents mysteres de la foi. Je crois qu’au contraire, quand on approfondit un 
mystere, on eomprend mieux les autres.
Oui. Vouspouvez me donner un exemple de qa, alors? De cette unite?
Des Dogmes?
Oui.
(Pause) Pas facile comme 9a.
Non, ben, c ’est pas grave s ’it n’y en a pas. Done, votre foi c ’est.. c’est pas vraiment 
difficile ct vivre?
(Pause, puis il rigole)
C’est pas une question, euh,...
Non, non, non. Je reflechis, parce que... la foi, en fait, je ne crois pas que 9a soit la foi 
qui soit difficile a vivre. C’est l’acte de foi qu’on pose qui est difficile a poser. Je crois 
plutot 9a, moi. Et l’acte de foi implique une soumission de notre part. Et 9a, je pense 
que c’est difficile. Je pense que c’est la difficulte majeure. C’est de se soumettre.
A quoi?
A la volonte de Dieu sur nous. Je pense que c’est une des causes, une des 
consequences du peche originel. C’est l’homme qui veut prendre la place de Dieu. 
‘Vous serez comme des dieux’. II ne veut pas se soumettre. II veut pas revenir petit 
enfant. Je pense que c’est l’obeissance qui est le, quelquechose de plus difficile, dans 
la foi. Et je pense que, la foi en elle-meme, le contenu de la foi, ne me pose pas de 
probleme. Je ne crois pas, parce que 9a, c’est un mystere, si vous voulez, qu’on 
approfondit, au fur et a mesure qu’on avance mais c’est plus accepter de se soumettre. 
Qa, 9a m’est difficile. Mais quand j ’y arrive, je me rends compte que c’est source de 
joie. Done, euh, on, 9a incite a continuer...
Oui. Qa je comprends aussi! Oui. Tout a fait. Bon, c ’est bien. D ’accord. Merci. La 
cinquieme. Si vous deviez defendre votre foi, de quoi vous serviriez-vous pour la 
justifier, et quels arguments avez-vous pour la justifier a vous-meme?
Moi, je, ma reponse, c’est pas de l’ordre de 1’argument. C’est de l’ordre de la vie. 
C’est a dire que, euh, la je pense notamment une foi, euh, avec, il y avait un chef
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d’entreprise qui etait venu a Ars, etj’avais, on m’avait demande de lui faire visiter le 
village. Alors, il m’avait, il m’avait, il m’avait interroge notamment concemant tous 
les problemes de, de la sexualite vis-a-vis des jeunes. II m’a dit, comment est-ce 
qu’on, comment leur transmettre le message? Et moi, je leur avais repondu, et je crois 
que je suis toujours d’accord avec ga, je leur avais dit, ecoutez, proposez-leur, si vous 
avez des jeunes qui font un peu, qui ne respectent pas ce que dit l’Eglise, propose-leur 
de vivre comme dit l’Eglise pendant un mois, et puis qu’apres ils viennent vous 
revoir. Et puis s’ils sont plus heureux, bah, qu’ils continuent, et puis s’ils sont 
malheureux, bah, qu’ils s’arretent. C’est pas de l’ordre de 1’argument, je pense que 
c’est de l’ordre de 1’experience.
Oui, oui. D ’accord. Done, c ’est, Faites-le et vous verrez.
Voila.
D ’accord. Et dans votre vie, bon ben, evidemment vous essayer de le faire, et c 'est 
votre experience done, si vous le faites, vous trouvez la raison.
Oui.
Un exemple?
Oui. Je suis la voie, la verite et la vie, quoi. C’est le Christ. II est la voie, la verite, 
done c’est de l’ordre de 1’intelligence, et c’est cette voie, ce chemin, cette intelligence, 
elle mene a la vie. A plus de vie. Done, mais un exemple concret...
Oui. Qa, qa m ’interesse. Comment vous savez que, par exemple, done, c ’est le 
bonheur qui vous ditfinalement que...
Que c’est le bon chemin.
Qui justifie le choix que vous avez fait. Le bonheur.
Oui, c’est l’epanouissement, je pense.
Oui, c’est lapaix, d’accord. Done, c’est qa qui juge finalement si, si le choix que vous 
avez fait est le bon choix ou pas.
Oui. C’est vrai que je pense quand vous dites ga, un saint triste est un triste saint et on 
est tous appele a la saintetd, mais je crois que c’est dans lajoie, et je crois que, bon, 
ben, c’est vrai que la soufffance fait partie du chemin puisque nous sommes chretiens. 
On porte une croix, mais cette croix est inseparable de lajoie. C’est paradoxal, c’est 
de l’ordre de la foi, mais je crois que c’est vrai.
Oui. Qa m ’interesse. C’est bien. Done, votre argument c’est qu’on est appele a etre 
joyewc... Est-ce qu ’ily a, done, si on arrive a avoir qa, on est dans la bonne voie.
Je pense, oui.
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Et s ’il y avait un non-Chretien qui vous disait qu 'il avait la paix mais d’une autre 
maniere. Qui n’etaitpas dans la voie chretienne?
La, je pense que, que... Comment la, c’est j ’allais dire oui. C’est plus, c’est le fruit de 
cours qu’on a re9us mais qui nous disent que tous les, que dans les autres religions 
non-chretiennes, il y a des verites, qui sont vraies, et qui decoulent finalement de 
l’Eglise catholique. Tout passe par le Christ. Et c’est une, c’est a dire que la paix 
qu’ils trouvent, en fait, c’est une partie de ce que nous on a. Et nous, on a la plenitude. 
Done on est priviligie. Je ne sais pas si 9a repond a votre question.
Oui. Je pensais par exemple a, bon, un petit exemple concret, s’ily avait un couple 
qui vivait sans etre maries, hors de manage, et ils vous disaient, ils vous disaient que 
ils ont la paix dans ce qu ’ils font. Et ils sont joyeux, ils out le bonheur ensemble, etc 
etc. mais c'est contre I’enseignement de VEglise.
J ’en douterais.
Quoi, de leur...
Oui. Oui, je pense, oui.
Pourquoi?
C’est a dire... Quelle est leur situation?
Bon, ben, ils vivaient ensemble, hors de mariage, ils n ’etaient pas maries, et done, 
bon, ben, ga, c ’est contre I ’enseignement de I ’eglise. Mais ils vous disent qu ’ils sont 
heureux, ils ont la joie, ils ont la paix.
(Pause) Je ne sais pas si j ’en douterais, mais, euh, mais euh, mais je pense qu’il y 
aurait une plenitude de notre cote qu’ils n’auraient peut-etre pas, a laquelle ils 
n’auraient peut-etre pas acces. Mais je ne sais pas si je peux douter du fait qu’ils 
soient heureux. Meme s’ils vivent pas comme l’Eglise le dit. Je pense quand meme 
que la Revelation est faite pour faire grandir l’homme et pour son bonheur. Done, a 
partir du moment ou on, c’est pas qu’on n’obeit pas, mais, enfin, moi, je peux, pour 
prendre un autre exemple tres concret, on se rend compte quand meme que le 
Sacrement du mariage, c’est, c’est avec le Christ, quoi. C’est le Christ, c’est l’union 
au Christ, c’est la priere qui permet aux epoux de rester fideles toute leur vie et de se 
supporter. Et qu’on s’est quand meme rendu compte avec soixante huit, notamment en 
France ou il y a eu une desertification des eglises, que le nombre de divorces a 
augmente, et je pense qu’on peut le mettre en correlation quand meme. Si une foi qui 
n’est pas fondee sur le Christ, l’homme, l’homme voue a lui meme, qu’est-ce qu’il 
peut faire, quoi.
Oui, oui. C’est sur.
Done c’est un peu dans cet ordre-la que je dirais j ’en douterais, mais, mais je ne suis 
pas sur de mon coup du tout. Ils peuvent tres bien etre heureux. Mais c’est sur que
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l’homme est pauvre. C’est ce que je dirais, quoi. L ’homme livre a lui-meme est 
pauvre.
Done, c ’est moins heureux qu ’il ne le seraient s ’ils vivaient autrement.
Oui, ou alors, c’est, ou alors je dirais ils n’ont pas decouvert un amour qui est l’amour 
du Christ. Voila. Peut-etre 9a.
D ’accord. Oui.
A la limite, je comprendrais qu’ils n’aient pas conscience de 9a. Oui.
Oui, oui. Je vous comprends. Je vous pousse un tout petit peu parce qu’il faut que j ’ai 
les mots! Meme si je comprends, je ne peux pas, je ne peux pas baser mes arguments 
sur le silence si vous voulez. Done je vous demande parce que j ’ai besoin de reponses, 
c’est tout. Bon, ben, merci. Alors, la sixieme. Est-ce que vous faites une difference 
entre lire des livres porn* vous aider dans votre vie spirituelle et devotionnelle, et lire 
des livres simplement pom 1’etude? Si oui, lisez-vous ces livres differemment?
(Pause) Moi, je pense pas qu’il y ait de, non, je, je, comme je vous disais tout-a- 
l’heure, c’est vrai que notre vie au Seminaire est tres unifiee. C’est a dire que le cote 
etude eclaire vraiment notre vie tous les jours. Et c’est vrai que, done, il y a des livres 
comme la vie des Saints, qui est plus, qui sont plus orientes vers la vie, la devotion, et 
c’est vrai aussi que les livres intellectuels aident aussi beaucoup. Pour moi, l’homme 
on forme un tout, quoi, si vous voulez. Je pense qu’on formale tout. Je lis pas, je ne 
peux pas dire que je lise les livres differemment. J ’essaie de les comprendre aussi bien 
les uns que les autres.
Oui. Et vous... vous preferez un certain genre de livre, ou vous favorisez...
Oui, plutot les... la spirituality.
Oui. Pourquoi?
Je ne sais pas. Je suis attire par 9a. La sagesse.
La sagesse?
Mmm. La philosophic, j ’aime bien aussi. J ’aime beaucoup la philosophic.
Et vous le mettez en pratique, ou qu ’est-ce que qa vous fait?
Oui, le but, une de mes grosses questions, c’est de savoir comment mettre en pratique. 
Comment. Le comment.
Moi aussi! Done le livre... Est-ce qu’ily a des livres qu’on vous oblige a etudier qui 
vraiment vous ne disent rien du tout?
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Pas beaucoup en fait dans mon seminaire. La on a une tres grande liberte. Liberte de 
choix. On est tres peu contraint a lire des livres.
Ah oui? Done ils ne vous disent pas, II faut lire qa, il faut lire qa.
Non... Bon, ben, si, on nous conseille, quoi, mais on n’est jamais oblige.
Et vous choissisez? Vous dites, bon, je prends celui-la et pas celui-la?
Oui.
C’est quoi qui fait le choix alors?
Je peux difficilement dire. Mais, comment dire, j ’ai pas, ga tourne toujours autour du 
meme sujet, moi, les livres que je lis, voyez. C’est pas, par exemple, le choix entre un 
livre de science-fiction et puis un livre sur la foi. Moi, c’est souvent, c’est a 1’interieur 
de la foi done c’est suivant la question que je me pose.... Ou l’etat dans lequel je me 
trouve.
Oui, d’accord. Done c ’est selon les questions que vous vousposez.
Mmm.
Oui. Done c ’est a la poursuite de qa.
Mmm.
Jamais I’inverse. C’est jamais que vous lisez quelque chose et puis vous avez des 
questions qui jaillissent.
Non, c’est vrai que c’est rarement comme ga.
D ’accord. Comme je vous dis, il n’y a pas de bonne reponse, ni mauvaise! Bon. On 
continue. La septieme. Quand vous lisez des livres theologiques ou ecoutez les 
orateurs ou enseignants, utilisez-vous des criteres pour juger de la justesse de 
Venseignement? Quels sont ces criteres? Qu ’est-ce que c ’est juste ’pour vous?
(Pause) C’est sur que... Comment dire... Moi, si j ’ai choisi unpeu le Seminaire ouje 
suis, c’est parce que, je, je, j ’avais besoin d’etre, d’etre en confiance par rapport a 
l’enseignement. Done, euh, je, je, c’est vrai que ga m’aurait ete tres penible a chaque 
fois de devoir me demander si ce qu’on m’enseignait etait juste ou pas. Done, moi, je 
rentre bien dans une, dans une situation de confiance des le depart. Je ne remets pas 
en cause l’enseignement que je regois.
D ’accord. Et votre critere pour faire ce choix, c ’etait quoi? Quels etaient les criteres 
pour faire ce choix de Seminaire?
Ben, je crois que c’est un ensemble du, c’est l’ensemble de la vie du seminaire qui 
etait proposee. La conception de, de ce que proposait le seminaire en tant que vie pour
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un seminariste. Je pense que c’est 9a qui m’a decide. Qui m’a, qui m’a fait dire 9a me 
parait, 9a me parait juste, 9a me parait bien. Done c’est a dire avec une vie de priere 
forte, une vie, une vie communautaire forte, une vie intellectueUe qui, qui est mise en 
troisieme position, qui est forte mais avec peut-etre un manque de temps par 
moments. Mais c’est surtout une vie de priere importante, avec une vie 
communautaire forte qui est plus, qui est difficile a mettre en place, mais je pense que 
c’est par la confrontation avec les autres que, qu’on arrive a decouvrir soi-meme.
Done c’est les trois axes fondamentaux du seminaire. Et au niveau intellectuel, bon, 
ben, c’est sur que peut-etre inconsciemment je fais souvent le, le, les criteres pour 
juger de la justesse d’un enseignement, c’est surement souvent par rapport a 
l’experience de la vie. Je pense que 9a doit etre de cet ordre-la.
La votre?
Oui.
Done vous entendez ou vous voyez quelque chose et vous voyez si qa revient a votre 
vie?
Oui, ou a 1’enseignement de l’Eglise. C’est surtout 9a quand meme. Ce que dit 
i’Eglise.
Oui. Selon Vatican II, ouselon...
Oui, Vatican II. C’est sur qu’au fur et a mesure de ma formation je me suis rendu 
compte que vraiment, surtout pom un Pretre, ce que pense un Pretre de telle ou telle 
question c’est bien, mais c’est pas le probleme. Le Pretre doit transmettre ce que dit 
l’Eglise. Ce que le Christ, lui, a transmis a ses Apotres et ses Apotres ont transmis aux 
autres. A lalimite, on a meme... je pense, a savoir... effacer sonjugement personnel 
pour se soumettre encore une fois a 1’enseignement de l’Eglise et puis transmettre le 
plus fidelement possible ce qui dit l’Eglise. Moi, je pense que c’est 9a qui, qui, un des 
criteres de justesse.
Est-ce qu’ily a un Eveque Catholique quipreche contre quelque chose du Vatican II? 
C’est ce qui arrive en Franceparfois? Votre reaction?
C’est delicat. Je sais qu’on doit obeissance a l’Eveque, 9a c’est clair. Mais apres on 
n’a pas le droit de poser des inquisitions contre la conscience, contre notre propre 
conscience. Si on sait que l’Eveque nous demande pas de faire ce que demande 
l’Eglise, je pense qu’on peut, en bonne conscience, lui desobeir. On n’a pas non plus a 
violer sa conscience, je pense.
Est-ce vous avez jamais trouve que vous etiez d’accord avec un Eveque qui etait 
contre I 'enseignement du Vatican II, ou I ’inverse, en accord avec Vatican II et contre 
un Eveque?
La premiere question e’etait quoi?
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Je vous ai donne deux situations, la premiere e’etait d’etre en accord avec un Eveque 
qui etait contre le Vatican II...
Non, je ne pense pas que 9a me soit arrive.
Ou I ’inverse. En accord avec le Vatican II et en desaccord avec un Eveque.
Si moi je suis en accord avec le Vatican II? Qa revient a la meme. Qa doit etre la 
meme chose que la premiere, non?
La, c’est, s’ily avait un Eveque qui... Comment je peux vous le dire... Si, si, si e’etait 
votre Eveque qui n ’etait pas en accord avec le Vatican II. Si vous seriez plutot en 
accord avec le Vatican II ou si vous seriez plutot en accord avec I ’Eveque.
Ah, d’accord. Je serais plutot d’accord avec Vatican H. Avec l’Eglise.
Oui. Et il y a plusieurs Eveques en France qui, qui, qui ont des problemes avec des 
aspects du Vatican II?
La je ne connais pas assez. Je ne peux pas vous dire. Ce que je peux vous dire, je 
pense qu’il y a un renouvellement des Eveques en France. Qui me parait bon.
Chez nous VEglise Catholique en France a une reputation d’etre une eglise... plus 
ouverte, fn, plus moderne, plus, plus disponible, plus prete a aller en desaccord avec 
le Vatican II. Je ne sais pas. J’ai vecu aussi en Espagne et I ’Eglise en Espagne est 
plus traditionnelle que VEglise en France. Je ne sais pas si c ’est vrai.
Mmm. Peut-etre c’est en train de changer maintenant, il me semble.
Quoi, VEglise en France?
Oui. Au niveau des Eveques, je pense qu’il y a une plus grande fidelite a Rome, il me 
semble.
Et pourquoi vous avez choisi, fin, vous m ’avez deja ditpourquoi vous avez choisi 
votre Seminaire actuel, mais, est-ce qu’ily a un Seminaire que vouspouvez nommer 
auquel c ’etait absolument hors de question que vous alliez a ce Seminaire?
Je n’y tiens pas teUement, nommer.
D ’accord, c’est bon! Impeccable. C’est pas grave, e’etait juste par inter et. La 
huitieme. Lorsqu 'on vous presente plusieurs vues ou differentes interpretations sur un 
enseignement biblique, quelle est votre reaction?
(Pause) C’est pas... Comment dire... Est-ce que les... C’est sur que c’est pas tres 
facile. Mais euh, c’est pas forcement eontradictoire, je pense, mais, hum, quand on 
presente plusieurs vues differentes, elles ne sont pas forcement contradictoires, 
opposees, mais peut-etre qu’il y a une profondeur de la verite qui, qui nous depasse et 
qu’il faut accepter. Et qu’en fait peut-etre ces differentes interpretations sont
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differents eclairages qui eclairent la meme verite et qui ne sont pas forcement 
contradictoires. C’est un peu ce que je dirais. J ’essayerais de comprendre dans ce sens 
la.
Meme si elles paraissent contradictoires? J’essay e de vous donner un exemple mais je 
n ‘arrive pas a trouver non plus!
D’accord.
Non, je n ’arrive pas a trouver. Bon, dans ce cas la, done, c \est pas un probleme 
finalement. Est-ce que I’Eglise Catholique a un enseignement, je ne connais pas tres 
bien. Est-ce que I’Eglise Catholique a un enseignement sur toute la bible? Ou elle 
accept e plusieurs...
Non, je pense qu’il y a des donnees de foi qui ne sont pas arretees. Qui sont, qui sont 
laissees ouvertes a la recherche. II y a certains domaines ou l’Eglise s’est prononeee. 
Ou je pense que la question est tranchee, II y a d’autres domaines ou c’est, c’est, c’est 
ouvert a la reflexion, quoi.
Et vous connaissez la foi protestante un tout petit peu?
Un petit peu.
Huh, alors par exemple, pour vous donner un exemple simple, sur la Vierge. La foi 
protestante dit que quand Jesus est ne, c ’etait d’une Vierge, mais que Marie n ’etait 
pas restee Vierge apres la naissance de Jesus. Tandis que, si j ’ai bien compris,
I ’Eglise Catholique dit que elle est bien restee Vierge /apres/ apres. Alors ga depend 
d’une interpretation de la bible. Done voila deux, deux vues contradictoires sur ce 
que la bible dit.
Mais la difference, je pense, c’est que la verite, nous, on la regoit de l’Eglise, euh.
Vous comprenez? Et que porn* nous l’Eglise est une mere.
Oui? Done, dans ce cas-la, c’est I’Eglise qui a decide...
Oui, je pense qu’on fait confiance a l’Eglise.
Oui. Et I’Eglise, c’est I’Eglise Catholique.
Oui L ’Epouse du Christ.
Oui. Je vais vous pousser un tout petit peu car ga m ’interesse!
II me semble avoir vu ga en corns, que le, le, le protestantisme refuse l’Eglise, refuse 
la mediation de 1’Eglise. D’apres ce que j ’ai compris.
Euh, oui. Mais ily a I ’Eglise anglicane qui est au milieu. Elle aussi elle dirait que 
Marie n ’etaitpas restee vierge apres la naissance de Jesus. (Rire doucement) Fin, 
vous m ’avez donne votre reponse. C’est bon. Je comprends. Bon, on continue.
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Pouvez-vous me donner un exemple ou vos etudes chretiennes vous ont conduit a 
modifier ou adapter ce que vous croyiez ou pratiquiez auparavant? Alors, 
'auparavant’, ce serait avant de devenir seminariste. Vous m ’avez dejaparle de 
quelques exemples en tous cas...
Oui, oui. Au niveau de la confession, par exemple?
Oui, oui.
C’est sur que par exemple au niveau de la metaphysique, pour prendre, c’est sur que 
9a, c’est notre rapport a l’etre qui nous, qui nous, qui est different apres avoir fait de 
metaphysique. C’est a dire que rapidement, le, le, je crois que le but un peu de la 
metaphysique c’est mi peu de parvenir a s’emerveiller de l’etre, de 1’existence des 
choses. Savoir qu’une chose, 9a existe. Qa parait banale a l’heure actuelle, mais je 
pense que justement on a perdu beaucoup de choses et 9a a rapport a l’etre, le fait 
qu’une chose existe, qu’elle soit, j ’allais dire, pour utiliser un langage metaphysique, 
portee au dessus du neant, a chaque instant, je crois que c’est mie merveille. Done la, 
pom citer un exemple, par exemple, une etude ou on apprecie ou on se reconnait que, 
que cette chose existe, non pas par elle meme mais par un autre. Done c’est... source 
d’ emerveillement.
Oui. Oui. Tres bien. Vous m ’en avez deja parle de qa avant aussi. C’est bon. Alors, 
celle-la, elle est un peu pareil: Est-ce qu ’il a eu un evenement dans votre vie qui vous 
a fait 'repenser’ la faqon de laquelle vous compreniez votre foi? Quelque chose qui 
s ’estpasse dans votre vie?
C’est sur, c’est sur, mais je ne sais pas comment le formuler. C’est sur que la foi, c’est 
hum, c’est, c’est pas quelque chose de, comment dire, a un moment donne j ’ai pu 
percevoir la foi comme une espece de refuge. Et euh, c’est difficile a expliquer! C’est 
plus la decouverte que vivre avec Dieu c’est vraiment une aventure et que il n’y a pas 
de chose toute faite. Et que, que c’est toujours nouveau, la vie est toujours nouvelle, 
c’est pas, II faut faire ceci, il faut faire cela, et si on a fait 9a, c’est bon, c’est OK.
C’est euh, c’est plus rentrer dans une dynamique de... d’aventure, de combat, qui est 
en meme temps source de joie, de...
Oui. Et un evenement qui vous a fait repenser parce que c ’etait un evenement dur, un 
evenement qui a pose un defi, par exemple, a vos croyances...
Ben oui, c’est sur, comment dire, j ’ai eu un evenement ou je, je peux..., dans le 
courant de mes etudes, done je, j ’ai, j ’etais parti pom* Rome et puis j ’en suis revenu. 
Parce que 9a pas ete. Qa a ete trop vite done j ’etais un peu perdu, quoi. Done, je suis 
reste cinq semaines et 9a, c’est pas bien passe done je crois que c’est a partir de ce 
moment-la qu’il y a eu un peu une prise de conscience, de beaucoup de choses.
Et... Dites-moi non si vous voulez, mais est-ce vous voulez bien m ’en parler un peu 
plus?
Euh...
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C’etait quoi, par exemple, vous m \avez dit que vous n ’etiez pas pret. Fret comment?
C’est, c’est, c’est, e’etait le passage entre le premier cycle et le second cycle. Et quand 
on rentre dans le second cycle, parce que... on dit generalement au seminaire que le 
premier cycle, on a une annee de discernement, et deux annees de philosophic. Bon, 
done, on dit que 1’annee de discernement c’est fait pour discerner. Done, apres l’annee 
de discernement 9a doit etre clair, et on considere quand meme globalement que le 
premier cycle est quand meme un temps de discernement general. Et qu’une fois 
qu’on rentre au second cycle, moi, je ne sais pas, moi, ce que je voulais, e’etait que les 
choses soient vraiment claires, au niveau de l’engagement, et, et ben, e’etait un peu 
trop vite. Done je suis passe du premier en second cycle un peu trop rapidement. Ce 
n’etait pas mur. Done, euh...
Alors, e’etait quoi le choc?
Oh le choc, c’est que, j ’etais pas, j ’etais pas pret, quoi. J ’ai change a la fois de 
communaute, bon, ben, e’etait tres complique. II y a eu plein de choses qui se sont 
mises ensemble. A la fois des problemes de sante, des changements de lieu...
Les changements de...?
De lieu. J ’ai change de seminaire. Je suis passe au Seminaire fran9ais a Rome. 
Changement de langue, de pays, de... changement de Diocese, enfin, de dependance 
de Diocese, tout 9a, done il y avait un ensemble de choses, et finalement, m’ont perdu, 
quoi, un petit peu. Done je suis revenu.
Et vous allezy aller encore une fois? Vous irez a Rome apres?
Ah, ben, je ne sais pas. A moins qu’on m’y envoie, mais pour le moment c’est pas 
prevu.
D ’accord. Et comment cela vous a fait... Dans votre foi. Qu ’est-ce qui s ’est passe a 
votre foi, votre fagon de vivre. C’est une question de destabilisation? De reetablir un 
peu.
Oui, e’etait plus une question de destabilisation.
Pas les croyances.
Pas la croyance en elle-meme, mais la maniere de la vivre peut-etre. Pas au niveau de 
l’objet a croire, 9a, 9a n’a pas change, mais c’est la maniere de le faire. La mantere de 
vivre, je pense.
Comment?
Euh... En etant plus, euh, plus combatif finalement. Plus...
Maintenant.
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Oui,
Contre?
Contre la vie en elle-meme. Le combat un peu de la vie. Et accepter que les choses ne 
soient pas mises en place, euh, que la vie c’est perpetuellement nouveau et que, on n’a 
pas a chercher de fausse securite, quoi. Finalement, approfondir sa foi en se reposant 
sur Dieu uniquement, je pense que c’est ga, que ga a du m’apporter.
Oui. Bon, merci. Alors, le onzieme. Ya-t-il des fois ou la bible provoque en vous une 
reaction negative? Que faites-vous avec cespassages? S’ily en a.
Oui. Ben, j ’essaye toujours de positiver. Je crois que je reconnais objectivement les 
choses que je ne comprends pas, mais je me dis, si c’est la, c’est que ga a un sens, 
quoi, c’est que ga veut nous dire quelque chose et, je prends pas forcement la peine de 
chercher jusqu’au bout. C’est peut-etre un tort. Trouver la reponse. Et ga ne me 
scandalise pas plus que ga quoi, si vous voulez. Je m’arrete pas au scandale. Je ne 
m’arrete pas.
Vous pensez a un passage en particulier, ou...
Ben, je pense par rapport a..., oui, a des..., par exemple dans tout l’Ancien Testament, 
tous les massacres, toutes les guerres entre les ... C’est sur que ga parait scandaleux, 
quoi, en pleine. Mais...
Vous les mettez a cote, alors?
Bah, non. Pas forcement. Je m’arrete pas forcement au, au sens litteral, si vous voulez. 
Je ne sais pas comment expliquer. Humainement parlant, c’est sur que c’est 
scandaleux, tuer quelqu’un. C’est clair. Ben, je ne sais pas. J ’ai peut-etre une vie un 
peu trop, trop, spiritualiste. Je ne sais pas. Mais non, parce que je pense que le plus 
important c’est quand meme la vie eternelle, si vous voulez. Done est-ce que tous les 
gens qui sont tues a la guerre sont finalement damnes? Je n’en sais rien, moi. C’est ga 
le plus important. ’Fin, c’est ce que je me dis.
Done, vous prioritisez dans la bible. II y a des choses qui sont plus importantes. Le 
plus important. Puis ily a des choses qui sont moins importantes... Oui, d’accord. 
C’est ce que je fais aussi! Alors, celle-la,je crois que vous avez deja repondu. Parce 
que ga revient plus ou moins a une autre question, done, je ne sais pas s ’il y a 
d’autres choses a dire... Peut-etre pas.
Ben, comment, c’est pas vraiment des aspects de la foi en elle-meme, et c’est peut- 
etre la maniere de la transmettre. Qa, ga fait difficulty Qa c’est clair. C’est pas 
vraiment la foi en elle.meme. C’est la maniere de transmettre la foi. Dans le monde 
actuel. Avec les difficultes, les pressions, le mass-media, tout ga. C’est sur qu’on a a 
faire a une forte opposition. Et euh, c’est plus dans ce sens la, quoi.
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Juste pour moi, parce que je ne sals pas si la, si c’est une question de langue... Mais, 
qu ’est-ce que vous... Quandje vous parle de la foi, qu ’est-ce vous comprenez de la 
foi? Qu ’est-ce que qa veut dire, la foi?
La foi, c’est le contenue de la foi, c’est 1’enseignement. C’est, c’est les differents 
articles du Credo, quoi. Fin, c’est ce que je comprends. C’est 9a, c’est ce que vous 
voulez dire?
Oui, oui, non, c ‘est parce que, bon, ben, evidemment il y a le mot foi ’ en anglais, et 
je voulais juste verifier que quand vous parlez de la foi, ou quand en franqais on parle 
de la foi, qa veut dire la meme chose que quand nous on parle de la foi. Et done, vous 
faites une difference entre les croyances, la foi, qa fait les croyances et la pratique. II 
y a cette difference.
Oui, je pense. Entre le contenu et puis le fait de la vivre.
Oui. Oui. Oui, c ’est la meme chose. Mais qa doit revenir finalement a la meme chose.
Parce qu’il y a des gens qui croient mais qui ne pratiquent pas, quoi. Alors, est-ce 
qu’ils sont vraiment croyants? Ils peuvent tres bien tout savoir mais pas mettre en 
pratique.
Oui. Oui. Mais finalement, quand on parle, quand on parle de la foi en general, qa, qa 
doit etre la pratique du contenu? Non?
Euh, je ne sais pas.
Non, je, je, je vous pose la question. J’explore. Je fais une petite exploration.
Oui, oui, oui. Je reflechis. Je ne sais pas. Mais, je ne sais plus. Qa me fait penser a une 
parole d’Ecriture, quoi. C’est pas celui qui dit Seigneur, Seigneur, qui entrera dans le 
Royaume de Dieu, mais celui qui fera ma volontd, quoi. Vous voyez? Done, euh, moi, 
j ’aime bien distinguer la foi, ce que nous demande l’Eglise, mais apres, bon, ben, soit 
on fait, soit on ne fait pas, quoi. Qa rejoint un peu le savoir et puis le pouvoir le faire, 
quoi. Je pense qu’il y a des gens qui peuvent tres bien savoir ce qu’il faut faire puis 
pas vouloir le faire.
Oui. Oui, c ’est sur. Oui. Tres bien. La treize. Avez-vous vecu des conflicts entre votre 
experience dans la vie, done c ’est pas dans la vie communautaire parce que qa c ’est 
pour la vie ici (Notre Dame)...
On a une vie communautaire forte aussi, nous.
Ah oui, bon, ben, vous pouvezparler de votre vie communautaire, ou dans la vie 
quotidienne si vous voulez, et I ’enseignement chretien que vous avez requ, qui venait 
soi de I ’interieur ou de I ’exterieur du Seminaire. Comment avez-vous reagi?
Bon, surement, j ’ai pas vraiment d’exemples en tete. Mais c’est clair que, bon, ma 
reaction c’est, de plus en plus qu’il ne faut pas juger les autres. Ne jugez pas. Je pense
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que 9a c’est tres important. Je pense souvent aussi a St Jean de la Croix qui dit, pour 
reussir a la vie spirituelle il faut etre bienveillant. Et puis je pense qu’on est vraiment 
des pauvres. On est des pauvres, done euh, je crois qu’euh...
Alors, ga m ’interesse parce qu ’il y avait I ’autre question qui demandait sur la justesse 
de I’enseignement, par exemple. Alors, pour juger la justesse, il faut juger!
Ah oui, mais la, c’est pas juger la personne. La je pensais, la on juge plus euh, conflit, 
moi je pensais qu’il s’agissait de juger des personnes. Comment avez-vous reagi...
Oui. Fin, e’etait peut-etre... Non, c’est I’enseignement chretien. C’est pas la personne 
chretienne.
Ah, d’accord. C’est l’enseignement. C’est sur que la, si vraiment il y a, il y a quelque 
chose qui ne va pas entre ce qu’on nous demande de vivre et puis l’enseignement de 
l’Eglise, je pense qu’il faut aller le dire. II faut reagir. Je crois que... J ’ai pas... J ’ai pas 
de souvenirs comme 9a en tete, mais je crois que je Pai fait. Fin, si vraiment e’etaient 
des choses importantes je crois que je l’aurais fait, euh. Si vraiment on nous 
demandait de faire quelque chose en contradiction avec notre foi, je crois que je 
l’aurais fait, c’est clair. Je prends un autre exemple. J ’allais faire un BAFA (un 
BAFA, c’est pour etre animateur de camp) et j ’etais, j ’etais inscrit avec une 
association qui soi disant etait chretienne, et euh, e’etait pas, franchement, 
l’enseignement etait, etait mauvais, moi je suis parti, quoi. Je suis reste une joumee et 
je suis parti.
Une joumee!
Oui!
Qu ’est-ce qu ’ily avait dans I ’enseignement qui, qui..
Huh, je ne me souviens plus bien mais, euh, 9a n’allait pas!
Pie in de choses.
Oui, oui, oui. Qa n’avait rien a faire, la.
Done vous etes parti.
Oui, oui, oui. (Rire, tous les deux).
Bon, ben, c ’est bien. D ’accord. Alors, la quatorzieme, qui me fait rigoler. En 
Angleterre, des reportages ont ete donnes sur Dieu qui aurait transforme par miracle 
le metal de plombages dentaires en or lots d’un service de louange. Comment 
reagissez-vous a cette nouvelle?
Bof...
Dites ce que vous voulez, euh?I (Rire)
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Je suis mefiant vis-a-vis des reportages. Je suis mefiant vis-a-vis de la presse en 
general, premiere chose. Je suis tres mefiant. Et puis, ben, moi j ’ai envie de dire, je ne 
sais pas, quoi. Si, Dieu est libre. II peut fake ce qu’il veut, quoi. Mais c’est pas 
fondamental pour ma foi, quoi. Je ne remettrais pas forcement en cause, euh. Je serais 
mefiant. Voila un petit peu ce que je dkais.
Et si, parce que j ’ai pose cette question a nos eleves, il y avait une, une jeune femme 
qui, qui etait assise en face de moi, comme vous, elle m ’a dit, oui, oui, oui, c ’est vrai, 
parce que je connais quelqu ’un. Je connais quelqu ’un, et c ’est pas de I ’or jaune, c ’est 
de I ’or blanc, et euh, je connais une personne qui a regu ce miracle.
Non, parce que moi, j ’ai deja assiste a d’autres mkacles, effectivement. Comme, par 
exemple, par le Pere Tardiff. Mais la, c’etait des mkacles d’ordre, d’ordre... de la 
sante. Et ma reaction a ete de dke, euh, j ’avais vraiment l’impression d’etre un peu 
comme, parce que je me le disais souvent, si j ’avais vecu aux temps du Christ, et que 
j ’assistais a tous les mkacles qu’il faisait, j ’aurais une foi beaucoup plus grande. En 
fait, je me suis rendu compte que non. Parce que la, j ’avais assite a des mkacles et je 
me suis dit, ‘T’es toujours le meme avec ta foi.’
Qu ’est-ce que vous avez vu?
Ah bah, des gens qui par exemple ne pouvaient pas marcher le matin et qui 
marchaient le sok, oui.
A Lourdes?
Non, non. Pas a Lourdes. C’etait en Belgique. A 1’eglise de Coupelberg. Le Pere 
Tardiff etait venu.
Et vous en avez vu.
Ah oui, oui, oui. Et puis meme, je sais que ga existe, quoi. Des prieres de guerison, et 
des gens qui sont gueris. Oui. J ’y crois, quoi. Mais d’apres moi, il faut etre prudent. 
C’est quand meme un domaine ou il faut etre prudent, quoi.
Mais les plombages dentaires, c ’est pas, c ’est pas une question de sante.
Non, non. C’est pour ga que ga parait un peu gros, mais bon, j ’y mettrais pas ma foi, 
comme je vous disais, mais bon...
Qa ne vous fait pas poser des questions sur Dieu?
(Pause) Bon, c’est vrai, ga parait bizarre, quand meme. C’est vrai que ga parait 
bizarre, quoi.
(Rire) Moi aussiI Tres bizarre!
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Oui, oui, oui. Parce que 9a nous emmene a, un peu, a aimer Dieu pour argent, quoi. 
Alors que c’est unpeu contradictoire. On ne peut pas aimer Dieu et 1’argent. C’est 
pour 9a que je serais tres, tres suspect.
Tres mefiant. Moi aussi! Bon. On continue. Y a-t-il un probleme ethique ou social qui 
vous touche particulierement? Expliquez comment vous en etes arrive a une solution 
sur ce probleme et les criteres que vous avez utilises.
(Pause) Je ne sais pas. Non, j ’ai pas vraiment, j ’ai pas vraiment reflechi.
Vous avez des cours en ethique?
Oui, oui.
Qui, qui touchent quoi?
Done, on a eu des cours sur, surtout pour les moyens de contraception, tous les 
problemes de sexualite, tout 9a.
Oui.
C’est tres, comment dire, je pense qu’au niveau de 1’ethique, c’est, a chaque fois on a 
affaire a une personne unique. Et que done il y a les grandes principes de l’Eglise. Si, 
moi, ce que je retiendrais, c’est de dire, moi, ce que j ’ai retenu du message de l’Eglise 
vis-a-vis de tous ces problemes-la, par exemple, c’est de dire qu’il n’y a pas de, de loi 
de gradualite, qu’il n’y a ... Attendez, hein... Je me trompe a chaque fois... II n’y a pas 
de graduqlite de la loi mais il y a une loi de gradualite. C’est a dire que la loi est la loi, 
on ne peut pas la changer. II n’y a pas la gradualite de la loi. Et il y a une loi de 
gradualite, c’est a dire que les personnes evoluent petit a petit. C’est avec le temps 
qu’on va fake entrer dans, dans ce que dit l’Eglise. Et qu’apres chaque personne est 
un cas avec une situation donnee et, et que je crois que il n’y a pas de systeme, meme 
si on veut avoir de grandes orientations, des grands principes qu’on a, c’est a dire 
qu’on connait le chemin a suivre, mais apres, euh, je crois qu’il faut adapter au, cas 
par cas. C’est un peu ce que je dirais. J ’ai pas, et alors, euh, par rapport aux problemes 
sociaux, bah, c’est sur que... on est un peu depasse par, euh, par euh, par le monde, 
dans le systeme a la fois politique, economique et social dans lequel on vit. Pas 
tellement 1’impression d’avoir, euh, d’avoir beaucoup d’acces pour modifier les 
choses.
Oui. Revenons par exemple aux problemes ethiques, sans doute, comme chez nous 
I ’Eglise catholique prend une position sur I ’homosexuality, par exemple, alors, euh, 
quand, votre position sur I'homosexuality, comment vous avez... vous arrivez a 
formuler cetteposition? A travers I’enseignement de VEglise Catholique, je suppose.
Mmm. C’est sur. Moi, je pense que surtout ce sont des personnes qui sont blessees, 
dans leur affectivite, et qu’il faut aider. C’est pas d’abord les rejeter, c’est clair. Mais 
f  Eglise ne peut pas accepter l’homosexualite dans la mesure ou c’est un desordre. Je 
pense. C’est un desordre profond. Done, c’est plus des gens qui sont blesses qu’il faut 
aider. Les entourer, leur faire comprendre que... ils n’ont pas fait le bon choix, quoi, et
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que, il y a quelque chose qui ne va pas en eux. C’est un peu comme 9a que je vois les 
choses.
Oui. Et qa, qa vient de votre raison, ou qa vient de I ’enseignement de I ‘Eglise, ou un 
peu les deux, ou...
C’est un peu les deux, je pense.
Oui. Qa, c ‘est... fin, je vous expliquerai tout a I ’heure. Pour I ’instant il faut passer a 
la derniere. Pensez-vous que votre foi influence la maniere dont vous voyez le monde 
etl’analyse que vous en faites? Si oui, expliquez comment, s’il vous plait.
C’est sur.
(Eire) Expliquez comment, s ’il vous plaitI
Ah, c’est sur que je pense que pour un chretien, pour un croyant, le plus important 
c’est la vie eternelle. Et, bon, en parlant de 1’Eglise, par exemple, on a une conception 
trop, trop humaine de l’Eglise. Quand on parle de d’Eglise, c’est vraiment une realite 
mystique qui, qui, qui est(a?) oppose(e?) des chretiens qui vivent ici-bas, mais 
egalement de ceux qui sont au ciel, et puis de ceux qui sont au purgatoire. Et je pense 
qu’on ne vit pas assez dans la foi, de vie de foi. Je pense qu’un chretien, c’est 
vraiment quelqu’un qui, qui doit vivre avant tout, de foi. Vivre avec Dieu au quotidien 
et done dans cette perspective-la, dans le mesure on sait que Dieu est infiniment bon 
et, et qu’il est tout puissant, bah... on s’en remet, on s’abondonne.
Oui. Et done, comment vous voyez le monde?
Mai! (Rire) C’est difficile. On vit dans un monde difficile. Mais, euh, la c’est plus de 
l’enseignement que j ’ai re9U. Je pense qu’il y a un combat entre le bien et le mal et je 
pense que les deux augmentent en meme temps. Et a la fois il y a une augmentation 
des forces du mal et puis en meme temps une augmentation des forces du bien. Je 
pense que c’est... faut pas dramatiser non plus. Voila ce que je dirais, quoi. Hein, mais 
bon... c’est sur qu’il y a quand meme des choses dramatiques qui se passent. Mais il y 
aussi de tres belles choses qui se passent. II faut savoir voir les deux, quoi.
Et les belles choses qui se passent sont toujours, euh, des choses saintes, ou ily a une 
zone neutre, si vous voulez?
Qu’est-ce que vous appelez, hum...
Neutre?
Oui.
Mmm, qa, j ’essaye de, de, de voir si les choses qui sont bonnes sont forcement des 
choses chretiennes.
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Non. Pas forcement, je ne crois pas. Non, c’est sur que comme je vous disais tout-a- 
l’heure, il y a, il y a du bien en dehors du cbretien, euh. C’est clair.
Done, ily a, c’est ce que j’appelle une zone neutre.
Oui, oui, oui. Non, c’est clair que... C’est a dire, que quand meme tout homme est 
cree avec une conscience. Dans la mesure meme s’il ne connait pas Dieu, s’il n’a 
jamais entendu parler de Dieu et qu’il vit selon sa conscience, d’apres moi il fait de 
belles choses.
Oui. Oui. Bon, c ‘est bien. Vous avez termine! Merci beaucoup.
Appendix B A66
People’s Ways o f  Believing: learning processes andfaith outcomes
A p p e n d ix  C 
P e o p le ’s  w a y s  o f  b e l ie v in g  
In troduction
The compilation of the typology was important not only in bringing order to the raw 
data, but also because it was in and of itself a basic response to the research question. 
The typology was dependent on people having found ways of relating to external faith 
authorities, and reflected these ways. If those authorities were to be removed, so the 
typology would cease to exist. For that reason alone, it was possible to assert that faith 
influenced learning in some way: people’s faith authorities were integral to the way in 
which they learnt, and this resulted in various characteristic traits that depended on 
those authorities. The question could still be begged as to whether similar 
characteristics would be displayed in a non-faith context, yet as far as the research 
was concerned, this proved inconsequential. The inextricability of faith authorities 
from the patterns of learning displayed by the interviewees, coupled with their clear 
distinctiveness in contrast to other categories of external ‘knowledge’, indicated that 
for this particular group, there was a relationship between the way they learnt, and 
their faith. In the first instance, given the foundational stones undergirding the 
typology, this related primarily to the way in which people internalised and 
externalised information.
The typology therefore represented four distinct ‘ways of believing’, paralleling 
Belenky et aV s ‘ways of knowing’. This Appendix outlines the principal 
characteristics of each type, focusing in particular on the ‘lived laith’ exemplified, its 
nature and salient dimensions.
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I. People’s ways o f be lieving
The thesis employs this phrase to express people’s relationship with their faith 
authorities. Each description to follow outlines the major characteristics of this 
relationship.
1.1 Discrete ways o f believing
Clive, Denise, Edward, Jon, Martin, Penny, Phillip, Tina, Trevor
The majority of members of this group had been placed in the inner-cognitive 
quadrant of the original matrix, although Penny, Tina and Phillip were fairly near the 
line straddling experiential and cognitive positions. Clive had been the odd one out, 
primarily expressing outer-cognitive ways of understanding the relationship between 
his life and faith, although in reality living a largely experiential faith. There were a 
number of signs of leanings towards other types. Clive himself established his faith 
intellectually, but then interpreted his experience in faith terms in very similar ways to 
Interpretive learners. Penny displayed clear signs of having moved from the 
Interpretive position that had characterised her faith when she arrived at college and at 
times harking back to these. Her academic training had ‘pushed’ her into a Discrete 
way of believing, yet to a degree her experiential thrust was resisting the resulting 
enforced separation between faith and life. She appeared not (yet) to have the 
intellectual skills necessary to bring the two together, but I hypothesised that these 
would develop and she would eventually become a related believer. Phillip too 
acknowledged a move away from frmdamentalism that had meant he had interpreted 
his experience according to rigid doctrines and faith principles. His faith was 
primarily intellectual and had been separate from his life, but his education was 
introducing him to new ways of looking at things with the result that he was 
appreciating other perspectives and other people’s experiences. He held fast to his 
Discrete faith, but was beginning to recognise the validity of other ways of believing. 
Denise’s journey has already been mentioned, and (as will be seen) Jon and Martin 
describe significant tensions that they resolve more, or less, successfully. Discrete 
believers exhibited more discomfort than any of the other types: discomfort resulting 
from strong ‘selves’ battling with strong faith convictions; from a disjuncture that
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separated their faith from their experience and set the two potentially against each 
other; from being semi-‘forced’ to shift from a dearly-held faith position to another...
Discrete believers were the most diversified of all the types. Their overarching 
common characteristic was a cognitive, intellectual faith. The way in which this was 
exerted, however, was not totally uniform, despite certain shared features as described 
below.
I. la Separation
(i) Faith and experience
A separation between faith and experience was a basic characteristic of this group of 
believers. For one or two, this was quite a problem.
Part of my thesis is the Doctrine of God. How do we understand God? And 
I’m leaning towards the orthodox tradition that understands God in terms of 
persons. The basis of God is the person of the Father who out of love created 
the Spirit and the Son, so it’s all relational. God is primarily relation and 
people. It’s not a matter of substance. Substance is impersonal and in a sense 
completely unimportant for your faith. So if love is fundamental to God, and 
relation is fundamental to God, how come that in my life, it doesn’t work out? 
Uhh, I understand that you can’t feel the love for God because it’s a different 
kind of love that we can’t really (tape unintelligible), but somehow that should 
feed back that there should be kind of an interaction that you sense that God 
loves you in your daily life. Maybe not everyday, but once in a while. Uhh, 
unless you’ve got completely wrong expectations, which I might have. But it’s 
the knowledge that that particular doctrine, I think of it as orthodox, is correct. 
But in practical life I so often run into a wall which I can’t get through. That 
causes, that... insurmountable tension.
Jon had eventually had to seek medical attention to help deal with the effects of this 
tension.
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The separation lived out by these interviewees took a variety of forms. For Jon it 
appeared to be a clear-cut division between intellectual conclusions and real-life 
experience. Martin lived a more subtle tension. Not only did his faith framework and 
experience not cohere...
I suppose I’ve always assumed that what I’m taught doesn’t necessarily have 
to be backed up with experience in my life (laughter). So I’ve never, I’ve 
never kind of made that connection if you see what I mean.
.. .but as a result of his theological education he had begun to understand this in 
epistemological and philosophical terms.
I’ve learnt about different epistemological approaches that carry with them 
views of, about objective thinking, subjectivism, what is public knowledge, 
what is private... etc. Various approaches. Umm, and I think that that has 
changed my faith in the sense that I was previously thinking very much along 
the lines of objective means, factual means, everyone should accept. Which is 
a very modernist way of thinking. Which is in line with to some extent my law 
degree, and to some extent with the society I grew up in abroad, in a country 
which is by and large fairly modernist. So having the chance to explore 
epistemologies that are not based on that distinction, between factual and 
personal pr subjective, umm, that is actually workable, has had a major impact 
on my faith, because it allows for the possibility of knowledge based on 
relationship and based on trust which has much to do with the sort of faith that 
the church talks about. So suddenly that’s become credible in my own 
thinking. And that’s had a major impact, I think. In that I now have the 
categories to be able to say, Well, maybe that thinking’s wrong. Because 
before I only saw one way of thinking about the world. So, yeah, that’s had a 
major, and that way of thinking that I thought was more or less universal 
didn’t work for my Christian faith at all. Because I couldn’t prove with 
certainty that my faith was right or true in any sense, because by definition 
faith was private and subjective and non-factual.
The realisation that different types of knowledge functioned in different ways was a 
major revelation to Martin, and he was consequently able to hold the two concurrently 
in his life. They did not integrate, but neither were they at war.
Appendix C A70
People’s Ways o f  Believing: learning processes andfaith outcomes
(ii) Objectivity
Objectivity was a dearly-held value to most Discrete believers, and this too resulted in 
separation between faith authorities and life. Penny consciously and deliberately 
turned to the bible, putting her trust in it because of its objectivity.
I think the bible is the one tiling that I can hold onto as the word of God and 
therefore it plays a more vital role that I’m... It’s an objective thing as 
opposed... That my faith is now based on Scripture as opposed to before when 
it was based on my, how I reacted to certain things and what God’s telling me. 
Umm, but, so now I just cling onto that because I can look at it and think, Well 
this is God’s word to humanity. At the same time I do use it as encouragement 
and I do seek after the bible. I don’t use it as much as I should and that’s at my 
own peril, I know. But I have thoroughly enjoyed the few times I’ve preached, 
or the few times I’ve had to do an essay really grappling with one or two of, I 
mean you can spend days and days just understanding and taking out verses 
and working out what they mean. And to me that speaks to me more than 
reading a whole passage or a whole book. It’s just really understanding what 
the two, and I don’t know whether or not that is just reading completely into 
the bible, whether or not that’s two thousand years of scholarship who have 
really, I don’t know what it is, but I think, I do find it amazing that God can 
use every single word of the bible to me. And that, that really does, that speaks 
to me more in my life. I do use it for Quiet times and I do use it for words of 
encouragement, for me and for other people.
Her transition from Interpretive to Discrete was evident, as were (probable) 
continuing remnants of her previous position which lessened the degree of 
discreteness between this faith authority and her life. The need for objectivity was an 
important theme in her interview, and she constantly spoke of ‘bringing things down 
to scripture’, as opposed to using herself as a referent and hermeneutical centre. Clive 
similarly sought objectivity, but found it intellectually rather than ‘physically’ and 
conceptually. He spent time considering the biblical evidence of the life, death and 
resurrection of Jesus, and was intellectually convinced that these events were 
historical fact. As with Penny, having established an objective core on which to pin 
his position, he then tended to operate as an Interpretive believer.
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(iii) Two selves potentially at war
The tensions experienced by certain Discrete believers has been indicated in the above 
discussion. Nevertheless, a separate section focusing on the role of the self is 
warranted since it was a very noticeable feature among certain members of this group. 
While it is certainly appropriate to describe Jon’s struggle in terms of a 
faith/experience dichotomy since this is how he lived it, it had its roots in two 
different pources of epistemic validation: reason and experience, each with its own 
forms of reasoning. Jon had a highly developed ability in both forms. Each appeared 
equally valid, and he found each equally convincing and necessary. He experienced 
two sides of himself at war with each other. Martin too articulated the sense of having 
been almpst schizophrenic for similar reasons. Discrete believers had a well 
developed self. They were well able to articulate their views, assert and defend their 
opinions, think autonomously and reflect on their own and other positions. Difficulties 
arose, nevertheless, when two different alternatives were either equally intellectually 
convincing, or an intellectual and/or emotional commitment to either or both resulted 
in a stand-off. While Jon and Martin exemplified the difficulties most clearly, there 
were signs of impending crises in other members of the group. Trevor and Clive were 
both faced with mismatches between their faith authorities and their experience. Once 
again, due to their developed selves, they were beginning to struggle...
The members of this group displayed differing degrees of separation according to the 
techniques they employed to join their faith authorities and their experience. These 
techniques have been alluded to in this section, and are explored more fully in the 
next as they represent concrete ‘ways of learning’. It should also be noted that the 
desire for objectivity was not exclusive to Discrete believers, although was certainly 
more heavily emphasised in this group than in others. Nevertheless, Simon, for 
example, categorised as a related believer, also focused on the historicity of the gospel 
accounts and based the rest of his life and faith on this. Discrete believers were so 
categorised because the prime faith authorities were located outside people 
themselves, and this provided such a vital anchor that it was never relinquished and 
was constantly, or regularly, referred to. Those who cultivated a highly intellectual 
faith experienced the greatest degree of tension; those with less tension also employed 
techniques representative of other ways of believing.
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I.lb A world-view that made sense
Making sense was a common theme among Discrete believers. They adhered to the 
Christian faith because it ‘made sense’ according to their personal powers of 
reasoning. They often emphasised a creator God that contrasted against a sinful 
human race, and this Interpretive paradigm both made sense evidentially and meant 
that since their Christian faith authorities and (observed) experience cohered at these 
important points, they accepted it as a framework by which to understand the rest of 
life. Their way(s) of reasoning did not jar significantly with that/those of the world 
around them and hence Discrete believers tended to follow conventional patterns of 
thought employed in the wider world (contrasting thus against Interpretive believers, 
see later). As a result, they gave the impression of being well rooted with both feet 
firmly on the ground. While wanting to affirm the possibility that God could and did 
intervene in human life and reality, most employed an earthly rationale in order to 
determine whether this was the case or not. Denise, for example, asked for her 
reaction to reports that God had changed ordinary dental fillings into gold confessed 
to personally knowing people to whom this had apparently happened. Yet she was 
unconvinced.
I think God’s created the world in a certain way, and by and large, not that I 
want to have a Deist view of God, but I think by and large it ticks over more or 
less according to the laws of nature. But I do think God can intervene. But I’d 
have to be persuaded. I’d be like Thomas, you know. I want to see the marks! 
At the same time, earthly sense could and did occasionally conflict with other ‘senses’ 
as was indicated in Jon and Martin’s cases above.
As an intellectual approach to the world, the role of the Christian framework making 
overall sense of the world was that of providing Discrete believers with an intellectual 
world-view. Denise and Tina both emphasised the importance of having 
(constructing) a ‘big picture’ into which they fitted other elements. This approach was 
clearly influenced by a particular lecturer with whom they had studied. Nevertheless, 
it worked for them, although in different ways. Martin spoke of his need for a 
‘structure’ which he was continually revising.
[The bible] helps me to think about life generally, and because of how I think, 
my mind operates more easily with the big picture, the systematic level, and I
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try to, I’m constantly revising my picture of the world and how I, how I 
understand it in my own thinking.
The role of people’s faith authorities in the living out of that world-view varied. As 
the typology of believers grew and began to take shape, it became apparent that 
Discrete believers ‘pointed’ towards any of the three possible routes to another 
position. People’s world-views could be highly rigid, or reasonably flexible, the most 
rigid appearing to function at the topmost pinnacle of the apex, with increasing 
flexibility as people slipped toward another position. This ‘slippage’ involved a 
number of strategies which the thesis elected to categorise these traits as ways of 
learning rather than ways of believing, although there is significant overlap.
1.2 Related ways o f believing
Beth, Felicity, Frances, Simon
The uniting characteristic of these four individuals was the virtually seamless 
integration of faith and experience, coupled with a strength of self that generally 
meant their own views took supremacy over their faith authorities. Simon was the 
odd-one-out of the group, firstly because he was the only man, and secondly because 
all three women were also Anglican ordinands studying part-time. Simon was a full­
time student still undecided on what he would do on completion of his studies and on 
their exact purpose. Once again the strength of the typology became apparent in its 
ability to handle diversity.
I.2a Personally ‘owned’ faith authorities
Related believers all found a central core around which they based their lives and their 
faith. This differed from person to person, yet all were linked by a common 
characteristic: that of a personal, or personalised faith authority, as opposed to the 
intellectual and doctrinal focus of Discrete believers. In a similar way to Assimilative 
learners they had so internalised their faith authorities that personal instinct was 
considered reliable, and they took what Frances expressed as a sense of being
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‘prodded or poked, like a sheepdog5 seriously. In general, however, this was always 
tried out and tested with reference to other people. Friends were vitally important as 
trusted sounding boards, as opposed to the authority figures they so often became to 
Interpretive learners.
Related believers did not live a highly individualised faith in the same way that 
Assimilative and (particularly) Interpretive believers did. Nevertheless, the essence of 
their faith was in their very, selves as opposed to primarily in their intellect as was the 
case of Discrete believers. They exhibited ‘big’ selves: beings that invested 
themselves in life and reality, making sense of the world by integrating as many 
aspects as possible according to well-reasoned precepts.
(i) Integration
In direct contrast to Discrete believers, Related believers’ faith authorities were highly 
integrated into individuals’ lives to the point that they saw them as totally inseparable. 
I don’t feel that my faith is something apart from my life, or apart from my 
studies. What my studies then I think do with my faith, there doesn’t seem to 
be that division, umm, and I talked to one of my students last year, and, umm, 
she was veiy depressed and she said, I just don’t see what the point is in going 
on. I don’t see what my purpose is in life. And I said, the purpose of your life 
is that yon have to live it. That you’re unique, that you’re special, you’re 
important. You are who you are and nobody else can be you. You have to do 
this. Umm, can you believe that? And she said, Well, I know that you believe 
that. As if this was a belief that I sort of, you know, entertained. And I said, 
Look, this is not something I’m just sort of bringing in to help you. It’s not a, 
a, a belief that is separate from me. I said, I couldn’t be who I am or do what I 
do unless I believed what I believe. This is, this is a truth. This is not 
something I’m just... It’s not a theory, it’s not like a psychological theory I’m 
offering you to bolster you. This is what I believe. (Felicity)
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(ii) Reflection
These believers by and large constructed their own faith by using external authorities 
as sources which they then compared with their experience, contemplated, reflected 
upon and decided—autonomously—if they made sense in and for theft lives. Even 
when they had been accepted as authoritative, the process of reflection continued and 
theft faith was constantly being worked and re-worked, always relating it back to theft 
selves, lives and experience. Related believers were in no way prepared to take 
someone else’s word about faith and how it should function. Frances, for example, 
was aware that accepting a faith precept at face value was inadequate for her.
I think the whole thing about atonement is really difficult and I haven’t 
properly begun to get my head round that. And that is the area I think where I 
most have to say, Well, I believe this because the bible tells me so. But at 
some point I will get to a stage in my life where I need to unpack it and it may 
be because I’m made to unpack it on this course, or it may be because I just 
have arrived at that time in my own spiritual development when I need to 
unpack it. And at that point I will find people to talk to, and I will pray, and I 
will read, and I will theologically reflect, and all those other things. And see 
where I get to.
She, as the others, was very prepared to discard aspects of faith teaching that she 
considered irrelevant, inappropriate or simply ridiculous, although each articulated a 
slight unease regarding a potential danger of discarding more than one should.
Talking about the authority of the bible, Frances states:
I do have problems with some of the things in there about the role of women, 
because I’m aware that there is a danger when you pick and choose and say, 
yes this is universally applicable down the years, and that is culturally 
moderated and we can disregard it. But nevertheless, I think one has to be 
intelligent about it and look at, look at it as a whole, almost. And pick out the 
things that are consistent, and stick with those. And I think there are things in 
there that are just wonderfully consistent about God’s love and God’s 
patience, and about the need to treat everything that is with respect because it 
is made by God, because it is good. And because this is what is asked of us, I 
think. I think if that’s where you come from, then a lot of the other issues 
actually begin to sort out. But that’s a personal view.
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1.2 b Personal/personalised faith authority and life focus
(i) Focus on Jesus
I’m very Christocentric, so it would come down to the story of Jesus. (Beth) 
Related believers put a high emphasis on the person of Jesus as the most authoritative 
dimension of their faith. Felicity’s interview abounded with references to Jesus as she 
described how she reflected and made important decisions, often specifically asking 
‘What would Jesus do?’. This emphasis was evident not only in the focus of how they 
worked out and lived their faith but also in how they prioritised their faith authorities. 
Jesus, his words, his gospel, his life... all took precedence over other dimensions of 
the bible, for example. The gospels were easier to relate to than Paul, and many of the 
wranglings the church had entered into over points of doctrine, order etc were 
considered both irrelevant and tedious.
(ii) People-centred ministry
All these believers were primarily concerned with people and their ministry amongst 
people. Felicity saw her training very much as having a people-oriented goal:
I think you need, you need the theology and you need the discipline of the 
understanding of the, umm, theories behind the Eucharist and the history and 
that sort of thing, but that in itself is not an end. That’s a, a means to an end. 
And the end is ministry and the ministry is people. I prefer people to paper! 
Beth agonised over the ‘institutionalisation’ that training for ordination inherently 
involved, seeing it as a process of depersonalisation, and Simon’s major concern was 
to see other people discovering the transformative effects of the Christian message for 
themselves.
Related believers shared the personal emphasis with Interpretive believers, who also 
valued the human over and above the doctrinal. Related believers were notable for the 
specific techniques that they employed as a means of personalisation, however. A 
focus on Jesus was notably absent from Interpretive behaviour, and could well be 
included as a related way of learning rather than a way of believing. The overlap 
between these two dimensions of the research is evident.
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I.2c Role of self 
(i) Self assertion
Related learners demonstrated a confident self-assertion over and above their faith 
authorities that meant that in many ways—and ways that were entirely 
uncharacteristic of the other groups—the authorities were left standing. The use of 
and role of faith authorities is considered in the next section as a way of learning. 
However, Beth’s highly feminist emphasis, Frances’s pragmatism and Felicity’s no 
nonsense approach all cohered with Simon’s assertion that his own position was 
‘right’ in the face of an uncomfortable aspect of faith.
I tend to distance myself from say, the behaviour of Israel in the Old 
Testament, as an example. Where it seems God says, You’ve got to go in and 
destroy the Canaanites. And especially at the moment with the Balkan 
situation, it sort of throws up questions. So how do I react to that? What do I 
do with it? My reaction to it is to hold back a bit and say, This part of the bible 
isn’t so much authoritative in the sense of it telling us what to do, but it is an 
authoritative recording of what happened. And it’s an authoritative recording 
of how the people at the time understood God, and that’s a part of our faith, 
but our faith is something that develops and grows. So rather than saying, This 
happened in the bible. It says God wanted it to happen, therefore I’ve got to 
adjust to God, I do tend more to say, This reflects their understanding of God 
at the time, but I’m right!
(ii) Balance between self and authority
The preceding sections have indicated how vital personalising faith was to related 
believers. These individuals demonstrated a real strength of self, and while respectful 
of their faith authorities, neither did they experience them as oppressive or dominant. 
They were simply ‘there’, one of life’s givens, yet not to be accepted on the grounds 
of authority alone. There was evidence in the interviews of a delicately-held balance 
between being overly self-assertive, and overly submissive, although holding the 
balance did not appear to be problematic. Instead, interviewees appeared to appreciate 
the challenge of finding and maintaining it, understanding this as part of their overall 
walk and journey of faith.
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The balance was most clearly articulated in Beth’s interview. Asked how she 
reacted to reports that God had changed ordinary dental fillings into gold, she replied: 
I’m quite interested in why God would do that. I’d be very angry with God if 
God had done that when there’s the situation in Kosovo and things like that. 
I’d be very angry indeed actually.
Anger with God was something that members of the Interpretive group also 
expressed, but with far greater hesitation, and portraying a degree of fearfulness. 
Beth’s anger was straightforward and natural, indicating a form of evenly-matched 
balance in the relationship between herself and God. She was able to assert her self 
over and against her faith authority. Nevertheless, she also spoke of a significant 
period of doubt that she had lived with difficulty. It was occasioned through the 
making public of her faith as a result of moving towards the public role of an ordained 
Anglican priest, but focused on deeper, more profound dimensions of her faith, 
provoking new questions which required new, as yet undiscovered resolutions. She 
was unwilling to abandon her faith, yet obviously lived through a time when she 
seriously questioned it, primarily (and typically, for a Related believer) regarding how 
it should be lived. Beth’s doubt differed from Denise’s in that it had a different focus. 
Nevertheless, the two women probably came the nearest of all the interviewees to 
meeting in the middle of the typology, each from a different initial position.
The thesis originally entitled this section ‘an equal inequality with faith 
authorities’. In many ways, Related believers saw their task as working out the 
balance between self and faith authorities in a way that it cohered with life, providing 
them with a holistic world-view with a different structure from that of Discrete 
believers. Related believers had much in common with Belenky et al’s 
Constructivists.
I.2d A mysterious frith
Related believers often sought to integrate ordinary logic with what they saw as a 
faith logic, to construct something mysterious and intangible. Unlike Interpretive 
believers whose reality bubble lifted them into new, unrooted realms of existence, 
Related believers kept one foot firmly on the ground, while acknowledging aspects of 
lived faith that nevertheless broke normal logical conventions. They reasoned that this
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was part of the nature of faith, yet another important part was that it did obey ‘natural 
law’: were it not to do so, it would be so totally incomprehensible that it would be 
outside their ability to commit to it.
I know that what I believe is irrational! Umm, and I also know that it’s true. 
Umm, that’s not... I never... I never, I think that spiritual knowing and spiritual 
discerning is different from ordinary knowing and ordinary discerning. And 
when people say, you know, umm, I’m asking these questions and I need 
answers, I say, Well, it doesn’t work like that. And they say, Oh, yes, yes. I 
just need an answer to this question. And you say, Well, that’s like saying, you 
know, umm, What colour was the symphony? You know, or, How did the 
music taste? You know. So it doesn’t apply. You know, you can’t say, I just 
need an answer to this spiritual question, because spiritual questions don’t 
admit those kinds of question and answer processes. Umm, so people say, well 
that’s not a rational feeling or, umm... What really must have happened is 
something completely different. Umm, I say, Well, but... you know... it’s how 
we apprehend what happened that coimts. So, yes, it doesn’t sound, it’s not, it 
doesn’t sound rational cos it’s not rational, but it’s, it’s a different order of  
knowing. Which I know is contradictory to my wanting logic in sermons, but,
I think you’ve got to, to show respect for the, the spiritual, which includes 
treating it logically and rationally. Umm, even though it itself is not rational in 
the same sense that a, a theorem is rational. Does that make sense? (Felicity) 
Felicity was happy to ‘be in the mystery’; Frances accepted that faith had an 
essentially subjective dimension to it; Beth described an awareness that she was 
becoming ‘more irrational’ despite the fact that she understood her faith better. Simon 
alone focused on the ‘real historical events of Jesus’ and considered them entirely 
rational. His struggle was more with what he considered ‘other rational alternatives’ 
that were equally viable explanations for the phenomenon he experienced as faith.
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1.3 A ss im ila tiv e  w a y s  o f  b e lie v in g
Anne, Craig, Roger, Yvonne
This group consisted of the three Roman Catholics: Anne and Yvonne, both 
Benedictine nuns, and Roger, a seminarian. Craig was a surprising ‘wild card’, since 
he came from a veiy different stable. It had been apparent even at the time of his 
interview that he lived his faith, life and experience very differently from his peers, 
but only detailed analysis revealed important characteristics that placed him as an 
Assimilative learner. He was nevertheless less able to articulate a number of the finer 
details that related his faith to his experience, lacking the educational structure and 
well-worked-out rationale that the Roman Catholics benefited from.
I.3a A faith-experience cycle
Je suis la voie, la verite et la vie, quoi. C ’est le Christ. II est la voie, la verite,
done c ’est de I ’ordre de I ’intelligence, et c ’est cette voie, ce chemin, cette
intelligence, elle mene a la vie. A plus de vie.1 
Roger quoted a verse from the bible as part of his response to the question of how he 
would defend and justify his faith, but this response immediately indicated that 
through assuming and assimilating the intelligence and knowledge of faith, its truth 
becomes apparent through the resulting quality o f life. Earlier, he had stated that he 
wouldn’t defend his faith through reasoning, but through the fullness of life which is 
experienced by those who live it. Roger’s argument was cyclical and allowed no 
deviation or alternative through its absoluteness. By implication, however, those who 
did not follow the same path experienced a lesser quality of life, and they did so 
because they did not accept the wisdom o f faith.
Roger articulated this position the most clearly o f the four members o f this 
group, although there were hints o f it in others. Anne, for example, stated on a number 
of occasions that her call, and that o f faith in general, was to a life of well-being and 
happiness, which was achieved by learning to allow faith and faith authorities to have 
supremacy over her (see later). She asserted that her intelligence was formed through
11 am the way, the truth and the life, you see. It’s Christ. He is the way and the truth, so it falls into the 
realm of intelligence, and it’s this way, this path, this intelligence, which leads to life. Or rather, to a 
fuller life.
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her faith authorities, and she took on a new way of thinking and acting which led to 
her general well-being and ultimately to eternal life.
The cyclical nature of this reasoning resembled that of Interpretive believers. 
While the latter constructed a reality ‘bubble’ (see later) that was largely removed 
from conventional reality, Assimilative believers also lived in an alternative reality 
that was essentially self-contained. The major difference between the two groups was 
that one focused on the faith authority, the other on ‘life on earth’.
I.3b Faith authorities: a means of self-transformation
Assimilative learners used their faith authorities as a go-between which bridged 
various dimensions of experience. Craig highlighted the fact that these authorities 
were turned to with the express purpose of transforming his own self. The conviction 
of a need for self-transformation was very apparent in all four members o f this group, 
although this involved a high degree of circular reasoning. Anne and Roger both 
spoke of their ultimate goal being that o f eternal life. The way of achieving this was 
through a process of self-transformation, since ‘on est des pauvres’ (Roger: ‘we are 
poor and worthless’). Craig did not articulate an emphasis on eternal life. 
Nevertheless, he stated:
I’m totally guilty, and stand from the point of being in the gutter, I’ve done 
most things that other people haven’t, in terms of sin. I’ve had more 
opportunity for having bad habits than most, I’ve had more freedom in at least 
two or three different types of lifestyles at once than people, and taken often 
full advantage of them. Even as a Chr istian, and my life has been a 
meandering either close with God or telling God exactly what I think of him 
and going off accordingly, doing my own thing because, before he pulls me 
back again. So I don’t have any justification for me whatsoever. But his 
initiation and his calling worked for me to turn round and follow him, and that 
he would forgive my life and sins, and all that I was. It isn’t just the sin itself 
but the sheer pollution and the effects. And despite who I was and who I’ve 
become through my way o f living, he’s prepared to take me and shape me and 
mould me. On the basis of Jesus Christ and his work, with a purpose that he 
gives to my life and with the help of the Holy Spirit,
At another point he asserted that:
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I think that the three years that I believe that I’ve been given whilst I’m at 
college, only probably thirty to thirty-five percent of it at all relates to the 
academic style and way of thinking. And the rest of it is sorting out Craig.
The view that such a transformation was necessary was a faith-dictated view that each 
had taken to heart. An impermeable circle was created that began and ended with 
faith, reinforced by the conviction that this faith represented ultimate and absolute 
truth. Nevertheless, in learning terms the focus was very much on people themselves. 
Experience, passed through a faith filter, had its prime role in changing people into 
new beings fit for a faith goal.
Faith authorities were therefore highly authoritative, and took a variety of forms. 
Christian doctrine and teaching, the bible, Church leaders of various ranks, Christian 
saints and ancestors in the faith... All existed with the primary goal of enabling these 
learners to be transformed. Part of the process involved complete submission. Craig’s 
quote (above) indicates how he saw himself as inappropriately rebelling against God. 
Anne stated that one of the aspects o f her faith she found difficult to live was bringing 
her own natural and ‘easy’ inclinations under control. Submission took place in 
different ways. Some of it was emotional and linked to the will, as people strived to 
control their instinctive desire to assert themselves. Other techniques involved 
deliberate thought-stopping. This took place in three ways:
(i) As a deliberate and conscious faith principle.
Le Pretre doit transmettre ce que dit l’Eglise. Ce que le Christ, lui, a transmis a 
ses Apotres et ses Apotres ont transmis aux autres. A la limite, on a meme... je 
pense, a savoir... effacer son jugement personnel pom* se soumettre encore une 
fois a 1’enseignement de l’Eglise et puis transmettre le plus fidelement 
possible ce qui dit l’Eglise. Moi, je pense que c’est 9a qui, qui, un des criteres 
de justesse.2
Roger’s statement is stark, and to some would be astonishing. His faith convictions 
led him to a position where he felt he was bound to refrain from exercising his own
2 The Priest has to pass on what the Church says. What Christ communicated to his disciples, and his 
disciples passed on to others. I suppose really we ought to... I think, we probably have to know... how 
to eradicate our own personal judgment in order to submit ourselves again and again to the teaching of 
the Church, and then pass what the Church says on as faithfully as possible. I think that that has to be 
one of the criteria of soundness for me.
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critical and evaluative powers. As before, the argument and reasoning is cyclical. 
Nevertheless, his position was consciously thought through and deliberately adhered 
to as a faith principle.
(ii) As a faith response of reverence and obedience
Certain faith authorities demand a high degree of reverence. Anne, for example, 
preferred to seek what the bible was telling her in passages which provoked a negative 
reaction in her, rather than challenge the text. This involved approaching the text with 
respect and humility, and refraining from engaging with the difficulties.
J’essaie de garder ce respect quand meme. C’est la parole de Dieu. II ne faut 
quand meme pas... C’est, c’est la. C’est dans le livre. On ne va pas l’enlever 
(?si on a envie d’autres choses?). Done il y a peut-etre quand meme quelque 
chose a me dire... quelquefois c’est surprenant. Quelquefois on a un verset qui 
nous parle, et n’ a jamais parle a personnel ... II faut avoir cette humilite aussi, 
vis-a-vis du texte, je pense.3 
Craig welcomed the ‘humbling’ that many o f life’s experiences resulted in, and saw 
his overall goal in life as learning to submit to God’s rule in his life.
There’s a constant sense o f challenge in so far as actually picking up the word 
and humbling oneself to it. And I find the same problem with prayer, or 
challenge with prayer. And allowing the word to take precedence in me rather 
than me wanting to take precedence in the word.
(iii) As a faitii response of trust
On the occasions when Anne could have employed her evaluative powers, very 
frequently she preferred not to. When faced with incomprehensible texts or situations, 
for example, she would immediately turn to other authorities to provide an answer, 
and if these were either not available or proved inadequate, she was comfortable in 
assuring herself that it wasn’t necessary to understand in the immediate and that at 
some point in the future she would. Similarly, both she and Yvonne were at ease with
31 try to maintain a certain respect all the same. It’s God’s word. We can’t... It, it’s there. It’s in the 
book. We can’t just take it out (if we don’t like it?). So perhaps it’s there to tell me something... 
Sometimes it’s surprising. Sometimes a verse speaks to us (me) which has never spoken to anyone ever 
before! ... We need to have a certain humility before the text I think.
Appendix C A84
People’s Ways of Believing: learning processes and faith outcomes
accepting certain positions simply because ‘des gens plus intelligents que moi’ (more 
intelligent people than me) had made a decision. For members o f the other groups, 
this would have been an act of retreat. For members of this group, the thesis has 
classed the act as a response of trust. In the first place, in general, most important faith 
questions had already been discussed and decided upon at a high level, so answers 
already existed; it was simply that she did not know what they were. ‘Normalement il 
doit y avoir une explication, quoi’ (Yvonne: there would normally be some sort of 
explanation). This was an area where Craig’s response differed slightly from the 
others. He too turned to external authorities when perplexed (commentaries, other 
people...) but as a result of his studies had moved to less secure ground. He did not 
exhibit the same degree of trust, but lived instead with an increasingly uncomfortable 
niggling. The outcome, however, was the same: ‘The tiling gets chucked in the area 
for mulling and don’t know. Into my “I don’t know” area’.
Secondly, and very pertinently for the thesis, the overall goal o f Assimilative 
learners was to assimilate their faith authorities to the point of eradiating themselves, 
and the way to do this was to avoid developing their own critical faculties. This would 
have been totally counterproductive to their overall goal. Roger states that:
Je pense qu’il y a des donnees de foi qui ne sont pas arretees. Qui sont, qui 
sont laissees ouvertes a la recherche. II y a certains domaines ou l’Eglise s’est 
prononcee. Ou je pense que la question est tranchee. II y a d’autres domaines 
ou c’est, c’est, c’est ouvert a la reflexion, quoi. ... La verite, nous, on la reipoit 
de l’Eglise, euh. Vous comprenez? Et que pour nous l’Eglise est une mere.4 
‘Free’ reflection and evaluation is an activity for those appointed to the task, and who 
can be trusted by dint o f their position and faith standing not to move beyond the 
established boundaries. The major duty for ‘normal’ Christians is to evaluate all other 
aspects of life according to the established faith framework.
I.3c Instinct
Most commonly, this evaluation was an instinctive one. Anne spoke of something 
inside her ‘vibrating’ when what she was being taught cohered with her faith
41 think that there are certain dimensions of faith which are still open to question. Which are, which are 
still open to being researched. There are certain areas where the Church has declared its position. 
Where I think the question is closed. There are other areas where it’s, it’s, it’s open to reflection,... We 
receive the truth from the Church, Do you see? And for us, the Church is a mother.
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framework. Yvonne too said she knew instinctively whether something was right or 
wrong. She confessed ‘une grande fidelite a 1’enseignement de l’Eglise.... Ne pas 
remettre en question des choses qui ont ete definies par des conciles ou par des 
autorites vraiment, enfin, serieuses.5’ This fidelity, coupled with her family and 
monastic background, gave her an interior sense of what is right and wrong. This 
corresponded, o f course, with the overall goal of those in this group of self­
transformation and merging faith, learning and life: Yvonne knew, in her very being, 
because she had been formed, moulded and trained precisely for that. Craig had 
developed a lifetime’s experience of filtering situations and information through his 
experiential and faith frameworks, which meant that he could instinctively know 
whether something was right or wrong, and he felt more able to trust that than his 
intellectual powers. Asked whether he read theological books or listened to preachers 
and lecturers with an eye to whether they were sound or not, and if so, what criteria he 
used, he responded:
I don’t do it objectively. Umm, I don’t think, at all, in the way that perhaps I 
should, as I haven’t been ever a person who naturally is critical and has a 
critique in my way of thinking to be able to be as insightful as other people 
that I know here do as a matter of course. It’s something that I’ve had to learn 
more. So I pick up flavours and distinctions of what preachers may say and 
relate them back to my own as it were experience and source and pool of 
resource, if you like, that I’ve gained over the years. So that would be the 
distinctions that I would be constantly making. Whether they would be 
distinctions or Oh, that’s new and different, is that right? Or, That’s a new 
angle on that one. Let’s experience and see if it’s sound or not. But I’m not 
naturally, I don’t have the natural critique of a person and therefore I don’t 
think I can answer this question very well or say that I’m good at doing that. 
OK. That’s fine. Essentially you ’re saying that no you don’t. Very much.
I think I do. I think I’m learning to. It’s probably the best answer I could give.
I would say that, I would certainly know instinctively whether something was 
true or not, because I’ve lived for twenty years being a broker, having to judge 
truth from even the most effective o f lies.
5 ‘A real faithfulness to the teaching of the Church.... We don’t question those things which have been 
established by councils or by authorities which are genuine and serious.’
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Lacking the defined structure of the Roman Catholic faith framework that would have 
directed and trained his instinct, Craig had developed a highly personal and individual 
approach to faith and life. While he displayed very similar traits to the other members 
of the group, in his case this seemed to be more as a result of temperament and 
intellectual acumen than faith convictions, although one fed and influenced the other. 
He had found a way of living his faith that ‘instinctively’ suited him.
1.4 In te rp re tiv e  w a y s  o f  b e lie v in g
Chris, Margaret, Miranda, Ruth
The major common theme joining these people was the way in which they looked 
beyond themselves to an external faith authority in order to interpret their experience. 
Individuals used their faith authorities to interpret and give meaning to their 
experience, and used this, re-extemalised, to reinforce and continually construct and 
reconstruct their faith as they understood it. The total number of people interviewed 
was evidently much too small to assert any ‘findings’ with confidence, especially with 
regard to the individual types. However, I hypothesize that there may be significance 
in the fact that this group consisted entirely of women...
I.4a Construction of a faith-reality bubble
Somewhat inevitably if all experience is interpreted according to a particular set of 
authoritative dicta, so an all-encompassing reality is constructed. These interviewees 
saw the whole of life in the light of God, his word, Christian teaching and the faith 
lives of those around them. Since (by implication and experience) these dicta did not 
provide a ready-made interpretation of all aspects of life, a degree of filling-in was 
necessary. This took place via a number of techniques, some of which are more fully 
developed in the sections that follow. Faith-reasoning, for example, functioned as an 
essential partner within a faith-reality bubble. One could not exist without the other. 
Faith was a much ‘bigger’ entity for these believers than for members of other groups, 
therefore: essential faith cores were embellished, developed, extended, personalised 
and individualised as the Interpretive construction o f faith took place. These
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extensions themselves often then became authoritative, providing an ever-increasing 
outer faith boundary within which Interpretive believers lived.
I.4b ‘Faith reasoning’
(i) Allowing for the miraculous
One significant characteristic of these interviewees was the willingness to work with a 
faith logic and rationality that allowed for the miraculous. While virtually every 
person interviewed, across the board of all the groups, wanted to assert God’s right 
and power to intervene in everyday life and contravene the ways of the world in one 
way 01* another, Interpretive learners actively sought these occasions out, discovering 
them in ordinary everyday occurrences and ‘coincidences’. (We might recall, for 
example, Miranda’s quote in which she spoke of becoming aware of God’s particular 
and individual love for her during a particular stressfiil time, as a result o f a series of 
events all of which included the same [unusual] numerical figure.) This expectancy of 
seeing God’s miraculous and supernatural hand in everyday life resulted in the 
superseding o f ‘traditional’ rationality. To quote Chris:
You see, nothing would surprise me about God. You know. God, I don’t think 
there’s anything surprising in a way about raising somebody from the dead or 
somebody being able to have a baby when they haven’t actually had sex with 
somebody else. Umm, because if God wants to do that that way, I have no 
problem with thinking that he can do it. Umm, I get, you know, I’m amazed 
sometimes, and I do feel it’s an arrogance in some people, particularly perhaps 
some theologians, I don’t know, who will explain everything, you know, Well, 
this doesn’t really mean this. Actually, when Jesus comes again there aren’t 
really going to be trumpets in the sky because a trumpet wouldn’t be able to 
float in the sky because it would be too heavy! Now, I’ve actually heard 
somebody say that. I’ve actually heard somebody say that in a lecture, and I 
thought, Well, how small minded can we get here. Umm, that, you know, if 
God wants trumpets to float off the ground, there is really no problem for him 
to be able to do that. You know. Wonderful. Umm, yeah, so, so, no, I don’t 
have a problem with that.
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(ii) Avoidance of rigorous logical and critical thought
Coupled with this willingness to allow for and welcome the miraculous was a 
tendency in all four Interpretive believers to avoid rigorous logical thought. Chris, on 
a number of occasions, confessed to never really having thought about something, or 
saw herself as ‘bumbling along’ not really knowing what she thought. She had a high 
degree o f antipathy toward the value of academic study, and understood theological 
soundness as being evidenced through someone being ‘open to the Holy Spirit and the 
inspiration of God’. As indicated above, all also relied heavily on the views of other 
people, and tended to leave intellectual wrangling to those to whom it was o f interest! 
Margaret, as is shown in section 1.4c, wanted to be given answers and tended to 
bypass the process of reasoning that had led to these and that would have equipped 
her to evaluate them. This characteristic links significantly with the sense of self and 
relationship to faith authorities outlined in section 1.4c, and is more fully developed at 
that point. Faced with the fact that to critique was becoming more familiar to her due 
to the demands of her course o f study, she was then caught in the conundrum of no 
longer knowing whether the bible could actually say anything to her any more, and 
wasn’t at all sure that she liked being as critical as she had become in general.
(iii) Use of subjective judgment
In the original analysis of the interviews, Interpretive learners had been classed among 
those who turned to experience to validate their faith. This permitted a highly 
individual and subjective way of reasoning. In a similar way to Assimilative learners, 
Interpretive learners entered a cyclical pattern, since their experience validated their 
faith which in turn validated their experience. So Margaret, for example, understood 
God to be speaking to her directly through a worship song. The fact that it was saying 
completely the opposite to her friend next to her was not only of little import, but 
actually underlined the marvellous individuality of God’s concern for his people.
Something which, to give a specific example, has come up a couple of times 
recently has been an appreciation o f how God, or as myself and a friend 
concerned have seen it, has spoken to each of us very differently about the 
same situation. Umm, to move us from maybe the extreme position that we 
stand in somewhere further towards a middle ground somewhere. Umm, and 
the friend concerned really felt God speaking to her concerning being more
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strict with herself, more disciplined with herself in her devotional life, and in 
her faith and perhaps in general. Umm, she felt that she’d been taking grace 
for granted, almost, whereas I felt that because I’ve been in the habit of taking, 
of being quite harsh on myself, that I, I was being spoken to about relaxing a 
bit more, almost coming back to what you were talking about in chapel a few 
weeks ago, about being rather than doing, things like that, but oui* reactions 
were set off by the same incident and we actually spent quite a lot of time 
arguing at complete cross purposes with each other about it until we realised 
where we were both coming from and why we had such a different reaction.
... The matter which set it off was umm, a Keith Green song which I react to 
very, very badly (laughing), because I sort of heard the very powerfi.il message 
and immediately felt quite condemned about what it was saying and then sort 
of felt, well, why should I feel like this? She said, Oh no, I don’t feel it’s 
condemning me at all, I just feel it’s encouraging me to be more disciplined! 
With such an individual and experiential approach, adhering to a commonly-held 
public rationale was of little importance. As Assimilative learners, Interpretive 
learners turned to their own instinct and their own personal knowledge to validate 
knowledge.
When presented with a number of alternative positions or interpretations of 
biblical teaching, what is your normal reaction? Ooh. Umm, I think probably 
it’s to look at each one carefully and try and find out where I feel the truth that 
I can relate to is. (Chris)
Rationality was subjective...
I don’t feel what I believe is irrational because / know it’s true... (Chris)
. ..and a commonly-used word throughout all the interviews was ‘feel’ (see Margaret’s 
quote above). Interpretive believers relied on their subjectively-felt judgment to 
discern what was right and wrong, what was of God and what wasn’t. This was one 
area in which it became clear that Penny had made the transition from an Interpretive 
to Discrete believer. Her interview revealed a real discomfort with the vulnerability of 
basing her faith on such total subjectivity, and she had found ways o f identifying 
objective authorities.
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(iv) Attribution of faith significance to the incomprehensible
This links directly to the overall theme of people interpreting their experience 
according to faith premises. However, it was sufficiently marked amongst the 
members of this group to warrant specific comment. Unpleasant and 
incomprehensible dimensions of life were dealt with differently in the learning 
patterns of each group, provoking a serious re-working of faith in some instances. 
Interpretive believers did the opposite, and employed techniques that brought even the 
incomprehensible into their faith reality. No experience was outside the bounds of a 
faith interpretation. Even the most challenging did not push these believers into re­
thinking the way they lived and understood their faith.
Well, with the friend who died... Well, because she’d been very ill before she 
died, so though it was a shock when she died, and we were all very upset, I 
think it got us talking... we realised that for her, she was better off, in a way, 
she’d had in many ways rotten things happen to her here so it was a relief in a 
way. And also just the way that she had lived her life. You didn’t feel that it 
was a waste that she’d died quite yoimg. So that was, that caused us to talk 
about that, and how we lived our life and how she’d lived her life. We talked 
about heaven... With the friend who had the stroke, probably not so positive. 
It’s harder to be more positive, because almost you can’t see the point o f it. It 
just seems pain for pain’s sake. We can’t say that she’s better off now, or, and 
so that’s been more of a bewildering... I think making us all realise that to live 
life day to day and to be responsible and to make the most o f each day, but 
also just causing us to accept that some things are unexplainable, and also just 
to think that you’re not going to sail through life just because you’re a 
Christian and everything’s going to be fine, you know, but to actually think 
about the fact that bad things do happen and also, I think one of the big things 
that certainly hit me and one or two others is, how on earth would you cope 
with these things if you didn’t have a faith. It’s hard enough when you do, but 
without God, how would you cope? I don’t know. (Ruth)
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I.4c Deference to uncontrollable authorities
The word ‘deference’ has deliberately been chosen in contradistinction to 
‘submission’ which was the position of Assimilative learners. The latter identified and 
‘appointed’ faith authorities, and followed this by cultivating a specific relationship 
with these authorities. The submission and obedience outlined in section I.3b was 
conscious and thought-through, and was seen to achieve a specific goal. Interpretive 
learners, however, with perhaps the exception of Chris, lived a different relationship 
with their faith authorities and representatives thereof. (I would actually ask whether a 
similar deference was also characteristic of their relationship with other, non-faith- 
related authorities, but had no data to provide an answer.) Rather than appoint the 
authorities as a conscious and deliberate decision, the authorities somehow appointed 
themselves and exerted a significant power over these people. For that reason, they 
tended to be the sort that couldn’t be ‘controlled’ by interpretation, and took mostly a 
human form through other people, or an intangible divine form such as God himself. 
Miranda, Ruth and Margaret each expressed concern about potentially not being or 
doing ‘right’ in the eyes of others, communicated a vague sense of anxiety that she 
might somehow fall out of God’s will—which might even lead to him punishing 
her—and generally deferred to other people’s intellectual ability and conclusions. All 
three also shared a common characteristic of wanting to establish more firmly what 
they believed so that they could stand firm in the face of opposition or questioning. 
Other people were immensely influential: often more so than impersonal faith 
authorities. Margaret’s interview oozed with ‘duty’ and she was struggling 
desperately with what she termed the ‘faith-works balance’, or the be/do relationship. 
She was tired of being the subject of a form of faith-related emotional blackmail when 
other people, or even her own reading of the bible, told her what she ought to be doing 
if she was fulfilling God’s will for her. She, like her counterparts, was beginning to 
develop attributes that would eventually see her moving to another type.
I.4d Role of self
Coupled with this deference to uncontrollable authority was a notably weak sense of 
self, albeit a growing one. At varying points, Margaret, Miranda and Ruth all revealed 
an ambiguous fimctioning of the self, particularly vis-a-vis other people. This was the
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research finding that corresponded most closely to the original hypothesis and to 
Belenky et al’s and Perry’s previous work. Other people were ‘right’ and as a result 
there was little point in even trying to develop their own individual views. The fact 
that this was something they were now being asked to do was a real eye-opener and 
confidence booster to them.
When I started on the course, that, to realise what they wanted was oui* 
opinion, and I was thinking, Well, who ami to have any opinions? You know, 
with all these eminent theologians... But actually, to sort of have the 
confidence to try and find out my own position, and umm, has been a very 
good experience in a way. (Miranda)
Margaret had originally started her college years wanting to be ‘told’ what the truth 
was because this would enable her to deal with the questions other people ‘threw’ at 
her about her faith. She was having to change her original perceptions about the 
nature of faith and its relationship to absolute and relative truth.
. As far as dealing with questions, answering challenges maybe that were 
thrown at me by other people, other Christians, or sorting out issues for 
myself, yes I can see I am working towards more confidence in that area.
Umm, but at the same time, I can see that where I’d hoped to find answers,
Pm maybe just in some cases finding that even the experts don’t have answers 
and that really all there are, are a lot of opinions. So in some cases where I was 
really hoping to come to a conclusion on something I’m just learning what the 
questions are, and realising that finding answers is a lot more difficult than I 
had thought.
In Perry’s terms, Margaret was making the vital move from relating to Authority to 
relating to authorities; in Fowler’s terms, she was at a point of potentially moving 
from Stage 3 to Stage 4. Both involved a strengthening of the self that meant 
developing the means of owning one’s personal and individual faith conclusions.
Chris was the exception at this point, since she displayed no sense of inadequacy or 
self-doubt. This may have been temperamental, which raises questions pertaining to 
the research that were explored in an earlier chapter. She shared other major traits 
characteristic of the group, however.
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Lack of self-assertiveness and a weak sense of self also linked clearly to Interpretive 
learners’ avoidance of rigorous logical thought. Since they considered themselves 
intellectually inferior to the eminent theological scholars whose views they were 
studying, and to their bright student peers, these believers seemed to quail at the 
prospect of acquiring similar intellectual skills, preferring instead to develop a set of 
their own. Once again similarities with Belenky et aVs research was evident. The 
scholars state:
Subjectivist women distrust logic, analysis, abstraction, and even language 
itself. They see these methods as alien territory belonging to men. As we 
listened to subjectivist women describe their attitudes about truth and 
knowing, we heard them argue against and stereotype those experts and 
remote authorities whom social institutions often promote as holding the keys 
to the truth—teachers, doctors, scientists, men in general. It was as if, by 
turning inward for answers, they had to deny strategies for knowing that they 
perceived as belonging to the masculine world. (Belenky et al, 1986:71)
There was no evidence at all among these believers that they saw their position as 
gender-related. To suggest that they ‘distrusted’ logic, analysis and abstraction is also 
probably incorrect. These women conveyed more a sense of being unable or unwilling 
to adhere to the patterns of thought being asked of them. They rebelled against them, 
as Chris’s quote under section 1.4b(i) demonstrates, yet rather than resent or distrust 
these methods of reflection, some were beginning to wonder in the revelation that 
they too could develop the capacity to think in such a way. As Interpretive believers, 
however, they were content to accept the considered views and conclusions of these 
experts, appropriating the given framework to their own lives in a way that made 
sense to them. The issue was more one of self-confidence (and perhaps ‘practice’) 
than of gender-related distrust, although given the masculine origins o f theology, 
patterns of Interpretive belief might well trace back to the same roots.
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II. S u m m a r y  a n d  c o n c l u s i o n
Figure AC1 depicts in tabular form the essential characteristics of the four types.
Figure AC 1
Ways of believing
Discrete • Separation between faith authorities and experience 
© Intellectual approach to faith
• Search for objectivity
® Dualistic self, often experiencing tension 
® Construction of a world-view that makes sense and that 
provides structure 
@ Indications, in varying degrees, of characteristics 
representative o f other types on the typology 
« Use o f conventional logic
Related * Emphasis on the personal: focus on a personal faith authority, 
understanding of faith in personal terms, construction of 
personal faith knowledge 
® Self plays a larger role than the faith authorities, allowing an 
equal inequality, evidenced through factors such as anger 
with God and doubt 
® Faith a process not an end
® Conventional use of logic, yet allowing for mystery and a 
place for the incomprehensible
Assimilative « Construction o f a faith-experience cycle that focuses on 
quality and end goals o f life
• Prime role of faith is to transform self
• Emphasis on submission and obedience 
® Developed and deliberate use of instinct 
® Use o f a pre-determined faith-logic
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Interpretive ® Construction of a faith-reality bubble
• Employment o f ‘faith reasoning’: faith-authenticated patterns
of thought that allow for the miraculous, do not require
rigorous logic, make use of subjective judgment, and uphold
the bubble in which they exist
• Deference to uncontrollable authorities such as other people
and God
• Often a weak role and sense of self
The analysis brought to light a number of further characteristics that linked different 
types, in addition to those on which the construction of the typology was based (see 
previous chapter). These added further weight to its strength and validity. Briefly 
summarised, they consisted of the following.
a) Discrete and Assimilative believers shared an emphasis on doctrine and belief. 
The content of faith was very important. Although it was used differently at 
the extreme position of each type, the two poles were also connected through a 
form of submission that was highly characteristic o f Assimilative believers,
yet present also in some Discrete believers.
b) Assimilative and Interpretive believers exhibited a number of common 
features. Their faith was predominantly individual, as distinct from the world­
view representative of Discrete and Related believers. Neither type practised 
or cultivated autonomous rigorous thought, preferring instead to be ‘open’ and 
ready to be moved and changed. Each used a specific form of faith logic, on 
the one hand pre-determined and well-established, on the other individually 
constructed. Experience too was individually focused and used to achieve faith 
goals.
c) Discrete and Related believers were both concerned to use as high a degree of 
conventional logic and reasoning as possible. This meant that both types gave 
the impression o f being more firmly rooted and grounded than their 
counterparts. Nevertheless, the groups differed in that Related believers were 
prepared to accept a non-conventionally-reasoned dimension of their lives that
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related to their faith, which was hardly, if at all characteristic of Discrete 
believers.
The analysis also revealed a number o f dichotomies that represented in more general 
terms the structure of the typology.
a) Evidence vs experience. Discrete believers based their faith on evidence, but 
often found that their personal experience did not cohere with the resulting 
framework. Related believers emphasised their personal experience in order to 
construct a personalised world-view in which their views were ‘evidenced’.
b) Belief vs faith. This was the difference between intellectual commitment and 
lived construction o f experiential knowledge. Again most strongly contrasted 
between the Discrete and Related believers, this characterised either a top- 
down pattern of constructing faith, or a bottom-up.
c) Doctrinal vs human. This dichotomy is similar to the previous ones in that the 
emphasis on doctrine removes the personal and (potentially) subjective, 
whereas the human includes and welcomes it.
d) Critique vs acceptance. To critique also involves a distancing, whereas to 
accept implies welcoming and embracing. The various groups tended to favour 
one approach or the other.
e) Impersonal vs personal authority. Certain groups favoured, accepted, respected 
and cultivated a personal faith authority, while others sought an impersonal 
and objective authority. Each side had a degree of misgiving vis-a-vis the 
other.
f) Goal vs process. This dichotomy has already been explored. Nevertheless, 
people tended either to focus on faith content as an end in itself, or use it and 
their faith authorities as sources from which to move and develop.
It is perhaps curious that the way in which the analysis took place resulted firstly in 
the identification of people’s ways of believing and only secondly in their ways of 
learning, especially in light of earlier claims that the thesis would take an ‘inside-out’ 
approach. The fact that people’s reflective styles emerged from their ways of
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believing perhaps tacitly acknowledges the inter-relatedness of the two components 
and affirms the wording of the original research question which was articulated in two 
halves. The inside-out approach was fundamentally present, nonetheless, since the 
interview questions had centred around a core epistemological component.
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Appendix D
G u id e  t o  C o d in g  P r a c t i c e  
L e a r n in g  a n d  F a ith  d i a l e c t i c s
L e a rn in g
Inner Outer
What factors control goal-setting, pacing, decision-making and evaluation?
Who and what is experienced as validating/non-validating?
F aith
Experiential Cognitive
How is faith legitimated?
What factors govern the understanding and outworking of faith?
G u id a n c e  fo r  c o d in g
Coding procedure
Please identify instances where you consider the above dialectics are represented by 
putting ‘blobS’ in the margin. I have used the following colours:
• Inner: BLUE
• Outer: RED
® Experiential: LIME GREEN 
« Cognitive: BROWN 
If you consider a sentence or phrase represents two categories at the same time, put a 
blob of both colours.
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Past or present habit
When a respondent refers to a previous habit that is no longer representative of the 
way he/she behaves, thinks or operates, do not code these instances. The research is 
interested in present behaviour.
Repeat of the same example in the same sentence
If the respondent repeats exactly the same point, 01* even the same words within the 
same sentence, only mark one example. If, however, he/she repeats the same point in 
a subsequent sentence, mark both instances.
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